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GRAND
CHAMBER
CASE OF
YUMAK AND SADAK v. TURKEY
(Application
no. 10226/03)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
8 July
2008
This
judgment is final but may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey,
The
European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed
of:
Boštjan
M. Zupančič,
President,
Peer Lorenzen,
Françoise
Tulkens,
Josep Casadevall,
Rıza
Türmen,
Corneliu Bîrsan,
Volodymyr
Butkevych,
Nina Vajić,
Anatoly
Kovler,
Vladimiro Zagrebelsky,
Elisabeth
Steiner,
Javier Borrego Borrego,
Khanlar
Hajiyev,
Renate Jaeger,
Ján
Šikuta,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,
Päivi
Hirvelä, judges,
and
Vincent Berger, Jurisconsult,
Having
deliberated in private on 21 November 2007 and 4 June 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on the last mentioned
date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 10226/03) against the Republic
of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by two Turkish nationals, Mr Mehmet Yumak and
Mr Resul Sadak (“the applicants”), on 1 March 2003.
- The
applicants, who had been granted legal aid, were represented by Mr T.
Elçi, a lawyer practising in Diyarbakır. The Turkish
Government (“the Government”) were represented by their
Agent.
- The
applicants alleged that the electoral threshold of 10% imposed
nationally for parliamentary elections interfered with the free
expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the
legislature. They relied on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.
- The
application was allocated to the Second Section of the Court (Rule 52
§ 1 of the Rules of Court). On 9 May 2006 it was declared
partly admissible by a Chamber of that Section composed of the
following judges: Jean-Paul Costa, Ireneu Cabral Barreto, Rıza
Türmen, Mindia Ugrekhelidze, Antonella Mularoni, Elisabet
Fura-Sandström and Dragoljub Popović and also of Sally
Dollé, Section Registrar.
- A
hearing on the merits (Rule 54 § 3) was held in public in the
Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 5 September 2006.
- In
its judgment of 30 January 2007 (the Chamber judgment), the Chamber
held by five votes to two that there had been no violation of
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. The joint dissenting opinion of
Judges Ireneu Cabral Barreto and Antonella Mularoni was annexed to
the judgment.
- On
21 April 2007 the applicants asked for the case to be referred to the
Grand Chamber by virtue of Article 43 of the Convention. On 9 July
2007 a panel of the Grand Chamber granted the request.
- The
composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the
provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and
Rule 24.
- The
applicants and the Government each filed written observations on the
merits. Observations were also received from Minority Rights Group
International, a non-governmental organisation based in London, which
the President had authorised to intervene in the written proceedings
(Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 24).
- A
hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building,
Strasbourg, on 21 November 2007 (Rule 59 § 3).
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Mr M.
Özmen, co-Agent,
Mr H. Hünler, Counsel,
Mrs A.
Özdemir,
Mrs V. Sirmen,
Mrs Y. Renda,
Mrs Ö.
Gazialem, Advisers;
(b) for the applicants
Mr T.
Elçi, Representative,
Mr T. Fisher,
Mrs E.
Frank, Advisers,
Mr R. Sadak, Applicant.
The
Court heard addresses by Mr Elçi and Mr Özmen and replies
from Mr Fisher and Mr Özmen to questions from several
judges.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The applicants were born in 1962 and 1959 respectively
and live in Şırnak. They stood for election in the
parliamentary elections of 3 November 2002 as candidates of the
People's Democratic Party (DEHAP) in the province of Şırnak,
but neither of them was elected.
A. The parliamentary elections of 3 November 2002
- Following
the 1999 earthquakes Turkey went through two serious economic crises
in November 2000 and February 2001. There then followed a political
crisis, due firstly to the state of health of the then Prime Minister
and secondly to the numerous internal divisions within the governing
coalition, a grouping of three political parties.
- It
was in that context that on 31 July 2002 the Grand National Assembly
of Turkey (“the National Assembly”) decided to bring
forward the date of the next parliamentary elections to 3 November
2002.
- In
early September three left-wing political parties, the People's
Democracy Party (HADEP), the Labour Party (EMEP) and the Democratic
Socialist Party (SDP), decided to form a “Labour, Peace and
Democracy Block” and to form a new political party, DEHAP. The
applicants began their electoral campaign as the new party's leading
candidates in the province of Şırnak.
- Such
pre-electoral alliances had already been formed in 1991, since the
Nationalist Labour party (MÇP – the successor to and
predecessor of the MHP) and the Reformist Democracy Party (IDP) had
secured seats for their candidates by joining the list presented by
the Welfare Party (RP), and the People's Labour Party (HEP –
the predecessor of DEHAP) had won 18 seats in parliament by
placing candidates on the list of the Popular Social Democratic Party
(SHP). In that way some parties not likely to obtain 10% of the
national vote sometimes manage to obtain parliamentary
representation: they join the list of a larger party and then, once
elected, leave it and go their own way, either with independent MPs
or under the banner of another party.
- The
results of the elections of 3 November 2002 in the province of Şırnak
gave the DEHAP list 47,449 of the 103,111 votes cast, a score of
about 45.95%. However, as the party had not succeeded in passing the
national threshold of 10%, the applicants were not elected. The three
seats allocated to Şırnak province were shared as follows:
two seats for the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma – the
Justice and Development Party, a party of the conservative right),
which had polled 14.05% (14,460 votes), and one seat for Mr Tatar, an
independent candidate who had polled 9.69% (9,914 votes).
- Of
the eighteen parties which had taken part in the elections only the
AKP and the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – the People's
Republican Party, a left-wing party) succeeded in passing the 10%
threshold. With 34.26% of the votes cast, the AKP won 363 seats, 66%
of those in the National Assembly. The CHP, which polled 19.4%,
obtained 178 seats, or 33% of the total. Nine independent candidates
were also elected.
- However,
not only DEHAP, which scored 6.22%, but many other political parties
were unable to obtain seats in parliament. These included the True
Path Party (DYP, centre-right), the National Action Party (MHP,
nationalist), the Young Party (GP, centrist) and the Motherland Party
(ANAP, centre-right), which polled 9.54%, 8.36%, 7.25% and 5.13% of
the votes cast respectively.
- The
results of these elections were generally interpreted as a huge
political upheaval. Not only did the proportion of the electorate not
represented in parliament reach a record level in Turkey
(approximately 45%) but in addition the abstention rate (22% of
registered voters) exceeded 20% for the first time since 1980. As a
result, the National Assembly which emerged from the elections was
the least representative since 1946, the year in which a multi-party
system was first introduced. Moreover, for the first time since 1954,
only two parties were represented in parliament.
- To
explain the National Assembly's unrepresentativity, some commentators
have referred to the cumulative effect of a number of factors over
and above the existence of a high national threshold. For example,
because of the protest vote phenomenon linked to the economic and
political crisis, the five parties which had obtained seats in the
1999 parliamentary elections – including the three which had
formed the governing coalition between 1999 and 2002 – were
unable to reach the 10% threshold in 2002 and were accordingly
deprived of representation in parliament. Similarly, electoral
fragmentation had an effect on the results in that numerous attempts
to form pre-electoral coalitions had come to nothing.
- After
these elections the AKP, which had an absolute majority in
parliament, formed a government.
B. The parliamentary elections of 22 July 2007
(subsequent to the Chamber judgment)
- In
early May 2007 the Turkish parliament decided to hold early
parliamentary elections, choosing 22 July 2007 as the date. The
decision followed a political crisis resulting from parliament's
inability to elect a new President of the Republic to follow on from
Ahmet Necdet Sezer before the expiry of his single seven-year term of
office, on 16 May 2007. In the normal course of events, these
elections should have been held on 4 November 2007.
- Fourteen
political parties took part in the elections, which were marked by
two characteristics. Firstly, a strong mobilisation of the electorate
was observed following the presidential crisis, since the
participation rate rose to 84%. Secondly, political parties used two
pre-electoral strategies to circumvent the national 10% threshold.
The Party of the Democratic Left (DSP) took part in the poll under
the banner of the CHP, a rival party, and by that means managed to
win 13 seats. The Party for a Democratic Society (DTP, pro-Kurdish,
left-leaning) presented its candidates as independents using the
label “A thousand hopes”; it also supported certain
left-wing Turkish candidates. This movement was backed by other small
left-wing groups such as the EMEP, the SDP and the ÖDP (the
Freedom and Democracy Party, socialist). More than sixty independent
candidates stood for election in about forty provincial
constituencies.
- In
the elections the AKP, the CHP and the MHP managed to get over the
10% threshold. With 46.58% of the votes cast, the AKP won 341 seats,
62% of the total. The CHP, with 20.88% of the votes, won 112 seats,
20.36% of the total; however, the 13 MPs mentioned in paragraph 23
above subsequently resigned from the CHP and went back to the DSP,
their original party. The MHP, which polled 14.27% of the votes, won
71 seats, or 12.9% of the total.
- The
strong showing by independents was one of the main features of the
elections of 22 July 2007. Independents had disappeared from the
National Assembly in 1980 but reappeared in 1999, when there were
three. In 2002 nine independent MPs were elected from a national
total of 260 independent candidates. In the elections of 22 July
2007, 27 independent MPs were elected. In particular, more than
twenty “Thousand hopes” candidates were elected after
obtaining approximately 2.23% of the votes cast and joined the DTP
after the elections. The DTP, which had 20 MPs, the minimum number to
be able to form a parliamentary group, was thus able to do so. The
independents also included a socialist MP (the former president of
the ÖDP), a nationalist MP (the former president of the Great
Union Party – BBP, nationalist) and a centrist MP (the former
president of ANAP).
- A
government was formed by the AKP, which again secured an absolute
majority in parliament.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
A. The constitutional and legislative context
1. The Constitution
- Article
67 of the Constitution, as amended on 23 July 1995, provides:
“Citizens shall have the right to vote, to stand
for election, to engage in political activities independently or as
members of a political party and to take part in referendums in
accordance with the rules laid down by law.
Elections and referendums shall be conducted under the
administration and supervision of the judiciary and in accordance
with the principles of free, equal, secret and universal suffrage, in
a single round of voting, the votes cast being counted and recorded
in public. Nevertheless, the law shall make suitable provision for
Turkish citizens resident abroad to be able to exercise their right
to vote.
Every Turkish citizen of at least eighteen years of age
shall have the right to vote and to take part in referendums.
Exercise of these rights shall be regulated by law.
Serving members of the armed forces, officer cadets and
persons serving prison sentences, other than those convicted of an
unintentional offence, shall be deprived of the right to vote.
The National Electoral Commission shall determine the
measures to be taken to guarantee the security of the operations to
count and record the votes in prisons and remand centres, and those
operations shall be conducted in the presence of the competent judge,
who shall take charge of and supervise them.
Electoral laws must reconcile fair representation with
governmental stability.
