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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF KAUCZOR v. POLAND
(Application
no. 45219/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
3 February
2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Kauczor v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas
Bratza,
President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Giovanni
Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
Ján
Šikuta,
Mihai
Poalelungi,
Nebojša
Vučinić,
judges,
and Lawrence
Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 13 January 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 45219/06) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Polish national, Mr Adam Kauczor
(“the applicant”), on 5 November 2006.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr I. Płaza, a lawyer practising in
Katowice. The Polish Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- The
applicant alleged that his pre-trial detention had exceeded a
“reasonable time” within the meaning of Article 5 §
3 of the Convention. He
also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention of the
allegedly unreasonable length of the criminal proceedings against
him.
- On
4 May 2007 the
President of the Chamber to which the case has been allocated decided
to give notice of the application to the Government. It was also
decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as
its admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant, Mr Adam Kauczor, is a Polish national who was
born in 1967 and lives in Siemianowice Śląskie.
A. The applicant's detention and criminal proceedings
against him
- On
9 February 2000 the applicant was arrested. On 10 February 2000 the
Katowice District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) remanded him in
custody on suspicion of murder. That decision was upheld by the
Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) on 1 March
2000.
- The
applicant's pre trial detention was subsequently extended by the
Katowice Regional Court's decisions of 25 April 2000, 3 July
2000 (upheld by the Katowice Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny)
on 2 August 2000), and 23 April 2001.
- Meanwhile,
on 21 June 2000 the applicant was indicted for murder and
illegal possession of weapons. The Prosecutor requested that
thirty-four witnesses be heard by the trial court and the testimonies
of a further one hundred and four witnesses be read out at the trial.
- The
first hearing was scheduled on 28 December 2000. It was
adjourned, however, due to the absence of a key witness.
Subsequently
the court held sixty hearings. Approximately twenty hearings were
cancelled or adjourned either because of the absence of the
applicant's counsel or summoned witnesses, or because of the illness
of a judge.
- On
26 November 2001 the Katowice Regional Court decided to extend
the applicant's detention until 30 April 2002. However that
decision was changed by the Katowice Court of Appeal's decision of
19 December 2001. The Katowice Court of Appeal agreed to
continue the applicant's detention, but only until 9 February
2002. It was held that the first instance court was no longer
competent to extend the preventive measure, since the length of the
applicant's detention was about to reach the statutory two-year
time limit laid down in Article 263 § 3 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (Kodeks postępowania karnego).
- Between
2001 and 2003 the court held a hearing every two or three months.
- During
this time, the applicant's detention was extended by the Katowice
Court of Appeal's decisions of 6 February 2002 (confirmed by the
same court on 13 March 2002), 15 May 2002 (upheld on
23 October 2002), 23 October 2002 (upheld on 12 March
2003), 12 March 2003 (upheld on 23 April 2003).
- On
21 May 2003 the applicant's trial commenced de novo because
the judge rapporteur had retired.
- The
first hearing scheduled on 5 July 2003 was adjourned due to the
absence of a key witness and one of the lay judges.
- From
the beginning of 2004 until mid 2005 the court held on average
one hearing per month.
- On
16 September 2005 the President of the Criminal Section
(przewodniczący wydziału) ordered that hearings be
scheduled more often than once a month.
- In
2006 the court scheduled twenty-three hearings, of which eleven did
not take place. It appears that between January and October 2007 the
court scheduled nine hearings.
- Meanwhile,
the applicant's detention was extended by the Katowice Court of
Appeal decisions of 23 July 2003 (upheld on 27 August
2003), 26 November 2003 (upheld on 17 December 2003),
18 February 2004 (upheld on 17 March 2004), 11 August
2004 (upheld on 25 August 2004), 24 November 2004 (upheld
on 5 January 2005), 16 March 2005 (upheld on 20 April
2005), 27 July 2005 (upheld on 10 August 2005), 19 October
2005 (upheld on 23 November 2005), 25 January 2006 (upheld
on 22 February 2006), 19 April 2006 (upheld on 19 May
2006), 19 July 2006 (upheld on 23 August 2006), 25 October
2006 (upheld on 15 November 2006), and 24 January
2007.
- The
domestic courts justified the applicant's pre trial detention in
its initial phase by the existence of strong evidence against the
applicant and the likelihood that a severe penalty would be imposed,
as well as by the need to secure the proper course of the
proceedings. The latter was derived from the fact that there was a
suspicion that the applicant had been aided in committing the offence
charged and that the alleged accomplices were being sought by the
authorities. During that time numerous witnesses were heard and an
identification parade was held.
- At
the later stage of the applicant's detention, the authorities relied
on the complexity of the case as the reason for extending the
measure. It was also emphasised that many of the scheduled court
hearings did not take place for various objective reasons, such as
the illness of a judge, the applicant's request for the withdrawal of
a judge, the absence of witnesses or of the applicant himself, as
well as difficulties in obtaining the report of ballistic forensic
experts as requested by the applicant at an advanced stage of the
proceedings.
