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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF
DOROZHKO AND POZHARSKIY v. ESTONIA
(Applications
nos. 14659/04 and 16855/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
24
April 2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Dorozhko and Pozharskiy v. Estonia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Peer Lorenzen,
President,
Volodymyr Butkevych,
Rait
Maruste,
Renate Jaeger,
Mark
Villiger,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,
Mirjana
Lazarova Trajkovska, judges,
and Claudia
Westerdiek, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 25 March 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in two applications (nos. 14659/04 and 16855/04)
against the Republic of Estonia lodged with the Court under Article
34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a stateless
person, Mr Aleksandr Dorozhko, and by an Estonian national, Mr
Vyacheslav Pozharskiy (“the applicants”), on 12 April and
7 April 2004, respectively.
- The
applicants, who had been granted legal aid, were represented by Mr M.
Männik, a lawyer practising in Tallinn. The Estonian Government
(“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms M.
Hion, Director of the Human Rights Division of the Legal Department
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- On
22 February 2007 the Court declared the applications partly
inadmissible and decided to communicate the complaints concerning the
lack of impartiality of a City Court judge to the Government. Under
the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided
to examine the merits of the applications at the same time as their
admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- Mr
Aleksandr Dorozhko, the applicant in application no. 14659/04 (“the
first applicant”), was born in 1960. Mr Vyacheslav Pozharskiy,
the applicant in application no. 16855/04 (“the second
applicant”), was born in 1981. Both of them are currently
serving prison sentences.
- The
applicants were arrested around midnight on the night of 8 to
9 November 2002. They were initially suspected of having caused
grievous bodily harm and of temporary unauthorised use of other
persons' movable property (cars). Subsequently, the applicants were
also charged with robbery.
- On
20 November 2002 the Tallinn City Court (linnakohus) refused
to extend the applicants' detention. The second applicant was
released. The first applicant, however, was not released by the
police; he was kept under arrest and declared under suspicion of an
offence of threatening behaviour. On 22 November 2002 the City Court
authorised his further detention.
- In
the meantime, on 20 November 2002, the police chief inspector I. P.
ordered that a team of investigators be set up for the criminal case
concerned. The team consisted of I. P. himself as the head of the
team and three other senior police inspectors: L., G. and K.
- In
the submission of the Government, the further criminal investigation
was practically solely carried out by police investigator L., while
only a few procedures were performed by investigators G. and K. The
criminal case file did not contain any indication that I. P.
personally performed any investigative actions or that he issued any
instructions or guidelines to the members of the team.
- Nevertheless,
the first applicant was informed by the Tallinn Police Prefecture and
the Public Prosecutor's Office during the pre-trial investigation, in
response to his complaints, that I. P. was a member of the team of
investigators set up for the criminal case concerned and he had the
powers to conduct all investigative activities.
- On
14 March 2003 the Lääne County Court (maakohus)
authorised the second applicant's detention until 14 May 2003 in
different criminal proceedings not related to the present case.
- In
the meantime, on 3 February and again on 29 April 2003, after the
Public Prosecutor's Office had amended the charges, the applicants
were committed for trial by the Tallinn City Court. The case was
heard by a court composed of a professional judge, E. P., and two lay
judges. The hearings before the City Court took place on several
dates.
- At a City Court hearing on 30 May 2003 the first
applicant said in his closing statement that because he had refused
to cooperate with the police investigators B., I. P. and K., the
charges against him had been changed. He also said that although a
judge had ordered his release, police investigators I. P. and K. had
not released him from the police cell but had detained him again on
suspicion of threatening behaviour.
- On
30 May 2003 the City Court convicted the applicants of robbery and
temporary unauthorised use of other persons' movable property. The
first applicant was also convicted of an offence of threatening
behaviour. The first applicant was sentenced to nine years' and the
second applicant to seven years' imprisonment.
- The
applicants and the first applicant's lawyer appealed against the
judgment. The applicants in their appeals challenged, inter alia,
the impartiality of the City Court's judge E. P., as her husband, I.