Amendments to electoral laws shall not be applicable to
elections taking place during the year following their entry into
force.”
- Article
80 of the Constitution provides:
“Members of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey
shall represent the whole nation and not the regions or persons which
have elected them.”
- Under
the terms of Article 95 of the Constitution and section 22 of Law no.
2820 on political parties, a political party which has at least
twenty MPs may form a parliamentary group.
2. The electoral system
- Law
no. 2839 on the election of members of the National Assembly,
published in the Official Gazette on 13 June 1983, lays down the
rules of the system for parliamentary elections.
- Turkey's
Grand National Assembly is a single-chamber parliament which
currently has 550 members elected to serve for five years. The
elections are held in the constituencies formed by the 81 provinces
in a single round of voting. They take place throughout the national
territory, on the same day; suffrage is free, equal, universal and
secret. Counting the votes and recording the results is done in
public. Each province is represented in parliament by at least one
MP. The other seats are allocated in proportion with the local
population. Provinces with from one to 18 MPs form a single
constituency; those with from 19 to 35 MPs are divided into two
constituencies; Istanbul, which has more than 35 seats, is divided
into three constituencies.
- Section
16 of Law no. 2839 provides:
“... [P]olitical parties may not present joint
lists...”
- Section
33 of Law no. 2839 (as amended on 23 May 1987) provides:
“In a general election parties may not win seats
unless they obtain, nationally, more than 10% of the votes validly
cast... An independent candidate standing for election on the list of
a political party may be elected only if the list of the party
concerned obtains sufficient votes to take it over the 10% national
threshold...”
- In
allocating seats the D'Hondt system of proportional representation is
used. That method – under which the votes cast for each list
are first divided by a series of whole numbers (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 etc.)
and seats then allocated to the lists which have the highest
quotients – tends to favour the majority party.
- Sections
21(2) and 41(1) of Law no. 2839 read as follows:
Section 21(2)
“Persons wishing to stand as independent
candidates shall deposit with the competent Treasury authorities, as
a guarantee, a sum equal to the gross monthly salary of a civil
servant of the highest rank, and shall place a receipt for payment of
that sum in the file presenting their candidature in the
parliamentary election.”
Section 41(1)
“... if, in a parliamentary election, an
independent candidate has not obtained sufficient votes to win a
seat, the sum deposited as a guarantee shall be forfeited to the
Treasury.”
- Section
36 of Law no. 2820 on political parties (published in the Official
Gazette of 24 April 1983) provides:
“In order to be able to take part in an election,
a political party must have a seat in at least half the provinces and
have held its general meeting at least six months before polling day,
or must have a group within the Grand National Assembly.”
- Section
81 of Law no. 2820 provides:
“Political parties are not entitled to assert that
there exist within the territory of the Republic of Turkey minorities
based on a race, religion, sect, culture or language.”
- Under
the relevant legislation the name of independent candidates is not
printed on the voting slips provided near the Turkish borders. That
means that Turkish electors resident abroad may vote only for a
political party using the ballot boxes placed at border
crossing-points or large airports. Similarly, whereas political
parties have time allocated on television and radio for
electioneering broadcasts, independent candidates do not.
3. Constitutional case-law
- The
Constitutional Court's case-law on the compatibility of electoral
thresholds with the principle of a democratic State has been
contradictory.
- At
first, in a judgment delivered on 6 May 1968 (E. 1968/15,
K. 1968/13), the Constitutional Court held to be contrary to the
principle of a democratic State the “ordinary threshold”
introduced by parliament in order to correct the effects of the
proportional representation system. This is a threshold which varies
in accordance with the number of seats to be filled in each
parliamentary constituency. The threshold applied in a constituency
is calculated by dividing the number of votes cast by the number of
seats to be filled, and seats are awarded only to candidates who get
across it. The Constitutional Court held in particular that such a
threshold, which could enable the representatives of a minority of
electors to form a government, was likely to hinder the
representation of all currents of thought.
- Later,
after the adoption of the 1982 Constitution, the Constitutional Court
gave its views on the question of electoral systems in a judgment
delivered on 1 March 1984 (E. 1984/1, 1984/2), ruling as follows:
“The first paragraph of Article 67 of the
Constitution provides that citizens are entitled to vote and stand
for election in accordance with rules laid down by law. However, it
does not grant an unlimited margin of appreciation to the
legislature. By virtue of Article 67 elections are conducted under
the administration and scrutiny of the judicial power and according
to the principles of free, equal, secret and universal suffrage in a
single ballot, the votes being counted and recorded in public.
Provided those rules are complied with, the legislature may therefore
adopt whatever electoral system it deems most appropriate. If the
constituent assembly had had a particular system in mind, it would
have adopted a binding rule. As it did not do so, the legislature is
free to adopt the system it considers best adapted to the country's
political and social conditions ...
Provided that it does not enact measures tending to
restrict the free expression of the people, or subject political life
to the hegemony of a single party, or destroy the multi-party system,
parliament can put in place one of the existing electoral systems.”
- In
a judgment of 18 November 1995 (E. 1995/54, K. 1995/59) the
Constitutional Court had the opportunity to rule on the
constitutionality of section 34/A of Law no. 2839. That section,
which referred to section 33 of the same law, also imposed the
electoral threshold of 10% for the allocation of the seats for
Assembly members elected in the “national constituency”.
The Constitutional Court declared the provisions establishing the
national constituency null and void, but held that the 10% national
threshold could be regarded as compatible with Article 67 of the
Constitution.
The
relevant passages of the judgment read as follows:
“... [T]he Constitution defines the Turkish State
as a Republic... The constitutional structure of the State, which is
based on national sovereignty, is a product of the nation's will,
mediated through free elections. That choice, emphasised in the
various Articles of the Constitution, is set forth clearly and
precisely in Article 67, entitled 'The right to vote, to be elected
and to engage in political activities'. Paragraph 6 of
Article 67, as amended, provides that electoral laws must be
framed in such a way as to strike a balance between the principles of
'fair representation' and 'governmental stability'. The aim is to
ensure that the electors' will is reflected as far as possible [in]
the legislature. ... [In order to] choose the system whose methods
are most conducive to the expression of the collective will and the
taking of collective decisions in the legislature, ... enacting the
appropriate legislation in the light of the country's specific
circumstances and the requirements of the Constitution, it is
necessary to opt for [the system] which is most compatible with the
Constitution or to reject any system incompatible with it.
The impact of a representative democracy is visible in
various fields. The effect of unfair systems adopted with the
intention of ensuring stability is to hamper social developments. ...
Where representation is concerned, the importance attached to
fairness is the main condition for governmental stability. Fairness
ensures stability. However, the idea of stability, in the absence of
fairness, creates instability. The principle of 'fair representation'
with which the Constitution requires [compliance] consists in free,
equal, secret and universal [suffrage], with one round of voting and
public access to the counting of votes and the recording of results,
and produces a number of representatives proportional to the number
of votes obtained. The principle of 'governmental stability' is
perceived as a reference to methods designed to reflect votes
[within] the legislature so as to guarantee the strength of the
executive power. The 'governmental stability' which it is sought to
ensure through the threshold (described as a 'hurdle'), just like
'fair representation' ..., is protected by the Constitution. In
elections ... importance must be attached to combining these two
principles, which seem antinomic in certain situations, in such a way
[as to ensure] that they counterbalance and complement each other...
In order to achieve the goal of 'governmental
stability', set forth in the Constitution, a national [threshold] has
been introduced...
Clearly, the [threshold] of 10% of the votes cast
nationally laid down in section 33 of Law no. 2839 ... came into
force with the approval of the legislature. Electoral systems must be
compatible with constitutional principles ..., and it is inevitable
that some of these systems should contain strict rules. Thresholds
which result from the nature of the systems and [are expressed] in
percentages, and [which] at national level restrict the right to vote
and to be elected, are applicable [and] acceptable ... provided that
they do not exceed normal limits... The [threshold] of 10% is
compatible with the principles of governmental stability and fair
representation...”
Three
judges of the Constitutional Court out of eleven disagreed with the
arguments of the majority, considering that the 10% national
threshold was incompatible with Article 67 of the Constitution.
- In
the same judgment, however, the Constitutional Court declared null
and void an electoral threshold of 25% for the allocation of seats
within provinces (provincial threshold). Holding that such a
threshold was inconsistent with the principle of fair representation,
it observed:
“Although a national threshold is imposed in
parliamentary elections in accordance with the principle of
'governmental stability', imposing in addition a threshold for each
electoral constituency is incompatible with the principle of 'fair
representation'.”
4. Brief account of past parliamentary elections
- The
elections of 1950, 1954 and 1957 – in which the majority
representation system was used – were unable to ensure an
institutional balance between the majority in parliament and the
opposition. This imbalance was one of the main reasons for the 1960
coup d'état. Following the intervention of the armed forces,
parliament adopted proportional representation, using the D'Hondt
method, to strengthen pluralism and the political system. As a
result, the elections in 1965 and 1969 produced stable majorities in
the National Assembly while enabling small parties to be represented.
However, in the elections of 1973 and 1977 the main political
movements were unable to establish stable governments, although they
had wide electoral support. That period of government instability was
marked by the formation of one coalition after another, each made
fragile by the disproportionate influence of the small parties on
government policy.
- Following
the military regime of the years 1980 to 1983, Law no. 2839 on
the election of members of the National Assembly, enacted on 13 June
1983, re-established proportional representation, with two electoral
thresholds. To the 10% national threshold was added a provincial
threshold (the number of electors divided by the number of seats to
be filled in each constituency); in 1995 the Constitutional Court
declared the provincial threshold null and void. In the 1983
parliamentary elections the Motherland Party (ANAP) obtained an
absolute majority in parliament.
- The
parliamentary elections of 29 November 1987 likewise enabled the
ANAP, with 36.31% of the vote, to form a stable parliamentary
majority. Two other parties also won seats. In the elections of
20 October 1991 five parties gained seats in parliament. This
result was due in particular to the fact that three small political
parties (MÇP, IDP and HEP) had taken part in the elections
under the banner of other political parties with the aim of
circumventing section 16 of Law no. 2839, which makes it illegal to
form joint lists before elections. The government was based on a
coalition of two parties. In those elections the eighteen candidates
of the HEP (People's Labour Party – pro-Kurdish) were elected
to parliament on the list of the (social-democratic) SHP party; they
later resigned from the SHP to join the ranks of their own party, the
HEP.
- In
the general election of 24 December 1995 five parties gained seats in
parliament. However, as none of them had a parliamentary majority, a
coalition was formed.
- The
1999 parliamentary elections again resulted in no party having a
parliamentary majority. Five political parties won seats in the
National Assembly. A coalition of three parties formed a government.
