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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF
KEHOE v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
(Application
no. 2010/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
17 June
2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Kehoe v. the United Kingdom,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Lech
Garlicki,
President,
Nicolas
Bratza,
Giovanni
Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
David
Thór Björgvinsson,
Ján
Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
judges,
and
Lawrence Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 27 May 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 2010/06) against the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by Irish
nationals, Ms Mary Kehoe ("the applicant") and her four
children on 12 January 2006.
- The
applicant was represented by Ms Whitfield, a lawyer practising in
London. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”)
were represented by their Agent, Ms K. McCleery of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, London.
- The
applicant alleged that there had been unreasonable delay in enforcing
the financial obligations of her ex-partner in respect of child
support and that she had had no access to court in this regard,
invoking Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention.
- By
a decision of 26 June 2007, the Court declared the application partly
admissible as regarded the applicant's complaint of lack of access to
court, inadmissible as regarded her children.
- The
applicant and the Government each filed further written observations
(Rule 59 § 1). The applicant replied in writing to the
Government's observations. The Chamber decided, after consulting the
parties, that no hearing on the merits was required (Rule 59 § 3
in fine).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant married Mr K in 1983. They had four children. The marriage
broke down and the applicant applied for divorce. Mr K left the
marital home at the beginning of 1994. The children remained with the
applicant who, in December 1993, had applied to the Child Support
Agency (“the CSA”) to obtain financial support from their
father for bringing up the children. There had been an oral agreement
that he pay GBP 150 maintenance per week towards the support of the
children. According to the applicant, some payments had been
voluntarily made but they had rapidly ceased. She only had a limited
income from a part-time evening job and child benefit and even when
she obtained full-time secretarial employment in 1994 she was
struggling financially.
- The
CSA did not send a Maintenance Enquiry Form (MEF) to Mr K until 25
May 1995, which resulted in the applicant losing the opportunity to
receive maintenance for the period prior to that date.
- On
13 July 1995 Mr K returned the MEF accepting paternity. Insufficient
information was given to allow a full maintenance assessment to be
made. An interim maintenance assessment (IMA) was issued with effect
from 5 October 1995.
- Mr
K's liability changed many times after that date, inter alia
as his employment changed and it proved difficult to obtain
information.
- According
to the summary in the later High Court judgment, the key features
were as follows:
- By
March 1996 arrears of GBP 4,244 had accumulated.
- The
CSA negotiated an agreement with Mr K that he would pay under the
IMA, GBP 124.33 per week plus GBP 25.67 towards arrears.
- On
21 June 1996 a liability order was applied for because he had
breached the agreement. The order was discontinued when regular
payments were resumed.
- On
1 February 1999 the Secretary of State issued an apology to the
applicant for the inconvenience caused by the delay in issuing the
MEF and paid her GBP 10,381.14, comprising the amount of child
support she might have received up to that point if the MEF had been
sent at the proper time, namely GBP 8,632.04 (inclusive of interest),
and GBP 1,749.10 ex gratia compensation.
- On
1 September 1999, the CSA issued a further apology about the service
which she had received and made an additional "consolatory"
compensation payment of GBP 110.
- In
December 1999 and April 2000, the CSA paid the arrears not yet
received plus interest for the delay.
- On
15 December 2000 a second application for a liability order was
granted for GBP 6,329.24, covering arrears from May 1995 to
11 September 2000. Payments were not made and bailiffs were
instructed to levy distress, but were unsuccessful.
- On
31 January 2001 the liability order was registered as a county court
debt. Consideration was given to a committal order but the policy was
to use this only as a last resort.
- On
9 October 2001 a deduction of earnings order (EO) was issued for GBP
608.80 per month, increased to GBP 889.06 on 21 February 2002.
Following this Mr K again stopped paying. EOs on the company of which
he was a director proved unsuccessful. In an interview with the CSA
Mr K alleged that he had stopped paying as two of the qualifying
children had been living with him for five years and a third had
moved in recently, while the fourth had gone to live with the mother
in Spain. The CSA was aware of the changed circumstances of the
children and had taken this into account in assessments. Having
established that the applicant was permanently resident in Spain the
case was closed on 13 January 2003 with effect from 30 September
2002. Arrears remained due however and the CSA continued to seek to
enforce them.
