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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF KUMKIN AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 73294/01)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
5 July
2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Kumkin and Others v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr C.L. Rozakis, President,
Mr L.
Loucaides,
Mrs N. Vajić,
Mr A.
Kovler,
Mr K. Hajiyev,
Mr S.E. Jebens,
Mr G.
Malinverni, judges,
and Mr S. Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 14 June 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 73294/01) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by twelve Russian nationals whose names are listed
in the schedule appended hereto, on 26 April 2001.
- The
Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
Mr P. Laptev, the Representative of the Russian Federation at the
European Court of Human Rights.
- On
11 October 2005 the Court decided to give notice of the application
to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicants are Russian nationals who live in the town of Lytkarino in
the Moscow Region. They receive old-age pensions.
- On
1 February 1998 the Law on the Calculation and Adjustment of State
Pensions (hereafter “the Pensions Act”) introduced a new
method of calculation of retirement benefits based on what is known
as the “individual pensioner coefficient” (“the
IPC”). The IPC was the ratio between an individual's wages at
the time of retirement and the national average wage. The IPC was
meant to maintain a link between pensions and previous earnings.
- The
applicants considered that the Lyuberetskiy District Division of the
Pension Fund (hereafter “the Fund”) had incorrectly
calculated their pensions and they sued the Fund for an increase of
their pensions in accordance with the Pensions Act.
- On
12 April 2000 the Lytkarino Town Court found in the applicants'
favour. The Town Court held that the Fund had misconstrued the law
and that the applicants' pensions should be recalculated and
increased in line with an IPC of 0.7 starting from 1 February 1998.
On 30 May 2000 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the judgment on
appeal.
- On
31 May 2000 the Fund requested the Lytkarino Town Court to reopen the
case owing to a newly-discovered circumstance. The Fund claimed that
on 29 December 1999 the Ministry of Labour and Social
Development had issued an Instruction on the Application of
Limitations established by the Pensions Act. The Instruction
clarified how the Pensions Act should be applied. The Fund further
indicated that on 24 April 2000 the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation had dismissed the complaint by a group of individuals
challenging the Instruction. The Supreme Court found that the
Ministry of Labour had acted within its competence when it had issued
the Instruction, and that the Ministry's interpretation of the
Pensions Act had been correct. The Fund contended that since it had
been unaware of the Supreme Court's decision of 24 April 2000 at the
time of the judgment of 12 April 2000, the judgment would have to be
reconsidered.
- On 16 October 2000 and 5 February 2001 the Lytkarino
Town Court dismissed the Fund's request. The Town Court held as
follows:
“The Supreme Court's judgment [of 24 April 2000]
did not invalidate any other decision which had served as a basis for
the judgment of the Lytkarino Town Court of 12 April 2000. By that
judgment the Supreme Court held that the Instruction of the Ministry
of Labour complied with the requirements of the law. But that
Instruction existed and was in force at the time the Town Court
examined the case and issued the judgment in question. The fact that
the Supreme Court gave a detailed analysis of the Instruction, and
that it could have been taken into consideration by the Lytkarino
Town Court when it issued the judgment, does not lead to the
conclusion that the disputed judgment [of 12 April 2000] should be
quashed. The Lytkarino Town Court was competent to review the
disputed actions of [the Fund] in compliance with the law.”
Both
decisions were quashed by the Moscow Regional Court on 8 November
2000 and 26 February 2001, respectively, and the case was remitted
for a fresh examination.
- On
18 April 2001 the Lytkarino Town Court granted the Fund's request and
reopened the proceedings. The Town Court applied Article 333 of the
RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure according to which judgments could be
reconsidered in the event of discovery of significant circumstances
which were not, and could not have been, known to the party
concerned. The Town Court found that the Instruction could serve as
such a circumstance. The decision of 18 April 2001 was final and not
amenable to appeal.
- On
the same day the Town Court, after the fresh examination of the case,
dismissed the applicants' action in full, having applied the
Instruction.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- Article
333 of the RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure of 1964 (in force at the
material time) provided for grounds for reconsideration of final
judgments on the basis of “newly-discovered circumstances”.
Such grounds included, inter alia, significant circumstances
which were not and could not have been known to the party which
applied for reconsideration, and invalidation of a court ruling or
another authority's decision which had served as a legal basis for
the judgment in question.
Article
334 required that an application for reconsideration of a judgment
owing to the discovery of new circumstances should be lodged within
three months after the discovery of the circumstances.
Pursuant
to Article 337 a court, after having examined an application for
reconsideration of a final judgment on the basis of newly-discovered
circumstances, should either grant such an application and quash the
final judgment or dismiss the application. Such a decision was not
amenable to appeal.
