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GRAND
CHAMBER
CASE OF STEC AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
(Applications
nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
12 April
2006
This
judgment is final but may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom,
The
European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed
of:
Mr L. Wildhaber, President,
Mr C.L.
Rozakis,
Sir Nicolas Bratza,
Mr B.M. Zupančič,
Mr L.
Loucaides,
Mr J. Casadevall,
Mr J. Hedigan,
Mr M.
Pellonpää,
Mrs M.
Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
Mr R.
Maruste,
Mr K. Traja,
Mr
A. Kovler,
Mr S. Pavlovschi,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Mr J.
Borrego Borrego,
Mr D. Spielmann,
Mr E. Myjer, judges
and
Mr T.L. Early, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 9 March and 6 July 2005, and on 15 March
2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in two applications (nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01)
against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by five United Kingdom nationals on
20 November 2000 and 30 January 2001 respectively. The first
applicant, Regina Hepple, was born in 1933 and lives in Wakefield.
The second applicant, Anna Stec, was born in 1933 and lives in
Stoke-on-Trent. The third applicant, Patrick Lunn, was born in 1923
and lives in Stockton-on-Tees. The fourth applicant, Sybil Spencer,
was born in 1926 and lives in Bury. The fifth applicant, Oliver
Kimber, was born in 1924 and lives in Pevensey.
2. The
first, second, third and fourth applicants were represented by Ms J.
Starling, and the fifth applicant was represented by Mr J. Clinch,
both solicitors practising in London. The respondent Government were
represented by their Agent, Mr D. Walton, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office.
- The
applications were allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court
(Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section,
the case was assigned to a Chamber composed of Judges Pellonpää,
Bratza, Casadevall, Maruste, Pavlovschi, Garlicki and Borrego
Borrego, together with the Section Registrar, Mr M. O’Boyle. On
5 March 2002 the Chamber decided to join the two applications, and on
24 August 2004 it decided to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the
Grand Chamber with immediate effect, none of the parties having
objected to relinquishment (Article 30 of the Convention and
Rule 72).
- The
composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the
provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and
Rule 24 of the Rules of Court. Judges Costa and Baka were prevented
from sitting in the case at the time of the adoption of the
admissibility decision. They were replaced by the first and second
substitute judges, Judges Loucaides and Hedigan (Rule 24 §
3).
- In
accordance with the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention and Rule 54A § 3, the Court decided to examine
jointly the issues of the admissibility and merits of the
applications.
- The applicants and the Government each filed written
observations on the admissibility and merits of the case.
- By
a letter dated 25 February 2005, the first applicant, Mrs Hepple,
informed the Court through her representative that, for personal
reasons, she no longer wished to continue with the case. Her
representative later confirmed Mrs Hepple’s withdrawal in
response to a letter from the Court.
- A
hearing on admissibility and merits took place in public in the Human
Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 9 March 2005 (Rule 59 § 3).
There
appeared before the Court:
(a)
for the Government
Mr
Derek WALTON, Agent;
Mr
David PANNICK, Q.C.,
Ms Claire WEIR Counsel;
Ms
Elisabeth HAGGETT,
Mr
Jeremy HEATH,
Ms
Kath WILSON,
Mr Andrew FEARN, Advisers;
(b)
for the applicant
Mr
Richard DRABBLE, Q.C.,
Ms Helen MOUNTFIELD, Counsel;
Mr
John CLINCH,
Ms Jacky STARLING,
Solicitors.
The
Court heard addresses by Mr Pannick Q.C. and Mr Drabble Q.C., as well
as their answers to questions put by Judges Bratza and Maruste.
- On
the same day, since it had been confirmed that Mrs Hepple did not
intend to pursue her application (see paragraph 7 above), and
considering that respect for human rights did not require it to
continue examining it, the Court decided to strike-out Mrs Hepple’s
application (Article 37 § 1(a)).
- By
a letter dated 13 April 2005, Mrs Hepple, through her representative,
informed the Court that she had changed her mind and now wished to
proceed with her application.
- On
6 July 2005 the Court decided to disapply Article 29 § 3 (see
paragraph 5 above) and to consider the admissibility and merits
separately. It further decided, unanimously, not to restore
Mrs Hepple’s application to the list and, by a majority,
to join to the merits the Government’s objections
concerning the victim status of the third applicant, Mr Lunn, the
fourth applicant, Mrs Spencer, and the fifth applicant, Mr Kimber.
Finally, again by a majority, it declared admissible, the
applications of the second, third, fourth and fifth applicants.
- On
5 September 2005 the Court asked the parties for further observations
on the merits, which it received on 11 November 2005.
- The
Government had requested a further hearing on the merits, but on 13
December 2005 the President decided that it would not be necessary to
hold a further hearing on the merits. On 15 March 2006 the Grand
Chamber confirmed the decision not to hold a hearing.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as
follows:
A. Mrs Stec
- On
18 January 1989 Mrs Stec injured her back at work and was unable to
continue working. She was awarded reduced earnings allowance (“REA”:
see paragraph 26 below) from 24 January 1990. On 13 March 1993
she reached the age of 60 and as from 31 March 1996 her award of
REA was replaced by an award of retirement allowance (“RA”:
see paragraph 30 below).
- The
applicant appealed against this decision on the basis of sex
discrimination to the Trent Social Security Appeals Tribunal
(“SSAT”). The SSAT allowed her appeal on 4 October 1996,
and the adjudication officer subsequently appealed to the Social
Security Commissioner (“the Commissioner”).
