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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF
KUZNETSOVA v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 67579/01)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
7
June 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be
subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Kuznetsova v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr C.L. Rozakis, President,
Mr A.
Kovler,
Mrs E. Steiner,
Mr K. Hajiyev,
Mr D.
Spielmann,
Mr S.E. Jebens,
Mr G. Malinverni,
judges,
and Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 15 May 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on the last mentioned
date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 67579/01) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms Lidiya Vladimirovna
Kuznetsova (“the applicant”), on 14 February 2001.
- The
applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr I.
Ogorodnikov, a lawyer practising in the Moscow Region. The Russian
Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr P.
Laptev, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European
Court of Human Rights.
- The
applicant complained, in particular, of the quashing of a final
judgment in her favour on account of newly discovered circumstances.
- By
a decision of 19 January 2006, the Court declared the application
partly admissible.
- The
applicant and the Government each filed further written observations
(Rule 59 § 1). The Chamber having decided, after consulting the
parties, that no hearing on the merits was required (Rule 59 § 3
in fine), the parties replied in writing to each other's
observations. The Chamber also decided, after examining the request
of the Government, that there is no need to relinquish jurisdiction
in favour of the Grand Chamber under Rule 72 of the Rules of
Court.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Serpukhov
in the Moscow Region.
A. Background to the case
- The
applicant is in receipt of an old-age pension.
- On
23 June 1997 the Federal Law on Calculating and Upgrading
State Pensions (the “Pensions Law”) was enacted. It
introduced a new scheme for calculating retirement benefits –
the “Individual Pensioner Coefficient” (“IPC”).
- On
1 December 1997 the Ministry of Labour brought in the
Regulations on the Implementation of the Pensions Law (“the
Regulations”) clarifying the application of the Pensions Law.
- On
1 February 1998 the Pension Fund Agency of Serpukhov (“the
Agency”) re-assessed the amount of the applicant's pension
according to the Pensions Law interpreted in the light of the
Regulations, and decided that the IPC to be applied in her case
should be 0.525.
- On
18 June 1998 the Supreme Court of Russia ruled that the
Regulations were unlawful.
- On
29 December 1999 the Ministry of Labour issued the
Directive on the Application of Limitations established by the
Pensions Law (“the Directive”). The Directive again
specified how the Pensions Law should apply.
- By
decisions of 24 April, 25 May and 3 August 2000 the Supreme Court of
Russia, sitting at three different levels of jurisdiction, confirmed
the lawfulness of the Directive.
B. First set of court proceedings
- In
January 2000 the applicant instituted court proceedings against the
Agency, claiming that under the Pensions Law she was eligible to an
IPC of 0.7.
- On
13 April 2000 the Serpukhov Town Court of the Moscow Region
found in the applicant's favour, having established that the
defendant had misinterpreted the Pensions Law. In respect of the
Agency's argument that it had applied the law in accordance with the
Directive, the court noted that the Directive was essentially similar
to the Regulations of 1 December 1997, which the Supreme
Court had ruled were unlawful. Accordingly, the court ordered the
Agency to apply an IPC of 0.7 when calculating the applicant's
pension thereby increasing it by RUR 822.5 and awarded her
arrears of RUR 4,593.89.
- On
22 May 2000 the Moscow Regional Court dismissed the
defendant's appeal, and the judgment of 13 April 2000
became final.
- On 16 June 2000
enforcement proceedings commenced.
C. Re-opening of the applicant's case and ensuing
proceedings
- In
June 2000 the Agency applied for a review of the judgment of
13 April 2000 owing to the discovery of new circumstances.
It claimed that on 24 April 2000 the Supreme Court of
Russia had confirmed the lawfulness of the Directive and contended
that since it had been unaware of the decision of the Supreme Court
when the judgment in the applicant's favour was delivered, that
judgment should be reviewed.
- On
16 August 2000 the Serpukhov Town Court granted the
Agency's application and re-opened the proceedings.
- On
12 September 2000 following a fresh examination of the case
the Serpukhov Town Court dismissed the applicant's claims in full
having applied the Directive.
- On
26 September 2000 the applicant lodged an appeal against
that judgment.
- On
6 October 2000 the Serpukhov Town Court stayed the
applicant's appeal and invited her to provide a valid explanation for
her failure to observe the statutory time-limit of 10 days for
appealing against a first-instance judgment, and to pay a court fee
in the amount of RUR 87.83. As the applicant failed to fulfil
these requirements, on 18 October 2000 the court returned
her appeal papers to her.
