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SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF HIDVÉGI v. HUNGARY
(Application
no. 5482/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
14
October 2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Hidvégi v. Hungary,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Françoise
Tulkens,
President,
Ireneu
Cabral Barreto,
Vladimiro
Zagrebelsky,
Danutė
Jočienė,
András
Sajó,
Nona
Tsotsoria,
Işıl
Karakaş,
judges,
and Sally
Dollé, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 23 September 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 5482/05) against the
Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Hungarian national, Mr László
Endre Hidvégi (“the applicant”), on 4 February
2005.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr G. Kutas, a lawyer practising in
Budapest. The Hungarian Government (“the
Government”) were represented by Mr L. Höltzl, Agent,
Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.
- On
21 November 2007 the
President of the Second Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. Applying Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the
application at the same time.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Budapest.
- In
April 1997 the applicant bought a flat from a private individual,
S.M. The seller stipulated that she had the right to buy back the
property until 30 July 1997. However, she was not able to exercise
this right because of the lack of sufficient means.
- In
September 1997 the Land Registry registered the applicant's property
rights on the flat. Subsequently, the applicant requested S.M. to let
him have possession. Since S.M. was reluctant to leave the flat, the
applicant requested the Gödöllő District Court to
order the execution of the purchase contract – which had been
concluded by a notary public (közjegyzői okirat)
and, therefore, was executable as a final court judgment. The
District Court issued the order on 10 November 1997.
- Subsequently,
S.M. brought an action against the applicant before the Gödöllő
District Court, requesting the court to establish the invalidity of
the purchase contract and to order the termination of its execution.
In April 1998 the District Court dismissed the plaintiff's action. On
appeal, in October 1998 the Pest County Regional Court upheld the
first-instance decision.
- S.M.
requested that the case be reopened. The Gödöllő
District Court suspended the execution of the purchase contract. The
applicant appealed. The Pest County Regional Court reversed the
first-instance decision and ordered the continuation of the execution
in April 1999. Subsequently, S.M.'s request to reopen the case was
dismissed. In May 1999 S.M. again requested the suspension of the
execution, but the District Court dismissed her request.
- In
the meantime, the applicant was charged with the forgery of the
contract in question. In view of the ongoing criminal proceedings,
the Gödöllő District Court suspended the execution of
the contract on 15 July 1999. In May 2003 the Budapest
Regional Court, acting as a second-instance court, acquitted the
applicant. On 12 June 2004 the applicant requested the continuation
of the execution. On 13 July 2004 the District Court accepted the
applicant's claim. The Regional Court upheld the first-instance
decision on 21 October 2004.
- According
to the information available in the case file, the execution
proceedings are still pending.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
- The
Government contested that argument.
- The
period to be taken into consideration began on 10 November 1997 and
has not yet ended, according to the information available in the case
file. It has thus lasted over ten years and ten months for two levels
of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
application (see Frydlender, cited above).
- Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument
capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the
present circumstances. Having regard to its case-law on the subject,
the Court finds that the length of the proceedings was excessive and
failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
- There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant further complained that the length of the proceedings had
infringed his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, as
guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which provides as follow:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
- The
Court notes that this complaint is linked to that under Article 6 § 1
of the Convention which has already been examined above and must
therefore, likewise, be declared admissible. However, having regard
to its finding under Article 6 § 1 (see paragraph 18 above), the
Court considers that it is not necessary to examine separately
whether there has also been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 (see Zanghì v. Italy, judgment of 19 February
1991, Series A no. 194-C, p. 47, § 23).
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- The
Court observes that the applicant complained under Article 14 of the
Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
,
without substantiating or developing further this complaint. The
Court finds, however, that the applicant's submissions do not
disclose any appearance that he suffered discrimination in breach of
the Convention. It follows that this part of the application is
manifestly-ill founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3, and
must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 15,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and
non-pecuniary damage.
- The
Government contested these claims.
- The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.
However, on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR 8,000 for
non-pecuniary damages.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant also claimed EUR 4,500 for the costs and expenses incurred
before the domestic courts and for those incurred before the Court.
- The
Government did not express an opinion on the matter.
- According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. The Court notes that the applicant's costs
claim has not been substantiated by any relevant documents and must
therefore be rejected.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaints concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings and a violation of property rights
admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds that there is no need to examine
separately the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 8,000
(eight thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in
respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Hungarian
forints at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 October 2008, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Sally Dollé Françoise Tulkens
Registrar President
