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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF BUBIĆ v. CROATIA
(Application
no. 23677/07)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
9 July 2009
This judgment will become
final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2
of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Bubić v.
Croatia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Christos
Rozakis,
President,
Nina
Vajić,
Anatoly
Kovler,
Elisabeth
Steiner,
Khanlar
Hajiyev,
Dean
Spielmann,
George
Nicolaou,
judges,
and Søren
Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 18 June 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 23677/07) against the Republic
of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Croatian national, Mr Gorki Bubić (“the
applicant”), on 23 April 2007.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr T. Vukičević, a lawyer
practising in Split. The Croatian Government (“the Government”)
were represented by their Agent, Mrs Š. StaZnik.
- On
26 March 2008 the President of the First Section decided to
communicate the complaint concerning the applicant's right to
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions to the Government. It was also
decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as
its admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Povlja on Brač island.
Background of the case
- The
applicant was an employee of a company, Ceming, in Solin. Sometime in
1988 another employee of the same company, Z.G., moved into a flat in
Split, Pujanke, owned by the company Ceming and measuring 77.38
square metres.
- On
6 June 1988 the company Ceming as the owner of the flat instituted
administrative proceedings seeking Z.G.'s eviction on the ground that
Z.G. had broken into the flat and moved in without any legal basis.
The relevant part of the eviction request reads:
“Z.G. moved
into the flat without any authorisation, without a contract on the
use of the flat or any other valid basis for entering the flat, by
breaking the door ...”
- A
decision ordering the eviction of Z.G. was issued on 27 June 1988 by
the Split Municipality, Committee for Urbanism, Construction,
Property and Housing (“the Split Housing Committee”). The
parties were, however, not able to submit a copy of this decision
because the case file had been lost. It was referred to in the
submissions filed by Ceming with the Split State Attorney's Office on
6 September 1989. The relevant part of these submissions reads:
“Z.G. moved
into the flat without any authorisation, without a contract on the
use of the flat or any other valid basis for entering the flat, by
breaking the door ...
In view of the above
[Ceming] instituted administrative proceedings with the Split
Municipality, Committee for Urbanism, Construction, Property and
Housing, and that Committee ordered the eviction of Z.G. from the
flat in question in its decision of 27 June 1988 ...”
- On
8 May 1989 the company Ceming allocated to Z.G. another flat in
Split, in the same apartment building, measuring 54,18 square metres.
- The
decision of 8 May 1989 was annulled as illegal on 8 January 1990 by
the Split Employment Court. It found that Z.G. had a house where he
lived with his family. The relevant part of this decision reads:
“According to
the statement of participant Z.G. and a report of the on-site visit
carried out by the Commission of the respondent this court has
established that the participant, together with his family, lives in
a one-storey family house located in Klis. According to Z.G, the
ground floor comprises two rooms, a kitchen, bathroom and toilet,
measuring in all fifty square metres while the first floor, measuring
about forty square metres, comprises two more rooms and an additional
space. It is undisputed that the first floor is in the exclusive
ownership of Z.G., while the ground floor, again according to Z.G.,
is in his co-ownership in 5/8 together with his mother in 1/8, his
brother in 1/8 and the children of his late brother in 1/8. The whole
building is in sole and undisturbed possession of Z.G, his spouse,
one son and Z.G.'s mother, while his other son rents a flat in
Kučine. ...”
- On
6 December 1990 the company Ceming allocated to the applicant and his
family (his wife and three children) a flat in Split, Pujanke, the
same one Z.G. had already moved into, consisting of three bedrooms, a
living room, a kitchen with a dining room, storage, a bathroom with
toilet and a hallway, and measuring 77.38 square metres, by which the
applicant acquired a specially protected tenancy of the flat. A note
on the allocation decision stated that it became final on 21
September 1990. The flat was publicly owned and the said company had
the right to dispose of it. The applicant and his family could not,
however, move into the flat because Z.G. occupied it (see § 5
above).
