FOURTH SECTION
PARTIAL DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 6809/03
by Dariusz CZAJKOWSKI
against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 16 October 2007 as a Chamber composed of:
	, President,

 judges,
and Mr  Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 4 February 2003,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Dariusz Czajkowski, is a Polish national who was born in 1962 and lives in Kościan.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
A.  The criminal proceedings
On 18 February 1993 the applicant was arrested by the police.
On 20 February 1993 the Poznań District Prosecutor decided to detain the applicant on remand in view of a reasonable suspicion that he had committed a burglary at the “Plus” warehouse from where he had stolen 120,000,000 (old) zlotys (12,000 Polish zlotys, PLN) and goods worth PLN 6,000.
On 14 May 1993 the applicant was indicted before the Poznań Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki). The bill of indictment contains the following statement:
“On the basis of the evidence obtained, it was determined that the perpetrator of the offence is Dariusz Czajkowski who is employed in the company “Plus” as a commercial director.”
On 2 August 1993 the applicant was released from detention.
On 18 November 1993 the Poznań Regional Court gave a judgment. The applicant was acquitted of all charges.
The prosecutor lodged an appeal against the judgment.
On 21 April 1994 the Poznań Court of Appeal quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the District Prosecutor.
On 29 November 1994 the prosecutor decided to stay the proceedings.
On 2 January 1996 the prosecutor decided to resume the proceedings against the applicant. The prosecutor established that it was necessary to hear two witnesses but their addresses were unknown. Thus, on 19 January 1996 the prosecutor again stayed the proceedings.
It appears that the applicant on several occasions inquired about the progress of the investigation and about the reasons for the delay.
On 16 June 2003 the Poznań District Prosecutor replied to the applicant’s letters in which he had complained about the delay in the investigation against him and the lack of information about his case. He informed the applicant that the proceedings had been stayed since it had proved impossible to establish the addresses of the witnesses. On 3 December 2003 the Poznań Appellate Prosecutor in another letter dismissed the applicant’s allegations that the delay in his case had been caused by the inactivity of the prosecution service.
On 3 March 2004 the investigation against the applicant was resumed and one witness was heard. However, on the same date the District Prosecutor decided to stay the proceedings again.
On 23 September 2004 the Poznań Regional Prosecutor dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision to stay the proceedings.
The investigation against the applicant remains stayed before the Poznań District Prosecutor.
B.  The seizure of the car and subsequent proceedings
On 25 February 1993 the police seized the applicant’s car, a Fiat 126p, on the ground that it had been bought with the money from the burglary. It appears that the previous owners of the car withdrew from the contract of sale because of a defect in the contract. On 30 April 1993 the Poznań District Prosecutor decided to return the car to its previous owners and prohibited them from selling it. He recovered from the sellers the sum of money paid by the applicant for the car, decided that the money was material evidence (dowód rzeczowy) in the case against the applicant and deposited it with the court.
On 17 June 1994 the applicant’s lawyer asked for the money to be returned to the applicant. On 5 July 1994 the Poznań District Prosecutor dismissed the request since material evidence of the alleged offence could not be returned to an accused. The applicant’s appeal against this decision was dismissed by the Regional Prosecutor on 17 August 1994.
Subsequently, the previous owners asked for the prohibition on selling the car to be lifted. On 29 November 1994 the Poznań District Prosecutor allowed the request and in December 1994 the car was sold to another person.
On 20 January 2003 the applicant requested the prosecution service to start an investigation into an offence allegedly committed at the time of registration of the car by its new owner in December 1994. On 30 April 2003 the Września District Prosecutor discontinued the investigation. He established that the car had been sold following the prosecutor’s decision of 29 November 1994. The applicant appealed. On 12 November 2003 the Września District Court dismissed the appeal against the prosecutor’s decision of 30 April 2003. The court established that the limitation period had elapsed in the instant case and the prosecution of the alleged offences was therefore time-barred.
On 15 December 2003 the Poznań Regional Prosecutor answered one of the applicant’s complaints relating to the loss of his car. The prosecutor informed the applicant that the money obtained for the car had been considered as material evidence and had been deposited with the court. Thus, it could be claimed by the applicant by means of a civil action or awarded by the court in a final decision given in his criminal case.
