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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> DALA v. HUNGARY - 71096/01 [2004] ECHR 468 (5 October 2004) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2004/468.html Cite as: [2004] ECHR 468

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SECOND SECTION

CASE OF DALA v. HUNGARY

(Application no. 71096/01)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

5 October 2004

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Dala v. Hungary,

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Mr J.-P. COSTA, President,

Mr A.B. BAKA,

Mr L. LOUCAIDES,

Mr C. BîRSAN,

Mr K. JUNGWIERT,

Mr M. UGREKHELIDZE,

Mrs A. MULARONI, judges,

and Mrs S. DOLLé, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 14 September 2004,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 71096/01) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Mr Sándor Dala (“the applicant”), on 12 January 2001.

2.  The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr L. Höltzl, Deputy State-Secretary, Ministry of Justice.

3.  On 5 February 2003 the Court decided to communicate the complaint concerning the length of the proceedings to the Government. Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time.

THE FACTS

4.  The applicant was born in 1929 and lives in Komárom, Hungary.

5.  On 29 April 1991 the applicant brought an action against his former spouse seeking the division of the matrimonial property.

6.  Following three hearings, the District Court was inactive between 9June 1993 and 19 October 1995. The District Court then held four more hearings. On 13 March 1997 the defendant requested that a real-estate expert be appointed. Due to a delay in depositing the expert’s costs attributable to the parties, the expert was only appointed on 19 January 1998. Having obtained evidence from numerous witnesses as well as from a judicial real-estate expert, on 4 June 1998 the Komárom District Court ruled on the division of the property.

7.  On 10 February 1999 the Komárom-Esztergom County Regional Court confirmed the first-instance decision in substance.

8.  On 30 April 1999 the applicant filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, which on 29 December 2000 upheld the Regional Court’s judgment. This decision was served on the applicant on 16 January 2001.

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION CONCERNING THE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS

9.  The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

10.  The Government contested that argument.

11.  The period to be taken into consideration only began on 5 November 1992, when the recognition by Hungary of the right of individual petition took effect. However, in assessing the reasonableness of the time that elapsed after that date, account must be taken of the state of proceedings at the time. By that date the proceedings had already been pending for over a year and a half.

The period in question ended with the service of the Supreme Court’s decision on 16 January 2001. It thus lasted over eight years and two months before three court instances.

A.  Admissibility

12.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits

13.  The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).

14.  The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above).

15.  Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.

There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.

II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION CONCERNING THE FAIRNESS OF THE PROCEEDINGS

The applicant also complained that the decisions given by the domestic courts in the above proceedings were wrong. He again invoked Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

However, the Court considers that there is nothing in the case file which indicates that the courts hearing the case lacked impartiality or that the proceedings were otherwise unfair. The mere fact that the applicant is dissatisfied with the outcome of the litigation cannot of itself raise an arguable claim of a breach of Article 6.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

III.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

16.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Damage

17.  The applicant claimed 32,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.

18.  The Government found the applicant’s claim excessive.

19.  The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. However, it awards the applicant EUR 4,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

B.  Costs and expenses

20.  The applicant did not make any separate claim under this head.

C.  Default interest

21.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1.  Declares the complaint concerning the excessive length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

3.  Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 4,500 (four thousand five hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 5 October 2004, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

S. DOLLé J.-P. COSTA

Registrar President