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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF WOŹNIAK v. POLAND
(Application
no. 29940/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
7 July
2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Woźniak v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas
Bratza,
President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Giovanni
Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Ledi
Bianku,
Nebojša
Vučinić,
judges,
and Lawrence
Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 16 June 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 29940/06) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Hungarian national, Mr Richard
Woźniak (“the applicant”), on 6 July 2006.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr J. Danisewicz, a lawyer practising in
Gdańsk. The Polish Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr
J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- The
applicant alleged that his detention on remand exceeded a “reasonable
time” within the meaning of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention.
- On
18 January 2007 the
President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. It was also decided to examine the
merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility
(Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Gdańsk.
- On
20 July 2001 the applicant was remanded in custody by the Gdańsk
Regional Court on suspicion of murder. The court held that there had
been a risk that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings or
abscond, given the severity of the penalty he faced.
- Later,
several other persons were detained and charged in connection with
the same investigation conducted by the Gdańsk District
Prosecutor's Office. The charges against the applicant were also
extended.
- The
applicant's detention was subsequently prolonged on the following
dates: 11 October 2001, 10 January, 18 April, 17 September 2002,
28 January, 2 July, 1 October, 30 December 2003, 3 February,
21 April, 7 December 2004, 24 February, 9 June 2005, 29 May
and 21 September 2006. The courts relied mainly on the
reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in
question and on the gravity of the charges. The courts considered
that the applicant had been charged with the commission of crimes for
which he was liable to a sentence of imprisonment exceeding 8 years,
and that the circumstances of the case indicated that there was a
reasonable risk that he might obstruct the proceedings. Regard was
also had to the number of suspects and the need to obtain further
evidence.
- During
the investigation and the trial the applicant filed several
unsuccessful applications for release and appealed, likewise
unsuccessfully, against the decisions prolonging his detention.
- From
20 March 2002 until 9 May 2002 and from 17 February 2003 until
18 March 2003 the applicant served prison sentences imposed in other
sets of criminal proceedings against him.
- On
14 June 2004 the Gdańsk Regional Court delivered a judgment in
the case. The applicant appealed.
- On
24 February 2005 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal partly quashed the
first-instance judgment in respect of the applicant, sentenced him to
6-years' imprisonment in respect of some of the charges, and remitted
the remainder of the case for retrial.
- Between
2005 and 2007 the Gdańsk Regional Court held fourteen hearings
in the case.
- The
applicant was released on 14 May 2007. The Gdańsk Regional Court
found that the necessary pieces of evidence had been obtained and the
case was at its final stage, so there was no need to prolong the
applicant's detention.
- The
proceedings are pending.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
- The
relevant domestic law and practice concerning the imposition of
detention on remand (aresztowanie tymczasowe), the grounds for
its prolongation, release from detention and rules governing other,
so-called “preventive measures” (środki
zapobiegawcze) are stated in the Court's judgments in the cases
of Gołek v. Poland, no. 31330/02, §§ 27-33,
25 April 2006 and Celejewski v. Poland, no.
17584/04, §§ 22-23, 4 August 2006.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of his detention on remand had
been excessive. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
A. Admissibility
- The
Government submitted in the first place that the applicant had not
exhausted the remedies provided for by Polish law as regards his
complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, in that he had
failed to appeal against some of the decisions prolonging his
detention or dismissing his motions for release.
19. The Court reiterates that it is well established in its case-law
that an applicant must make normal use of those domestic remedies
which are likely to be effective and sufficient. When a remedy has
been attempted, use of another remedy which has essentially the same
objective is not required (see Yaşa v. Turkey, 2
September 1998, § 71, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1998 VI).
- In
the present case the applicant lodged appeals against most of the
decisions prolonging his detention. The Court considers that the
purpose of the remedies used by the applicant was to obtain a review
of his detention pending trial. In the circumstances of the case
these remedies constituted adequate and effective remedies within the
meaning of Article 35 of the Convention as their aim was to obtain
his release.
- The
Court further notes that the arguments raised by the Government are
similar to those already examined and rejected in a previous case
against Poland (see Buta v. Poland, no. 18368/02, 28
November 2006) and that the Government have not submitted any new
circumstances which would lead the Court to depart from its previous
findings.
- It follows that this complaint cannot be
rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Court further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Period to be taken into consideration
- The
applicant's detention started on 20 July 2001, when he was arrested
on suspicion of murder. On 14 June 2004 the Gdańsk Regional
Court convicted him as charged.