- On
2 February 1996 the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
adopted a ruling concerning certain provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (CCrP). In that ruling the Constitutional Court
decided that Article 384 of the CCrP (“Grounds for
reconsideration of a [criminal] case on the basis of newly discovered
circumstances”, which was in many respects similar to Article
333 of the Code of Civil Procedure) was unconstitutional in that it
limited the grounds for the reopening of a criminal case to
situations of “newly discovered circumstances”. In that
ruling the Constitutional Court suggested that this provision of the
CCrP prevented rectification of judicial errors and miscarriages of
justice.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1
- The
applicants complained that the decision of the Lytkarino Town Court
of 18 April 2001 to quash the judgment of 12 April 2000 and
reconsider the case had violated their “right to a court”
and deprived them of the fruits of the litigation. The Court
considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 §
1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Pravednaya
v. Russia, no. 69529/01, §§ 19-42, 18 November
2004). The relevant parts of these provisions provide as follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations... everyone is entitled to a fair... hearing ... by
[a]... tribunal established by law...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law...”
A. The parties' submissions
- The
Government submitted that the judgment of 12 April 2000 had not
determined any definite amount, but had rather established how
pensions should be calculated. In this connection they recalled the
Court's findings in the case of Kiryanov v. Russia ((dec.),
no. 42212/02, 9 December 2004) and maintained that the dispute
in the present case concerned legislation on pensions which fell
outside the area of “civil rights and obligations”. In
support of this assertion the Government also referred to Schouten
and Meldrum v. the Netherlands (judgment of 9 December 1994,
Series A no. 304) and Pančenko v. Latvia, ((dec.),
no. 40772/98, 28 October 1999), alleging that “the
determination of the order of calculation of pensions belongs to the
realm of public law”.
- The
Government further contested that the pensions awarded to the
applicants by virtue of the judgment of 12 April 2000 constituted
their “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1. They noted that in the case of Pravednaya v.
Russia (no. 69529/01, 18 November 2004) the Court had
regarded a judicial award of that type as the applicant's
“possession”. However, in the Government's view, such an
approach created confusion. If the sum awarded by a court was a
pensioner's “possession”, it should not be affected by
any subsequent increase in pension rates. Therefore, in Pravednaya
the applicant would have had to return the money she had already
received from the Pension Fund by virtue of the more recent changes
in the legislation on State pensions. They concluded that in order to
avoid such situations the Court should not regard the pension amounts
awarded by the domestic courts as claimants' “possessions”
within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
- The
Government also claimed that the Town Court had not reopened the case
capriciously, but because of the decision of the Supreme Court which
had confirmed the lawfulness of the Instruction. The case was
reopened with a view to correcting a judicial error. In their
request for reopening, the Fund referred to the decision of the
Supreme Court of 24 April 2000. This was a major difference
in relation to the Pravednaya case where the request for
reopening had been made without reference to that decision of the
Supreme Court.
- The
Government invited the Court to conclude that the complaint was
incompatible with the Convention ratione materiae, or,
alternatively, that there had been no breach of Article 6 § 1 or
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the reopening of the case
concerning the applicants' pensions.
- The
applicants maintained their complaints.
B. The Court's assessment
1. Admissibility
-
As regards the Government's objection that the applicants' complaint
under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 was incompatible ratione
materiae, the Court notes that the Russian Government have
raised an identical objection in many cases concerning the reopening
of proceedings in pension disputes owing to so-called “newly
discovered circumstances”. The Court has examined that
objection in detail and dismissed it.
- In
particular, in the case of Bulgakova v. Russia (no. 69524/01,
18 January 2007) the Court held that Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention was applicable to proceedings concerning the
calculation of the applicant's pension on the basis of the IPC
because “even if the indication of the precise amount was
missing from the judgment, the proceedings at issue established a
particular pecuniary obligation of the State vis-à-vis
the applicant” and because “beyond doubt the pension and
the related benefits, which are purely economic in nature, are
'civil' rights within the meaning of Article 6 § 1”
(see Bulgakova, cited above, §§ 28-30).
- Furthermore,
the Court also found that a “legitimate” expectation to
receive a pension by virtue of a final court judgment, as in the
present case, attracted the protection of Article 1 of Protocol No.
1, and that the annulment of a sufficiently clear and specific
judgment constituted an interference with the applicant's
“possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 (ibid. § 31).
- The
Court sees no reason to depart from those findings in the present
case and dismisses the Government's objection that the applicants'
complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention
provisions.
