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SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF SCHWARTZ v. HUNGARY
(Application
no. 25073/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
3
November 2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Schwartz v. Hungary,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Françoise
Tulkens,
President,
Vladimiro
Zagrebelsky,
Danutė
Jočienė,
Dragoljub
Popović,
András
Sajó,
Nona
Tsotsoria,
Kristina
Pardalos,
judges,
and Sally
Dollé, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 13 October 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 25073/05) against the
Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Hungarian national, Mrs Lászlóné
Schwartz (“the applicant”), on 11 May 2005.
- The
Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by Mr L. Höltzl, Agent, Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.
- On
4 February 2009 the
President of the Second Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time
(Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Pilisvörösvár.
- On
13 July 1998 a Mr M. and other plaintiffs brought an action against
the applicant and Mr M. Wieszt, with a view to terminating common
ownership of a property. The Buda Surroundings District Court gave
judgment on 27 October 1999.
- Following
appeals and proceedings concerning the successions of deceased
parties – which involved stays of the case between 1 December
2001 and 11 March 2003, as well as between 6 December 2003 and
1
September 2004 – the Pest County Regional Court quashed this
decision and remitted the case on 17 February 2005.
- The
resumed first-instance proceedings were subsequently stayed again
because Mr Wieszt had died on 5 January 2006. The proceedings
resumed before the District Court on 26 September 2006. According to
the information available in the case file, the case is still pending
at first instance.
THE LAW
- The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Government contested that
argument.
- The
Court observes that the period to be taken into consideration has so
far lasted over eleven years and three months. Of this time, two
years and nine months corresponding to the staying of the proceedings
on various occasions, not imputable to the State, must be deducted.
However, the remaining period still exceeds eight and a half years
for two levels of jurisdiction. In view of such lengthy proceedings,
this complaint must be declared admissible.
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
application (see Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII). Having examined all the material submitted to it,
the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact
or convincing argument capable of persuading it to reach a different
conclusion in the present circumstances. Having regard to its
case-law on the subject, the Court considers that the length of the
proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable
time” requirement. There has accordingly been a breach of
Article 6 § 1.
- Relying
on Article 41 of the Convention, the applicant claimed pecuniary and
non-pecuniary damage of unspecified amounts. (She made no claim for
costs and expenses.) In support of her damages claim, she submitted
that, because of the litigation, she had had to take out a
4-million-Hungarian-forint
(HUF) mortgage, lost HUF 12.8 million
in outstanding rents, taken a HUF-6-million
private loan and spent HUF 10 to 15 million
on renovation. The Government contested these claims. The Court does
not discern any causal link between the violation found and the
pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. However,
it considers that the applicant must have sustained some
non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards her EUR
5,600 under that head. Furthermore, having regard to the fact that
the proceedings in question are still pending before the domestic
courts, the Court considers that the most appropriate form of redress
would be to bring them to a conclusion as soon as possible, by
conducting them in accordance with the requirements of Article 6 §
1 of the Convention (see, Uğuz v. Turkey, no. 31932/03, §
30, 13 December 2007).
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 5,600 (five
thousand six hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in
respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Hungarian
forints at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 November 2009, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Sally Dollé Françoise Tulkens
Registrar President