- As from that date he was detained “after
conviction by a competent court”, within the meaning of Article
5 § 1 (a) and, consequently, that period of his detention falls
outside the scope of Article 5 § 3 (cf. Kudła v. Poland
[GC], no. 30210/96, § 104, ECHR 2000 XI).
- When
on 24 February 2005 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal partly quashed
the first-instance judgment and remitted a part of the case for
retrial, the applicant was still serving the sentence imposed with
respect to the charges upheld in the appeal.
- The
Court further notes that between 20 March 2002 and 9 May 2002
and from 17 February 2003 until 18 March 2003 the applicant served a
prison sentence which had been imposed on him in other criminal
proceedings. This term, being covered by Article 5 § 1 (a), must
therefore be subtracted from the period of the applicant's pre-trial
detention for the purposes of Article 5 § 3.
Accordingly,
the period to be taken into consideration amounts to 2 years and 7
months.
2. The parties' submissions
(a) The applicant
- The
applicant submitted that the length of his detention on remand had
been unreasonable.
(b) The Government
- The
Government submitted that the applicant's pre-trial detention had
been justified by the existence of substantial evidence of his guilt,
the nature of the offences with which he had been charged and the
severity of the anticipated penalty.
- The
Government asserted that the necessity of the applicant's continued
detention had been thoroughly examined by the courts which on each
occasion had given sufficient reasons for their decisions.
Furthermore, the applicant's case had been extremely complex. Lastly,
they submitted that the authorities had displayed special diligence
in the conduct of the proceedings.
3. The Court's assessment
(a) General principles
- The
Court recalls that the general principles regarding the right “to
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial, as
guaranteed by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention were stated in a
number of its previous judgments (see, among many other authorities,
Kudła v. Poland [GC], cited above, § 110 et
seq, ECHR 2000 XI; and McKay v. the United Kingdom
[GC], no. 543/03, §§ 41 44, ECHR 2006-...,
with further references).
(b) Application of the above principles in
the present case
- In
their decisions on the applicant's detention, the authorities, in
addition to the reasonable suspicion against him, relied principally
on four grounds, namely the serious nature of the offences with which
he had been charged, the severity of the penalty to which he was
liable, the need to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings, and
the risk that the applicant might tamper with evidence.
- The
applicant was charged with murder (see paragraph 6 above) and
subsequently also with other charges.
- The
Court accepts that the reasonable suspicion against the applicant of
having committed serious offences could initially have warranted his
detention. Also, the need to secure the proper conduct of the
proceedings, in particular the process of obtaining evidence from
witnesses constituted valid grounds for the applicant's initial
detention.
- However,
with the passage of time, those grounds became less and less
relevant. The Court must then establish whether the other grounds
adduced by the courts – namely, the severity of the anticipated
sentence and the risk that the applicant would tamper with evidence –
were “relevant” and “sufficient” (see, Kudła
cited above, § 111).
- The
Court reiterates that while those above factors could justify even a
relatively long period of detention, they did not give the domestic
courts an unlimited power to prolong this measure.
- The
Court further notes that, according to the authorities, the
likelihood of a severe sentence being imposed on the applicant
created a presumption that he would obstruct the proceedings.
However, the Court would reiterate that, while the severity of the
sentence faced is a relevant element in the assessment of the risk of
absconding or re-offending, the gravity of the charges cannot by
itself justify long periods of detention on remand (see Michta
v. Poland, no. 13425/02, §§ 49, 4 May
2006).
- Having
regard to the foregoing, the Court concludes that the grounds given
by the domestic authorities could not justify the overall period of
the applicant's detention. In these circumstances it is not necessary
to examine whether the proceedings were conducted with special
diligence.
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of
the Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non pecuniary
damage.
- The
Government rejected the claim as being exorbitant.
- The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, it awards the applicant EUR 1,000 in respect of
non pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant also claimed EUR 2,000 for the costs and expenses
incurred before the Court.
- The
Government pointed to the fact that they had not received any invoice
acknowledging that the applicant had incurred any legal costs and
expenses in the preparation and defence of his case before the Court.
- According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of
his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these
have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to
quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in
its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it
reasonable to award the sum of EUR 200 for costs and expenses
for the proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 3 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,000
(one thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 200
(two hundred euros) costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be
chargeable, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State
at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 7 July 2009, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence
Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