- On
28 December 1990 Ceming sought enforcement of the decision of 27 June
1988, namely that the eviction of Z.G. be carried out (see §
7 above). On 15 January 1991 the Split Housing Committee issued an
enforcement order against Z.G. on the basis of its decision of 27
June 1988, after which the administrative authorities unsuccessfully
attempted on eleven occasions to enforce the eviction order between
January 1991 and December 1994.
- On
3 June 1991 Parliament enacted the Protected Tenancies (Sale to
Occupier) Act (Zakon o prodaji stanova na kojima postoji stanarsko
pravo), which regulated the sale of publicly-owned
flats previously let under protected tenancies, giving the right to
holders of such tenancies of publicly-owned flats to purchase them
from the provider of the flat under favourable conditions. All
publicly-owned flats became the property of the municipalities in
which they were situated.
- On
an unspecified date in 1991 the applicant brought a civil action in
the Split Municipal Court for Z.G.'s eviction. The applicant argued
that Z.G. had no title to occupy the flat, while the applicant had
been granted a specially protected tenancy of the flat. On 18 July
1991 the applicant's claim was allowed and the court ordered Z.G. to
vacate the flat within eight days of the date when the decision
became final. The relevant part reads:
“The decision
granting the flat to the plaintiff was adopted on 3 December 1990 and
it is therefore clear that it could not have become final on 20
September 1990, as is noted on it. ... It is obviously a mistake.
However, the fact is that that decision had meanwhile become final
because if not, the plaintiff, as a tenant - a holder of a specially
protected tenancy - would not have been issued with a decision fixing
the amount of the rent for the flat ...
The defendant is
using the flat in question without any right to do so. The results of
the proceedings show that the flat in question has never been
allocated for his use ... Therefore, he has no legal basis to live in
the flat in question ...”
However,
the judgment was quashed and the case remitted to the Split Municipal
Court for a new trial. On 16 July 1993 that court found that it had
no jurisdiction in the matter because the applicant had never moved
into the flat. This decision was upheld by the Split County Court
(Zupanijski sud u
Splitu) on 22 October
1993.
- Meanwhile,
in August 1992 Z.G. brought a civil action against the applicant in
the Split Municipal Court, seeking the annulment of the decision of 6
December 1990 by which the applicant had been granted the specially
protected tenancy of the flat in question. On an unspecified date
Z.G. died and his wife, A.G., took over the proceedings.
- Under
the Protected Tenancies (Sale to Occupier) Act the applicant as the
buyer and Split Municipality as the seller concluded a contract for
the sale of the said flat on 18 October 1994. A copy of the contract
was submitted for approval by the State Attorney's Office. On 21
October 1994 approval was given. It also stated that that approval
could not preclude the State Attorney from seeking annulment of the
contract.
- After
the applicant had become the owner of the flat in 1994, he became
entitled to participate in the administrative proceedings concerning
the eviction of Z.G. (see § 11 above). On 4 November 1994 the
applicant asked for the eviction order to be carried out. The
eviction was scheduled for 19 December 1994 but was not carried out.
- On
11 January 1995 the Split State Attorney's Office brought a civil
action against the applicant and Split Municipality in the Split
Municipal Court, seeking annulment of the contract of sale in
question. They argued that the applicant had never obtained a
protected tenancy of the flat because he had never moved into it.
- On
27 January 1997 the Split Housing Committee discontinued the
enforcement proceedings and annulled the enforcement order of 15
January 1991 (see § 11 above), finding that pursuant to the
Constitutional Court's decision of 20 November 1996 by which certain
provisions of the Housing Act were revoked, it no longer had
jurisdiction in the matter.