- On
11 December 2007 the Katowice Regional Court decided to lift the
preventive measure and to release the applicant. On an unspecified
date that decision was upheld by the Katowice Court of Appeal.
- The
case is currently pending before the Katowice Regional Court as the
court of first instance.
B. Proceedings under the 2004 Act
- On
an unspecified date in 2006 the applicant lodged a complaint about
unreasonable length of proceedings under the Law of 17 June 2004
on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a
reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do
rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez
nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004 Act”).
- On
25 October 2006 the Katowice Court of Appeal dismissed the complaint.
Although the court examined the entire length of the proceedings, it
held that there had been no inactivity or undue delay on the part of
the relevant court. It was observed that until April 2003 the court
had been dealing with the case speedily and there had been no periods
of inactivity. It was acknowledged that the proceedings had been
obstructed when the case had had to be opened de novo and a
new judge rapporteur had had to be assigned. The court emphasised
that from the end of 2003 until the end of 2006 over fifty hearings
had been scheduled. The fact that some of them were cancelled was
attributable to objective factors such as the absence of a lay judge,
illness of a presiding judge or absence of the applicant's lawyer.
Finally, it was pointed out that the case was of a complex nature
and, moreover, that the applicant himself had contributed to the
delay because of his multiple requests for new evidence to be
admitted.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Preventive measures, including pre-trial detention
- The
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1997, which entered into force on
1 September 1998, defines pre-trial detention (aresztowanie
tymczasowe) one of the so-called “preventive measures”
(środki zapobiegawcze). The other measures
are bail (poręczenie majątkowe), police supervision
(dozór policji), guarantee by a responsible person
(poręczenie osoby godnej zaufania), guarantee by a social
entity (poręczenie społeczne), temporary ban on
engaging in a given activity (zawieszenie oskarżonego w
określonej działalności) and prohibition on
leaving the country (zakaz opuszczania kraju).
Article 249
§ 1 sets out the general grounds for imposition of the
preventive measures. That provision reads:
“Preventive measures may be imposed in order to
ensure the proper conduct of proceedings and, exceptionally, also in
order to prevent an accused's committing another, serious offence;
they may be imposed only if evidence gathered shows a significant
probability that an accused has committed an offence.”
Article
258 lists grounds for pre-trial detention. It provides, in so far as
relevant:
“1. Pre-trial detention may be imposed
if:
(1) there is a reasonable risk that an
accused will abscond or go into hiding, in particular when his
identity cannot be established or when he has no permanent abode [in
Poland];
(2) there is a reasonable risk that an
accused will attempt to induce [witnesses or co defendants] to
give false testimony or to obstruct the proper course of proceedings
by any other unlawful means;
2. If an accused has been charged with a
serious offence or an offence for the commission of which he may be
liable to a statutory maximum sentence of at least 8 years'
imprisonment, or if a court of first instance has sentenced him to at
least 3 years' imprisonment, the need to continue detention to
ensure the proper conduct of proceedings may be based on the
likelihood that a severe penalty will be imposed.”
The
provisions on pre-trial detention are based on the precept that
pre trial detention, the most extreme among the preventive
measures, should not be imposed if more lenient measures are
adequate.
Article 257 reads, in so far as relevant:
“1. Pre-trial detention shall not be
imposed if another preventive measure is sufficient.”
Article
259 § 1 reads:
“1. If there are no special reasons to
the contrary, pre-trial detention shall be lifted, in particular if
depriving an accused of his liberty would:
(1) seriously jeopardise his life or health;
or
(2) entail excessively harsh consequences for
the accused or his family.”
Article
259 § 3 provides:
“Pre-trial detention shall not be imposed if an
offence attracts a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding one year.”
Article
259 § 4 specifies that the rule provided for in Article 259 §
3 is not applicable when the accused is attempting to evade justice,
when he persistently fails to comply with summonses or when his
identity cannot be established.
A
more detailed description of the relevant domestic law and judicial
practice concerning the imposition of pre-trial detention, the
grounds for its extension, release from detention and rules governing
other “preventive measures” are stated in the Court's
judgments in the cases of Gołek v. Poland,
no. 31330/02, §§ 27 33, 25 April 2006
and Celejewski v. Poland, no. 17584/04,
§§ 22 23, 4 August 2006.
- On
24 July 2006 the Polish Constitutional Court, having examined jointly
two constitutional complaints (skarga konstytucyjna) lodged by
former detainees, declared Article 263 § 4 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure unconstitutional in so far as it related to the
investigation stage of criminal proceedings (No. SK 58/03). The
provision in question provided that the detention measure might be
extended beyond two years if the pre trial proceedings could not
have been completed because of “important obstacles”
which could not have been overcome. The provision in question did not
set any statutory time-limit for extending the detention measure. The
Constitutional Court considered that the impugned provision, by its
imprecise and broad wording, could lead to arbitrary decisions of the
courts on pre-trial detention and thus, infringe the very essence of
constitutional rights and freedoms.