- Before
the election on 3 November 2002, the year which had seen the highest
proportion of votes going to parties not ultimately represented in
parliament was 1987, with 19.4% of the votes cast. In 1991, owing to
the participation of two pre-electoral coalitions, one between the
RP, the MÇP and the IDP and the other between the SHP and the
HEP, that proportion was brought down to 0.5%. After the elections on
22 July 2007 it was 13.1%.
- As
indicated above (see paragraphs 12-21), the elections of 2 November
2002 enabled the AKP to form a stable government which lasted until
22 July 2007, notwithstanding the fact that 45.3% of the
approximately 14.5 million votes were not reflected in the
composition of the parliament.
B. Relevant Council of Europe documents
- The
Council of Europe has not laid down binding rules on the question of
electoral thresholds.
1. Documents of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe
- The
relevant part of Resolution 1547 (2007) entitled State of human
rights and democracy in Europe, adopted by the Assembly on
18 April 2007, reads as follows:
“58. In well-established democracies, there should
be no thresholds higher than 3% during the parliamentary elections.
It should thus be possible to express a maximum number of opinions.
Excluding numerous groups of people from the right to be represented
is detrimental to a democratic system. In well-established
democracies, a balance has to be found between fair representation of
views in the community and effectiveness in parliament and
government.”
- In
its Recommendation 1791 (2007) entitled State of human rights and
democracy in Europe, adopted on 18 April 2007, the Assembly
recommended that the Committee of Ministers take measures to remedy
the deficiencies noted in the above-mentioned Resolution. With regard
to electoral thresholds, it recommended that the Committee of
Ministers urge member States to:
“17.10 consider decreasing thresholds
over 3% for parliamentary elections and .. consider the balance
between fair representation and effectiveness in parliament and
government”.
2. Documents of the European Commission for Democracy
through Law (the Venice Commission)
- The
“Code of good practice in electoral matters”, adopted by
the Venice Commission in 2002, emphatically states: “The five
principles underlying Europe's electoral heritage are universal,
equal, free, secret and direct suffrage.” “Within the
respect of” those principles, “any electoral system may
be chosen”.
- The
relevant part of the Venice Commission's report entitled Report on
electoral law and electoral administration in Europe, of 12 June
2006, reads as follows:
“[T]he effects of one particular electoral system
can be different from country to country, [and] we must appreciate
that electoral systems can pursue different, sometimes even
antagonistic, political aims. One electoral system might concentrate
more on a fair representation of the parties in parliament, while
another one might aim to avoid a fragmentation of the party system
and encourage the formation of a governing majority of one party in
Parliament. One electoral system encourages a close relationship
between voters and “their” constituency representatives,
while another makes it easy for the parties to specifically introduce
women, minorities or specialists into parliament by way of closed
party lists. In some countries, complicated electoral systems are
accepted in order to combine several political aims. In other
countries, it is seen as a priority that the electoral system be not
too difficult for the electorate and the administration to understand
and operate. The appropriateness of an electoral system is determined
according to whether it will do justice, bearing in mind the local
conditions and problems. In particular, transparency of the
elaboration of the list should be ensured. Thus, the electoral system
and proposals to reform should be assessed in each individual case.”
- In
its Report on electoral rules and affirmative action for national
minorities' participation in decision-making process in European
countries, of 15 March 2005, the Venice Commission, having
analysed the practices of certain member States, recommended five
specific measures to promote the representation of minorities. Two of
the measures concerned have a bearing on the question of electoral
thresholds:
“...
d. Electoral thresholds should not affect the
chances of national minorities to be represented.
e. Electoral districts (their number, the
size and form, the magnitude) may be designed with the purpose to
enhance the minorities' participation in the decision-making
processes.”
3. Documents specifically relating to elections in
Turkey
(a) Report of the Ad hoc Committee
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
- The
Government referred to the report of the Ad hoc Committee for
the Observation of Parliamentary Elections in Turkey (3 November
2002), produced on 20 December 2002. The relevant parts of the report
read as follows:
“As widely reported by the media, two parties only
out of 18 found their way into the new TBMM; the AKP (Justice and
Development) and CHP (Republican People's Party), leaving out all
other parties, which had been represented so far in the parliament
because they could not meet the 10% threshold. The party in
government until the elections received only 1% of the votes.
Economic and corruption problems were determining in the elections.
A clear and absolute majority has emerged with 362 seats
for the AKP, 179 seats for the opposition and 9 seats for independent
members. (These independent members are elected in small towns where
they have a good reputation.) It should be recalled that AKP had 59
seats in the previous parliament, and the CHP three (1999 elections).
This situation might create probably greater stability
in the country by avoiding complicated and unstable coalitions. On
Monday 4 November 2002 the Turkish stock exchange went up by 6.1%.
However, it also means that approximately 44% of the
voters have no representation in the Parliament.
The results must thus be considered as a clear protest
vote against the establishment as a whole, since none of the three
parties in the old governing coalition got enough votes for a single
seat!”
(b) The Parliamentary Assembly's
Resolution 1380 (2004)
- Paragraphs
6 and 23 of Resolution 1380 (2004) on “Honouring of obligations
and commitments by Turkey”, adopted by the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe on 22 June 2004, are worded as
follows:
“6. With regard to pluralist democracy,
the Assembly recognises that Turkey is a functioning democracy with a
multiparty system, free elections and separation of powers. The
frequency with which political parties are dissolved is nevertheless
a real source of concern and the Assembly hopes that in future the
constitutional changes of October 2001 and those introduced by the
March 2002 legislation on political parties will limit the use of
such an extreme measure as dissolution. The Assembly also considers
that requiring parties to win at least 10% of the votes cast
nationally before they can be represented in parliament is excessive
and that the voting arrangements for Turkish citizens living abroad
should be changed.
...
23. The Assembly therefore invites Turkey, as
part of its authorities' current reform process, to:
...
ii. amend the electoral code to lower the 10%
threshold and enable Turkish citizens living abroad to vote without
having to present themselves at the frontier;
...”
(c) Report on “Observation of the
Parliamentary elections in Turkey (22 July 2007)”
- The
relevant parts of the report entitled Observation of the
Parliamentary elections in Turkey, produced by an ad hoc
Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
read as follows:
“XII. Conclusions and recommendations
55. The parliamentary elections in Turkey, on
22 July 2007, were generally in compliance with Turkey's Council of
Europe commitments and European standards for free elections.
56. Overwhelmingly, the voting was well -
organised and conducted in an orderly and professional fashion, which
testifies to a long-standing tradition of democratic elections in
Turkey.
57. The high voter turnout shows that
confidence in the democratic process exists in Turkey.
58. Electoral administrators at all levels
dispatched their duties effectively and in good faith.
59. However, the Rapporteur believes that
Turkey could do more in terms of organising even better elections
that would guarantee a genuinely representative Parliament. The 10%
threshold requirement could be lowered, in accordance with Assembly
Resolutions 1380 (2004) and 1547(2007). The fact that the new
Parliament elected on 22 July 2007 is far more representative than
the outgoing Parliament representing about 90 percent of the opinions
of the electorate, is due to the fact that three instead of two
parties are represented and to the ploy of opposition parties to
launch party-sponsored independent candidates and not to any steps
taken by the Turkish authorities themselves.
60. The Turkish authorities may wish to
consider seizing the Venice Commission on this issue, as well as on
simplifying electoral legislation.”
- Moreover,
in reply to a question from a parliamentarian following his address
to the Parliamentary Assembly on 3 October 2007, the President of the
Republic of Turkey said that the 10% threshold met a real need, but
might in due course be dispensed with (see
the verbatim record of the sitting on 3 October 2007). The
relevant parts of his reply read as follows (Registry translation of
summary in French in the Verbatim Record of the sitting on 3 October
2007):
“Mr Gül explained that the 10% threshold had
been introduced to remedy the instability of previous years, in which
there had been a large number of coalition governments in close
succession. The threshold did not prevent independent candidates from
standing. In the latest parliamentary elections, in July 2007, voter
turnout had been 85%, which showed how representative parliament was.
Now that political stability had been restored the 10% threshold
could be reconsidered.”
C. Comparative law
- Although
there is no uniform classification of types of ballot and electoral
systems, it is usual to distinguish three main types: majority vote
systems, proportional systems and mixed systems. In majority vote
systems the winner is the candidate or list of candidates obtaining
the majority of the votes in the decisive round of voting. This type
of ballot makes it possible to vote in governments with clear
parliamentary majorities, but at the same time it militates against
the representation of minority political parties. Thus, for example,
in the United Kingdom the use over many decades of a single round of
voting in a single-member majority-vote system (“first past the
post”), combined with the existence of two dominant political
parties, has had the effect of giving few seats to other parties in
relation to the number of votes that they obtain. There are other
similar cases, in France for instance, where there is a majority-vote
system spread over two rounds of voting. At the opposite extreme, the
aim of the proportional representation system is to ensure that the
votes cast are reflected in a proportional number of seats.
Proportional representation is generally considered to be the fairest
system because it tends to reflect more closely the various political
forces. However, the disadvantage of proportional representation is
that it tends to lead to fragmentation among those seeking electoral
support and thus makes it more difficult to establish stable
parliamentary majorities.
- Currently,
proportional systems are the most widely used in Europe. By way of
example, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russia, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey have opted for one or other variant
of proportional representation. There are also mixed systems
containing various combinations of the two types of ballot (in
Germany, Italy and Lithuania, for example).
- In
some proportional systems statutory thresholds are used to correct
the negative effects of proportional voting, and in particular to
ensure greater parliamentary stability. These thresholds, generally
expressed as a percentage of the votes cast, are “limits, fixed
or variable, defined in terms of the electoral result, which
determine the share of a list or candidate in the distribution of
seats”. However, the role played by thresholds varies in
accordance with the level at which they are set and the party system
in each country. A low threshold excludes only very small groupings,
which makes it more difficult to form stable majorities, whereas in
cases where the party system is highly fragmented a high threshold
deprives many voters of representation.
- Analysis
of the electoral thresholds adopted in the member States which have
proportional representation shows that only four States have opted
for high thresholds: Turkey has the highest, at 10%; Liechtenstein
has an 8% threshold; the Russian Federation and Georgia use 7%. A
third of the States impose a 5% threshold and 13 of them have chosen
a lower figure. The other member States (seven in number) do not use
thresholds. Moreover, in several systems the thresholds are applied
only to a restricted number of seats (in Norway and Iceland, for
example). Thresholds for parties and thresholds for coalitions may be
set at different levels. In the Czech Republic, for example, the
threshold for one party is 5%, whereas in the case of a coalition it
is raised by 5% for each of the constituent parties. In Poland, the
threshold for coalitions is 8% whatever the number of constituent
parties. There are similar variations among the thresholds for
independent candidates: in Moldova, for example, the relevant
threshold is 3%.