- The Court further notes that the present complaint is
not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3
of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
(a) Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
(i) General principles
- The
right to a fair hearing before a tribunal as guaranteed by Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention must be interpreted in the light of the
Preamble to the Convention, which, in its relevant part, declares the
rule of law to be part of the common heritage of the Contracting
States. One of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the
principle of legal certainty, which requires, among other things,
that where the courts have finally determined an issue, their ruling
should not be called into question (see Brumărescu v. Romania
[GC], no. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999 VII). This
principle underlines that no party is entitled to seek a review of a
final and binding judgment merely for the purpose of obtaining a
rehearing and a fresh determination of the case.
- Indeed,
the Convention in principle tolerates the reopening of final
judgments if new circumstances are discovered. For example, Article 4
of Protocol no. 7 expressly permits the State to correct miscarriages
of criminal justice. A verdict ignoring key evidence may well
constitute such a miscarriage. However, the power of review should be
exercised to correct judicial errors and miscarriages of justice, and
not treated just as an “appeal in disguise” (see Ryabykh
v. Russia, no. 52854/99, § 52, ECHR
2003 IX).
- The
Court recalls its findings in the Pravednaya case, cited
above, where it held (§§ 28 et seq.) as follows:
“The procedure for quashing of a final judgment
presupposes that there is evidence not previously available through
the exercise of due diligence that would lead to a different outcome
of the proceedings. The person applying for rescission should show
that there was no opportunity to present the item of evidence at the
final hearing and that the evidence is decisive. Such a procedure is
defined in Article 333 of the CCivP and is common to the legal
systems of many member States.”
However,
this procedure may be misused, as in the Pravednaya case. In
that case the relevant pension agency, referring to the same
Instruction as in the present case, had obtained the reopening of the
proceedings and the quashing of the initial judgment with retroactive
effect. The Court concluded that this had constituted a breach of
Article 6 § 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
(ii) Application to the present case
- The
Government argued that the present case should be distinguished from
the case of Pravednaya (cited above) because in the instant
case the Town Court's decision to reopen the proceedings had been
based on the “newly discovered circumstance” constituted
by the Supreme Court's judgment of 24 April 2000, whilst in the
Pravednaya case it had been the Instruction which served as
the ground for the reopening. The Court agrees that the main
difference between the two cases lies in the legal instruments on
which the domestic courts relied to justify the quashing of the final
judgments and the reopening of the proceedings. However, the Court is
not convinced that this difference warrants a departure from the
conclusion reached in the case of Pravednaya.
- The
Court observes that on 12 April 2000 the applicants obtained a
judgment by which the Fund, a State body, was to recalculate and
increase their pensions in compliance with the requirements of the
new Pensions Act. Before giving judgment the Town Court had examined
and applied various legal instruments, including the Instruction,
regulating the calculation and payment of pensions. This conclusion
is supported by the findings made by the Town Court in its decisions
of 16 October 2000 and 5 February 2001 (see paragraph 9
above). The Town Court's interpretation and application of the
domestic law led to the judgment in favour of the applicants. On
24 April 2000, while the appeal proceedings against the Town
Court's judgment were pending, the Supreme Court adopted a judgment
confirming the lawfulness of the Instruction which supported the
Fund's reading of the Pensions Act. On 30 May 2000 the Regional
Court upheld the judgment of the Town Court. On the following day the
Fund applied for a reopening of the proceedings, referring to the
Supreme Court's judgment. Following the two refusals, on 18 April
2001 the Town Court accepted the request, reopened the proceedings
and dismissed the applicants' claims, applying the Instruction.
- The
Court has to ascertain whether the Supreme Court's judgment of 24
April 2000 may count as a “newly discovered circumstance”,
as it was found to be by the Town Court, and whether the quashing of
the final judgment of 12 April 2000, as upheld on 30 May 2000, was
justified in the circumstances of the case.
- The
Court reiterates that circumstances which concern a case and which
already existed during the trial, but remained hidden from the judge
and became known only after the trial, are “newly discovered”.
Circumstances which concern the case but arise only after the trial
are “new” (cf. Bulgakova, cited above, § 39).
Furthermore, for evidence to be considered a “newly discovered
circumstance” it has to have been previously unobtainable
through the exercise of due diligence. A person applying for a
judgment to be set aside should show that it was impossible to
present the item of evidence at the final hearing and that the
evidence is decisive (see
Pravednaya, cited above, § 31).