- On
8 November 2002 a committal hearing was held. Mr K admitted owing GBP
6,329.24 for the period 25 May 1995 to 11 September 2000 and GBP
13,859.12 for the period 12 September 2000 until 4 September 2002. He
agreed to pay the former sum by 8 July 2003 and the latter sum at GBP
500 per month from November 2002.
- Payment
was not made in November 2002. He was contacted on 10 December
2002 and told that unless payment was made by 13 December 2002
committal proceedings would be restored. A payment of GBP 1,500 was
made on 30 December 2002.
- The
applicant brought proceedings under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA),
seeking a declaration that the provisions of the Child Support Act
1991 were incompatible with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as
they denied a parent with care of children access to court in
connection with disputes as to whether the absent parent had paid or
ought to pay sums due under a maintenance assessment or as to the
manner in which the obligations under the maintenance assessment
should be enforced and seeking damages under section 7 of the HRA
based on the CSA's undue delay after 2 October 2000 in taking steps
to enforce the child maintenance assessments obtained in this case.
She maintained that she had expended much energy and suffered much
stress in attempting to get the CSA to obtain payments for her and
had been repeatedly told that the dispute was between the CSA and
Mr K and did not involve herself; she believed that she would
not have received a fraction of the money eventually paid if she had
not continually pressurised the CSA and complained of their inaction
and inability to obtain maintenance for her.
- On
16 May 2003, Mr Justice Wall found that the applicant had a civil
right to seek maintenance for her children from their father, such
right being an autonomous substantive right, plainly recognised in
English law and provided for by domestic legislation. The exclusion
of the claimant from the enforcement process imposed a procedural bar
on the prosecution/enforcement of the claim which engaged Article 6.
He found that the court was given jurisdiction by the HRA such that
if the CSA had acted in any way incompatible with the claimant's
Article 6 rights she could bring an action for damages under section
7, while any decision by the CSA not to enforce or any failure to
enforce timeously or effectively would be subject to challenge by
judicial review. On this basis the scheme under the 1991 Act was HRA
compliant and she was not entitled to a declaration of
incompatibility. He issued directions with a view to an eventual
trial as to whether there had been undue delay and to determine any
damages. This part of the order was stayed pending appeal to the
Court of Appeal.
- On
5 March 2004, the Court of Appeal upheld the Secretary of State's
appeal and dismissed the applicant's cross-appeal. It held, as
summarised in the head note:
"that the Child Support Act 1991 introduced a new
child support system, its self- contained nature being a critical
feature of its effect in domestic law; that the scheme was built
firmly on the central premise that the assessment, collection and
enforcement of maintenance orders should be in the hands of the Child
Support Agency and consequentially it redefined the rights and
obligations of parents and those caring for children; that there was
no justification for departing from the general principle that
Article 6 was concerned only with disputes recognisable as such under
domestic law and founded on the existence of an underlying right;
that under the scheme the applicant had no legal right in domestic
law to a child maintenance payment of any particular amount or at
all; and that, accordingly, she was unable to assert that she had an
arguable civil right under Article 6 which entitled her to a
determination by a court.”
- The
Court of Appeal further held that the judge had erred in finding that
she had a right to damages to supplement her limited right of
judicial review; damages could only be awarded where the Act was
incompatible with Article 6, and the Act did not become incompatible
because of a lack of entitlement to damages for its incompatibility.
- On
14 July 2005, the House of Lords, by a majority of four to one,
rejected the applicant's appeal.