THE LAW
I. SCOPE OF THE GRAND CHAMBER'S JURISDICTION
- The
Court observes that in the Chamber judgment (paragraph 40) the
complaint was formulated as follows:
“The applicants alleged that the imposition of an
electoral threshold of 10% in parliamentary elections interfered with
the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the
legislature.”
- During
the proceedings before the Chamber the applicants, relying mainly on
the results of the elections on 3 November 2002, complained of the
10% threshold. To that end, they carried out a comprehensive review
of elections in Turkey since 1946, the year in which a multi-party
system was introduced under the Republic. Later, in their referral
request submitted on 20 April 2007, criticising in particular
the analysis of the Turkish electoral system made by the Chamber in
its judgment, they submitted that that judgment gave the Contracting
Party an extremely wide margin of appreciation as regards the
introduction and operation of the electoral system.
- After
9 July 2007, the date on which a panel of five judges allowed the
applicants' request for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber,
early parliamentary elections took place in Turkey.
- Whereas
they had commented at some length on the elections of 22 July
2007 in the observations they submitted to the Grand Chamber on
7 September 2007, the applicants' representatives made it clear
at the hearing on 21 November 2007 that the application had been
lodged in order to secure a ruling that there had been a violation
resulting from the elections of 3 November 2002, not those of 22 July
2007.
- The
Government argued at the hearing that, in so far as the applicants'
complaints related to Turkey's constitutional structure, they should
be considered to be an actio popularis, and maintained that
the general results of 22 July 2007 had confirmed the Chamber's
findings in its judgment of 30 January 2007.
- The
Court must therefore determine the scope of the examination of the
case it is required to make, deciding in particular whether it can
restrict itself to studying the results of the elections on 3
November 2002, without taking into account events after the Chamber
judgment.
- The
Court reiterates that, according to its settled case-law, the “case”
referred to the Grand Chamber necessarily embraces all aspects of the
application previously examined by the Chamber in its judgment, there
being no basis for a merely partial referral of the case (see Cumpǎnǎ
and Mazǎre v. Romania [GC], no. 33348/96, § 66, ECHR
2004 XI, and K. and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702/94, §§
140 and 141, ECHR 2001 VII)
- The
“case” referred to the Grand Chamber is the application
as it has been declared admissible. This does not mean, however, that
the Grand Chamber may not also examine, where appropriate, issues
relating to the admissibility of the application, just as is possible
in normal Chamber proceedings, for example by virtue of Article 35 in
fine of the Convention (which empowers the Court to “reject
any application which it considers inadmissible ... at any stage of
the proceedings”), or where such issues have been joined to the
merits or where they are otherwise relevant at the merits stage (see
K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, § 141).
- The
Court observes at the outset that it does not have jurisdiction to
examine a domestic electoral law in the abstract, and that it is
primarily for the national authorities, and in particular the courts,
which are specially qualified for the task, to construe and apply
domestic law (see, for example, Gitonas and Others v. Greece,
judgment of 1 July 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1997 IV, § 44, and Briķe v. Latvia (dec.),
no. 47135/99, 29 June 2000). However, in the present case, the
applicants' case does not amount to an actio popularis. In the
elections of 3 November 2002 they were affected directly and
immediately by the impugned threshold (see, mutatis mutandis,
Serge Moureaux and Others v. Belgium, no. 9267/81,
Commission decision of 12 July 1983, Decisions and Reports (DR) 33,
p. 127). Since the Chamber gave judgment before the elections of
22 July 2007, it mainly took into account the results of the
elections of 3 November 2002 and the context in Turkey at that
time. The Court will now examine the case in the light of the results
of the parliamentary elections of 3 November 2002, but without
neglecting the elections of 22 July 2007, in which the
applicants were admittedly not candidates, but which nevertheless
have some bearing on the assessment of the effects of the electoral
threshold complained of by the applicants.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
- The
applicants alleged that the imposition of an electoral threshold of
10% in parliamentary elections interfered with the free expression of
the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature. They
relied on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which provides:
“The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold
free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under
conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of
the people in the choice of the legislature.”
A. The Chamber judgment
- The
Chamber found that the aim of the 10% electoral threshold imposed in
parliamentary elections was to strengthen governmental stability by
preventing excessive and debilitating parliamentary fragmentation. It
could also be considered necessary to achieve that aim and
proportionate. It accordingly concluded that “Turkey [had not]
overstepped its wide margin of appreciation with regard to Article 3
of Protocol No. 1, notwithstanding the high level of the threshold
complained of” (see paragraphs 66-79 of the Chamber judgment).
B. Arguments of the parties
1. The applicants
- The
applicants contested the Chamber's considerations, arguing that it
had made a restrictive and cursory interpretation of the right to
free elections.
- In
the first place, the applicants considered that as the 10% threshold
prevented a large part of the population from expressing its choice
regarding its parliamentary representation it quite evidently
constituted a serious interference with the right to participation
and served no legitimate aim for the purposes of Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1.
- In
that connection, the applicants challenged the argument that the
measure complained of was intended to strengthen parliamentary
stability. They asserted that the military authorities, who had taken
power in the 1980 coup d'état, placed the full blame for the
social and political agitation in Turkey between 1970 and 1980, and
the governmental instability it had led to, on the electoral system
then in force. In their opinion it was artificial to establish a
causal link between the threshold and the political situation in
Turkey in the 1970s, as assessed in the Chamber's judgment.
- The
applicants laid emphasis on the fact that two of the four elections
in which proportional representation was used without recourse to the
electoral threshold (those of 1965 and 1969) had produced
single-party governments; the other two (those of 1973 and 1977) had
led to coalition governments.
- Moreover,
though it was not excluded that lowering or abolishing the national
electoral threshold would lead to a coalition government, such an
outcome was not necessarily synonymous with governmental instability.
Coalition governments were sometimes more stable than single-party
governments.
- The
applicants contended that it was difficult to defend the view that
the exceptional measure in question strengthened representative
democracy. The Council of Europe had been created to strengthen
democracy and democratic values. Although the Contracting States
certainly had a broad margin of appreciation in the matter, they
could not rely on that latitude – without taking into account
the right to fair representation – to an unlimited or
disproportionate extent, namely by excluding from the political life
of the country a particular discrete segment of the population.
- Such
a high national threshold made representation very unfair and led to
a crisis of legitimacy for the government, since parliament ought to
be the free tribune of any democracy. Clearly, a parliament whose
composition reflected only about 55% of the votes cast was not
capable of supplying the representative legitimacy on which any
democracy is based. In that connection, the applicants pointed out
that in the parliamentary elections of 1987, 1991, 1995 and 1999 the
proportion of the votes cast in favour of parties not represented in
parliament had been, respectively, 19.4% (about 4.5 million
votes), 0.5% (about 140,000 votes), 14% (about 4 million votes) and
18.3% (about 6 million votes). The results of the 2002 election had
led to a “crisis of representation”, since 45.3% of the
votes – that is, about 14.5 million votes – had not
been taken into consideration and were not reflected in the
composition of parliament.
- The
applicants submitted that the Court should take account of the
following factors: firstly, the crucial role of pluralism as a pillar
of democracy and the consequent importance of political parties,
particularly those which act to ensure that a particular region of a
country can make its voice heard in parliament; secondly, the fact
that the electoral threshold used in Turkey was the highest among the
member States of the Council of Europe and, since there were no
corrective measures, the fact that it hindered the expression of
certain social groups; thirdly, and lastly, the special situation in
Turkey and the effects of the threshold in practice, namely the
impossibility for any party based in one region to be represented in
the National Assembly. If those factors were not taken into
consideration, the right to free elections would be left to the
arbitrary interpretation of individual States, which could use the
fact to plead justification for thresholds higher than 10%.
- The
applicants also argued that the 10% threshold was not in conformity
with the common European standard. The national threshold adopted in
Turkey was the highest in Europe, or possibly in the world. If that
threshold had been applied in other countries, a number of
well-established parties would no longer participate in government;
that would apply, for example, to the Free Democrats in Germany, the
centrist and Christian parties in Scandinavia, the Greens in the
Netherlands and the centre-left and the right in Italy. In most
countries which had introduced a threshold the level chosen was 5%
(in 2001 the average was 4.25% in central and eastern Europe). Even
countries which were experiencing serious problems regarding
integration and needed to stabilise party representation, in view of
the existence of independent or very small parties, had not seen fit
to impose thresholds twice as high. The applicants pointed out, by
way of example, that in the 2002 elections an electoral threshold of
5% would have enabled eight parties (out of the 18 which put up
candidates), including DEHAP, to win seats in the Turkish parliament,
instead of just the two main national parties.
- The
argument that the applicants or other members of their party could
have participated in the elections as independent candidates –
one of the Government's main arguments and one of the grounds on
which the Chamber had based its decision – disregarded the role
of parties in the context of the political system. Neither
independent candidatures nor the formation of alliances could take
the place of independent political parties, since these played an
essential role as fundamental elements of democracy. It was obvious
that candidates who stood in their own name and were able to count
only on their own limited personal and financial resources could not
compete with parties which had considerable logistical and financial
resources.
- Moreover,
in Turkey independent candidates were subject to a number of
unfavourable restrictions and conditions. For example, the names of
independent candidates were not printed on the ballot slips supplied
to border areas, which meant that persons entering Turkish territory
for the precise purpose of taking part in an election in a frontier
polling station could not vote for independent candidates, a fact
which considerably reduced such candidates' chances of being elected.
The impossibility for independent candidates to make electoral
broadcasts, although all political parties had an express entitlement
to air time on television and radio, was also a serious disadvantage
(see paragraph 39 above). Lastly, the right of electors to choose,
freely and equally, to be represented by parties – rather than
independents, for example – and the right of all parties to
compete on an equal footing were essential principles for the
purposes of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.
- As
regards the possibility of forming a coalition with other political
parties with the aim of getting across the 10% threshold, the
applicants pointed out that section 16 of Law no. 2839 prevented
parties from presenting joint lists and from participating in
parliamentary elections by forming perfectly legal coalitions.
Further, they submitted that the political climate, marked by the
rising strength of nationalism, made it impossible to form such
alliances.
- The
applicants further explained that under section 36 of the law on
political parties a political party could not put up candidates for
election if it was not implanted in the country (see paragraph 36
above). Moreover, under the same law, it was forbidden to create a
party based on a particular ethnic group or region (see paragraph 37
above). That rule reflected the prevailing official ideology in
Turkey. The absolute rejection of regional parties manifestly
constituted a serious infringement of the principle previously stated
by the Court that there is “no democracy without pluralism”.
Account needed to be taken of the vast, multicultural nature of
Turkish society, and the applicants and their party were bound to be
penalised because, even if they sought support throughout the country
by defending national policies, it was mainly a particular segment of
the population which supported them.