The applicant lodged a civil action for compensation with the Gdańsk District Court for his unlawful detention in 1993 and for the seizure of his car and the non-return of the deposit. On 22 February 2005 the court exempted him from court fees.
On 26 June 2006 the applicant’s court-appointed lawyer informed the applicant that he saw no prospects of success for his civil action. In particular, he explained that a civil court would not be competent to examine a claim for compensation for unlawful detention as such a claim had to be lodged with a criminal court after the final acquittal. As regards his motion for reimbursement of the sum of money for the car deposited with the court, the lawyer maintained that the matter could only be dealt with in a final decision of the court examining his criminal case and that a civil claim would fail.
In the light of the lawyer’s opinion the applicant decided to withdraw his civil claim.
C.  Other proceedings
In March and April 2003 the applicant made several complaints to the prison authorities about his health problems. Following his complaints, on 3 April 2003 he was transferred to a hospital unit of the Medyka Prison.
The applicant asked the prosecutor to start an investigation into his allegations against the prison authorities. The applicant complained about the conditions in the Medyka Prison, in particular that in spite of his poor state of health he had been obliged to walk 100 metres to the showers and to use a squat toilet - the only one available in his cell. He also complained that one letter sent to him by the court’s bailiff had been illegally opened by the prison authorities. On 12 June 2003 the prosecutor decided to discontinue the investigation into the applicant’s complaints as he considered that his allegations were manifestly ill-founded. The prosecutor established that the applicant had not previously requested to be moved to a cell located closer to the showers or with a different type of toilet. As regards the alleged censorship of the letter from the court’s bailiff, the prosecutor established that no offence had been committed as the letter had been opened accidentally by the prison administration because it had been wrongly addressed by the bailiff’s office. The applicant’s appeal against this decision was dismissed on 18 November 2003 by the Przemyśl District Court.
On 30 September 2005 the Gdańsk District Prosecutor discontinued the investigation into the applicant’s allegations that his correspondence with various institutions had been controlled or censored. The prosecutor informed the applicant that according to the domestic law his correspondence might have been controlled for security purposes or censored. While the domestic law prohibited interference with his correspondence with certain authorities or international organisations, nevertheless, no instance of censorship of correspondence with those bodies had been established. It is not clear whether the applicant appealed against this decision.
COMPLAINTS
1.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the unreasonable length of the criminal proceedings against him. In particular he complained about the inactivity of the prosecution service which, since 1994, has been conducting an investigation against him.
2.  He also complained under Article 6 § 2 about the statement included in the bill of indictment in which the prosecutor stated that the applicant was the perpetrator of the offence. The applicant complained that the prosecutor should not have made a statement as to his guilt before a final judgment had been delivered by a court.
3.  The applicant complained that he had been deprived of his possessions, in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, in that in 1993 and 1994 the prosecutor decided to return his car to its previous owners and subsequently agreed to its sale.
4.  The applicant raised general and multiple complaints relating to his detention in various detention centres between 2003 and 2005 maintaining that his detention conditions were inhuman given his state of health. He also submitted that his correspondence, including with the Court, had been blatantly opened and censored by the authorities.
5.  The applicant also complained that the groundless prosecution against him had ruined his private and family life. As a consequence of the criminal proceedings he had been dismissed from his job and had lost his good name and reputation since it became well-known that he had robbed his employer. He was hounded and prosecuted because of his criminal past in spite of the obvious fact that for 14 years the prosecution service has been unable to mount a case against him.
THE LAW
1.  The applicant alleged a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the unreasonable length of the criminal proceedings against him.
The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case file, determine the admissibility of this complaint and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 2 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.