P., had headed the team of investigators which had been set up for
the investigation of the criminal case concerned. The second
applicant noted that this issue had been raised at a City Court
hearing but judge E. P. had not withdrawn.
- On
6 June 2003 the first applicant's wife also lodged a complaint to the
Court of Appeal, arguing, inter alia, that judge E. P. should
have withdrawn because her husband had been involved in the pre-trial
investigation.
- At
the hearing before the Court of Appeal on 9 October 2003 the first
applicant raised the issue of impartiality of the City Court judge E.
P. According to the record of the hearing, he stated as follows:
“The presiding judge was [E. P.]. Her husband was
the person who carried out the preliminary investigation. I only
learned about it after the court hearing. This fact affected the
impartiality of the judge. It could also be seen from the record [of
the court hearing] because it is imprecise. ... It affected the
judicial investigation. The judge did not grant my requests,
everything happened very quickly. She[]
wanted to have me imprisoned. I did not request the removal of the
judge. I did not know at that time that her husband had been the head
of the preliminary investigation.”
- According
to the prosecutor the applicants had not been aware that E. P. and I.
P. were married to each other when the City Court began to hear the
case. In her submission they had become aware of it later, by the
time of the subsequent hearings. However, no requests for removal of
the judge had been made.
- At
the end of the Court of Appeal hearing the second applicant said that
I. P. had interrogated him. He added: “[I. P.] threatened me
[and said] that if I confessed, I would not go to prison.”
- On
9 October 2003 the Tallinn Court of Appeal (ringkonnakohus)
acquitted the applicants in respect of the second count of temporary
unauthorised use of other persons' movable property. It upheld the
City Court's judgment in the remaining part.
- Referring
to Article 20 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Kriminaalmenetluse koodeks), which concerned grounds for
disqualification of a judge, the Court of Appeal found that the
applicants' allegations did not warrant quashing the City Court's
judgment and referring the case to the first-instance court for a new
trial. Moreover, it was noted that none of the parties to the
proceedings had requested judge E. P.'s disqualification during the
proceedings in the City Court; neither had the impartiality of the
judge nor that of the court been put into doubt in the appeals. The
first applicant had submitted at the Court of Appeal hearing that he
had become aware of the fact that I. P. was the judge's husband
during the court proceedings. The Court of Appeal found, however,
that the judge's possible relationship with an official participating
in the preliminary investigation did not prove the judge's
partiality. It noted that although I. P. had been the head of the
team of police officers investigating the case, the investigation had
in fact been carried out by another police investigator. None of the
reports concerning various investigative activities (uurimistoimingu
protokoll) in the case file had been drawn up by I. P. Moreover,
besides judge E. P., two lay judges had taken part in deciding the
case. The Court of Appeal considered that the allegation concerned
was artificial and had been submitted with a view to delaying the
proceedings.
- In
his appeal to the Supreme Court (Riigikohus), the first
applicant argued that judge E. P. could not have been unaware of the
fact that her husband had led the team of investigators and that the
applicant had made several complaints during the preliminary
investigation to the Public Prosecutor's Office against the police
investigators, including I. P. He asserted that judge E. P. should
have withdrawn from hearing the case. In his view the judicial
investigation in the City Court had not been impartial; the lack of
impartiality had particularly been reflected in the severity of the
sentence. The applicant had not requested E. P.'s removal because he
had found out too late and through informal sources that she was
married to I. P. Nevertheless, he was of the opinion that his failure
to request the judge's removal should not deprive him of the right to
impartial adjudication of the charges against him.
- The
second applicant argued in his appeal to the Supreme Court that judge
E. P. had had no right to administer justice in respect of him
because she was the wife of the head of the team of police
investigators.
