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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF VÄÄNÄNEN v. FINLAND
(Application
no. 10736/03)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
20
February 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Väänänen v. Finland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza, President,
Mr G.
Bonello,
Mr K. Traja,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Ms L.
Mijović,
Mr J. Šikuta,
Mrs P. Hirvelä,
judges,
and Mr T.L. Early, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 30 January 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 10736/03) against the
Republic of Finland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Finnish national, Mr Toimi
Väänänen (“the applicant”), on 27 March
2003. The applicant died on 22 June 2003.
However, his widow Ms Irma Väänänen
and his children Ms Oili Ruuska, Ms Kaija Tammilehto and Mr Harri
Väänänen expressed their
wish to pursue the application. For practical reasons Mr
Toimi Väänänen will continue to be
called “the applicant” in this judgment.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr Jouko Laurikkala, a lawyer practising
in Helsinki. The Finnish Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Arto Kosonen
of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- On
29 November 2005 the
Court declared the application partly inadmissible and decided to
communicate the complaint concerning the length of the proceedings.
Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to rule on
the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1919 and lived in Helsinki.
- In
March 1985 the applicant underwent knee surgery in Palm Beach,
Florida. On 15 June 1985 he was struck on the operated knee by G.
Soon afterwards, an infection developed in the applicant’s knee
and he became disabled.
- The
applicant instituted civil proceedings against G. in the Circuit
Court of Palm Beach County, which on 6 May 1988 ordered G. to pay the
applicant 500,000 US dollars (USD) in pecuniary and non-pecuniary
damages.
- On
11 June 1989 G. died. As he had failed to pay the damages, the
applicant lodged, on 9 September 1991, an action for damages against
G.’s estate before the then Helsinki City Court
(raastuvanoikeus, rådstuvurätt), claiming 2,008,500
Finnish Marks (FIM; corresponding to USD 500,000) plus interest. He
alleged that his disability in movement and the operations which
followed were caused by G.’s blow. On 27 November 1992 the
defendant was summoned.
- The
City Court held its first hearing on 6 February 1992. At the second
hearing on 4 June 1992 the applicant requested an adjournment in
order to submit trial documents from the United States. He also asked
for witnesses to be heard in the United States.
- At
the third hearing on 29 October 1992 the case was adjourned in order
to allow the parties to submit questionnaires to the witnesses to be
heard abroad.
- At
the fourth hearing on 19 November 1992 the case was adjourned in
order to hear four witnesses in the United States by way of
international legal assistance. The City Court obtained the
witnesses’ statements on 30 November 1993.
- The
applicant was, however, dissatisfied with the hearing of the
witnesses, and requested that they be heard again. At its sixth
hearing on 25 February 1994 the District Court (käräjäoikeus,
tingsrätten; formerly the City Court) of Helsinki adjourned
the case so that the witnesses could be heard again in Florida.
- At
the ninth hearing on 19 September 1995 the applicant asked the court
to speed up the proceedings.
- The
witnesses’ statements were received by the District Court on
26 January 1996. At the tenth hearing on 19 April 1996 the
applicant requested the court to decide on the case. The defendant,
however, requested an adjournment, and the applicant did not object.
- At
its fifteenth hearing on 23 May 1997 the District Court decided to
ask for an expert opinion from the National Authority for Medicolegal
Affairs (terveydenhuollon
oikeusturvakeskus, rättskyddscentralen för hälsovården).
The opinion was received on 31 October 1997.
- At
the seventeenth hearing on 21 November 1997 the case was adjourned
upon the applicant’s request to allow the parties to give their
final statements and the applicant to submit a further expert
opinion.
- On
26 May 1998 the District Court declared the case closed and adjourned
it in order to give a decision.
- At
its twentieth hearing on 18 September 1998 the District Court issued
its judgment, dismissing the applicant’s claims. It found no
causal link between the blow and the infection. It further ordered
the applicant to reimburse the defendant’s legal expenses
amounting to almost 30,000 euros (EUR).
- On
15 October 1998 the applicant appealed to the Helsinki Court of
Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten). On 15 December 1999 the
appellate court decided to ask for another expert opinion from the
National Authority for Medicolegal Affairs. The expert opinion was
received on 16 July 2001. Having been granted an extension of the
time-limit for submitting his observations, the applicant’s
observations were filed with the court on 8 November 2001.
- The
Court of Appeal held an oral hearing on 19-21 December 2001. In its
judgment of 13 March 2002 it ordered the defendant to pay the
applicant 1,500 EUR in compensation for non-pecuniary damage for pain
resulting from the blow but dismissed his other claims. The applicant
was further ordered to reimburse the defendant’s legal expenses
incurred before the appellate court.
- Meanwhile,
on 18 January 2001, upon the applicant’s application, the
Deputy Chancellor of Justice (apulaisoikeuskansleri, biträdande
justitiekanslern) considered that the proceedings before the
court of first instance had been excessive in length. He also noted
that the delay in the appellate court proceedings had been caused by
the delay in receiving the expert opinion from the National Authority
for Medicolegal Affairs. As the case was still pending before the
domestic courts, he did not take any further action.
- On
1 October 2002 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta
domstolen) refused the applicant leave to appeal.
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
- The
Government contested that argument.