- The
Commissioner joined Mrs Stec’s case to those of the other three
present applicants, and also to that of Mrs Hepple. Having heard
arguments on 11 and 12 December 1987, the Commissioner decided on 8
May 1998 to refer the following questions to the European Court of
Justice (“ECJ”):
“1. Does Article 7 of Council Directive 79/7/EEC
permit a Member State to impose unequal age conditions linked to the
different pension ages for men and women under its statutory old-age
pension scheme, on entitlement to a benefit having the
characteristics of Reduced Earnings Allowance under a statutory
occupational accident and disease scheme, so as to produce different
weekly cash payments under that scheme for men and women in otherwise
similar circumstances, in particular where the inequality:
(a) is not necessary for any financial reason connected
with either scheme; and
(b) never having been imposed before, is imposed for the
first time many years after the inception of the two schemes and also
after 23 December 1984, the latest date for the Directive to be given
full effect under Article 8?
2. If the answer to Question 1 is Yes, what are the
considerations that determine whether unequal age conditions such as
those imposed in Great Britain for Reduced Earnings Allowance from
1988 to 1989 onwards are necessary to ensure coherence between
schemes or otherwise fall within the permitted exclusion in Article
7?
3. ... ”
- In
his order of reference the Commissioner observed that:
“On the main issue, it is apparent from the
information before me (and the adjudication officers so concede) that
the imposition after 1986 of unequal age conditions on REA for the
first time was not necessary to maintain the financial equilibrium or
coherence (insofar as that word is understood in a financial sense)
of the UK social security schemes.
It is also apparent (and on the information before me I
so decide as a fact) that such imposition was not necessary to enable
the United Kingdom to retain the different pension ages under its
old-age scheme. That difference had co-existed with the Industrial
Injuries Scheme ... for nearly 40 years from 1948 without it, and Rea
could simply have been left as it was, or a non-discriminatory
cut-off age adopted, without upsetting the pension system as it had
always operated.
The real question therefore is the more difficult one of
whether a government which considers it a costly anomaly to go on
paying a benefit such as REA to people too old to work is permitted
to impose a new cut-off at unequal ages, claiming the benefit of the
exclusion in Article 7 for the ‘possible consequences for other
benefits’ having regard to what was said in the [ECJ’s]
judgment in Graham, on the ground that the ages selected are
the same as those for the pension, and ... the government take the
view as a matter of policy that the income-replacement functions of
REA should be performed after pension age by the pension, plus the
very much smaller ‘retirement allowance’ instead.”
- The
ECJ gave judgment on 23 May 2000 (see paragraph 41 below). On 31 July
2000 the Commissioner, following the ECJ’s ruling, struck out
the applicants’ cases where they were the appellants before him
and allowed the appeals where the adjudication officers had been the
appellants.
B. Mr Lunn
- On
11 November 1973 Mr Lunn suffered a work-related injury to his right
hand, as a result of which he had to stop working. From 12 May 1974
he received special hardship allowance, which was converted to REA
from 1 October 1986. On 19 May 1988 he reached the age of 65 and from
17 May 1993, when he turned 70, he received a statutory
retirement pension. On 26 March 1996 an adjudication officer reviewed
the award of REA and decided that, with effect from 31 March 1996, it
should be replaced by an award of RA, paid at approximately 25% of
the REA rate.
- The
applicant appealed on the ground that a woman in the same
circumstances would have been treated as having retired on or before
19 May 1988 and would have been entitled to a frozen rate of REA
for life, a more valuable benefit. On 24 September 1996 the Stockport
SSAT dismissed his appeal, and Mr Lunn appealed to the Commissioner,
who referred the case to the ECJ (see paragraphs 17-19 above).
C. Mrs Spencer
- Mrs
Spencer suffered a work-related injury to her neck on 17 July
1966. She was awarded special hardship allowance from 15 January 1967
and from 1 October 1986 this was converted to an award of REA.
Her sixtieth birthday was on 11 December 1986 and she received a
retirement pension from 23 December 1986. It was decided on 10 May
1993, with effect from 11 April 1988, to freeze for life her award of
REA at GBP 25.28 per week.
- The
applicant appealed to the Bolton SSAT on the basis that, had she been
a man, she would have continued to receive unfrozen REA. The SSAT
allowed her appeal on 30 November 1994, and the adjudication officer
appealed to the Commissioner, who referred the case to the ECJ (see
paragraphs 17-19 above).
D. Mr Kimber
- On
12 March 1982 Mr Kimber injured his back at work and was unable to
continue working. He was awarded special hardship allowance from 15
September 1982, converted to REA from 1 October 1986. He reached the
age of 65 on 30 September 1989 and received a retirement pension from
29 September 1994. On 29 April 1996 an adjudication officer reviewed
his award of REA and decided that with effect from 31 March 1996 it
should be replaced by an award of RA.
- The
applicant appealed to the Eastbourne SSAT, on the basis that a woman
in his circumstances could have chosen to have been treated as
retired from 10 April 1989, and so would have been entitled to frozen
REA for life, a more valuable benefit than RA. The SSAT allowed his
appeal on 2 October 1996 and the adjudication officer appealed to the
Commissioner, who referred the case to the ECJ (see paragraphs 17-19
above).
II. RELEVANT NON-CONVENTION MATERIAL
A. Benefits for industrial injury and disease in the
United Kingdom
- Reduced
earnings allowance (“REA”) is an earnings-related
additional benefit under the statutory occupational accident and
disease scheme which was put in place in 1948. Originally the benefit
was known as “special hardship allowance”, but it was
recast and renamed by the Social Security Act 1986. At the time of
the introduction of these applications, the relevant legislation was
Part V of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992.
- REA
has, since 1990, been funded by general taxation rather than the
National Insurance Scheme. It is payable to employees or former
employees who have suffered an accident at work or an occupational
disease, with the purpose of compensating for an impairment in
earning capacity. The weekly amount is based on a comparison between
the claimant’s earnings prior to the accident or disease and
those in any actual or notional alternative employment still
considered suitable despite the disability, subject to a maximum
weekly award of GBP 40. It is a non-contributory benefit, in that
eligibility is not conditional on any or a certain number of
contributions having been made to the National Insurance Fund.