- In
the applicants' submission, one of the main aims of a democracy based
on a system of elected parties was to ensure that political parties
whose electorate was implanted wholly or mainly in a particular
region could function and be elected freely, without restrictions,
and that the electors who voted for them should be represented on an
equal footing. If that principle was applied, it was obvious that the
impossibility for DEHAP to enter parliament when it had obtained more
than 45% (about two million) of the votes cast in south-eastern
Turkey significantly distorted representation. In addition, the
obligation to operate at national level was to be seen in the context
of a political culture which systematically ignored debate about “the
Kurdish question”, manifestly blocking the free expression of
the will of a large proportion of the people of south-eastern Turkey,
in breach of the Court's settled case-law. Accordingly, the free
expression of the will of the majority of the electorate in the
region concerned had been deliberately hindered.
- More
concretely, the applicants submitted that on account of the
application of the electoral threshold in the 2002 parliamentary
elections DEHAP, which was known for its interest in and commitment
to the Kurdish question, had not obtained a single seat in parliament
although it had achieved very high scores in a number of
constituencies. In their opinion it could not be considered that the
parliamentary elections of 22 July 2007 had solved the problem,
even though the DTP, the successor to DEHAP, had presented
independent candidates. The fact that political parties supported by
Kurds had presented independent candidates was in itself a handicap.
- Consequently,
in the applicants' submission, the fact that they were not elected to
the National Assembly on account of the national 10% threshold when
in the parliamentary elections of 3 November 2002 the DEHAP list –
to which they belonged – had obtained 45.95% of the votes cast
in the constituency of Şırnak was incompatible with Article
3 of Protocol No. 1. They argued that the excessively high threshold
was in conflict with the object and purpose of the provision
concerned, which was to guarantee the right to the free expression of
the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature. By
depriving a whole segment of the population of the possibility of
being one day represented in parliament by a party which voiced its
opinions, the national threshold removed the very essence of that
right. Such a serious and systematic interference with the rights of
a whole group, unique as it was among all European electoral systems,
could not be justified by the margin of appreciation left to the
State and therefore manifestly constituted a violation of the
Convention.
2. The Government
- The
Government asked the Grand Chamber to endorse the Chamber's finding
that there had been no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.
- They
submitted that the 10% threshold was calculated to ensure the
country's political stability by preventing excessive fragmentation
of the composition of parliament and to strengthen democracy and
political parties by encouraging the latter to propose policies
accepted more or less generally throughout the country. The threshold
did not infringe the fundamental principles of democracy such as
pluralism. On the contrary, facilitating the election of independent
candidates by exempting them from the 10% threshold made it possible
for pluralism to put down deep roots in society. In that connection,
the Government emphasised that between 1961 and 1980, when Turkey did
not apply any threshold, there had been twenty changes of government
in nineteen years, whereas between 1983 and 2007, the period when the
10% threshold was in force, seven elections had produced three
coalition governments and three single-party governments. These
figures showed that the threshold had positive effects on
governmental stability.
- The
Government further submitted that the refusal to propose policies
accepted more or less generally throughout the country and cutting
oneself off from the rest of the country by representing only one
region or a particular constituency could not be considered
compatible with the unitary structure of the State. On that point,
Turkey was not alone. The Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v.
Belgium judgment showed that even in Belgium, where there were
language groups, MPS and senators represented the Belgian nation.
Similarly, Article 80 of the Turkish Constitution provided that MPs
represented society as a whole.
- The
Government considered that the threshold was a proportionate measure
which mainly fell within its margin of appreciation. They argued in
particular that, as had been confirmed by the elections on 22 July
2007, the applicants could have been elected on 3 November 2002 if
they had stood as independents or if DEHAP had formed an electoral
coalition with one or more of the large parties.
- In
that connection, they submitted that the results of the parliamentary
elections of 22 July 2007 corroborated the Chamber's findings in its
judgment of 30 January 2007. The members of the DTP – the party
which, according to the applicants had taken the place of the one
they were members of – had stood as independent candidates in
the 2007 elections and had been elected easily because as
independents they were not subject to the national threshold. A few
days after their election they had rejoined the DTP and formed a
parliamentary group (see paragraph 25 above). Having decided
that it could not cross the threshold in the 2007 elections, the DTP
had urged its members to stand as independent candidates and had
managed to obtain twenty seats in parliament. It was important to
note that the total number of votes obtained by the DTP's independent
candidates represented only 2.04% of the national vote, which meant
that the DTP would not even have been able to reach the 5% threshold
which, according to the applicants, was the expression of a “common
democratic political tradition” among European countries. If
the threshold had been lower – say 2% – the DTP, with
2.04% of the votes cast, would have won only one seat, or two at the
most. By winning twenty seats, or 3.6% of the total number of seats
in the Grand National Assembly, the DTP had managed to raise its
representation in parliament to the maximum.
- Moreover,
political parties could collaborate under the banner of a large
party, even though forming joint lists was prohibited by section 16
of Law no. 2839 on the election of members of parliament. The DSP,
for instance, a party which had been a member of the ruling coalition
from 1999 to 2002, had been unable to get over the 10% threshold in
the 2002 elections. Before the 2007 elections, therefore, it had
collaborated with the CHP, its rival, managing in that way to obtain
thirteen seats on that party's lists. The MPs elected as a result
then left the CHP and rejoined their first party, the DSP. In the
1991 elections the HEP, which was the first avatar of the group which
ultimately became the applicants' party, had also managed to get some
of its candidates elected from the lists of another party.
- The
two possibilities which had been put into practice in the 2007
elections – standing as an independent candidate or
collaborating with another party with a view to being elected from
its lists – were very concrete examples of the existing
correctives. Recourse to these correctives in the latest elections
had made it possible to offer 85% of all voters some representation
in parliament. The Government submitted that if these options had
been used in 2002, the results would have been similar.
- In
their referral request the applicants had asserted that the 10%
threshold had been kept with a view to excluding from parliament
their political party and its successor, the DTP, in 2002 and 2007
respectively. But the results of the 2007 elections proved that that
allegation was without foundation. The DTP had a parliamentary group
of twenty MPs, and on that account its participation in the next
elections was guaranteed by virtue of section 36 of Law no. 2820
on political parties, even if it did not satisfy the condition of
national implantation. Section 36 provided that political parties
which had a parliamentary group could take part in the elections next
following even if they did not satisfy the national implantation
condition.
- The
Government rejected the applicants' argument that the judgment given
by the Chamber on 30 January 2007 permitted States thenceforth to
raise the participation threshold in accordance with opinion poll
results. The Chamber's reasoning clearly indicated that it had
properly taken into account the existing alternatives to the
threshold and the review carried out by the Constitutional Court on
the basis of the principles of “fair representation” and
“governmental stability”, which had to complement each
other. In the light of the possible alternatives, the Chamber had
also held that the free expression of the opinion of the people had
not been hindered and that the Government had not overstepped their
margin of appreciation. The results of the 2007 elections clearly
confirmed the findings of the Chamber judgment.
- As
regards the results of the 2007 poll, given that 85% of all voters in
the country were now represented in parliament, the Government
considered that the principle of fair representation had been
respected satisfactorily. Furthermore, in the smaller provinces,
particularly those where most of the DTP's independent candidates
were standing on 22 July 2007, the chances of being elected were
higher than in larger provinces or constituencies. For example, to be
elected in the first Istanbul constituency a candidate had to obtain
about 111,750 votes, whereas in Hakkari province (south-eastern
Turkey) 34,000 were needed. The distribution of seats among the
provinces was manifestly more favourable to the smaller provinces,
which made it possible to ensure that the principle of fair
representation was respected.
- In
conclusion, the Government submitted that, where the free expression
of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature was not
hindered, regulation of the electoral system and the system of
political representation of a State party to the Convention fell
outside the purview of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. The 10%
threshold applied to political parties in parliamentary elections did
not prevent the people from expressing their opinion freely on the
choice of their representatives in parliament. That had been proved
by the elections held on 22 July 2007. The conclusions of the
Chamber's judgment of 30 January 2007 were therefore correct. The
Chamber had not departed from the Court's case-law nor given a new
interpretation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.
C. Submissions of the third-party intervener
- The
non-governmental organisation Minority Rights Group International
agreed with the applicants. They said that the 10% threshold was the
highest national threshold in Europe. It had been introduced without
being accompanied by the slightest corrective measure which might
have remedied the problems it caused. On account of the threshold it
was absolutely impossible for a party operating on a regional basis
to be represented in parliament. In Turkey that meant more precisely
that none of the Kurdish parties could enter parliament even though
in their own regions these parties regularly achieved scores
comparable with that reached by the applicants in 2002 (45% of the
votes cast). It was clear that all the measures taken by the
Government, centring on the 10% threshold, were the result of a
deliberate policy of exclusion. Moreover, even if the policy had not
been deliberate, the effects would have been the same.
- In
addition, the excessively high threshold ran counter to the object
and purpose of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, namely guaranteeing the
right to the free expression of the opinion of the people in the
choice of the legislature. By depriving a whole segment of the
population of the possibility of being one day represented in
parliament by a party which voiced its opinions, the national
threshold removed the very essence of that right. Such a serious and
systematic interference with the rights of a whole group, unique as
it was among all European electoral systems, could not be justified
by the margin of appreciation left to the State and therefore
manifestly constituted a violation of the Convention.
D. The Court's assessment
1. General principles established by the case-law of
the Convention institutions
(a) Criteria applied by the Court in
relation to Article 3 of Protocol No. 1
- The
Court emphasises in the first place that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1
enshrines a characteristic principle of an effective democracy and is
accordingly of prime importance in the Convention system (see
Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, judgment of 2 March
1987, Series A no. 113, § 47). Democracy
constitutes a fundamental element of the “European public
order”, and the rights guaranteed under
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are crucial to establishing and
maintaining the foundations of an effective and meaningful democracy
governed by the rule of law (see, most recently and among many other
authorities, Zdanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, §§
98 and 103, ECHR 2006 IV).
- The
Court has often emphasised the role of the State as ultimate
guarantor of pluralism and stated that in performing that role the
State is under an obligation to adopt positive measures to “organise”
democratic elections “under conditions which will ensure the
free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the
legislature” (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited
above, § 54; see also, mutatis mutandis,
Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, judgment of
24 November 1993, Series A no. 276, § 38.
- Free
elections and freedom of expression, and particularly the freedom of
political debate, form the foundation of any democracy (see
Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, p. 22, § 47, and
Lingens v. Austria, judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no.
103, §§ 41 and 42). The “free expression of the
opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature” is a
matter on which Article 11 of the Convention also has a bearing,
guaranteeing as it does the freedom of association, and thus
indirectly the freedom of political parties, which represent a form
of association essential to the proper functioning of democracy.