- Lord
Bingham of Cornhill stated in rejecting the appeal:
"[6] That a caring parent in the position of Mrs
<K.> was given no right of recovering or enforcing a claim to
child maintenance against an absent or non-resident parent was not a
lacuna or inadvertent omission in the 1991 Act: it was the essence of
the new scheme, a deliberate departure from the regime which had
previously obtained. The merits of that scheme are not for the House
in its judicial capacity to evaluate. But plainly the scheme did not
lack a coherent rationale. The state has an interest, most directly
in cases where public funds are disbursed, but also more generally
that children should be adequately supported. It might well be
thought that a single professional agency, with the resources of the
state behind it and an array of powers at its command, would be more
consistent in assessing and more effective and economical in
enforcing payment than individual parents acting in a random and
uncoordinated way. It might also be thought that the interposition of
an independent, neutral, official body would reduce the acrimony
which had all too frequently characterised applications for child
maintenance by caring against absent or non-resident parents in the
past which, however understandable in the aftermath of a fractured
relationship, rarely enured to the benefit of the children. For
better or worse, the process was deliberately changed.
[7] The 1991 Act cannot in my opinion be interpreted as
conferring any right on a parent in the position of Mrs <K>.
She is of course the person to whom child maintenance will be paid,
directly or indirectly and subject to any deduction of benefit, as
the person who incurs the expense of bringing up the children. But
the right which she had enjoyed under the former legislation was
removed, and the right to recover the maintenance has been vested in
the CSA..."
- Baroness
Hale of Richmond, dissenting, found that prior to the 1991 Act a
father had, at common law, a duty to maintain his legitimate minor
children which had always been unenforceable in the courts. However
it had been expanded and reinforced by two kinds of statutory
obligation: a private law obligation to make the payments ordered by
a court under various statutes (e.g. matrimonial and family
proceedings) and a public law obligation to reimburse the State for
benefits paid for the children. The new scheme which transferred the
task of assessing and collecting maintenance from the courts did not
however remove these obligations or the corresponding right of the
child to benefit from them. The obligation of a parent to maintain
his children and the right of the children to have the benefit of the
parental obligation to maintain them were not wholly contained in the
1991 Act. The 1991 Act left all previous law intact save precluding
courts from using their powers in cases where the CSA was supposed to
do it for them. Accordingly the children's civil right to parental
support survived the 1991 Act which acted not only as a limit to the
extent of the obligation but also as a limit to its enforcement.
Article 6 was therefore engaged.
- In
assessing whether the limitations on enforcement of those rights was
compatible with the Convention, Baroness Hale noted that there was
undoubtedly a legitimate aim. Although the non-enforceability by the
custodial parent in non-benefit cases was not a necessary feature of
comparable child support schemes elsewhere in the common law world,
the matter had been debated. That possibility was rejected as the
Government did not want to create one law for the rich and one for
the poor. There were also cases where the parent with care was
sometimes in receipt of benefits and at other times not. She
concluded that this was just the sort of policy choice in a
socio-economic field which the courts were usually prepared to leave
to the judgment of Parliament, which was best able to make the
decision as to which scheme would most effectively secure the
recognition and enforcement of the children's rights generally. It
would be difficult to hold that the scheme as a whole was
incompatible with the children's rights to a speedy determination and
enforcement of their claims. That said, she considered that the
public authority charged by Parliament with securing those rights was
under a duty to act compliantly with Article 6. She would therefore
have allowed the appeal and restored Mr Justice Wall's order.
- Meanwhile,
all money owed to the applicant was paid by 27 April 2005 and her
case was closed.
THE LAW
THE SCOPE OF THE CASE
- The
Court recalls that in its decision on admissibility dated 27 June
2007 it decided to join to the merits the Government's objection
concerning non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of the
applicant's complaint that she had no effective access to court
concerning failures or omissions of the CSA or Secretary of State;
while rejecting the remainder of the case as inadmissible, it
declared admissible the application insofar as it concerned the
applicant's complaints about delays by the CSA in paying maintenance
for the periods from May 1995 to 5 November 1996 and from 18 August
1999 to 27 April 2005.
THE GOVERNMENT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
- The
Government invited the Court to reconsider its ruling on the six
months rule. They submitted that the running of time should not be
regarded as delayed until the payment of all outstanding benefits,
arguing that where the applicant complained of discrete periods of
failure to pay maintenance, she had to bring her complaints to
Strasbourg within six months of the end of those periods. The earlier
period at the very least was out of time (May 1995 to 5 November
1996). Since Article 6 did not apply directly to the CSA, the case
could not be treated as analogous to Article 6 delay cases where the
applicant could claim in respect of the totality of the time taken in
the proceedings.