- Under
more recent legislation the benefit is being phased out altogether
and no fresh right to REA can arise from an accident incurred or a
disease contracted on or after 1 October 1990. In addition, a
succession of legislative measures after 1986 attempted to remove or
reduce it for claimants no longer of working age, in respect of whom
the Government considered any comparison of “earnings” to
be artificial. Before these changes, there had been a continued right
to REA notwithstanding the attainment of retirement age and REA had
been payable concurrently with the State pension.
- The
method chosen to reduce eligibility was to impose cut-off or limiting
conditions by reference to the ages used by the statutory old-age
pension scheme, namely 65 for men and 60 for women until 1996, then
tapering up to eventual equality at 65 in 2020 (Part II of the Social
Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, as amended by the
Pensions Act 1995: see paragraphs 31-35 below).
- Under
the new provisions (Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act
1992), all REA recipients who, before 10 April 1989, had reached
either (1) 70, if a man, or 65, if a woman, or (2) the date of
retirement fixed by a notice, at age 65+ for a man or 60+ for a
woman, would receive a frozen rate of REA for life. All other REA
recipients would cease to receive REA, and would instead receive
retirement allowance (“RA”) either on reaching (1) 70, if
a man, or 65, if a woman, or (2) the date of retirement fixed by a
notice, at age 65+ for a man or 60+ for a woman or on giving up
employment at 65 for a man or 60 for a woman.
B. State pensionable age in the United Kingdom
- State
retirement pensions are funded entirely from the National Insurance
fund, to which all employers and the majority of the working
population, whether employed or self-employed, are liable to pay
compulsory contributions. The individual’s liability for such
contributions ceases at “pensionable age”.
- Men
and women born before 6 April 1950 attain pensionable age at 65 and
60 respectively (Schedule 4 to the Pensions Act 1995). The present
pension age for women was introduced in 1940 by the Old Age and
Widows’ Pensions Act. Prior to that, State pension age was 65
for both men and women. According to the Government’s Green and
White Papers (“Options for Equality in State Pension Age”,
Cm 1723, December 1991 and “Equality in State Pension Age”,
Cm 2420, December 1993), the lower age for women was introduced in
response to a campaign by unmarried women, many of whom spent much of
their lives caring for dependent relatives, and also as part of a
package to enable married couples, where the wife was usually younger
than the husband and financially dependent on him, to receive a
pension at the couples’ rate when the husband reached 65.
- In
the 1993 White Paper, the Government pointed out that while,
historically, women’s entitlement to State pension was
frequently reduced because their traditional role of caring for the
family in the home led to fragmented employment records, the number
of women in employment had greatly increased in recent years: in
1967, 37% of employees were women, compared with 50% in 1992
(although the statistics did not differentiate, for example, between
full- and part-time workers). Moreover, Home Responsibilities
Provision, introduced in 1978, now assisted those whose working life
was shortened because of time spent caring for a child or sick or
disabled person to build up entitlement to a basic pension, and the
concession which allowed married women to pay reduced rate National
Insurance contributions, leaving them reliant on their husbands’
contributions, was withdrawn in 1977. The Sex Discrimination Act 1986
had amended the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 to make it unlawful for
an employer to have different retirement ages for men and women. The
view of the Government, expressed in the White Paper, was that the
preferential pension age for women had no place in modern society and
it was proposed to equalise pensionable age for men and women.
- It
was decided to equalise at 65, rather than a lower age, because
people were living longer and healthier lives and because the
proportion of pensioners in the population was set to increase. It
was estimated that any move towards paying male State retirement
pensions earlier than 65 would cost in the order of GBP 9.8 billion
per year gross (representing additional pension payments to men
between 60 and 65 and lost income from National Insurance
contributions from these men) or a net sum of GBP 7.5 billion per
year (when account was taken of savings on payment of other,
non-National Insurance Fund benefits to such men). It was decided to
introduce the change gradually to ensure that women affected by the
change and their employers had ample time to adjust their
expectations and arrange their financial affairs accordingly.
- In
order to bring male and female pensionable age into line with each
other, therefore, section 126 of the Pensions Act 1995, together with
Schedule 4, provide for the pensionable age of women born between 6
April 1950 and 5 April 1955 to increase progressively. With
effect from 2010, the pensionable age of men and women in the United
Kingdom will begin to equalise, and by 2020 both sexes will attain
pensionable age at 65.
C. Pensionable age in other European countries
- According
to information provided by the Government in December 2004, men and
women became eligible to receive an old age pension at the same age
in Andorra, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, The Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, San Marino, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden.
- Women
were entitled to receive a pension at a younger age than men in
Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation,
Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, Switzerland, the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, and Ukraine. Many of these countries were
phasing in equalisation of pensionable age. This was to take place in
Austria between 2024-33; in Azerbaijan by 2012; in Belgium between
1997 and 2009; in Estonia before 2016; in Hungary by 2009; in Latvia
by 2008; and in Lithuania by 2006.
D. European Union Directive on Equal Treatment in
Social Security
- Council
Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 (“the Directive”)
concerns the progressive implementation of the principle of equal
treatment for men and women in matters of social security. Article
4(1) of the Directive prohibits all discrimination on grounds of sex,
in particular as concerns the calculation of benefits. Such
discrimination can be justified only under Article 7(1)(a), which
provides that the Directive is to be without prejudice to the right
of Member States to exclude from its scope the determination of
pensionable age for the purposes of granting old-age and retirement
pensions and the possible consequences thereof for other benefits.