- As
regards the civil action brought by the Split State Attorney's Office
(see § 17 above), the Municipal Court held in favour of the
latter and in its judgment of 10 July 2002 annulled the contract of
sale between the applicant and the Split Municipality (see § 15
above). It held that the conditions for acquiring protected tenancy
were that there should exist a final and enforceable decision on
granting such a tenancy and that the holder of the protected tenancy
had moved into the flat concerned. It found that the stamped
certificate stating that the decision of 6 December 1990, granting
the applicant protected tenancy on the flat at issue, had become
final, was obviously erroneous since it bore the date 21 September
1990. It was impossible for a decision of 6 December 1990 to become
final three months before it was issued. It concluded as follows:
“... this court
considers that the first defendant has never moved into the flat in
question and therefore according to the relevant legal provisions has
never acquired the status of a holder of a specially protected
tenancy. He could not therefore have purchased the flat in question
under the provisions of the Specially Protected Tenancy (Sale to
Occupier) Act. For that reason this court has not addressed the
preliminary question whether the decision on granting the specially
protected tenancy had become final, because the criterion for
acquiring a specially protected tenancy, namely that the first
defendant has moved into the flat, has not been satisfied and thus
the first defendant has not acquired the status of a holder of a
specially protected tenancy.”
- The
judgment was upheld by the Split County Court on 27 August 2004. The
relevant part of the judgment reads:
“The findings
of the first-instance court that the sale contract concluded on 18
October 1994 between the defendants was null and void are accepted as
correct by this court....
The first-instance
court correctly established the following relevant facts:
- that the first
defendant had been granted the right to occupy the flat in question
by a decision of Ceming, ... of 6 December 1990;
- that the first
defendant had never moved into the flat on the basis of a final
decision.
On the basis of the
above facts, which were correctly and fully established, the
first-instance court correctly concluded that the first defendant had
never acquired the specially protected tenancy of the flat in
question because, under section 59 § 1 of the Housing Act
(Official Gazette nos. 51/85 – 70/93,...), the specially
protected tenancy is acquired on the day of entering the flat on the
basis of a final decision to that effect.
Since the first
defendant has not acquired the specially protected tenancy, he does
not have the right under section 6 § 1 of the Specially
Protected Tenancy (Sale to Occupier) Act (Official Gazette nos. 43/92
– 58/95) to purchase the flat. Therefore, the conclusion of the
first-instance court that the sale contract of 18 October 1994 was
null and void, under section 103 § 1 of the Civil Obligations
Act (Official Gazette nos. 53/91 – 112/99), is correct.
...
It is undisputed
between the parties to the proceedings that the first defendant was
granted the flat in question by a decision ... of 6 December 1990 and
that it bears a certified stamp that it had become final on 21
September 1990.
The conclusion of the
first-instance court that the above decision could not have become
final before it had been issued is correct.
...
The first defendant,
in his evidence given on 17 October 2000, claimed that he had no
possession of the flat in question since September 1990 which
confirms that the decision of the first-instance court is correct
because, even assuming that he actually had possession of the flat in
September 1990, such possession was not based on the final decision
granting him that flat for his use.”
- In
his subsequent constitutional complaint the applicant argued that the
decision of 6 December 1990 had in fact become final on 6 January
1991 and that he had been prevented from entering the flat because
Z.G. had already occupied it illegally in 1988. He also relied on the
Supreme Court's practice that a specially protected tenancy could not
be lost where the holder of such a tenancy had failed to enter the
flat because it had already been illegally occupied by a third
person. It was dismissed by the Constitutional Court (Ustavni
sud Republike Hrvatske) on 26 October 2006 as ill-founded.
- In
the civil proceedings brought by Z.G. in August 1992 (see §
14 above), on 30 April 2007 the Split Municipal Court declared the
decision of 6 December 1990 (granting the specially protected tenancy
to the applicant) null and void on the ground that it had not been
adopted according to the procedure prescribed for granting a
specially protected tenancy. This judgment was upheld by the Split
County Court on 6 February 2008 and thus became final.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. The relevant legislation
- The
relevant provisions of the Housing Act (Zakon o stambenim
odnosima, Official Gazette nos. 51/1985, 42/1986, 22/1992 and
70/1993) read as follows:
Section 59
“A protected tenancy shall be acquired on the day
of entering the flat ...”