- It
was undisputed that the period to be taken into consideration began
on 9 September 1991 when the applicant lodged an action for damages
before the District Court and ended on 1 October 2002 when the
Supreme Court rejected the application for leave to appeal. It thus
lasted 11 years and 25 days.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes at the outset that the applicant died on
27 March 2003, after having lodged his application under
Article 34 of the Convention. It recalls that in
various cases in which an applicant died in the course of the
Convention proceedings it took into account the statements of the
applicant’s heirs or of close members of his family expressing
their wish to pursue the application (see, inter alia, Kalló
v. Hungary, no. 30081/02, § 24, 11 April 2006). The
Court considers that the applicant’s heirs, who had stated
their intention of continuing the proceedings, have a legitimate
interest in obtaining a finding that there had been a breach of the
applicant’s right guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention to have his case heard within a reasonable time (see,
mutatis mutandis, Dalban v. Romania [GC], no. 28114/95, §§ 1
and 39, ECHR 1999 VI).
Accordingly,
the Court finds that the applicant’s heirs have standing to
continue the present proceedings.
- The
Court further notes that the application is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. Nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII). Only delays attributable to the State may justify
a finding of a failure to comply with the “reasonable time”
requirement (see H. v. France, judgment of 24 October
1989, Series A no. 162 A, p. 21-22, § 55).
- The
Court notes that the application concerned proceedings of some
complexity, during which several witnesses were heard in the United
States by way of international legal assistance and several expert
opinions were requested from the National Authority for Medicolegal
Affairs. The Court considers, however, that even though the case was
of some complexity it cannot be said that this in itself justified
the entire length of the proceedings.
- As
to the conduct of the parties, the Court notes that the proceedings
before the City Court (later replaced by the District Court) took
some seven years. The Government submitted that although the case was
adjourned seven times in order to obtain witness statements from
abroad and expert opinions from the National Authority for
Medicolegal Affairs, the adjournments were ordered by the court only
when there was a special reason for doing so. In the applicant’s
view, the hearings had not been handled properly nor within a
reasonable time; he had asked the District Court to expedite the
proceedings and on 19 April 1996 he was ready to have a decision
taken on the case. The Court finds that the time elapsed before the
court of first instance appears to have been exceptionally lengthy.
However, the Court notes that on 19 November 1992 that court decided,
upon the applicant’s request, to hear four witnesses in the
United States by way of international legal assistance. The
witnesses’ statements were obtained on 30 November 1993.
Furthermore, on 25 February 1994 it decided to re-hear the witnesses
in the United States. The witnesses’ statements were received
on 26 January 1996. During those periods the proceedings were stayed,
which prolonged them by one year and almost two years, respectively.
The Court finds that these delays of some three years were not solely
the Finnish authorities’ responsibility.
- Turning
to the proceedings before the Court of Appeal, the Court does not
find any convincing explanation for the almost three and half year
time taken. It is to be noted that it took some fourteen months
before the appellate court requested an expert opinion from the
National Authority for Medicolegal Affairs. It further took some
nineteen months for the National Authority for Medicolegal Affairs to
issue its opinion. The Government argued that the case was not urgent
within the meaning of the Court of Appeal’s rules of procedure.
They also explained the delay by the fact that the first expert
doctor could not issue the requested opinion within the set
time-limit and observed that the court’s officials asked the
National Authority for Medicolegal Affairs six times to issue its
opinion. The applicant, for his part, reiterated that he also asked
the appellate court several times to speed up the proceedings and
that he did not consider that it was necessary for the National
Authority for Medicolegal Affairs to consult so many doctors in his
case.
- The
Court for its part does not find sufficient justification for the
above-mentioned delays in the Court of Appeal proceedings, which it
considers incompatible with the diligence required under Article 6 §
1. It recalls that it is for States to organise their judicial
systems in such a way that their courts can meet the Convention’s
requirements, which includes the manner in which they obtain the
necessary expert evidence (see, for example, Salesi v. Italy,
judgment of 26 February 1993, Series A no. 257 E, §
24, T. and Others v. Finland, no. 27744/95, § 65, 13
December 2005).
- The
time taken by the Supreme Court to refuse leave to appeal was
reasonable.
- The
Court concludes that in the light of the criteria laid down in its
case-law and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the
overall length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to satisfy
the reasonable time requirement. There has accordingly been a
violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant’s heirs claimed EUR 1,000,000 in respect of
non-pecuniary damage.
- The
Government contested the claim. They submitted that the finding of a
violation would in itself constitute sufficient just satisfaction.
- The
Court has found that the applicant’s close heirs may claim
compensation for non-pecuniary damage (see, inter alia,
Ernestina Zullo v. Italy [GC], no. 64897/01, § 149,
29 March 2006). The Court considers that the applicant must have
sustained non-pecuniary damage such as distress and frustration
resulting from the excessive length of the proceedings. As there were
delays in the proceedings which cannot be attributable to the
authorities (see paragraph 29 above), the Court considers it
reasonable to award the applicant’s heirs EUR 6,000 under that
head.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant’s heirs also claimed EUR 12,200 (inclusive of
value-added tax, “VAT”) for the costs and expenses
incurred before the Court.
- In
their memorial the Government regarded the applicant’s claim as
excessive. They took the view that any amount to be awarded under
this head should not exceed EUR 2,000 (inclusive of VAT).
- According
to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to
reimbursement of his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are
reasonable as to quantum. Furthermore, legal costs are
recoverable only in so far as they relate to the violation found. In
the present case the Court has declared some of the applicant’s
complaints inadmissible. Having regard to the nature of the case, the
Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant’s heirs
EUR 3,000 for their costs and expenses in connection with the
proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the remainder of the application
admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant’s
heirs, within three months from the date on which the judgment
becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2
of the Convention, the following amounts:
(i) EUR
6,000 (six thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR
3,000 (three thousand euros) inclusive of value added tax in respect
of costs and expenses;
(iii) any
tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 February 2007,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
T.L. Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