Under Article 7(2), “Member States shall periodically examine
matters excluded under paragraph (1) in order to ascertain, in the
light of social developments in the matter concerned, whether there
is justification for maintaining the exclusions concerned.”
E. ECJ consideration of Article 7(1)(a) of the
Directive
- In
the case of C-9/91 R v Secretary of State for Social
Security, ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission [“EOC”]
[1992] ECR I-4297, the ECJ found that Article 7(1)(a) must be
interpreted not only as authorising the retention of a statutory
pensionable age which differed according to sex, but also forms of
discrimination affecting access to certain benefits which were
“necessarily linked” to the difference in pensionable
age. Inequality between men and women, with respect to the
contribution periods required in order to obtain a pension of an
identical amount, constituted such discrimination where, having
regard to the financial equilibrium of the national pension system in
the context of which it appeared, it could not be disassociated from
the difference in pensionable age.
- In
C-328/91 Secretary of State for Social Security v
Thomas [1993] ECR I-1247, the ECJ held that the reasoning from
the EOC decision extended to benefits linked to differential
State retirement ages where “such discrimination is objectively
necessary in order to avoid disrupting the complex financial
equilibrium of the social security system or to ensure consistency
between retirement pension schemes and other benefit schemes.”
- In
the present applicants’ case, C-196/98, Hepple v Chief
Adjudication Officer [2000] ECR I-3701, the ECJ
applied the reasoning of Thomas to find, first, that “removal
of the discrimination at issue ... would have no effect on the
financial equilibrium of the social-security system of the United
Kingdom as a whole” (§ 29). However, it went on to hold
that it had been objectively necessary to introduce different age
conditions based on sex in order to maintain coherence between the
State retirement pension scheme and other benefit schemes, since (§§
31-34):
“... the principal aim of the successive
legislative amendments ... was to discontinue payment of REA—an
allowance designed to compensate for an impairment of earning
capacity following an accident at work or occupational disease—to
persons no longer of working age by imposing conditions based on the
statutory retirement age.
Thus, as a result of those legislative amendments, there
is coherence between REA, which is designed to compensate for a
decrease in earnings, and the old-age pension scheme. It follows that
maintenance of the rules at issue in the main proceedings is
objectively necessary to preserve such coherence.
That conclusion is not invalidated by the fact that REA
is replaced, when the beneficiary reaches retirement age and stops
working, by RA, the rate of which is 25% of REA, since RA is designed
to compensate for the reduction in pension entitlement resulting from
a decrease in earnings following an accident at work or occupational
disease.
It follows that discrimination of the kind at issue in
the main proceedings is objectively and necessarily linked to the
difference between the retirement age for men and that for women, so
that it is covered by the derogation for which Article 7(1)(a) of the
Directive provides.”
THE LAW
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION
TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1
- The
applicants claimed that the scheme of reduced earnings allowance
(“REA”: see paragraph 26 above) and retirement allowance
(“RA”: see paragraph 30 above), as it applied to each of
them, was discriminatory, in breach of Article 14 taken in
conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The latter provision
reads:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
Article
14 provides:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set
forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.”
- In
its admissibility decision of 6 July 2005 the Court held that the
applicants’ interests fell within the scope of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1, and that Article 14 of the Convention was therefore
applicable. It must now consider whether there has been a breach of
Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
A. The arguments of the parties
1. The applicants
- The
applicants did not deny that it had been reasonable for the
Government to seek to address the anomaly whereby industrial injury
earnings-replacement benefits continued to be paid to workers after
the age when they would, in any event, have ceased paid employment.
There was, however, no justification for introducing sex-based
discrimination into the scheme by linking the cut-off date to pension
age. The same objective could have been achieved, without
unacceptable financial consequences, by adopting a common age-limit
for men and women and/or by the use of overlapping benefit
regulations, ensuring that any State pension received was off-set
against REA. Other age-related benefits, such as winter fuel payment,
prescription charges and bus passes were paid with a common age
threshold.
- It
was important to note that the Commissioner, in his reference to the
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”: see paragraphs 17-18
above), had found that the introduction after 1986 of unequal age
conditions on REA had not been necessary to maintain the financial
equilibrium of either the REA or the pension scheme. Although
the ECJ had decided against them, the applicants emphasised that it
had been adjudicating on a different question, namely whether the
amendments fell within the scope of the Article 7 exception to the
non-discrimination provisions of the Directive. In particular, the
ECJ did not have to decide whether there was a proportionate
justification for the discrimination, but was instead construing the
phrase “the possible consequences thereof for other benefits”
in Article 7. The applicants did not consider that a finding in their
favour would have wider implications for the case-law of the ECJ
under Article 7, since the impact would be limited to other cases
where there was no financial necessity to maintain the link between
the benefit in question and pensionable age, and no compelling reason
to do so. Moreover, the mere fact that a measure which discriminated
on grounds of sex nonetheless fell outside the European Union’s
limited restrictions upon social security discrimination did not
prevent this Court from examining for itself the issue of
justification.
- The
applicants’ core submission was that there was a fundamental
difference in the level of justification required for a progressive
move to eradicate existing sex discrimination in the pension system
and the introduction, from 1986, of new discrimination in relation to
industrial injury benefits which had existed on equal terms for men
and women for almost 40 years. The labour market had already changed
by 1986, and ten years earlier the Sex Discrimination Act 1976 and
the European Community’s Equal Treatment Directive 76/207/EEC
had rendered discrimination in the field of employment unlawful. The
assumption that a woman’s working life would be five years
shorter than a man’s was therefore entirely illegitimate.
2. The Government
- The
Government emphasised that REA was designed to compensate those
who had suffered an industrial injury for their loss of earning
capacity, and was therefore a benefit linked intrinsically to work.