- On
15 November 2000 the Serpukhov Town Court stayed the
applicant's appeal against the decision of 6 October 2000
with reference to the same statutory time-limit and invited her to
show good cause for her failure to comply with it. On 4 December 2000
it returned the applicant's appeal papers since she had again failed
to comply with the requirements. The applicant did not appeal against
any of these decisions.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
- At
the material time the Code of Civil Procedure 1964 provided:
Article 333 Grounds for re-consideration
“[Judgments] which have come into force may be
re-considered on the basis of newly-discovered circumstances. The
grounds for re-consideration ... shall be:
1. significant circumstances which were not
and could not have been known to the party who applies for
re-consideration;...
4. cancellation of a court [judgment] or of
another authority's decision which served as a legal basis for the
[judgment] in question.”
Article 334 Making of application
“... [An application for re-consideration of a
[judgment] due to newly-discovered circumstances] must be made within
three months after the discovery of the circumstances.”
Article 337 Ruling on the re-reconsideration
of the case
“... No appeal shall lie against the ruling
ordering the re-consideration of the judgment ... due to
newly-discovered circumstances”.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION AND
ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the final judgment in her favour had been
quashed on account of newly discovered circumstances, which had
resulted in a decrease in her pension. The Court will examine this
complaint under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 to the Convention. These provisions read as follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by
[a] ... tribunal ...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
A. Submissions by the parties
1. The applicant
- The
applicant contended that the decision of the Supreme Court of 24
April 2000 was a new – as opposed to a newly discovered –
circumstance, since it was adopted between the first-instance and
appellate decisions in the applicant's case. The defendant Agency
should therefore have been aware of that decision before the appeal
proceedings. Moreover the decision of 24 April 2000 had been issued
in the context of another court dispute, and therefore, in the
applicant's view, should not have been used as a ground for
re-opening her case. The applicant next noted that the decision of
the Constitutional Court dated 14 January 1999 referred to by the
Government was irrelevant to her case, as it only concerned changes
caused by a law's unconstitutionality, whereas the constitutionality
of the legislation and regulations applied in her case had never been
disputed. Finally, the applicant alleged that the judgment of 13
April 2000 in her favour had become final and legally binding once it
had been upheld on appeal, and therefore constituted a “possession”,
within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, until it was
quashed on 13 August 2000.
2. The Government
- The
Government argued that the application was incompatible ratione
materiae with the provisions of the Convention. As regards the
applicability of Article 6 of the Convention, they referred to the
cases of Schouten and Meldrum v. the Netherlands (dec. nos.
19005/91 and 19006/91, 9 December 1994); Pančenko v. Latvia,
(dec. no. 40772/98, 28 October 1999) and Kiryanov v. Russia
(dec. no. 42212/02, 9 December 2004) and argued that the
applicant's pension dispute involved the interpretation of pension
legislation rather than the determination of her right to pension
benefits and that the method of the calculation of an old-age pension
belonged to the public-law domain.
- The
Government further contested that the pension awarded to the
applicant by the judgment of 13 April 2000 was a “possession”
within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They pointed out
that in the case of Pravednaya v. Russia (no. 69529/01,
18 November 2004) the Court had regarded a judicial award of
that type as being the applicant's “possession” and made
an order for the initial judgment in the applicant's favour to be
restored and the pension paid to the applicant in the amount
originally determined. However, in the Government's view, such an
approach created confusion. If the sum awarded by the court was a
“possession” of the pensioner, it should not be affected
by future rises in the pension rates. Therefore, in the Pravednaya
case the applicant would have to return the money she had already
received from the Pension Fund by virtue of the recent changes in the
legislation on State pensions. They concluded that in order to avoid
such a situation the Court should not regard the amounts of pension
awarded by the domestic courts as the claimants' “possession”
within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and that therefore
this provision was inapplicable in the present case.
- As regards the merits of the application, the
Government alleged that the decision to re-open
the applicant's civil case had not been arbitrary, since it had been
based on the Supreme Court's decision of 24 April 2000 confirming
the lawfulness of the Directive of
29 December 1999 clarifying how the
Pensions Law should be interpreted and applied. In
the Government's view, it had been necessary to re-open the case in
order to correct a judicial error in the application of the
substantive law.