- On
21 January 2004 the Supreme Court refused the applicants leave to
appeal.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- According
to Article 20 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Kriminaalmenetluse koodeks), as in force at the material
time, a judge could not participate in criminal proceedings and had
to be disqualified if he or she had a direct or indirect personal
interest in the case or if other circumstances gave reasons to doubt
his or her impartiality. Article 20 § 3 provided that a
person who was related to an official conducting a preliminary
investigation or court proceedings in a criminal case could not
participate in the proceedings as an expert, specialist, defence
counsel or representative of a victim, plaintiff or defendant, or as
an interpreter or translator.
- Article
26 § 1 (2) of the Code stipulated that a person whose spouse had
participated in the proceedings of a criminal case (menetlusosaline
kriminaalasjas) could not act as a judge in that case. The same
applied in respect of a person with regard to whom facts were
presented which gave reason to doubt his or her impartiality (Article
26 § 1 (4)).
- Article
34 § 1 of the Code provided that
participants in the criminal proceedings (kriminaalmenetluse
osaline; menetlusosaline) were: suspect, accused, accused at
trial and his or her defence counsel, prosecutor in court
proceedings, and victim, plaintiff, defendant and their
representative.
- In
Article 107-1 § 1 of the Code the rights and obligations of a
head of the investigation (uurimisjuht) were enumerated. He or
she could monitor the activities of a preliminary investigator and
give him or her instructions; form teams of investigators
(uurimisgrupp); annul unlawful or unjustified orders of
preliminary investigators; participate in the actions of preliminary
investigators or personally perform actions in a criminal matter.
- Under
Article 178 of the Code a head of the investigation could form a team
of investigators by his or her order. The head of the team of
investigators (uurimisgrupi vanem) had to be named in the
order. The latter had to coordinate the activities of the team of
investigators.
- Article
231 of the Code provided that after a judge had announced the panel
of the court, he or she had to explain to the participants in the
proceedings their right to request the judge's or lay judges'
disqualification.
- Article
232 of the Code stipulated that judges and lay judges had to withdraw
from hearing of the case, and the participants in the proceedings had
the right to request their disqualification, under the circumstances
specified in Article 20 or 26 of the Code.
THE LAW
I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
- The
Court considers that, in accordance with Rule 42 § 1 of the
Rules of Court, the applications should be joined, given their common
factual and legal background.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicants complained that they had been deprived of their right to
an impartial tribunal as provided in Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties' submissions
(a) The Government
- The
Government argued that the applicants had not requested the
disqualification of judge E. P., thereby waiving their right thereto.
In the Government's submission, the applicants were already aware of
the fact that judge E. P. and investigator I. P. were married to each
other during the proceedings before the City Court, although not
necessarily during the first court hearing. However, even at a later
stage of the proceedings they could have requested the judge's
disqualification but they had not done so. Referring to the records
of the court hearings of 29 April and 27 May 2003, according to which
the applicants did not make any requests for disqualification, the
Government argued that the applicants at least tacitly waived any
rights they may have had under Article 6 concerning the issue of
impartiality of the judge.
- The
Government reiterated that under the subjective test, the personal
impartiality of a judge had to be presumed until there was proof to
the contrary. In the present case, no evidence calling into doubt the
personal impartiality of the City Court judge had been adduced before
the Court.
- Under
the objective test, the Government considered that the applicants'
fears as to the lack of the judge's impartiality could not be held to
be objectively justified. They submitted that there was no evidence
to allow a conclusion that I. P. had had a direct connection with the
conduct of the preliminary investigation of the criminal case. The
team of investigators set up for the investigation had comprised four
investigators, each of whom had been authorised to perform
investigative actions. In fact, the investigation had mainly been
carried out by investigator L., while investigators G. and K. had
also performed some actions. In the Government's submission I. P. had
not been personally involved in the preliminary investigation,
although he had been formally appointed as the head of the team of
investigators. He had not signed any orders or other procedural
documents and there was no indication that he had given any
instructions or guidelines to the other investigators. The only
document signed by I. P. in the criminal case file had been the order
setting up the team of investigators.
- The
Government found that in a small country like Estonia the requirement
for automatic disqualification of a judge on the mere grounds of her
being married to an investigator would be too sweeping. Moreover, E.