By stopping it at State pensionable age, Parliament had acted in an
objectively justified manner by ensuring that a person, whether male
or female, would not both be eligible for a State retirement pension
and for a benefit for loss of earnings capacity. Using pensionable
age promoted, in a manner that could easily be understood and
administered, and was proportionate, the objective of discontinuing
REA for those who were no longer a regular part of the working and
earning sector of the population. The Government estimated that if,
following an adverse judgment, they were required to reform the REA
and RA scheme to reimburse for lost benefits all claimants in the
same position as the four applicants, this would cost in the region
of GBP 83 million, together with a further GBP one million
administrative costs and GBP 17 million in estimated future payments.
- The
justification for linking social security benefits to pensionable age
had been recognised by Article 7 of the Directive (see paragraph 38
above). In May 2000 the ECJ had considered and rejected the
contention raised by the present applicants that they had been
unlawfully discriminated against on the ground of their sex in breach
of the Directive (see paragraph 41 above). The case-law of the ECJ
(see extracts in paragraphs 39-41 above) showed this to be a dynamic
and evolving area of law in which the ECJ, and the domestic courts
bound by its jurisprudence and the Directive, applied a close,
proportionality-based analysis to test the continued objective
justification for the use of differential ages in access to both
State retirement pensions and linked benefits. If the Court were
to find a violation in the present case, it would create considerable
confusion: the domestic legislation would be lawful under a Directive
specifically concerned with sex discrimination in social security,
but unlawful under the more general provisions of the Convention.
- Finally,
the social, historical and economic basis for the provision of State
retirement pensions at the age of 65 for men, and 60 for women, as
well as the decision to equalise pensionable age for men and women
progressively from 2010-2020, involved complex economic and social
judgments, in respect of which the Government enjoyed a broad margin
of appreciation. Before deciding to set the new equal State
retirement pension age at 65 years, the Government had considered
several options, summarised in the 1993 White Paper (see paragraphs
32-34 above) and a full public consultation exercise had been carried
out. The clear conclusion reached was that 65 years was the correct
common State retirement pension age for the United Kingdom. In
1995, Parliament had decided to implement the reform in stages
because moving towards equality had enormous financial implications
both for the State and for individuals, particularly women who had
long been expecting to receive a State retirement pension at 60 (see
paragraphs 34-35 above). Several Contracting States retained
different pension ages for men and women, and a number had chosen to
implement a gradual equalisation of those ages (see paragraphs 36-37
above). Moreover, the European Community had accepted that its Member
States must be allowed a period of transition in which to plan and
implement the move to equal ages for men and women in relation to
State pensionable age (see paragraph 38 above).
B. The Court’s assessment
1. General principles
- The
applicants complain of a difference in treatment on the basis of sex,
which falls within the non-exhaustive list of prohibited grounds of
discrimination in Article 14.
- Article
14 does not prohibit a Member State from treating groups differently
in order to correct “factual inequalities” between them;
indeed in certain circumstances a failure to attempt to correct
inequality through different treatment may in itself give rise to a
breach of the article (see “Case relating to certain aspects
of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” v.
Belgium (Merits), judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A no. 6, § 10
and Thlimmenos v. Greece, no. 34369/97, § 44, ECHR
2000-IV). A difference of treatment is, however, discriminatory if it
has no objective and reasonable justification; in other words, if it
does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the
aim sought to be realised. The Contracting State enjoys a margin of
appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in
otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment (Van
Raalte v. the Netherlands, judgment of 21 February 1997, Reports
of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I, § 39).
- The
scope of this margin will vary according to the circumstances, the
subject-matter and the background (see Petrovic v. Austria,
judgment of 27 March 1998, Reports 1998-II, § 38). As
a general rule, very weighty reasons would have to be put forward
before the Court could regard a difference in treatment based
exclusively on the ground of sex as compatible with the Convention
(see Van Raalte, cited above, § 39, and Schuler-Zgraggen
v. Switzerland, judgment of 24 June 1993, Series A no. 263,
§ 67). On the other hand, a wide margin is usually allowed
to the State under the Convention when it comes to general measures
of economic or social strategy (see, for example, James and Others
v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no.
98, § 46; National and Provincial Building Society and Others
v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 23 October 1997, Reports
1997-VII, § 80). Because of their direct knowledge of their
society and its needs, the national authorities are in principle
better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is in
the public interest on social or economic grounds, and the Court will
generally respect the legislature’s policy choice unless it is
“manifestly without reasonable foundation” (ibid.).
- Finally,
since the applicants complain about inequalities in a welfare system,
the Court underlines that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not
include a right to acquire property. It places no restriction on the
Contracting State’s freedom to decide whether or not to have in
place any form of social security scheme, or to choose the type or
amount of benefits to provide under any such scheme. If, however, a
State does decide to create a benefits or pension scheme, it must do
so in a manner which is compatible with Article 14 of the Convention
(see the admissibility decision in the present case, §§
54-55, ECHR 2005-...).
2. Application of these principles to the present case
- The
Court recalls that REA is an earnings-related benefit designed to
compensate employees or former employees for an impairment of earning
capacity due to an accident at work or work-related illness. In or
around 1986 it was decided, as a matter of policy, that REA should no
longer be paid to claimants who had reached an age at which, even if
they had not suffered injury or disease, they would no longer be in
paid employment (see paragraphs 26-30 above). The applicants concede
that it was reasonable to aim to stop paying REA to workers after the
age when they would, in any event, have retired, and the Court
agrees, since the benefit in question is designed to replace or
supplement earnings, and is therefore closely connected to employment
and working life.
- The
applicants do not accept, however, that in order to achieve this aim
it was necessary to adopt as the upper limit the age at which a man
or woman becomes entitled to the State retirement pension, since
State pensionable age is at present different for men and women. They
suggest that a single cut-off age and/or overlapping benefit
regulations could have been used instead.