- They
stressed that since the defendant Agency had learnt about this new
circumstance, which was of crucial relevance to the applicant's case,
only after the judgment of 13 April 2000 became final, it had been
entitled to request the re-opening of the applicant's case and the
domestic court had had good grounds for granting its request. In this
respect the Government also stressed that the Agency had lodged the
application for a review of the judgment of 13 April 2000 within the
statutory time-limit of three months after the delivery of the
decision of the Supreme Court of 24 April 2000 which constituted the
newly discovered circumstance in the applicant's case. The Government
also pointed out that the Constitutional Court of Russia had
recognised in a decision of 14 January 1999 that changes in the
law could constitute newly discovered circumstances and had gone on
to confirm in decisions of 2 February 1996 and 3 February 1998 that
the Supreme Court's rulings could be regarded as newly discovered
circumstances. They argued that the decision to re-open the case
fully complied with the Code of Civil Procedure, so that there had
been no violation of the applicant's right to a fair trial.
- As
to whether the applicant's property right had been violated, the
Government contended that the applicant had not acquired property
since the judgment which had conferred a right on her had been
annulled owing to the discovery of new circumstances and the
applicant's claims for a higher pension had ultimately been
dismissed.
- The
Government concluded that neither Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention nor Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention had been
violated as a result of the annulment of the judgment in the
applicant's favour.
B. The Court's assessment
1. The Government's objection on applicability
- The
Court notes at the outset that the Government's objection concerning
the applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was
adequately dealt with in the decision on the admissibility of the
present application. It does not consider it necessary to re-examine
the matter and therefore rejects the Government's objection in this
respect.
- In so far as the Government disputed the applicability
of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1, the Court reiterates that the
Convention does not guarantee, as such, the right to an old-age
pension or any social benefit in a particular amount (see, for
example, Aunola v. Finland (dec.), no. 30517/96,
15 March 2001). However a “claim” – even
concerning a pension – can constitute a “possession”
within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 where it has a
sufficient basis in national law, for example where it is confirmed
by a final court judgment (see Pravednaya, cited above, §
38; and Kopecký v. Slovakia judgment, [GC],
no. 44912/98, § 35, ECHR 2004-IX).
- The judgment of the Serpukhov Town Court of 13 April
2000 as upheld by the Moscow Regional Court on 22 May 2000 provided
the applicant with an enforceable claim to receive an increased
pension with an IPC of 0.7 together with arrears of RUR 4,593.89. It
became final and binding after being upheld on appeal and enforcement
proceedings were instituted. In the Court's view, the applicant
therefore had a “possession” for the purposes of Article
1 of Protocol No. 1. The Court also finds that the quashing on 16
August 2000 of that final and binding judgment deprived the applicant
of her entitlement to the increased pension, and therefore
constituted interference with her right to the peaceful enjoyment of
her possessions guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see
Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 74,
ECHR 1999-VII; and Pravednaya, cited above, § 39).
- The
Court concludes that the reversal of the final and binding decision
in the applicant's favour constituted interference with her rights
under both Article 6 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention. It remains to be established whether this interference
was justified.
2. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention
- The
Court reiterates that the right to a fair hearing before a tribunal
as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention must be
interpreted in the light of the Preamble to the Convention, which
declares, in its relevant part, the rule of law to be part of the
common heritage of the Contracting States. One of the fundamental
aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal certainty, which
requires, among other things, that where the courts have finally
determined an issue, their ruling should not be called into question
(see Brumărescu, cited above, § 61).
- This
principle insists that no party is entitled to seek a review of a
final and binding judgment merely for the purpose of a rehearing and
a fresh decision of the case. The power of review should be exercised
for correction of gross judicial mistakes and miscarriages of
justice, and not to substitute a review. The review cannot be treated
as “an appeal in disguise”, and the mere possibility of
two views on the subject is not a ground for re-examination.
Departures from that principle are justified only when made necessary
by circumstances of a substantial and compelling character (see
Ryabykh v. Russia, no. 52854/99, § 52, ECHR 2003–X).
- The
Court should be especially mindful of the dangers inherent in the use
of retrospective legislation which has the effect of influencing the
judicial determination of a dispute to which the State is a party.