Expression of the opinion of the people is inconceivable without the
assistance of a plurality of political parties representing the
currents of opinion flowing through a country's population. By
reflecting those currents, not only within political institutions but
also, thanks to the media, at all levels of life in society, they
make an irreplaceable contribution to the political debate which is
at the very core of the concept of a democratic society (see Lingens,
cited above, p. 26, § 42; Castells v. Spain,
judgment of 23 April 1992, Series A no. 236, p. 23, §
43; and United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey,
judgment of 30 January 1998, Reports 1998 I, § 44).
- As
the Commission has observed on a number of occasions, the words “free
expression of the opinion of the people” mean that elections
cannot be conducted under any form of pressure in the choice of one
or more candidates, and that in this choice the elector must not be
unduly induced to vote for one party or another (see X. v. the
United Kingdom, no. 7140/75, Commission decision of 8
October 1976, DR 7, p. 96). Accordingly no form of compulsion
must be brought to bear on voters as regards their choice of
candidates or parties. The word “choice” means that the
different political parties must be ensured a reasonable opportunity
to present their candidates at elections (ibid.; see also X.
v. Iceland, no. 8941/80, Commission decision of 8
December 1981, DR 27, p. 156).
- As
regards the general interpretation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1,
the Court has set out in its case-law the following main principles
(see, among other authorities, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt,
cited above, pp. 22 and 23, §§ 46-51; Zdanoka,
cited above, § 115; Podkolzina v. Latvia,
no. 46726/99, § 33, ECHR 2002 II; and Hirst v. the
United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], no. 74025/01, § 61, ECHR
2005 IX):
(i) Article
3 of Protocol No. 1 seems at first sight different from the other
provisions of the Convention and its Protocols which guarantee
rights, as it is phrased in terms of the obligation of the High
Contracting Parties to hold elections which ensure the free
expression of the opinion of the people rather than in terms of a
particular right or freedom. However, having regard to the travaux
préparatoires of Article 3 of the Protocol and the way the
provision has been interpreted in the context of the Convention as a
whole, the Court has established that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1
guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and the
right to stand for election (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt,
cited above).
(ii) The
rights enshrined in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute.
There is room for “implied limitations”, and Contracting
States must be given a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere.
(see, among other authorities, Matthews v. the United Kingdom
[GC], no. 24833/94, § 63, ECHR 1999 I, and Labita
v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 201, ECHR 2000 IV).
(iii) The
concept of “implied limitations” under Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1 is of major importance for the determination of
the relevance of the aims pursued by the restrictions on the rights
guaranteed by this provision. Given that Article 3 is not limited by
a specific list of “legitimate aims” such as those
enumerated in Articles 8-11, the Contracting States are therefore
free to rely on an aim not contained in that list to justify a
restriction, provided that the compatibility of that aim with the
principle of the rule of law and the general objectives of the
Convention is proved in the particular circumstances of a case. It
also means that the Court does not apply the traditional tests of
“necessity” or “pressing social need” which
are used in the context of Articles 8-11. In examining compliance
with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court has focused mainly
on two criteria: whether there has been arbitrariness or a lack of
proportionality, and whether the restriction has interfered with the
free expression of the opinion of the people.
(iv) However,
it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the
requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with.
It has to satisfy itself that limitations do not curtail the rights
in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence, and
deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit
of a legitimate aim and that the means employed are not
disproportionate (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above,
§ 52). In particular, any such conditions must not thwart the
free expression of the people in the choice of the legislature –
in other words, they must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern
to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure
aimed at identifying the will of the people through universal
suffrage (see Hirst (no. 2), cited above, § 62; Hilbe
v. Liechtenstein (dec.), no. 31981/96, ECHR 1999 VI, and
Melnychenko v. Ukraine, no. 17707/02, § 56, ECHR 2004 X).
Any departure from the principle of universal suffrage risks
undermining the democratic validity of the legislature thus elected
and the laws which it promulgates (see Hirst (no. 2), cited
above, § 62).
(v) As
regards the right to stand as a candidate for election, i.e. the
so-called “passive” aspect of the rights guaranteed
by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court has been even more
cautious in its assessment of restrictions in that context than when
it has been called upon to examine restrictions on the right to vote,
i.e. the so-called “active” element of the rights under
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. In the Melnychenko judgment cited
above (§ 57), the Court observed that stricter requirements may
be imposed on eligibility to stand for election to Parliament than is
the case for eligibility to vote. On that point, it took the view
that, while it is true that States have a wide margin of appreciation
when establishing eligibility conditions in the abstract, the
principle that rights must be effective requires that the eligibility
procedure contain sufficient safeguards to prevent arbitrary
decisions (ibid. § 59; see also mutatis mutandis,
Podkolzina, cited above, § 35).
(vi) Similarly,
the Court has held that, once the wishes of the people have been
freely and democratically expressed, no subsequent amendment to the
organisation of the electoral system may call that choice into
question, except in the presence of compelling grounds for the
democratic order (see Lykourezos v. Greece, no. 33554/03, §
52, ECHR 2006 VIII).
(b) Electoral systems and thresholds
- The
Court reiterates that the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of
appreciation when it comes to determination of the type of ballot
through which the free expression of the opinion of the people in the
choice of the legislature is mediated. In that regard, Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1 goes no further than prescribing “free”
elections held at “reasonable intervals” “by secret
ballot” and “under conditions which will ensure the free
expression of the opinion of the people”. Subject to that
reservation, it does not create any “obligation to introduce a
specific system” such as proportional representation or
majority voting with one or two ballots (see Mathieu-Mohin and
Clerfayt, cited above, § 54).
- The
rules in this area vary in accordance with the historical and
political factors specific to each State; the large variety of
situations provided for in the electoral legislation of numerous
member States of the Council of Europe shows the diversity of the
possible options. For the purposes of applying Article 3 of the
Protocol, any electoral legislation must be assessed in the light of
the political evolution of the country concerned, so that features
that would be unacceptable in the context of one system may be
justified in the context of another (see Py v. France,
no. 66289/01, § 46, ECHR 2005 I (extracts)), at
least so long as the chosen system provides for conditions which will
ensure the “free expression of the opinion of the people in the
choice of the legislature”.
- Moreover,
it should not be forgotten that electoral systems seek to fulfil
objectives which are sometimes scarcely compatible with each other:
on the one hand to reflect fairly faithfully the opinions of the
people, and on the other, to channel currents of thought so as to
promote the emergence of a sufficiently clear and coherent political
will. Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 does not imply that all votes
must necessarily have equal weight as regards the outcome of the
election or that all candidates must have equal chances of victory.
Thus no electoral system can eliminate “wasted votes”
(see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, §
54).
- With
regard to the level fixed by electoral thresholds, it should be noted
that in the case of Silvius Magnago and Südtiroler
Volkspartei v. Italy (no. 25035/94, Commission decision
of 15 April 1996, DR 85-A, p. 116), in which the facts most closely
resemble the circumstances of the present case, the Commission
expressed the opinion that “the 4% threshold required for the
election of the remaining 25% of the members of the Chamber of
Deputies” and even “a system which fixe[d] a relatively
high threshold” fell within the wide margin of appreciation
left to States in the matter. The Commission went on to say that
similar thresholds existed in other European legal systems (see
Etienne Tête v. France, no. 11123/84, Commission
decision of 9 December 1987, DR 54, p. 68, which concerned a 5%
threshold applied to the allocation of seats in elections to the
European Parliament). Lastly, the Commission considered that
electoral thresholds were intended to promote the emergence of
sufficiently representative currents of thought.
- In the case of Federación nacionalista
Canaria v. Spain ((dec.), no. 56618/00, ECHR 2001 VI)
the Court examined the thresholds which formed part of a system of
proportional representation used in the Autonomous Community of the
Canary Islands. There were two conditions framed as alternatives:
candidates had to obtain either at least 30% of the valid votes cast
in an individual island constituency or at least 6% of the valid
votes cast in the Autonomous Community as a whole. The Court observed
that such a system, “far from hindering election candidates
such as those put forward by the applicant federation, afford[ed]
smaller political groups a certain degree of protection”.
- Lastly,
in its very recent decision concerning inter alia a 5%
threshold applicable in parliamentary elections (Partija “Jaunie
Demokrāti” and Partija “Mūsu Zeme” v.
Latvia (dec.), nos. 10547/07 and 34049/07, 29 November 2007), the
Court took the view that the threshold concerned could not be held to
be contrary to the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1
in that it encouraged sufficiently representative currents of thought
and made it possible to avoid an excessive fragmentation of
parliament.
2. Application of the above principles in the present
case
- In
the present case the Court notes that the applicants alleged a breach
of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the fact that they had
not been elected to the National Assembly in the parliamentary
elections of 3 November 2002 despite the score of 45.95% of the
votes cast in the constituency of Şırnak achieved by DEHAP,
the party on whose list they had stood for election. They explained
that their party, which had polled 6.22% of the national vote, had
failed to reach the electoral threshold of 10% and had accordingly
been deprived of parliamentary representation.
- The
Court observes that the national threshold concerned is laid down by
statute, in section 33 of Law no. 2839, and determines how the seats
in parliament are to be shared nationally among the different lists
and different candidates. It clearly constitutes interference with
the applicants' electoral rights as provided in Article 3 of Protocol
No. 1, a point which is not in dispute between the parties.
- In
the light of the principles set out above, the Court must first
verify whether the measure complained of – whose foreseeability
is not in dispute between the parties – serves a legitimate
aim. Secondly, it must ascertain whether there was any arbitrariness
and whether there was a reasonable relation of proportionality
between the means employed and the aim pursued. In applying those two
criteria, it will seek to determine whether the limitation in
question impaired the very essence of the right to the free
expression of the people, within the meaning of Article 3 of Protocol
No. 1.
(a) Legitimate aim
- The
Court observes that, unlike other Convention provisions, Article 3
of Protocol No. 1 does not specify or limit the aims which a
restriction must be intended to serve. A great variety of aims may
accordingly be compatible with it, provided that the compatibility of
any particular aim with the principle of the rule of law and the
Convention's general objectives is established in the specific
circumstances of a given case.
- In
the applicants' submission, the threshold served no legitimate aim
since it prevented a large part of the population from expressing its
choice regarding its representation in parliament. The Government
rejected that argument, contending that the purpose of the threshold
was to avoid excessive parliamentary fragmentation and thus
strengthen governmental stability.
- With
regard to electoral systems, the Court's task is to determine whether
the effect of the rules governing parliamentary elections is to
exclude some persons or groups of persons from participating in the
political life of the country (see Aziz v. Cyprus, no.
69949/01, § 28, ECHR 2004 V) and whether the discrepancies
created by a particular electoral system can be considered arbitrary
or abusive or whether the system tends to favour one political party
or candidate by giving them an electoral advantage at the expense of
others (see X. v. Iceland, cited above).
- The
Court accepts that high thresholds may deprive part of the electorate
of representation. However, that circumstance alone is not decisive.