Section 92
“A person who does not enter the flat [of which he
or she is granted a specially protected tenancy] without a justified
reason within thirty days of the day when he or she is granted
occupancy shall lose the right to occupy the flat [granted to him or
her].”
- The Protected Tenancies (Sale to Occupier) Act (Zakon
o prodaji stanova na kojima postoji stanarsko pravo, Official
Gazette no. 27/1991 with further amendments - “the Act”)
regulated the conditions of sale of flats let under protected
tenancies.
Section
1 of the Act gave the right to the holders of protected tenancies of
publicly-owned flats to purchase such flats under favourable
conditions, provided that each holder bought only one flat.
Section
21 obliged a seller to submit the sale contract for approval by the
competent State Attorney's Office within eight days.
- The
relevant part of the Obligations Act (Zakon o obveznim odnsima,
Official Gazette, nos. 53/91, 73/91, 3/94, 7/96 and 112/99), as
then in force, read:
III. [LEGAL] BASIS
Permissible [legal] basis
Section 51
“(1) Each contractual obligation shall have a
permissible [legal] basis [causa].
(2)The basis is not permissible if it contravenes the
Constitution, peremptory norms or morals.
...”
Null and void contract on the ground of its [legal]
basis
Section 52
“Where there is no [legal] basis or where it is
not permissible, the contract is null and void.”
Unlimited right to plead nullity
Section 110
“The right to plead nullity shall be
inextinguishable.”
- The
relevant parts of the State Attorney's Office Act (Zakon o
drZavnom odvjetništvu, Official Gazette no. 75/1995) read:
Section 24
“...
... the competent State Attorney's Office shall ... seek
the annulment of a contract ... which contravenes peremptory norms.”
B. The Supreme Court's practice
- The
relevant part of decision no. Rev 1255/00-2 of 17 October 2000 reads:
“... the lower courts lost sight of what they had
established, namely that eight days after the defendants B. and Lj.B.
had obtained a decision granting them occupancy rights, a certain
D.M. had moved into the flat without legal basis and had thus
prevented the defendants B. from moving into the flat themselves.
Against this background it cannot be accepted that the
defendants had not acquired the specially protected tenancy and that
thus they were not entitled to purchase the flat in question under
section 6 of the Protected Tenancies (Sale to Occupier) Act ... On
the contrary, they were entitled to purchase the flat as tenants.
...”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that that his right to peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions had been violated in that the sale contract on the
purchase of the flat had been annulled. He relied on Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1, the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
- The
Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
- The
Government contended firstly that the applicant had not exhausted
domestic remedies since he had not sought reimbursement of the price
he had paid for the flat and possible damages in connection with the
annulment of the sale contract in question.
- The
applicant argued that the civil action suggested by the Government
could not be seen as an effective remedy for the violation alleged.
He argued that he had exhausted all available remedies, namely an
appeal against the judgment annulling the sale contract in question
and a constitutional complaint.
- The
Court notes that the applicant does not allege that the violation of
his right to peaceful enjoyment of his possession consists in the
fact that he did not obtain the reimbursement of the price he had
paid for the flat and possible damages in that respect, but in that
the national courts had annulled a valid sale contract for the flat
in question. In the Court's view a civil action suggested by the
Government could not in any respect address the violation claimed. In
this connection the Court agrees with the applicant that he exhausted
all available remedies when he lodged an appeal against the
first-instance judgment annulling the sale contract in question and
later on also a constitutional complaint. In his appeal and
constitutional complaint the applicant challenged the decision on the
annulment of the sale-contract in question and advanced arguments
relevant for the protection of this right under Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1. However, his attempts remained unsuccessful. It follows that
the Government's objection must be rejected.
- The
Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It
further considers that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The parties' arguments
- The
applicant argued that the measure in question had not been prescribed
by law and that it had not pursued any legitimate aim. Furthermore,
it had not been proportionate because he had purchased the flat in
question pursuant to the relevant laws and the contract of sale had
been approved by the competent State Attorney's Office. He could not
move into the flat because an illegal occupier had already moved in
beforehand. The findings of the
national courts in his case had been contrary to the established
practice of the Supreme Court.
