FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 37294/04
by Norman John HAYES
against the United Kingdom
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 27 March 2008 as a Chamber composed of:
and ,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 12 October 2004,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Norman John Hayes, is a British national who was born in 1957 and lives in Wirral. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr D. Walton of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.
A.  The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant received a notice of intended prosecution requiring him to name the driver of his car on 10 December 2001. The applicant replied that either he or his wife had been driving but neither could actually remember which one of them had been driving through the location of the speed trap on that date.
On 17 October 2002 the Magistrates’ Court convicted the applicant of an offence under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 for failing to give information which might have led to the identification of the driver of his car. He was fined GBP 150 and ordered to pay GBP 100 costs, with his licence to be endorsed with three penalty points.
On 27 November 2002 the Crown Court rejected the applicant’s appeal, amending the sentence such that he would have to pay GBP 212 costs.
The applicant appealed to the High Court by way of case stated claiming a breach of his rights under Article 6 of the Convention.
In the case stated, the Crown Court trial judge, having set out the facts of the case, stated that the court had been of the opinion that the applicant was trying to evade responsibility for the disregard of the speed limit, that the right against self-incrimination did not apply and accordingly dismissed the appeal.
On 4 February 2004 the High Court rejected the applicant’s appeal, referring to established domestic case-law on the point in Brown v. Stott [2001] 2 WLR 817.
B.  Relevant domestic law and practice
The relevant domestic law and practice is set out in O’Halloran and Francis v. the United Kingdom[GC], nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, §§ 25‑31, ECHR 2007‑...
COMPLAINTS	
The applicant complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention that he had been subject to compulsion to give incriminating evidence in violation of the right to remain silent and the privilege against self‑incrimination. Article 6 of the Convention provides, so far as relevant, as follows:
“1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...
2.  Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”
THE LAW
A. The parties’ submissions
1. The Government
The Government submitted that the present case was indistinguishable from the case of O’Halloran and Francis, cited above, and in particular the facts of Francis, where the applicant was convicted for failure to comply with the section 172 demand.
2. The applicant
The applicant disputed the Government’s submission that his case was indistinguishable from Francis. He maintained that in Francis there was no question of who had been driving the vehicle whereas in his case there was no evidence as to who was driving at the time. His conviction was obtained solely from the failure to be able to supply the information required by section 172 (2).
B. The Court’s assessment
The Court has previously examined cases raising issues similar to those in the present case in O’Halloran and Francis, cited above, where it found there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and that no separate issue arose to be considered under Article 6 § 2.
The Court has examined the present case and finds that there are no facts or arguments from the applicant which would lead to any different conclusion in this instance. The Magistrates’ Court and the Crown Court heard evidence from the applicant that either he or his wife had been driving the vehicle but neither of them could remember which of them it was. In the case stated by the Crown Court, that court was of the opinion that the applicant was trying to evade responsibility for the disregard of the speed limit. In these circumstances, and recalling that it is for domestic courts to assess the evidence before them (Edwards v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A no. 247‑B, § 34), it is clear the domestic courts were entitled to convict the applicant for failure to comply with a section 172 (2) demand and, accordingly, the Court agrees with the Government’s submission that the present case is indistinguishable from Francis.
It follows that the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill‑founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
	Lawrence Early	Lech Garlicki
	Registrar	President