Respect for the rule of law and the notion of a fair trial require
that any reasons adduced to justify such measures be treated with the
greatest possible degree of circumspection (see The National &
Provincial Building Society, the Leeds Permanent Building Society and
the Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom,
judgment of 23 October 1997, Reports 1997-VII, § 112;
and Zielinski and Pradal & Gonzalez and Others v. France
[GC], nos. 24846/94 and 34165/96 to 34173/96, § 57, ECHR
1999 VII).
- The
Court also notes, more specifically, that the procedure of re-opening
a civil case on account of newly discovered circumstances does not by
itself contradict the principle of legal certainty in so far as it is
used to correct miscarriages of justice. The Court's task is to
determine whether this procedure was applied in a manner which is
compatible with Article 6 § 1 (see Pravednaya, cited
above, § 28).
- Turning
to the present case, the Court observes that on 13 April 2000 the
Serpukhov Town Court delivered a judgment that was favourable to the
applicant. The domestic court construed the applicable law in the
applicant's favour and rejected the defendant Agency's reference to
the Directive supporting the Agency's interpretation of that law.
However, several months after the judgment of 13 April 2000 had
become final, it was set aside on the ground that it had not taken
into account the decision of the Supreme Court dated 24 April 2000
confirming the lawfulness of the Directive.
- The
Court does not consider it necessary to decide whether the decision
of the Supreme Court delivered on 24 April 2000, that is to say.
after the judgment of the Serpukhov Town Court, could be regarded as
“newly discovered evidence”, as stated by the Government,
or “new evidence”, as alleged by the applicant, as these
terms pertain to the domain of the domestic law. The Court reiterates
in this respect that it is not called upon to decide issues of
interpretation of domestic law but rather has to verify whether on
the facts of the case the authorities complied with the
requirements of Article 6 of the Convention. Having examined
the parties' observations and the materials in its possession, the
Court is not satisfied that the aforementioned requirements of
Article 6 § 1 were complied with.
- It
finds it difficult to accept the Government's argument that the
applicant's case was re-opened with a view to correcting a
judicial error in the application of the substantive law. It notes in
this respect that the only reason for the review of the settled
dispute was the adoption, in an unrelated set of proceedings, of the
decision of the Supreme Court, which confirmed the defendant Agency's
interpretation of the law applied in the applicant's case. In the
Court's view, being dissatisfied with the outcome of the civil
dispute with the applicant, the Agency
attempted in essence to re-argue the case with the result that
the “wrong” judicial interpretation of the law applied in
the applicant's case was replaced with the “correct”
interpretation, favourable to the Agency. Moreover, the application
of the Agency's interpretation of the law, as supported by the
decision of the Supreme Court, led to a retrospective recalculation
of the amounts due to the applicant under the judgment of 13 April
2000.
- Against
this background, the Court considers that the decision to re-open the
applicant's case was not aimed at correcting a judicial error or a
miscarriage of justice but rather was an abuse of procedure used
merely for the purpose of obtaining a rehearing and fresh
determination of the case. This, in the Court's view, infringed the
principle of legal certainty and the applicant's “right to a
court”.
- Accordingly,
there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
3. Alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
- The
Court reiterates that the existence of a debt confirmed by a binding
and enforceable judgment furnishes the judgment creditor with a
“legitimate expectation” that the debt will be paid and
constitutes the judgment creditor's “possessions” within
the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The quashing of
such a judgment amounts to an interference with his or her right to
the peaceful enjoyment of possessions (see, among other authorities,
Brumărescu, cited above, § 74).
- The
Court observes that in the instant case the applicant failed to
pursue the proceedings once the judgment in her favour had been
quashed. In particular, she did not properly appeal against the new
judgment which rejected her claims for a higher pension. It
reiterates in this respect that the quashing of a final and binding
judgment is an instantaneous act (see Sitokhova v. Russia
(dec.), no. 55609/00, 2 September 2004). Thus, the eventual
outcome of the subsequent proceedings is not directly relevant to the
Court's analysis of the complaint about the annulment of the judgment
in the applicant's favour (see Ivanova v. Ukraine, no.
74104/01, §§ 35-38, 13 September 2005), save in cases
where the subsequent proceedings result in an increased award for the
applicant.
- The Court further observes that the judgment of the
Serpukhov Town Court of 13 April 2000, as upheld by the Moscow
Regional Court on 22 May 2000, provided the applicant with an
enforceable claim to an increased pension with an IPC of 0.7 plus
arrears of RUR 4,593.89. It became final and binding after it had
been upheld on appeal, and enforcement proceedings were instituted.