- The
Government accepted that the annulment of the sale contract in
question amounted to an interference with the applicant's right to
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. However, they argued that the
measure had been based in law, namely the Civil Obligations Act, and
that it pursued a legitimate aim, that is protection of the rights of
others and protection of legality. Furthermore, they argued that the
measure had been proportionate, In that connection they stressed that
the applicant had never acquired a specially protected tenancy of the
flat at issue because he had never moved into that flat. Therefore,
he had not been entitled to purchase the flat.
The Court's assessment
- According
to the Court's case-law, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 comprises three
distinct rules. The first, which is expressed in the first sentence
of the first paragraph and is of a general nature, lays down the
principle of peaceful enjoyment of property. The second rule, in the
second sentence of the same paragraph, covers deprivation of
possessions and subjects it to certain conditions. The third,
contained in the second paragraph, recognises that the Contracting
States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of
property in accordance with the general interest. These rules are not
“distinct” in the sense of being unconnected: the second
and third rules, which are concerned with particular instances of
interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property, are to
be construed in the light of the principle laid down in the first
rule.
- In
the present case it is not disputed that the applicant suffered an
interference with his right of property which amounted to a
“deprivation” of possessions within the meaning of the
second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No.
1. The Court must therefore examine the justification for that
interference in the light of the requirements of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1.
- It
reiterates that the first and most important requirement of Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 is that any interference by a public authority with
the peaceful enjoyment of possessions should be lawful: the second
sentence of the first paragraph authorises a deprivation of
possessions only “subject to the conditions provided for by
law” and the second paragraph recognises that the States have
the right to control the use of property by enforcing “laws”.
Moreover, the rule of law, one of the fundamental principles of a
democratic society, is inherent in all the Articles of the Convention
(see Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, Reports of Judgments
and Decisions 1996-III, § 50; The former King of Greece
and Others v. Greece [GC], no. 25701/94, § 79, ECHR
2000-XII; and Malama v. Greece, no. 43622/98, § 43,
ECHR 2001-II).
- As
to the lawfulness of the interference, the Court notes that the
applicant's property title was declared null and void by the national
courts under Croatian civil law on contracts and the law regulating
the functions of the State Attorney's Office. The Court, noting that
its power to review compliance with domestic law is limited (see,
among other authorities, Allan Jacobsson v. Sweden (no. 1), 25
October 1989, Series A no. 163, § 57), is thus satisfied
that the nullification of the applicant's property title was in
accordance with domestic law.
- As
to the question of the legitimate aim pursued, the Court reiterates
that, because of their direct knowledge of their society and its
needs, the national authorities are in principle better placed than
the international judge to appreciate what is “in the public
interest”. Under the system of protection established by the
Convention, it is thus for the national authorities to make the
initial assessment as to the existence of a problem of public concern
warranting measures of deprivation of property. Here, as in other
fields to which the safeguards of the Convention extend, the national
authorities, accordingly, enjoy a certain margin of appreciation
(see, mutatis mutandis, Velikovi and Others v. Bulgaria,
nos. 43278/98, 45437/99, 48014/99, 48380/99, 51362/99, 53367/99,
60036/00, 73465/01 and 194/02, § 168, 15 March 2007). In
view of these considerations, the Court accepts that the interference
pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of legality.