- The
Court notes that the Supreme Court's ruling was made after the Town
Court's judgment of 12 April 2000. Thus, it did not exist while
the proceedings were pending before the Town Court. However, the
Supreme Court's judgment was given more than a month before the
appeal judgment of 30 May 2000 of the Regional Court. The Fund could
have invoked the Supreme Court's ruling at the appeal proceedings
before the Regional Court, but it did not do so. Instead, on the day
after the Regional Court had given the final judgment, the Fund
applied for a reopening of the case relying on the Supreme Court's
ruling. It did not provide any explanation as to its inability to
invoke the Supreme Court's judgment during the appeal proceedings.
- Having
regard to the fact that the Supreme Court's judgment of 24 April
2000 was adopted while the appeal proceedings were still pending and
that it was open to the Fund, through the exercise of due diligence,
to rely on that judgment before the Regional Court, the Court cannot
accept that the Supreme Court's judgment of 24 April 2000 could be
construed as a “newly discovered circumstance”.
- The
Court also does not lose sight of the fact that on two occasions the
Town Court refused to accept the Supreme Court's ruling as a “newly
discovered circumstance”, because it had merely given an
interpretation of the Instruction which had already been examined by
the Town Court (see paragraph 9 above). In this connection, the Court
reiterates that the fact that a higher-instance court disagreed with
the interpretation of the domestic law given by the courts below,
cannot, in itself, serve as an exceptional circumstance warranting
the quashing of a binding and enforceable judgment and reopening of
the proceedings on the applicant's claim (see Kot v. Russia,
no. 20887/03, § 29, 18 January 2007).
- The
Court considers that the Fund's request of 31 May 2000 to reopen
the case owing to the discovery of new circumstances was in essence
an attempt to re-argue the case on points which the Fund could have,
but apparently failed, to raise on appeal. That being so, the Court
considers the Fund's request to be an “appeal in disguise”
rather than a conscientious effort to make good a miscarriage of
justice (cf. Pravednaya, cited
above, §§ 31-33).
-
The Court therefore concludes that by granting the Fund's request to
set aside the final judgment of 12 April 2000, as upheld on appeal on
30 May 2000, the domestic authorities infringed the principle of
legal certainty and the applicants' “right to a court”
under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
- There
has accordingly been a violation of that Article.
(b) Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
- The
Court reiterates that the existence of a debt confirmed by a binding
and enforceable judgment constitutes the judgment beneficiary's
“possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1. Quashing of such a judgment amounts to an interference
with his or her right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions (see,
among other authorities, Androsov v. Russia, no. 63973/00,
§ 69, 6 October 2005).
- The
Court observes that the final and enforceable judgment of 12 April
2000, as upheld on 30 May 2000, by which the applicants had been
awarded increased pensions in accordance with the provisions of the
new Pensions Act, was quashed on 18 April 2001. The Town Court
re-examined the matter and dismissed the applicants' claims. Thus,
the applicants, through no fault of their own, were prevented from
receiving the initial judgment award.
- To
justify that interference the Government claimed that it had been
lawful and pursued a legitimate aim, namely to correct a judicial
error. The Court accepts that this measure pursued the public
interest; however, its compliance with the “lawfulness”
requirement of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is questionable. Whilst
the case was reopened because the domestic court viewed the Supreme
Court's judgment of 24 April 2000 as a “newly discovered
circumstance”, such a reading of Article 333 of the RSFSR Code
of Civil Procedure is more than liberal (see paragraph 33
above). Even assuming that the Town Court's reading of the domestic
law was not arbitrary, it still remains to be established whether the
interference was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
- In
this connection the Court has already examined a similar argument in
the Pravednaya case, where it held that “the State's
possible interest in ensuring a uniform application of the Pensions
Law should not have brought about the retrospective recalculation of
the judicial award already made” (Pravednaya, cited
above, § 41). The backdating of the recalculation, with the
effect that the sums due were reduced, frustrated the applicants'
reliance on the binding judicial decision and deprived them of an
opportunity to receive the money they had legitimately expected to
receive (cf. Bulgakova, cited above, § 47). In these
circumstances, the Court considers that the quashing of the
enforceable judgment of 12 April 2000, as upheld on 30 May 2000,
placed an excessive burden on the applicants and was incompatible
with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
- There
has therefore been a violation of that Convention provision.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- As
regards pecuniary damage, the applicants claimed the sums listed in
the schedule. These sums represent the difference between the
pensions to which they were entitled in accordance with the judgment
of 12 April 2000 and the pensions actually paid. They calculated
those sums on the basis of an IPC of 0.7 and in respect of a period
lasting until the date when the IPC was increased by virtue of
amendments to the Pensions Act and they started to receive pensions
based on an increased IPC. They further claimed indexing of those
sums to take account of inflation. The applicants claimed 1,000,000
Russian roubles to be paid to each of them in respect of
non-pecuniary damage.