P. had not been the only judge hearing the case – two lay
judges had also participated in deciding the criminal matter.
Finally, the Government pointed out that, subsequent to the
proceedings in the City Court, the case had also been heard by the
Court of Appeal, which had examined both the applicants' allegations
on the lack of impartiality of the City Court judge and adjudicated
the case on its merits, partially relieving the applicants of the
charges.
(b) The applicants
- The
applicants challenged the Government's argument that after the team
of investigators had been set up, I. P. had not performed any
investigative actions. They emphasised that the first applicant had
been informed by the Tallinn Police Prefecture and the Public
Prosecutor's Office that I. P. had been a member of the team of
investigators set up for the criminal case concerned having the
powers to conduct all investigative activities. They submitted that,
as head of the team of investigators, he had had, under Article 107-1
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the power to control the actions
of other investigators and that he had in fact exercised this power.
This had been indirectly confirmed by the first applicant's statement
before the City Court on 30 May 2003, where he had said that the
charges against him had been changed when he had refused to cooperate
with I. P. and that I. P. had not released him from the police cell.
Accordingly, the applicants maintained that the mere fact that the
investigative activities carried out by I. P. had not been recorded
or that they had consisted of giving oral instructions to other
investigators did not refute the fact that he had actually been in
charge of the investigation of the applicants' case.
- The
applicants also contested the Government's argument that they knew
the judge and investigator were married to each other during the
proceedings in the City Court. The second applicant had had certain
suspicions that I. P. and E. P. might have been married but the City
Court had not replied to his remark to that effect. The applicants
emphasised that the family name P. was common in Estonia.
- The
applicants contended that they had never waived any of their rights
under Article 6 of the Convention. In any event, such a waiver would
have run counter to an important public interest – the
requirement that the courts inspire confidence in the public and in
the accused.
- In the applicants' submission, the judge's lack of
impartiality in the present case had been demonstrated by the fact
that she had dismissed their requests to summon a forensic expert and
the first applicant's objections to the records of the hearings.
Accordingly, the judge had been partial under the subjective test.
- So
far as the objective test was concerned, the applicants reiterated
that I. P. had been the head of the team of investigators and that
they had known him as a person involved in the investigation of the
criminal case concerned, regardless of whether any documents had been
signed by him. They argued that it was not plausible that the judge
had not familiarised herself with the order signed by I. P. or that
she had not discussed business with her husband. In the applicants'
submission it was clear that the judge could not have been objective
as their acquittal would have run counter to the interests of her
husband's career.
- The
applicants considered that the Court of Appeal had failed to remedy
the defect that had occurred in the first-instance proceedings.
- The
applicants emphasised that the Contracting States were under the
obligation to organise their legal systems so as to ensure compliance
with the requirements of Article 6 § 1, impartiality being
unquestionably one of the foremost of those requirements. As concerns
the lay judges, the applicants pointed out that they did not have
legal qualifications and they had been unable to resolve questions of
law. In practice, the proceedings had been conducted and the judgment
composed by judge E. P.; the lay judges' presence had been mainly
formal.
2. The Court's assessment
(a) Whether the applicants waived their
right under Article 6 § 1
- The
Court observes at the outset that in the Government's submission the
applicants had not requested the disqualification of judge E. P.
and thereby waived their rights under Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention. The applicants did not agree.
- The
Court notes that it has accepted in its case-law the possibility that
a person may waive his or her right guaranteed under the Convention.
However, such a waiver must be made in an unequivocal manner and must
not run counter to any important public interest (see, for example,
Håkansson and Sturesson v. Sweden, judgment of 21
February 1990, Series A no. 171 A, p. 20, § 66,
and Mikolenko v. Estonia (dec.), no. 16944/03, 5 January
2006).