2.  The applicant also complained that the prosecutor declared him guilty in the bill of indictment of 14 May 1993, in breach of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, which provides as follows:
“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”
The Court recalls that the presumption of innocence enshrined in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention is one of the elements of a fair criminal trial required by Article 6 § 1. It will be violated if a statement of a public official concerning a person charged with a criminal offence reflects an opinion that he is guilty before he has been proved so according to law. It suffices, even in the absence of any formal finding, that there is some reasoning to suggest that the official regards the accused as guilty (see, mutatis mutandis, the Allenet de Ribemont v. France judgment of 10 February 1995, Series A no. 308, p. 16, § 35). In this regard the Court has emphasised the importance of the choice of words used by public officials in their statements before a person has been tried and found guilty of an offence.
Moreover, the principle of the presumption of innocence may be infringed not only by a judge or court but also by other public authorities, including prosecutors (see Daktaras v. Lithuania, no. 42095/98, § 42, ECHR 2000‑X). Nevertheless, whether a statement of a public official is in breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence must be determined in the context of the particular circumstances in which the impugned statement was made (see, inter alia, the Adolf v. Austria judgment of 26 March 1982, Series A no. 49, pp. 17-19, §§ 36-41).
The Court notes that in the present case the impugned statement was made by the prosecutor in the bill of indictment lodged against the applicant with the District Court.
While the use of the categorical form that the applicant “is the perpetrator of the offence” is unfortunate, the Court considers that, having regard to the context in which the word was used, the prosecutor was referring not to the question whether the applicant’s guilt had been established by the evidence – which was clearly not one for the determination of the prosecutor – but to the question whether the case file disclosed sufficient evidence of the applicant’s guilt to justify filing the bill of indictment against him (see Daktaras v. Lithuania, cited above, § 44). In these circumstances the Court concludes that there is no appearance that the statement used by the prosecutor in the bill of indictment constituted a breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence.
The Court finally notes that since the proceedings against the applicant are pending, he can still raise this complaint in his appeal against a judgment of the trial court in so far as he considers that the statement had a negative impact on the fairness of the trial.
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

3.  The applicant further complained, under Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the Convention, about the decision given on 25 February 1993 by which his car had been seized by the authorities. He also complained about subsequent decisions of the prosecutor taken in November 1994 relating to the return of the car to its previous owners and allowing it be sold.
the recognition by Poland of the right of individual petition took effecton 1 May 1993. prior to 10 October 1994, the date on which Poland ratified Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The Protocol only governs, for each Contracting Party, facts subsequent to its entry into force with respect to that Party.
It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione temporis with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
In so far as it can be understood that the applicant complained about the prosecutor’s decision of 29 November 1994, the Court notes that this complaint has been introduced out of time and must also be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

4.  The applicant raised several complaints relating to prison conditions and alleged censorship of his letters.
However, the Court notes that the applicant failed to submit any prima facie evidence to support his allegations that his correspondence with the Court had been censored by the authorities. His general complaints about censorship were dismissed by the domestic authorities which found the applicant’s allegations to be unsubstantiated. The Court thus considers, on the basis of the materials submitted by the applicant, that there is no appearance of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in the present case.
As regards the applicant’s complaints about inhuman prison conditions, regard being had to the reasons given by the authorities for dismissing his complaints, the nature of the difficulties alleged by him and given the practical demands of imprisonment, the Court considers that there is no evidence that the treatment complained of reached the threshold of severity required to bring the matters complained of within the ambit of Article 3 of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

5.  The applicant also complained that the lengthy criminal proceedings against him had ruined his private and family life. He was dismissed from his job and lost his good name and respect in the community as it became well-known that he had robbed his employer. The applicant also complained that he has been hounded and prosecuted because of his criminal past, even though the prosecution authorities have been unable for 14 years to mount a case against him.
The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 8 of the Convention, which in its relevant part provides as follows:
“1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life....”
The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case file, determine the admissibility of this complaint and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 2 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Decides to adjourn the examination of the applicant’s complaints concerning the unreasonable length of the criminal proceedings and the interference with his right to respect for his private and family life;
Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.
	T.L. 	Josep 
	Registrar	President