- The
Government, using the same method of calculation for the applicants'
pensions, argued that the applicants were entitled to lower sums than
they had claimed and that certain applicants would even have to
return money to the Pension Fund if the Court were to find a breach
of their rights owing to the quashing of a final judgment in their
favour.
- As
regards the applicants' claims in respect of the difference in
pension payments, the Court observes that in the present case it has
found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 in that the applicants had been unable to receive
increased pensions as a result of the reopening of the proceedings
and the quashing of the final judgment in their favour. The Court
notes that the most appropriate form of redress in respect of a
violation of Article 6 is to ensure that the applicant as far as
possible is put in the position he would have been in had the
requirements of Article 6 not been disregarded (see Piersack
v. Belgium (Article 50), judgment of 26 October 1984,
Series A no. 85, p. 16, § 12, and, mutatis
mutandis, Gençel v. Turkey, no. 53431/99,
§ 27, 23 October 2003). The Court finds that this principle
applies as well in the present case, having regard to the violations
found (cf. Poznakhirina v. Russia, no. 25964/02, § 33,
24 February 2005). The applicants were prevented from receiving
money they had legitimately expected to receive under the judgment of
12 April 2000.
- The
Court notes that the parties used the same method for the calculation
of the applicants' pensions. The only difference was the date until
which the parties applied the recalculation based on an IPC of 0.7.
The applicants alleged that they had been entitled to pensions with
an IPC of 0.7 until the date when the IPC was once again increased
and they had started to receive pensions with an IPC of more than
0.7. The Government made the recalculation with an IPC of 0.7 until 1
January 2002, when the IPC was abolished. In this connection the
Court notes that the Government did not dispute that the applicants
had been entitled to pensions with an IPC of more than 0.7 when the
IPC was increased. Moreover, it appears that when the IPC was
increased in 2001 the applicants started to receive pensions
calculated on the basis of the increased IPC. Further increases of
the IPC also affected the applicants' pensions. It follows that in
accordance with the judgment of 12 April 2000, as upheld on 30 May
2000, the applicants were entitled to pensions calculated with an IPC
of 0.7 until an increased IPC was introduced under the Russian
pension legislation.
- The
Court therefore accepts the applicants' calculation of the pensions
to which they were entitled in accordance with the judgment of
12 April 2000 and awards the sums thus claimed in full (as
listed in the schedule), plus any tax that may be chargeable on those
amounts.
- As
to the claim in respect of inflation-related losses, the Court notes
that the applicants did not indicate the amounts of those losses and
did not offer an explanation as to the method of their calculation.
They did not submit any document showing the inflation rates in their
region during the period under consideration. The Court therefore
dismisses this claim.
-
The Court further considers that the applicants suffered distress and
frustration resulting from the quashing of the judgment of 12 April
2000, as upheld on 30 May 2000. Making its assessment on an equitable
basis, the Court awards each of the applicants 2,000 euros (EUR) in
respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable
on those amounts.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicants also claimed unspecified sums for the costs and expenses
incurred in proceedings before the domestic courts and the Court.
- The
Government argued that the applicants had not substantiated their
claims.
- According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of
his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these
have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to
quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in
its possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the claim
for costs and expenses because the applicants did not indicate the
sums claimed and did not submit any receipts or other vouchers in
support of their claims.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the sums listed
in the schedule in respect of pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may
be chargeable;
(b)
that the respondent State is to pay each of the applicants, within
three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 2,000 (two
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted
into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of the
settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(c) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 5 July 2007, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President
SCHEDULE
|
APPLICANT'S NAME
|
YEAR OF BIRTH
|
SUM CLAIMED IN RESPECT OF PECUNIARY DAMAGE (in
RUR)
|
|
Viktor Alekseyevich Kumkin
|
not specified
|
4,662
|
|
Galina Aleksandrovna Medvedeva
|
1934
|
4,662
|
|
Nelli Nikolayevna Chernyavskaya
|
1936
|
5,472
|
|
Raisa Vladimirovna Bibikova
|
1931
|
4,020
|
|
Aleksandra Vasilyevna Grishayeva
|
1927
|
4,503
|
|
Lidiya Pavlovna Gavrilova
|
1939
|
4,341
|
|
Valentina Pavlovna Grishina
|
1935
|
4,503
|
|
Mariya Pavlovna Matyushkina
|
1943
|
4,503
|
|
Anna Vladimirovna Zvereva
|
1938
|
4,020
|
|
Mariya Stepanovna Sudarkova
|
1927
|
4,020
|
|
Valentina Yemilyanovna Mironova
|
1930
|
5,622
|
|
Irina Ivanovna Shadrina
|
1938
|
4,020
|