- In
the present case, the applicants and the Government disagreed on when
exactly the applicants had become aware that the City Court judge and
the investigator were married to each other. The Government conceded
that the applicants had not necessarily been aware of it at the
beginning of the judicial examination of the case. They argued, on
the basis of the prosecutor's statement before the Court of Appeal
(see paragraph 17 above) and on the fact that the first applicant's
wife had complained about the involvement of judge E. P. immediately
after the City Court had delivered its judgment (see paragraph 15
above), that the applicants must already have become aware that the
two were married before the end of the proceedings before the City
Court. In the applicants' argument, they had not been aware that the
judge and the investigator were married at that time. The second
applicant admitted that he had had some suspicions about it. The
first applicant had stated before the Court of Appeal that he had
become aware that they were married after the City Court had closed
the hearing.
- The
Court notes that the material in its possession does not allow it to
make a firm conclusion on when exactly the applicants became aware of
the judge's and the investigator's marriage. It appears probable that
they already had certain suspicions to that effect during the
proceedings before the City Court and that these suspicions were
subsequently confirmed in one way or another. The Court takes into
consideration that the first applicant was detained throughout the
criminal proceedings and that the second applicant was also detained
for a certain period, so they must have had difficulties in obtaining
reliable – or indeed official – information on whether
their suspicions were justified.
- In
any event, the Court notes that the second applicant voiced his
doubts at the hearing before the City Court and the applicants raised
this issue in their appeals shortly after the proceedings in the City
Court had come to an end. Against this background, the Court is
unable to conclude that the applicants unequivocally waived their
right to request the disqualification of the judge. The Court also
notes in this context that the Court of Appeal examined this
complaint on its merits and did not dismiss it on formal grounds as
having been made too late.
(b) Whether there was a violation of
Article 6 § 1
- The
Court reiterates that it is of fundamental importance in a democratic
society that the courts inspire confidence in the public and above
all, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned, in the accused
(see Padovani v. Italy, judgment of 26 February 1993, Series A
no. 257 B, p. 20, § 27). Article 6 of the
Convention requires a tribunal to be impartial. Impartiality normally
denotes absence of prejudice or bias. The Court has determined the
existence or absence of impartiality of a judge according to a
subjective test, that is on the basis of the personal conviction or
interest of a particular judge in a given case, and also according to
an objective test, that is, by ascertaining whether the judge offered
guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect
(see, for example, Kyprianou v. Cyprus [GC], no. 73797/01,
§ 118, ECHR 2005 ...; Pétur Thór
Sigurðsson v. Iceland, no. 39731/98, § 37,
ECHR 2003 IV; and Piersack v. Belgium, judgment of 1
October 1982, Series A no. 53, pp. 14-15, § 30).
- As
to the subjective test, the personal impartiality of a judge must be
presumed until there is proof to the contrary (see Kyprianou,
cited above, § 119, with further
references).
- As
concerns the objective test, it must be determined whether, quite
apart from the judge's conduct, there are ascertainable facts which
may raise justified doubts as to his or her impartiality. This
implies that, in deciding whether in a given case there is a
legitimate reason to fear that a particular judge lacks impartiality,
the standpoint of the person concerned is important but not decisive.
What is decisive is whether this fear can be held to be objectively
justified (see Micallef v. Malta, no. 17056/06, § 74,
15 January 2008; Wettstein v. Switzerland, no. 33958/96,
§ 44, ECHR 2000 XII; and Ferrantelli and Santangelo
v. Italy, judgment of 7 August 1996, Reports
1996-III, pp. 951-52, § 58). In this respect even
appearances may be of a certain importance or, in other words,
“justice must not only be done, it must also be seen to be
done” (see Micallef, cited above, §
75; and De Cubber v. Belgium, judgment of
26 October 1984, Series A no. 86, p. 14, § 26).
- At the outset, the Court takes note of the
Government's argument that Estonia is a small country and that in the
Government's view a requirement for automatic disqualification of a
judge on the mere grounds of her being married to an investigator
would be too sweeping. However, in proceedings originating in an
individual application the Court has to confine itself, as far as
possible, to an examination of the concrete case before it (see
Wettstein, cited above, § 41). Moreover, the Court
reiterates that the Contracting States are under the obligation to
organise their legal systems so as to ensure compliance with the
requirements of Article 6 § 1, impartiality being unquestionably
one of the foremost of those requirements. The Court's task is to
determine whether the Contracting States have achieved the result
called for by the Convention (see De Cubber, cited above,
p. 20, § 35).