- The
Government also raised the objection that the applicant had no
arguable civil right to receive maintenance. They disputed that they
had ever accepted that such a right existed, only that she had a
right to apply to the CSA for an assessment of Mr K's obligations to
pay maintenance, in respect of which the Court had held that she was
no longer a victim. The legislation in fact ensured that enforcement
of maintenance obligations was a discretionary matter for the CSA,
subject to public law supervision. The discretionary nature of
enforcement of maintenance obligations distinguished this case from
rights to social security benefits, such that there was no individual
economic right flowing from the specific rules laid down in a
statute. Although the right to apply for an assessment was a civil
right, the enforcement of maintenance obligations fell within public
law. The domestic courts' rulings on the issue indicated that there
should be strong reasons before this Court departed from the decision
that the applicant enjoyed no civil right.
- The
applicant replied that the Court's rejection of the Government's
objections in its decision on admissibility was entirely correct and
should not be revisited. She considered that the Government's
approach to the “civil right” issue was an exercise in
splitting hairs, making fine distinctions which ignored the reality
of the situation.
- The
Court considers however that it is unnecessary to rule again on these
matters for the reasons set out below.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 6 AND 13 OF THE
CONVENTION
A. The parties' submissions
- The
applicant submitted that it was not compatible with Article 6 to
remove her from the enforcement process, in particular as she was the
only one with an interest in the dispute. The scheme as set up was
inefficient and ineffective, the CSA showing itself incapable of
taking directed or consistent enforcement actions, being fobbed off
readily by the unsophisticated tactics of Mr. K. This placed an
excessive and disproportionate burden on her and deprived her of the
"essence" of her right, in which respect she relied on
Philis v. Greece (no. 1) (judgment of 27 August
1991, Series A no. 209).
- She
argued that the Government's approach was formalistic and unreal and
that there was no good reason for denying individuals such as the
applicant the option of enforcing their claims directly against the
absent parent, as was the case in other jurisdictions such as
Australia and New Zealand. The effect of the domestic system of
enforcement was that the applicant had no ability to control the
steps that were taken to enforce, despite the fact that she was the
person with the greatest knowledge of Mr K.'s affairs and
despite the fact that she and her children were the only persons with
a financial interest. The comparative material showed that it was
perfectly possible and administratively simple to set up a system
with the characteristics of the CSA but leaving the parent with care
with the option of enforcing it.
- As
regarded the possibility of applying for judicial review to secure
enforcement of maintenance payments within a reasonable time, she
argued that being required to make an application every time the CSA
failed to act effectively was not a practical option. Further, since
judicial review only became possible or relevant once there had been
a breach of duty by the public body concerned, the applicant had no
ability to apply to a court to prevent any unreasonable delay. It was
highly unlikely that the Administrative Court would, in an order of
mandamus, require the CSA to take any particular step e.g. to apply
for a charging order or a committal order. Any relief would have been
general and would not have ensured that the actions taken by the CSA
were in fact appropriate. As there was an absence of a power to award
damages in such proceedings, there was no right to just satisfaction
in terms of the unacceptable past delay that axiomatically must have
already occurred.
- The
applicant submitted under Article 13 that she had no effective remedy
against the delays of the CSA and no entitlement to bring an action
in damages or recover interest in respect of delays. Her ability to
force the CSA to take enforcement action by way of judicial review
did not give her any remedy in respect of delay that had already
occurred.