Such thresholds can work as a necessary corrective adjustment to the
proportional system, which has always been accepted as allowing for
the free expression of the opinion of the people even though it may
operate to the detriment of small parties when accompanied by a high
threshold (see, mutatis mutandis, Liberal Party, Mrs R. and
Mr P. v. the United Kingdom, no. 8765/79, Commission
decision of 18 December 1980, DR 21, p. 225)
- In
Turkey the 10% threshold is a general rule which applies without any
distinction to all political party candidates whatever electoral
constituency they are standing in. Since 1983, when the threshold was
introduced, numerous parties with very varied political lines have
been unable to obtain any seats in parliament, having failed to reach
it. The elections of 3 November 2002 illustrate the point; not only
DEHAP, the applicants' party, but several other parties, in
particular the DYP, the MHP, the GP and the ANAP (who obtained 9.54%,
8.36%, 7.25% and 5.13% of the votes cast respectively), failed to win
any seats in parliament (see paragraph 18 above). In 1991 and
2007 a number of candidates following the same political line as
DEHAP managed to win seats, either on the ticket of another political
party or by standing as independents (see paragraphs 15 and 25
above).
- In
addition, the Turkish electoral system, like that of many member
States, is predicated on the context of a unitary State. In
accordance with Article 80 of the Constitution, MPs represent
“the whole nation”, not “the regions or persons
which have elected them” (see paragraph 29 above); that is
precisely because of the unitary nature of the Turkish State. Each
province is represented in parliament by at least one MP. The
remaining seats are distributed in accordance with the number of
inhabitants, thus ensuring the representation of the whole national
territory (see paragraph 32 above). That is the result of a
choice made by the legislature reflecting the country's
constitutional structure and grounded on political and institutional
criteria. It is not as such incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol
No. 1, which does not in principle impose on Contracting States
the obligation to adopt an electoral system guaranteeing
parliamentary representation to parties with an essentially regional
base irrespective of the votes cast in other parts of the country. On
the other hand, a problem might arise if the relevant legislation
tended to deprive such parties of parliamentary representation (see
paragraph 121 above).
- Lastly,
the Convention institutions have generally accepted that electoral
thresholds are intended in the main to promote the emergence of
sufficiently representative currents of thought within the country
(see Silvius Magnago and Südtiroler Volkspartei, cited
above, and Etienne Tête, cited above; see also, to the
same effect, Partija “Jaunie Demokrāti”
and Partija “Mūsu Zeme”, cited above).
Consequently, the Court agrees with the Chamber's finding that the
interference in question had the legitimate aim of avoiding excessive
and debilitating parliamentary fragmentation and thus of
strengthening governmental stability.
(b) Proportionality
- Referring
to the Constitutional Court's judgment of 18 November 1995, the
Chamber considered that although the threshold was high it did not go
beyond a level within the margin of appreciation of the national
authorities in the matter, since it could not as such hinder the
emergence of political alternatives within society. The applicants
contested the Chamber's conclusion, whereas the Government asked the
Court to uphold it.
- The
Court observes that the national 10% threshold applied in Turkey is
the highest of all the thresholds applied in Europe (see paragraph 64
above). In order to verify that it is not disproportionate, the Court
will therefore first assess its level in comparison with the
threshold applied in other European countries. It will then examine
the correctives and other safeguards with which it is attended.
i. Elements of comparative law
- The
applicants submitted that the threshold applied in the present case
was not in conformity with “the common democratic political
tradition” of European countries.
- The
Court observes that electoral thresholds are not unknown among
European electoral systems and that there are different kinds which
vary according to the type of election and the context within which
they are used. Analysis of the electoral thresholds adopted in the
member States shows that, apart from Turkey, only three States have
opted for high thresholds. Liechtenstein has fixed the level at 8%,
and the Russian Federation and Georgia at 7%. A third of the States
impose a 5% threshold and 13 of them have chosen a lower figure.
The other States which have a proportional representation system do
not use thresholds. Thresholds also vary according to whether they
apply to a party or a coalition, and some countries have adopted
thresholds for independent candidates (see paragraphs 60 63
above).
- The
Court also attaches importance to the views expressed by the organs
of the Council of Europe, which agree as to the exceptionally high
level of the Turkish national threshold and have called for it to be
lowered. In its Resolution of 18 April 2007, in which it stressed the
indissoluble link between the representativeness of democracy and
thresholds, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
pointed out that “in well-established democracies, there should
be no thresholds higher than 3% during the parliamentary elections”.
That opinion was reiterated in the Parliamentary Assembly's
Recommendation 1791 (2007) (see paragraphs 52 and 53 above). In
addition, in texts concerning Turkey, namely the Parliamentary
Assembly's Resolutions 1380 (2004) and 1547 (2007) and the report on
“Observation of the Parliamentary elections in Turkey (22 July
2007)”, produced by an ad hoc Committee of the
Parliamentary Assembly, the organs of the Council of Europe urged
Turkey, among other recommendations, to amend its electoral code to
lower the 10% threshold (see paragraphs 58 and 59 above).
- However,
the effects of an electoral threshold can differ from one country to
another and the various systems can pursue different, sometimes even
antagonistic, political aims. One system might concentrate more on a
fair representation of the parties in parliament, while another one
might aim to avoid a fragmentation of the party system and encourage
the formation of a governing majority of one party in parliament (see
paragraph 55 above). None of these aims can be considered
unreasonable in itself. Moreover, the role played by thresholds
varies in accordance with the level at which they are set and the
party system in each country. A low threshold excludes only very
small groupings, which makes it more difficult to form stable
majorities, whereas in cases where the party system is highly
fragmented a high threshold deprives many voters of representation
(see paragraphs 58 and 59 above).
- The
large variety of situations provided for in the electoral legislation
of the member States of the Council of Europe shows the diversity of
the possible options. It also shows that the Court cannot assess any
particular threshold without taking into account the electoral system
of which it forms a part, although the Court can agree with the
applicants' contention that an electoral threshold of about 5%
corresponds more closely to the member States' common practice.
However, it has already been pointed out that any electoral
legislation must be assessed in the light of the political evolution
of the country concerned, so that features that would be unacceptable
in the context of one system may be justified in the context of
another, at least so long as the chosen system provides for
conditions which will ensure the “free expression of the
opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature” (see,
among other authorities, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited
above, § 54). That is why the Court must now assess the effects
of the correctives and other safeguards with which the impugned
system is attended.
ii. Correctives and other safeguards
- The
Government submitted that the Turkish electoral system has
correctives which tend to counterbalance the threshold's negative
effects. In that connection, they argued that, as the elections of 22
July 2007 had confirmed, the applicants could have been elected in
the elections of 3 November 2002 if they had stood as
independent candidates or if their party, DEHAP, had entered an
electoral coalition with one of the large parties.
- The
Court notes that the applicants did not really contest the
Government's assertion that recourse to the above types of electoral
strategy could have given them a real chance of being elected to
parliament. However, they emphasised the importance of political
parties in representative democracies, arguing that neither
independent candidatures nor the formation of alliances could take
the place of independent political parties, which played a crucial
role as fundamental elements of democracy.
- The
Court must therefore determine whether the alternatives referred to
by the Government can be regarded as means to attenuate the
threshold's negative effects.
- As
regards the possibility of standing as an independent candidate, the
Court, like the Chamber in paragraph 71 of its judgment, emphasises
the irreplaceable contribution made by parties to political debate.
They act as both an instrument which citizens can use to participate
in electoral debate and a tribune through which they can express
their support for various political programmes (see, mutatis
mutandis, United Communist Party of Turkey and Others,
cited above, p. 17, § 25). They can thus be distinguished from
other political actors such as independent candidates, who in general
are locally based. Similarly, the Court notes that in Turkey
independent candidates are subject to a number of unfavourable
restrictions and conditions not applicable to political parties. They
must deposit a guarantee, their names are not printed on the ballot
slips supplied to frontier posts and large airports and they are not
able to broadcast electoral messages whereas all political parties
have an express entitlement to air time on television and radio (see
paragraphs 36 and 39 above).
- The
Court notes however that this method cannot be considered to be
ineffective in practice. In the elections of 22 July 2007 in
particular the small parties were able to avoid the impact of the
threshold by putting up independent candidates, by which means they
succeeded in obtaining seats. The DTP, for example, DEHAP's
successor, was able to form a parliamentary group after winning
twenty seats in parliament (see paragraph 25 above).
- It
is true that this result was essentially due to the fact that,
instead of putting up their own candidates in their own name, the
opposition parties opted for a strategy which might be called
“independents supported by a party” (see paragraph 23
above). The fact that independents were not required to reach any
threshold greatly facilitated the adoption of that electoral
strategy, despite the restrictions listed above (see paragraphs 36
and 39). Nevertheless, this was a makeshift solution compared
with the position of a candidate officially sponsored by his or her
political party.
- The
same applies to the possibility of forming an electoral coalition
with other political groups. The Court notes in that regard that
section 16 of Law no. 2839 prevents parties from presenting
joint lists and from participating in parliamentary elections by
forming perfectly legal coalitions. As the Government pointed out,
political parties have developed an electoral strategy whereby they
can circumvent this prohibition. Use of this strategy has produced
tangible results, particularly in the 1991 and 2007 elections. Before
the elections of 20 October 1991 two alliances were formed under the
banner of two large political parties. By that means some small
parties, including the HEP – DEHAP's predecessor –
managed to obtain eighteen seats in parliament (see paragraph 15
above). The same electoral strategy bore fruit in the elections of 22
July 2007 (see paragraph 24 above).
- Admittedly, since 45.3% of the votes in the elections
of 3 November 2002 (about 14.5 million) were cast for
unsuccessful candidates, these electoral strategies can have only a
limited effect. As the Chamber pointed out in paragraph 73 of its
judgment, the fact that such a large part of the electorate was not
ultimately represented in parliament was hardly consistent with the
crucial role played in a representative democracy by parliament,
which is the main instrument of democratic control and political
responsibility, and must reflect as faithfully as possible the desire
for a truly democratic political regime.
- However,
it should be noted that, as numerous analysts have remarked, the
elections of November 2002 took place in a crisis climate with many
different causes (economic and political crises, earthquakes, etc. –
see paragraphs 12 and 20 above). In that connection, the fact that
the three parties which had formed the governing coalition after the
1999 elections were unable to reach the 10% threshold and were thus
deprived of parliamentary representation (see paragraph 20 above)
appears significant.
- In
addition, an overall analysis of the parliamentary elections held
since 1983 shows that the representation deficit observed after the
elections of November 2002 could be partly contextual in origin and
not solely due to the high national threshold. On that point, it
should be noted that, with the exception of those elections, the
proportion of the votes cast for ultimately unsuccessful candidates
never exceeded 19.4% (19.4% in 1987, 0.5% in 1991, 14% in 1995 and
18% in 1999). The proportion of votes for candidates who failed to
secure a seat even fell to 13.1% in the elections of 22 July
2007 (see paragraph 49 above).