- The
Court must also examine whether an interference with the peaceful
enjoyment of possessions strikes the requisite fair balance between
the demands of the general interest of the public and the
requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental
rights, or whether it imposes a disproportionate and excessive burden
on the applicant (see, among many other authorities, Jahn and
Others v. Germany [GC], nos. 46720/99, 72203/01 and
72552/01, § 93, ECHR 2005-VI). Despite the margin of
appreciation given to the State the Court must nevertheless, in the
exercise of its power of review, determine whether the requisite
balance was maintained in a manner consonant with the applicant's
right to property (see Rosinski v Poland, no. 17373/02, § 78,
17 July 2007). The concern to achieve this balance is reflected in
the structure of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention
as a whole, including therefore the second sentence, which is to be
read in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first
sentence. In particular, there must be a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be
realised by any measure depriving a person of his possessions (see
Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium, 20
November 1995, Series A no. 332, § 38, and Former King
of Greece and Others, cited above, § 89). Thus the
balance to be maintained between the demands of the general interest
of the community and the requirements of fundamental rights is upset
if the person concerned has had to bear a “disproportionate
burden” (see, among many other authorities, The Holy
Monasteries v. Greece, 9 December 1994, Series A no. 301-A,
§§ 70-71).
- The
Court notes that the contract of sale was annulled because it was
established that the applicant had never moved into the flat in
question. The Court notes that one of the preconditions on
part of the applicant for purchasing the flat in question was that he
had previously acquired a specially protected tenancy of that flat.
In this connection the Court notes that it was clear that under the
relevant provisions of the Housing Act a specially protected tenancy
was not acquired simply by a decision granting that right. Two
further conditions had to be fulfilled: that this decision become
final and that the person concerned enter the flat. However,
in the civil proceedings conducted against the applicant it was
established that the applicant had never moved into the flat and thus
could have not acquired a specially protected tenancy of it, despite
the decision of 6 December 1990 granting him such a right. As to the
question of whether the decision of 6 ecember 1990 had become
final, the Split Municipal Court and the Split County Court found
that the stamped certificate that it had become final on 21 September
1990 had been erroneous since the decision was issued after that
date. These courts did not examine that question further.
- As
to the findings of the national courts, the Court reiterates that
under Article 19 of the Convention its duty is to ensure observance
of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the
Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors
of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in
so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by
the Convention. The Court considers that the findings of the national
courts as to the fact that the applicant had never moved into the
flat in question and that the decision granting him the specially
protected tenancy could not have become final on 21 September 1990
are not arbitrary in any respect.
- The
applicant however argued that the decisions reached in his case were
contrary to the practice of the Supreme Court. While it is true that
according to the Supreme Court's practice, relied on by the applicant
(see § 27 above),
in a situation where a holder of a specially protected tenancy could
not enter a flat because it had already been occupied by a third
person without a valid legal basis the former does acquire the
specially protected tenancy and is entitled to purchase the flat in
issue, in the present case there are some additional elements which
dispense the Court from further examining that question. The
Court notes in this respect that the decision of 6 December 1990,
allocating the flat to the applicant (see § 10 above) was later
on declared null and void by the Split Municipal Court on 30 April
2007, a judgment which was upheld by the Split County Court on
6 February 2008, and thus became final. That decision has
consequences on the applicant's initial title in respect of the flat
in question as it finally established that the decision granting the
applicant specially protected tenancy had been null and void with the
effect that it could not have produced any valid legal effects.
Therefore, the complaint that this decision had not been enforced
must yield in the face of the subsequently established nullity of
this decision ab initio.
- Lastly,
the Court notes that the applicant is still able to claim the price
he had paid for the flat as well as any damages he has possibly
suffered in connection with the annulment of the sale contract.
- The
above considerations suffice for the Court to conclude that there has
been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in
the circumstances of the present case.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
that the enforcement order issued in the administrative proceedings
instituted in 1988 had never been carried out. He further complained
that the courts had taken no action about the length of the civil
proceedings he instituted in April 2002 in the Split Municipal Court
seeking the eviction of Z.G. Lastly, the applicant complained under
Article 8 of the Convention that his right to respect for his home
had been infringed.
- In
the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the
matters complained of were within its competence, the Court considers
that this part of the application does not disclose any appearance of
a violation of any of the above Articles of the Convention. It
follows that these complaints are inadmissible under Article 35 §
3 as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to
Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the
applicant's right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions admissible
and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 9 July 2009, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President