- The
Government submitted that the remedy of judicial review provided her
with an effective means of vindicating her complaints of delay in the
enforcement process. Undue delay by a governmental body in carrying
out its statutory functions was a ground of legal challenge as in R
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Mersin
([2000] INLR 511), where delays in administrative handling of an
asylum claim were found unlawful, or in cases where delay amounted to
the failure to discharge a statutory duty, a breach of statutory duty
or constituted a breach of legitimate expectations giving rise to
procedural impropriety. This applicant had not brought any
application for judicial review; if she had, and the courts had found
the CSA had delayed unreasonably, she could have obtained a mandatory
order requiring the CSA to act expeditiously. There would have been
no need – in law or practice – to return to court
periodically. However, even if the remedy did have to be invoked more
than once over a lengthy period, that would not demonstrate any bar
on access to court. Two of the judges in the House of Lords had held
that she had a clear right of recourse in judicial review. It was not
open to the applicant to do nothing for more than eight years and
then complain that judicial review did not permit her to recover
damages for the period during which she had taken no action. It was
not relevant in any case that damages were not available, as Article
6 provided for a right of access to the courts, not any right to a
particular remedy under domestic law once access to court had been
secured. It did not guarantee provision of a financial claim against
public authorities where loss might have been suffered as a result of
State action.
- Furthermore
the Government submitted that the new scheme constituted a
proportionate restriction on the applicant's right of access to court
as it sought to improve the system of recovery of maintenance from
non-resident parents, relieved parents with custody of having to
proceed in their own names, allowed an administrative recovery scheme
which could impose deductions of earnings orders without judicial
decision and relieved taxpayers of the burden of subsidising the
maintenance obligations of defaulting parents. In brief, it was a
complex socio-economic decision which fell within the margin of
appreciation of the Contracting State.
- Nor
had there in fact been any unreasonable delays by the CSA. It could
not be assumed that the applicant would have been better served by an
alternative procedure, enforcement of financial orders in family
proceedings being notoriously difficult. Experience showed that a
consensual approach was often far more effective in delivering money
to the parent with care; in the vast majority of cases this was more
successful than simply issuing court proceedings as soon as there was
a default. A careful examination of the payment history in this case
showed no unreasonable behaviour or delay by the CSA but rather a
diligent, conscientious discharge of its functions in the face of
cunning recalcitrance by the applicant's former partner.
- As
regarded Article 13, the Government submitted that judicial review
was an effective remedy to end delay even if not to provide financial
redress. There was in any event no right to a remedy to challenge a
legislative provision while after 2 October 2000 the applicant could
and did raise her complaints in HRA proceedings albeit she was
unsuccessful.
B. The Court's assessment
- The
Court recalls that Article 6 § 1 secures to everyone the right
to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations
brought before a court or tribunal. In this way the Article embodies
the “right to a court”, of which the right of access,
that is the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil
matters, constitutes one aspect only (see Golder v. the United
Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no.18, p. 18, §
36). This right to a court “extends only to 'contestations'
(disputes) over (civil) 'rights and obligations' which can be said,
at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law;
Article 6 § 1 does not in itself guarantee any particular
content for (civil) 'rights and obligations' in the substantive law
of the Contracting States” (see, inter alia, James
and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1986,
Series A no. 98, pp. 46-47, § 81, and Powell and
Rayner v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1990,
Series A no. 172, p.16, § 36). Article 6 § 1 will however
apply to disputes of a “genuine and serious nature”
concerning the actual existence of a right as well as to the scope or
manner in which it is exercised (see Benthem v. the Netherlands
judgment of 23 October 1985, Series A no. 97, p. 15, §
32).
- However,
this right is not absolute, but may be subject to limitations; these
are permitted by implication since the right of access by its very
nature calls for regulation by the State. In this respect, the
Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation, although
the final decision as to the observance of the Convention's
requirements rests with the Court. It must be satisfied that the
limitations applied do not restrict or reduce the access left to the
individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence
of the right is impaired. Furthermore, a limitation will not be
compatible with Article 6 § 1 if it does not pursue a legitimate
aim and if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved (see
Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 May 1985,
Series A no. 93, p. 24, § 57; Prince Hans-Adam II of
Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], no. 42527/98, § 44, ECHR 2001
- VIII).