- The
Court observes, though, that a single cut-off age would not have
achieved the same level of consistency with the State pension scheme,
which is based upon a notional “end of working life” at
60 for women and 65 for men. The benefits to which the applicants
refer as having the same starting age for men and women—winter
fuel payment, prescription charges and bus passes (see paragraph 44
above)—are not inextricably linked to the concept of paid
employment or “working life” in the way that REA is.
Overlapping benefit regulations, to ensure that any REA received was
deducted from the State retirement pension would, moreover, have
maintained the impugned difference of treatment, since women would
still have become entitled to their pensions and liable to start
receiving reduced-rate REA five years before men.
- The
Government, for their part, have explained that the use of the State
pension age as the cut-off point for REA made the scheme easy to
understand and administer (see paragraph 48 above). The
Court considers that such questions of administrative economy and
coherence are generally matters falling within the margin of
appreciation referred to in paragraph 52 above.
- Moreover
it finds it significant that, in the present applicants’ case,
the ECJ found that since REA was intended to compensate people of
working age for loss of earning capacity due to an accident at work
or occupational disease, it was necessary, in order to preserve
coherence with the old-age pension scheme, to link the age-limits
(see paragraph 41 above). While it is true that Article 7(1)(a) of
the Directive provides an express exception to the general
prohibition on discrimination in social security (see paragraph 38
above), the ECJ was called upon, in deciding whether the case fell
within the Article 7 exception, to make a judgment as to whether the
discrimination in the REA scheme arising from the link to
differential pensionable age was objectively necessary in order to
ensure consistency with the pension scheme. In reaching a conclusion
on this issue which, while not determinative of the issue under
Article 14 of the Convention, is nonetheless of central importance,
particular regard should be had to the strong persuasive value of the
ECJ’s finding on this point.
- The
Court considers, therefore, for the above reasons, that both the
policy decision to stop paying REA to persons who would otherwise
have retired from paid employment, and the decision to achieve this
aim by linking the cut-off age for REA to the notional “end of
working life”, or State pensionable age, pursued a legitimate
aim and were reasonably and objectively justified.
- It
remains to be examined whether or not the underlying difference in
treatment between men and women in the State pension scheme was
acceptable under Article 14.
- Differential
pensionable ages were first introduced for men and women in the
United Kingdom in 1940, well before the Convention had come into
existence, although the disparity persists to the present day (see
paragraph 32 above). It would appear that the difference in treatment
was adopted in order to mitigate financial inequality and hardship
arising out of the woman’s traditional unpaid role of caring
for the family in the home rather than earning money in the
workplace. At their origin, therefore, the differential pensionable
ages were intended to correct “factual inequalities”
between men and women and appear therefore to have been objectively
justified under Article 14 (see paragraph 51 above).
- It
follows that the difference in pensionable ages continued to be
justified until such time that social conditions had changed so that
women were no longer substantially prejudiced because of a shorter
working life. This change, must, by its very nature, have been
gradual, and it would be difficult or impossible to pinpoint any
particular moment when the unfairness to men caused by differential
pensionable ages began to outweigh the need to correct the
disadvantaged position of women. Certain indications are available to
the Court. Thus, in the 1993 White Paper, the Government asserted
that the number of women in paid employment had increased
significantly, so that whereas in 1967 only 37% of employees were
women, the proportion had increased to 50% in 1992. In addition,
various reforms to the way in which pension entitlement was assessed
had been introduced in 1977 and 1978, to the benefit of women who
spent long periods out of paid employment. As of 1986, it was
unlawful for an employer to have different retirement ages for men
and women (see paragraph 33 above).
- According
to the information before the Court, the Government made a first,
concrete, move towards establishing the same pensionable age for both
sexes with the publication of the Green Paper in December 1991. It
would, no doubt, be possible to argue that this step could, or
should, have been made earlier. However, as the Court has observed,
the development of parity in the working lives of men and women has
been a gradual process, and one which the national authorities are
better placed to assess (see paragraph 52 above). Moreover, it is
significant that many of the other Contracting States still maintain
a difference in the ages at which men and women become eligible for
the State retirement pension (see paragraph 37 above). Within the
European Union, this position is recognised by the exception
contained in the Directive (see paragraph 38 above).
- In
the light of the original justification for the measure as correcting
financial inequality between the sexes, the slowly evolving nature of
the change in women’s working lives, and in the absence of a
common standard amongst the Contracting States (see Petrovic,
cited above, §§ 36-43), the Court finds that the United
Kingdom cannot be criticised for not having started earlier on the
road towards a single pensionable age.
- Having
once begun the move towards equality, moreover, the Court does not
consider it unreasonable of the Government to carry out a thorough
process of consultation and review, nor can Parliament be condemned
for deciding in 1995 to introduce the reform slowly and in stages.
Given the extremely far-reaching and serious implications, for women
and for the economy in general, these are matters which clearly fall
within the State’s margin of appreciation.
3. Conclusion
-
In conclusion, the Court finds that the difference in State
pensionable age between men and women in the United Kingdom was
originally intended to correct the disadvantaged economic position of
women. It continued to be reasonably and objectively justified on
this ground until such time that social and economic changes removed
the need for special treatment for women. The respondent State’s
decisions as to the precise timing and means of putting right the
inequality were not so manifestly unreasonable as to exceed the wide
margin of appreciation allowed it in such a field (see paragraph 52
above). Similarly, the decision to link eligibility for REA to the
pension system was reasonably and objectively justified, given that
this benefit is intended to compensate for reduced earning capacity
during a person’s working life. There has not, therefore, been
a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 in this case.
- The
above finding further renders it unnecessary for the Court to
consider separately the issues relating to the victim status of the
third, fourth and fifth applicants’ complaints (see paragraph
11 above).