In the Court's view, the applicant therefore had a “possession”
for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
- The Court finds that the decision of 16 August 2000 to
quash the judgment of 13 April 2000 deprived the applicant of her
entitlement to an increased pension, and therefore constituted an
interference with her right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions
guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Brumărescu,
cited above, § 74; and Pravednaya, cited above,
§ 39).
- While the Court accepts that this measure was lawful
and pursued the public interest (such as, for example, providing an
efficient and harmonised State pension scheme), its compliance with
the requirement of proportionality is open to question.
- It
is true that the recalculation of a pension and its subsequent
reduction does not, as such, violate Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
(Skorkiewicz v. Poland (dec.), no. 39860/98, 1 June
1998). However, backdating the recalculation with the effect that the
sums due were reduced involved an individual and excessive burden for
the applicant and was incompatible with Article 1 of the Protocol. In
this respect, the Court refers to the aforementioned Pravednaya
judgment, in which it noted:
“40. ... The 'public interest' may
admittedly include an efficient and harmonised State pension scheme,
for the sake of which the State may adjust its legislation.
41. However, the State's possible interest in
ensuring a uniform application of the Pensions Law should not have
brought about the retrospective recalculation of the judicial award
already made. The Court considers that by depriving the applicant of
the right to benefit from the pension in the amount secured in a
final judgment, the State upset a fair balance between the interests
at stake (see, mutatis mutandis, Pressos Compania Naviera
S.A. and Others v. Belgium, judgment of 20 November 1995,
Series A no. 332, § 43).”
- The
Court does not find it necessary to depart from its conclusions in
that judgment and considers that there has been a violation of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the present case.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 6,813 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage,
which represented the amount of arrears and increased pension under
the judgment of 13 April 2000 index-linked to the inflation rate of
833.3% and converted into euros. She also claimed EUR 12,000 in
respect of non-pecuniary damage.
- The
Government contested the applicant's claims. They argued that the
applicant's method of calculation of the amount of pecuniary damage
was unreliable and that her claims in this respect were
unsubstantiated. They also submitted that the applicant's claims in
respect of non-pecuniary damage were excessive. In the Government's
view, a finding of a violation would suffice to compensate her for
any non-pecuniary damage she had sustained.
- The Court does not discern any causal link between the
violation of Article 6 and the pecuniary damage alleged. However, in
respect of the violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and having
regard to the nature of the violation found, the Court considers it
appropriate to award the applicant EUR 250 representing the sum she
would have received had the judgment of 13 April 2000 not been
annulled (see Yuriy Romanov v. Russia, no. 69341/01, §
60, 25 October 2005).
- As to non-pecuniary damage, the Court considers that
the applicant must have suffered distress and frustration resulting
from the decision to re-open a judgment in her favour, which cannot
sufficiently be compensated for by the finding of a violation. Making
its assessment on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR 500
in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant claimed EUR 5,500 in respect of the costs and expenses she
had incurred in the proceeding before the Court, EUR 5,000 of which
represented the amount she had paid to her lawyer under a contract of
legal representation and EUR 500 the amount of expenses for such
items as postage, photocopies and notary's fees.
- The
Government did not contest the authenticity of the contract of legal
representation submitted by the applicant, and agreed that the
expenses claimed by the applicant could be regarded as those actually
incurred. They argued, however, that the amount indicated in the
contract could not be considered as reasonable and necessary. They
also contested the amount of EUR 500, stating that those were part of
the total sum under the contract of legal representation. In the
Government's view, the sum of EUR 1,000 could be regarded as
reasonable and necessary in the present case.
- The
Court reiterates that in order for costs and expenses to be included
in an award under Article 41, it must be established that they were
actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum
(see, for example, Nilsen and Johnsen v. Norway [GC], no.
23118/93, § 62, ECHR 1999-VIII).
- In the present case, having regard to the documents
submitted by the applicant, the above criteria and the complexity of
the case, the Court accepts the Government's argument and awards the
applicant EUR 1,000 for costs and expenses, less EUR 715 received by
way of legal aid from the Council of Europe, plus any tax, including
value-added tax, that may be chargeable.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts, to be converted into the national currency of the respondent
State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) RUR
250 (two hundred and fifty euros) in respect of pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR
500 (five hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(iii) EUR
285 (two hundred and eighty-five euros) in respect of costs and
expenses;
(iv) any
tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 7 June 2007, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President