- In
the present case, the applicant argued that she had a civil right to
the enforcement of maintenance assessments made by the CSA in respect
of Mr. K and that she was denied effective access to court to secure
such enforcement or to seek redress for delays on the part of the CSA
in enforcing maintenance payments. The Government contended that,
under the scheme introduced by the 1991 Act, the applicant enjoyed no
such right and that the remedy of judicial review provided her with
an effective means of vindicating her complaints of delay in the
enforcement process. The Court does not find it necessary to resolve
the dispute as to existence of a civil right since, even assuming
that the applicant enjoyed such a right, the central question remains
whether her effective access to court was restricted or reduced in
such a way that the very essence of the right was impaired.
- The
Court notes that the applicant does not dispute that it was possible
for her to bring judicial review proceedings in the courts against
the CSA and/or the Secretary of State concerning alleged failure
properly to enforce the payment by Mr K of child support. The
parties' differ as to whether this procedure would afford effective
or practical solutions to the problem. While the applicant doubted
that a domestic court would do more than issue a general order of
mandamus for the CSA/Secretary of State to comply with their
duty, she did not rule out the possibility of applying for specific
measures to be included, whether by way of an order for attachment of
earnings or for committal, in which context it would have been open
to the courts, if they considered it appropriate, to add specific
directions. It is true that the courts would not have awarded damages
for any alleged periods in the past during which the applicant might
have considered the CSA to have been culpably inactive. However, the
Court considers that the opportunity to obtain court orders which
direct the relevant authority to take appropriate and expeditious
action must be regarded as effectively addressing the applicant's
principal concern, namely, the ongoing failure of Mr K to pay child
support. Indeed, insofar as the applicant argues that judicial review
only becomes available once there is a breach of duty in domestic
terms and provides no compensation for such past breach, the Court
would note that the issue before it is whether the applicant has
access to court to obtain payment of child support owing to her, not
whether she has any enforceable “civil right” to obtain
damages from the authorities for their shortcomings in that respect,
in which connection it would recall that Article 6 does not impose
any requirements as to the content of domestic law.
- Nor
is the Court persuaded by the applicant's argument that it would have
been onerous to expect her to bring applications to the courts every
time that the CSA was dilatory. Noting that the applicant did not put
the matter to the test, it is not apparent to this Court that the
proposition - that an order of mandamus, with or without
specific directions, would not have improved, or alleviated, the
situation - is sustainable. Effective access to court does not mean
in the particular circumstances of this case that Mr K. would thereby
have been brought to comply promptly for all occasions in the future.
As the Government have pointed out, obtaining payment by recalcitrant
parents is a fraught and difficult process; all that can be required
of the authorities is that they take such reasonable measures as are,
or should be, available to them. The applicant may only claim, for
the purposes of Article 6, that she have access to court when it
appears that they are not taking such reasonable measures. If, over a
certain lapse of time, this might require more than one application
to court, such does not per se disclose any disproportionate
burden or clog on the exercise of the right of access to court. If
the applicant had been in the position of taking direct action
against Mr K herself – her preferred option -, her observations
appear to envisage the fact that this might also have required serial
applications to the courts to counter his various delaying tactics.
- Furthermore,
in assessing whether the possibility of applying to the courts for
judicial review provided the applicant with effective access to
court, the Court must also give due weight to the Government's
arguments as to the purpose and context of the child support system
within England and Wales. The provision of a state enforcement scheme
for maintenance payments inter alia benefits the many parents
with care of children who do not have the time, energy, resources or
inclination to be embroiled in ongoing litigation with the absent
parent and allows the State to pursue those absent parents who
default on their obligations leaving their families on the charge of
the social security system and the taxpayer. The mere fact that it is
possible to envisage a different scheme which might also allow
individual enforcement action by parents in the particular situation
of the applicant is not sufficient to disclose a failure by the State
in its obligations under Article 6.
- The
Court concludes that the applicant has not been deprived of access to
court contrary to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Nor, in light
of that finding, is any violation of Article 13 disclosed either.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Finds that it is not necessary to rule on the
Government's preliminary objections;
- Holds that there has been no violation of
Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 17 June 2008, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Lech Garlicki
Registrar President