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
- Holds by sixteen votes to one that there has
been no violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in
conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;
- Holds by sixteen votes to one that it is
unnecessary to consider separately the issues relating to the victim
status of the third, fourth and fifth applicants.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in
the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 12 April 2006.
Luzius Wildhaber
President
T.L. Early
Deputy to the
Registrar
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74
§ 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinions of
Mr Borrego-Borrego and Mr L. Loucaides are annexed to
this judgment.
L.W.
T.L.E.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE BORREGO BORREGO
(Translation)
I
voted with the majority of the Chamber in finding that there had been
no violation of the Convention; in my case, however, this was based
on the belief that the applicants could not be considered to have
“possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1, which guarantees the protection of property.
In
its decision of 23 January 2002 in Slivenko v. Latvia ([GC],
no. 48321/99, § 121, ECHR 2002 II), the Court stated
on the subject of that provision: “An applicant can
allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only in so far
as the impugned decisions relate to his or her ’possessions’...
‘Possessions’ can be ‘existing possessions’
or assets, including claims by virtue of which the applicant can
argue that he or she has at least a ‘legitimate expectation’
of acquiring effective enjoyment of a property right.”
In
the matter of entitlement to benefits, a distinction was established
by the Commission, and taken up by the Court, between contributory
and non contributory benefits, the latter being considered not
to constitute “possessions”.
However,
in paragraph 54 of its decision of 6 July 2005 on the admissibility
of the present application, the Court, after examining the case law
on the subject – which, admittedly, is not entirely free of
ambiguity – stated: “If ... a Contracting State has in
force legislation providing for the payment as of right of a welfare
benefit – whether conditional or not on the prior payment of
contributions – that legislation must be regarded as generating
a proprietary interest falling within the ambit of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 for persons satisfying its requirements.”
Hence,
the notion of “possessions” is widened here to include
“interests”, and applies to all individuals, including
those who “for all or part of their lives, [are] completely
dependent for survival on social security and welfare benefits”
(ibid., paragraph 51). This is far removed from the notion of
property as the right of the citizen to “dispose at his
pleasure of his goods, income, and of the fruits of his labour and
his skill” (Article 16 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man
of 23 June 1793).
If we
accept that the protection of property extends to protecting property
owners, the Court’s new interpretation has an undeniable
attraction! Without any need for a revolution, all Europe’s
citizens have become property owners, protected by Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1. Everyone, from a billionaire right down to the
poorest person subsisting on social security, has become a property
owner.
This widening of the notion of “possessions” stems, in my
view, from the way in which this case was presented, in that it
sought to establish a close link between Protocol No. 1 and Article
14 of the Convention.
Hence,
paragraph 55 of the admissibility decision, to which paragraph 53 of
the judgment refers, reads: “Although Protocol No. 1 does not
include the right to receive a social security payment of any kind,
if a State does decide to create a benefits scheme, it must do so in
a manner which is compatible with Article 14.”
The
“prohibition of discrimination” element proved so
compelling – all the more so since the case related to
discrimination based on sex – that the Court, overlooking the
fact that Article 14 is secondary to the other substantive guarantees
and has no independent existence, found that there had been no
“violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction
with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1”, thereby placing a clear
emphasis on the discrimination rather than the property aspect.
I
remember the Kopecký v. Slovakia case, in which the
applicant claimed the restitution under an Extra-Judicial
Rehabilitations Act of items of property which had been taken away
from his father. He had proved that the items in question had
belonged to his father and had been confiscated and deposited in the
offices of the Regional Administration of the Ministry of the
Interior in 1958. However, as the Act required the applicant to
indicate the exact location of the items (gold and silver coins of
numismatic value), almost fifty years after they had been
confiscated, and he had been unable to do so, the Court held that
“the applicant had no ‘possession’ within the
meaning of the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see
Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 60,
ECHR 2004 IX).
In
truth, I consider the gold and silver coins belonging to Mr Kopecký’s
father to be much closer to the notion of “possessions”
than the benefits claimed by the applicants in the present case. In
Kopecký, however, the link with the prohibition of
discrimination was absent.
I
feel that the Court’s interpretation of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 in the present case goes somewhat too far and serves only to
heighten the confusion that already exists in this sphere.
Ultimately, however, I can live with it.
I
should like, nevertheless, to express my concern regarding one very
specific aspect of this new approach to the notion of “possessions”.
In
paragraph 48 of the admissibility decision, the Court found that
“[t]he Convention must also be read as a whole, and interpreted
in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between
its various provisions.”
I
quite agree. However, in my opinion, the Court may not, in
interpreting the Convention (see Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969), frustrate the sovereign
intentions of a Contracting Party.
As I
see it, the way in which “Article 14 taken in conjunction with
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1” is construed in this judgment
implies, purely and simply, the entry into force of Protocol No. 12
in a very important sphere (social-security benefits), in respect of
a Contracting Party which has not even signed Protocol No. 12.
Paragraph
34 of the admissibility decision summed up the Government’s
argument in that regard as follows: “The applicants were
seeking to widen the concept of a ‘possession’ to include
claims which had no basis in domestic law, in order to bring a
general complaint of discrimination of the type which would be
covered by the new Protocol No. 12 but not by Article 14.”
It is
my belief that we cannot bring into force, even in part, a Protocol
in respect of a State which has not yet signed it.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE LOUCAIDES
While
I am in agreement with the finding of the majority that both the
policy decision to stop paying REA to persons who would otherwise
have retired from paid employment, and the decision to achieve this
aim by linking the cut-off age for REA to the notional “end of
working life”, or State pensionable age, pursued a legitimate
aim and were reasonably and objectively justified, I am unable to
share the view of the majority that there has not been a violation of
Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in
this case.