- In
the present case, the Court notes that the applicants referred to the
judge's lack of impartiality under the subjective test as she had
dismissed several requests submitted by the applicants (see paragraph
41 above). The Government disagreed.
- The
Court, being aware of the difficulty of rebutting the presumption of
subjective impartiality, is nevertheless unable to conclude, on the
evidence before it, that judge E. P. in the present case displayed
hostility or ill-will for personal reasons so as to call into doubt
her impartiality under the subjective test (see Micallef,
cited above, § 72).
- The
Court finds that the case is different in so far as the objective
test is concerned. It appears probable that judge E. P. was aware of
the fact that her husband had been the head of the team of
investigators dealing with the applicants' case. If not from the
beginning, this was the case at least from the time the second
applicant had voiced his suspicions to that effect.
- As
to the Government's argument that the task of heading the team had
been merely of a formal nature, the Court notes that the team had
been set up specifically for the investigation of the applicants'
case. This means, in the Court's view, that I. P.'s connection with
the applicants' criminal case must have been considerably closer
than, for example, that of the head of a police institution who could
have had formal responsibility for all criminal matters dealt with at
any given time. Moreover, the first applicant had been informed by
the police and the Public Prosecutor's Office that I. P. was a member
of the team of investigators set up for the criminal case concerned
having the powers to conduct all investigative activities. The first
applicant can be understood as having considered I. P. personally
responsible for the investigation. Furthermore, the Court cannot
disregard the first applicant's statements before the City Court
according to which I. P. had in fact participated in the
investigation (see paragraph 12 above).
- In
the Court's view the above is sufficient to conclude that there were
ascertainable facts which could raise objectively justified doubts as
to the impartiality of the trial court presiding judge. Thus, there
was at least an appearance of a lack of impartiality by the judge E.
P., owing to her husband's involvement in the pre-trial investigation
of the criminal case. The Court does not consider it decisive that
two lay judges were in the composition of the court or that the case
was also heard by the Court of Appeal. It appears evident that the
professional judge's role in the proceedings was paramount compared
to the lay judges. The Court of Appeal, however, failed to remedy the
situation. The Court notes that the impartiality issue was raised
before the Supreme Court which also had all powers to remedy the
situation but which decided not to grant the applicants leave to
appeal.
- There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
first applicant made no claims in respect of pecuniary or
non-pecuniary damage. Therefore, the Court makes no award in his
favour (Rule 60 of the Rules of Court).
- The
second applicant made no claims in respect of pecuniary damage but
claimed 40,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
According to him, his unlawful conviction and imprisonment had caused
him mental and physical suffering. Moreover, he had been stabbed
while in prison, as a result of which he had needed medical care and
his health had deteriorated.
- The
Government did not comment on the second applicant's claim.
- The
Court reiterates that it cannot speculate as to whether the outcome
of proceedings would have been different if no violation of the
Convention had taken place (see Van Mechelen and Others
v. the Netherlands (Article 50), judgment of 30 October
1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 VII, p.
2432, § 18). Nevertheless, the fact remains that the criminal
proceedings against the applicants were not conducted in conformity
with the Convention.
- In
so far as the second applicant is concerned, the Court finds that he
has sustained damage which cannot be compensated by the finding of a
violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court
awards the second applicant the sum of EUR 1,500 by way of
compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicants, who had been granted legal aid, did not make any
additional claims for the costs and expenses incurred before the
Court.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Decides to join the applications;
- Declares the remainder of the applications
admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the second applicant, within three
months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention,
EUR 1,500 (one thousand and five hundred euros), plus any tax that
may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be
converted into Estonian kroons at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the second
applicant's claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 24 April 2008, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President