- Consequently,
the Court notes that the political parties affected by the high 10%
threshold have managed in practice to develop strategies whereby they
can attenuate some of its effects, even though such strategies also
run counter to one of the threshold's declared aims, which is to
avoid parliamentary fragmentation (see paragraphs 60 and 125 above).
- The
Court also attaches importance to the role of the Constitutional
Court in the matter. At the time when the 1961 Constitution was in
force the Constitutional Court, grounding its decision on the
principles of a democratic State and pluralism, rejected the idea of
applying an “ordinary threshold” within each electoral
constituency (see paragraph 40 above). Later, after the adoption of
the 1982 Constitution, when ruling on the question of electoral
systems, the Constitutional Court held that the legislature did not
have an unlimited margin of appreciation in the matter and could not
adopt “measures tending to restrict the free expression of the
opinion of the people, or subject political life to the hegemony of a
political party, or destroy the multi-party system” (see
paragraph 41 above).
- In its judgment of 18 November 1995 the
Constitutional Court varied its 1968 case-law (see paragraph 40
above), examining the basis for the existence of the threshold
complained of as a corrective to the general principle of
proportionality whereby excessive and debilitating parliamentary
fragmentation could be avoided. While accepting that thresholds
restricted “the right to vote and to be elected”, the
Constitutional Court held that they were acceptable provided that
they did not exceed normal limits and accordingly ruled that the 10%
threshold was compatible with constitutional principles. On the other
hand, citing the principle of “fair representation”, it
declared null and void an electoral threshold of 25% for the
distribution of seats within provinces. It thus asserted that the
constitutional principles of fair representation and governmental
stability should necessarily be combined in such a way that they
counterbalanced and complemented each other (see paragraph 43 above).
- It
can be seen from the foregoing considerations that the Constitutional
Court, in exercising vigilance to prevent any excessive effects of
the impugned electoral threshold by seeking the point of equilibrium
between the principles of fair representation and governmental
stability, provides a guarantee calculated to stop the threshold
concerned impairing the essence of the right enshrined in Article 3
of Protocol No. 1.
iii. Conclusion
- In
conclusion, the Court considers that in general a 10% electoral
threshold appears excessive. In that connection, it concurs with the
organs of the Council of Europe, which have stressed the threshold's
exceptionally high level and recommended that it be lowered (see
paragraphs 57 and 130 above). It compels political parties to
make use of stratagems which do not contribute to the transparency of
the electoral process. In the present case, however, the Court is not
persuaded that, when assessed in the light of the specific political
context of the elections in question, and attended as it is by
correctives and other guarantees which have limited its effects in
practice, the threshold has had the effect of impairing in their
essence the rights secured to the applicants by Article 3 of Protocol
No. 1.
- There
has accordingly been no violation of that provision.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
Holds by thirteen votes to four that there has been no
violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in
the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 8 July 2008.
Vincent Berger Boštjan M. Zupančič
Jurisconsult President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74
§ 2 of the Rules of Court, the joint dissenting opinion of
Judges Tulkens, Vajić, Jaeger and Šikuta is annexed to
this judgment.
B.M.Z.
V.B.
JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES TULKENS, VAJIĆ,
JAEGER AND ŠIKUTA
(Translation)
We do
not agree with the majority's conclusion that there has been no
violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, although we take the same
principles as our starting-point (paragraphs 105 to 115 of the
judgment).
- In
a proportional system the requirement of some kind of threshold
cannot in itself be held to be contrary to the requirements of
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, in that it encourages sufficiently
representative currents of thought and makes it possible to avoid an
excessive fragmentation of parliament. However, there is no doubt
that the current system in Turkey of a 10% threshold set up in 1980 –
which is the highest in Europe – deprives a large proportion of
the population of the possibility of being represented in parliament.
As
established in the parliamentary elections of 1987, 1991, 1995 and
1999, the proportion of the votes cast in favour of parties not
represented in parliament was, respectively, 19.4% (about 4.5 million
votes), 0.5% (about 140,000 votes), 14% (about 4 million votes)
and 18.3% (about 6 million votes). The results of the 2002
election led to a “crisis of representation”, since 45.3%
of the votes – about 14.5 million votes – had not been
taken into consideration and were not reflected in the composition of
parliament.
According to an OSCE report, the 10% national threshold in Turkey's
electoral system virtually eliminates the possibility of regional or
minority parties entering the Turkish Grand National Assembly and
distorts the essential purpose of a proportional system.
In fact, the high 10% threshold tends to suppress parliamentary
criticism and debate, which are the essence of representative
democracy. And as the Court has repeatedly observed, there can be no
democracy without pluralism (see Freedom and Democracy Party
(ÖZDEP) v. Turkey [GC], no. 23885/94, §§
39 and 41, ECHR 1999 VIII,).
- The
Government argued that the 10% electoral threshold served the
legitimate aim of ensuring governmental stability. A
proportional voting system in Turkey without this threshold, it was
submitted, would not lead to stable majorities. The Court endorsed
that argument without analysing it or
subjecting it to any criticism. Some have argued, however, that a
study of the historical background in Turkey casts doubt on this
objective, since under an electoral system without such a high
threshold it was also possible for solid governments to be formed.
Conversely, such a threshold brings more polarisation than stability.
Moreover,
in practice, smaller groups are now represented in parliament by
means of circumvention (cf. infra, point 4.). Thus the purpose
of the law can no longer be considered to be the exclusion of smaller
parties or groups from parliament, as the only remaining effect seems
to be that it weakens within the election process the chances of all
smaller parties which are not sure to pass the threshold. They have
either to find allies or disappear during elections by having their
candidates stand as independents.
- As
regards the proportionality of the interference, the
majority's first argument is that the elections of 3 November 2002
took place in a crisis of tension caused by a number of different
factors (economic pressure, political crisis and earthquake
(paragraph 141). In other words, that an exceptional solution is
needed for an exceptional situation.
However,
that argument – which at first sight appears reasonable –
is rendered considerably less persuasive by the fact that it was not
just in those elections of November 2002 that the high threshold of
10% was used. Firstly, the system was adopted much earlier, in
1983, and since then numerous political parties following extremely
varied political lines have been unable to secure seats in
parliament, having failed to get over the threshold (paragraph 123).
Secondly, the threshold was also applied after the 2002
elections, during the parliamentary elections of 22 July 2007. It is
true that reforms of the electoral system have been discussed, but to
date an invisible hand seems to have prevented these from coming to
fruition. In those circumstances, we consider that the argument which
the majority found decisive, namely the specific context of the 2002
elections, is not relevant.
- The
majority's second argument lies in the importance it attaches to what
it calls “correctives and other safeguards” capable of
limiting the effects of the 10% electoral threshold, which the
majority, in any event and in general terms, found to be excessive
(paragraph 147).
But
what are the safeguards concerned? The Court acknowledges itself that
they amount to “stratagems” which political parties are
compelled to make use of and which do not contribute to the
transparency of the electoral process (ibid.). A stratagem is
literally a ruse, as in the phrase ruse de guerre. Can a
democratic system which does not function properly be corrected by
“stratagems” and thus made compatible with the
Convention?
In
concrete terms, Turkish political parties have developed electoral
techniques to “by-pass” the obstacles; these include in
particular putting up independent candidates supported by a party
(but who immediately rejoin their original party once elected) and
adding candidates from one party to the list of another party. The
Court had no hesitation in finding that this was only a makeshift
solution (paragraph 138). It also drew attention to all the
difficulties in such a system, inasmuch as these candidates are
subject to a number of unfavourable restrictions and conditions
compared with political parties (see, for instance, paragraph 36 of
the judgment). The Court nevertheless accepted these “stratagems”
on account of what was presented as their result in practice. In
other words, the end justifies the means.
Apart
from the obvious problem of political morality that such a position
raises, it seems to us to be logically difficult to accept, since the
Court itself acknowledges that these “stratagems” run
counter to the legitimate aim of fixing such a high threshold, namely
preventing parliamentary fragmentation. Furthermore, these
correctives and safeguards are exclusively the result of political
considerations and agreements and there can be no certainty that they
will remain available in the future. These practices, which are in
any case themselves contrary to the Turkish Constitution and Turkish
electoral legislation (section 16 of Law no. 2839 on the
election of members of the National Assembly), may be changed and
disappear from one day to the next. That being the case, it is
difficult to accept that such correctives may be described as
safeguards for the purposes of the Convention. Lastly, the Court did
not consider the detrimental effect of these techniques on the party
system as such when parties have to seek and find protection from
other parties for the purpose of slipping through the 10% threshold.
In themselves, parties represent and unite different currents of
thought. Any interference with their independent participation in
elections curtails the free expression of the opinion of the people –
whether the interference is direct or indirect. Certainly, this is
the case when different parties form hidden alliances during the
elections, by-passing the legislation in place as interpreted by the
Constitutional Court (paragraph 42 of the judgment). To achieve
such alliances, candidates from one party have to be accepted, even
approved of by another party, which undermines the independence of
parties especially in respect of their representatives standing as
candidates on other parties' lists. In other words, it means playing
“hide and seek” with voters, thus undermining essential
democratic principles.
- The
voting system in the instant case, which has the highest threshold in
Europe, which fails to accommodate the interests and opinions of a
large part of the electorate that identifies strongly with a
particular region, or with a national or other minority (see
paragraphs 114 115 of the judgment), and in which forming open
coalitions with other political parties is prohibited (see judgment
of the Constitutional Court – paragraph 42), clearly exceeds
the very wide margin of appreciation left to the State and runs
counter to the object and purpose of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to
the Convention. As Professor I. Budge has written, “What
might have been justified then as an exceptional measure to buttress
a still fragile democracy can hardly be justified now when the
democracy is considered sufficiently stable and mature to seek
membership of the European Union”.
- We
are, therefore, not satisfied that these limitations of the voting
system do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to
impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness
(Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, judgment of 2 March 1987, §
52). It would seem, however, that by admitting that the system in
place can be seen as being in accordance with Convention standards
only if corrected, and at the same time accepting that these
corrections are due to “stratagems”, the majority
itself to a certain degree accepts a similar view.
Free
elections are one of the foundations of justice and peace in Europe;
they are indispensable for the development of an effective
political/pluralist democracy and thus of the rule of law and
observance of human rights. It is difficult to see how these
fundamental goals, underlying not only the Convention but the whole
Council of Europe system, can be achieved if based on electoral rules
that need to be circumvented (paragraphs 133 146, in
particular 139 and 143) in order to be compatible with the
Convention. Changes in this direction, by introducing the necessary
reforms of the electoral system in a clear and transparent way, would
thus – in our opinion – be the only appropriate way to
improve the present situation in accordance with the Convention.