The
issue before us was whether the difference in treatment between men
and women as regards State pensionable age, which was at the root of
the difference in their treatment as regards the operation of the REA
scheme, was acceptable under Article 14 of the Convention at the time
of the decisions about which the applicants complain, that is to say,
was reasonably and objectively justified.
I
fully agree with the opinion of the majority that it is “impossible
to pinpoint any particular moment when the unfairness to men caused
by differential pensionable ages began to outweigh the need to
correct the disadvantaged position of women” (see paragraph 62
of the judgment). That, however, is not the question. The important
issue to determine is whether this shift may or may not have occurred
before the decisions complained of by the applicants in the present
case.
In
1986 an Act was passed in the United Kingdom amending the Sex
Discrimination Act 1975 so as to make it unlawful for an employer to
have different retirement ages for men and women (see paragraph 33 of
the judgment). Until then the difference in pensionable ages had been
acceptable as a means of mitigating financial inequality and hardship
arising out of the woman’s traditional unpaid role of caring
for the family in the home rather than earning money in the workplace
(see paragraph 61 of the judgment). However, after 1986 such
justification of the difference in pensionable age became manifestly
untenable because of the amendment in question, which implies clearly
that the previous “factual inequalities” between men and
women were no longer a factor and that social conditions had changed
so that women were not substantially prejudiced because of a shorter
working life. The considerations and assumptions on which the overall
structure of pensions and benefits had been based over the previous
decades could not be relied on any more to justify differences on
grounds of sex.
Therefore, I find that at the time of the decisions about which the
applicants complain, and indeed at any time after 1986, the different
treatment of men and women as regards State pensionable age had no
objective and reasonable justification. It follows that it was
incompatible with Article 14 of the Convention, as was in turn the
different treatment of men and women as regards entitlement to REA.
It is
significant that the Government concentrated their arguments on
the margin of appreciation to which they were allegedly entitled in
setting the timetable for the reform intended to put an end to this
unequal treatment, which was no longer justified. These arguments are
summarised as follows in paragraph 49 of the judgment:
“Finally, the social, historical and economic
basis for the provision of State retirement pensions at the age of 65
for men, and 60 for women, as well as the decision to equalise
pensionable age for men and women progressively from 2010-2020,
involved complex economic and social judgments, in respect of which
the Government enjoyed a broad margin of appreciation. ... In 1995,
Parliament had decided to implement the reform in stages because
moving towards equality had enormous financial implications both for
the State and for individuals, particularly women who had long been
expecting to receive a State retirement pension at 60 ... Several
Contracting States retained different pension ages for men and women,
and a number had chosen to implement a gradual equalisation of those
ages ... Moreover, the European Community had accepted that its
Member States must be allowed a period of transition in which to plan
and implement the move to equal ages for men and women in relation to
State pensionable age ...”
These
arguments by the Government evidently persuaded the majority, who
expressed the following view in paragraphs 64 and 65 of the judgment:
“In the light of the original justification for
the measure as correcting financial inequality between the sexes, the
slowly evolving nature of the change in women’s working lives,
and in the absence of a common standard amongst the Contracting
States ... the Court finds that the United Kingdom cannot be
criticised for not having started earlier on the road towards a
single pensionable age.
Having once begun the move towards equality, moreover,
the Court does not consider it unreasonable of the Government to
carry out a thorough process of consultation and review, nor can
Parliament be condemned for deciding in 1995 to introduce the reform
slowly and in stages. Given the extremely far-reaching and serious
implications, for women and for the economy in general, these are
matters which clearly fall within the State’s margin of
appreciation.”
These
considerations by the Court call for the following observations on my
part.
First,
I consider that new social legislation, however well-balanced it may
be, cannot be invoked under the doctrine of the margin of
appreciation as an excuse for not having acted in due time to avoid
an instance of discrimination clearly lacking reasonable and
objective justification. Moreover it is clear that remedial
legislation intended to equalise the position in the future will
not do so with sufficient speed as to remedy the position of
these applicants (see, mutatis mutandis, Walden
v. Liechtenstein (dec.), no. 33916/96, 16 March 2000).
Furthermore,
I consider that “the absence of a common standard amongst the
Contracting States” (see paragraph 64 of the judgment) and the
fact that “many of the other Contracting States still maintain
a difference in the ages at which men and women become eligible for
the State retirement pension” (see paragraph 63) are of no
relevance. I cannot see how the fact that discrimination between men
and women regarding pensionable age exists in many other Contracting
States could legitimise unjustified discrimination in any particular
case brought before the Court. Therefore the majority are, I believe,
wrong in invoking such an argument, particularly taking into account
that no finding has been made by the Court that in those other
Contracting States which maintain the differential treatment of men
and women as regards retirement pensions, such treatment is based on
the same factual background as the one under examination in the
present case. The factual inequalities which ceased to exist in the
United Kingdom in or before 1986, and which supported the original
justification of discrimination, may still exist in some or all those
Contracting Parties. More importantly it should be recalled that
because all High Contracting Parties have accepted the obligations of
the Convention they have a duty to bring their legal systems into
line with the standards of the Convention. The finding of a general
failure to do so does not prevent the Court from holding any
individual State from being held responsible for a specific violation
of the Convention.
Finally,
I must state that I do not find the judgment of the European Court of
Justice in the present case an obstacle to my approach. That
judgment examined the question of discrimination in a different legal
context and in any case it is not binding on us.
Given
that I consider that there has been a violation of Article 14 taken
in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in this case, it
would normally have been necessary to consider the issues relating to
the victim status of the third, fourth and fifth applicants. However,
since the majority found no violation I confine myself to stating
that I would find a violation of the same Articles in respect of the
said applicants, assuming that they could claim to be victims.