The
Constitutional Court ruled that the unconstitutional provision was to
be repealed within six months from the date of the publication of the
judgment in the Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw).
- As
a result of the Constitutional Court's judgment, Article 263 § 4
of the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended as follows:
“The pre-trial detention shall be extended beyond
the period specified in paragraphs 2 and 3, only by the court of
appeal in whose jurisdiction the proceedings are conducted, upon a
motion from the court before which the case is pending, and at the
investigation stage, upon a motion from the appellate prosecuting
authorities. This can be done if deemed necessary in connection with
a suspension of criminal proceedings, in connection with actions
aiming at establishing or confirming the identity of the accused,
prolonged psychiatric observation of the accused, prolonged
preparation of an opinion of an expert, conducting evidentiary action
in a particularly intricate case or conducting them abroad, or
intentional protraction of proceedings by the accused.”
However,
a new provision was added in § 4(a) of Article 263:
“The court of appeal, in whose jurisdiction the
proceedings are being conducted may also, on a motion from the court
before which the case is pending, order the extension of the
detention on remand for a fixed period, exceeding that specified in
paragraph 3, because of other important obstacles whose removal has
not been possible”.
The
above amendment was adopted on 12 January 2007 and entered into force
on 16 February 2007 (Journal of Laws of 2007, No. 20, item 116).
B. Relevant statistical data
- In
the framework of the procedure before the Committee of Ministers (see
paragraph 34 below) the Polish Government supplied statistical data
concerning the number and the length of pre-trial detentions ordered
in a given year by the domestic courts.
According
to these statistics, in 2005 the total number of cases in which
pre-trial detention was ordered by regional courts amounted to 3,833.
That number comprised 30% of cases in which the measure lasted
between twelve and twenty-four months, and 23 % of cases in which the
measure exceeded two years. In 2006 the total number cases in which
pre-trial detention was ordered by district courts was 4,000. It
comprised over 33 % of cases in which the detention measure lasted
between twelve and twenty four months, and over 21 % of cases in
which the measure exceeded two years. District courts ordered
pre-trial detention in 7,635 cases in 2005 and 7,632 cases in 2006.
In both years, approximately in 12% of cases the detention measure
lasted between twelve and twenty-four months and in approximately 2.5
% over two years.
C. Remedies for unreasonable length of proceedings
- The
relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for excessive
length of judicial proceedings, in particular the applicable
provisions of the 2004 Act, are stated in the Court's
decisions in the cases of Charzyński v. Poland
no. 15212/03 (dec.), §§ 12 23, ECHR
2005 V and Ratajczyk v. Poland no. 11215/02
(dec.), ECHR 2005 VIII, and its judgment in the case of
Krasuski v. Poland, no. 61444/00, §§ 34 46,
ECHR 2005 V.
III. MEASURES TAKEN BY THE STATE TO REDUCE THE LENGTH OF
PRE-TRIAL DETENTION
A. Recent amendments to the relevant legislation
- In
addition to new Article 263 § 4 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (see paragraph 27 above) new amendments, designed to
streamline criminal proceedings, entered into force on 20 June 2007
(Law of 9 May 2007 on amendments to
the Code of Criminal Procedure; Journal of Laws of 2007, No. 99, item
664; Ustawa o zmianie
ustawy - Kodeks postępowania karnego oraz niektórych
innych ustaw). Those amendments strengthened
the powers of the authorities to discipline the participants.
In
particular, newly added Article 285 § l (a), which applies
in the investigative and judicial phase of criminal proceedings,
empowers a trial court to impose a fine of up to 10,000 Polish zlotys
(PLN) on a defence counsel or a representative of a party who has
failed to obey the summons of the authority conducting the
proceedings or who, without the approval of the competent authority,
has left the venue of the proceedings before they were completed.
A
similar admonishing measure may be applied in respect of experts,
witnesses, interpreters and other persons participating in the
proceedings (see among others, Articles 285
§ 1, 287 and 20 § 1 (a)).
In
addition, new Article 117 (a) entered into
force on 20 June 2007. According to this provision it is sufficient
if one of the defence lawyers or representatives of a party (who has
more than one defence lawyer or representative) is present before the
authority to proceed with the case.
- Another
amendment, preventing the obstruction of proceedings was introduced,
to Article 378 § 1
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to the new provision a
trial court shall appoint ex
officio a
defence counsel if the accused has
dismissed his lawyer or the lawyer himself has resigned and the
accused has not appointed a new defence counsel. Previously, in such
a situation, the court had to fix a time-limit for the accused to
choose a new defence counsel and only after this time had lapsed,
could the court act ex officio.
B. Other measures
- According
to the information supplied by the Polish Government to the Committee
of Ministers (see paragraph 28 above and paragraph 34 below), in
addition the Polish trial courts and prosecution authorities have
undertaken a series of practical measures in order to organise
criminal proceedings in a more efficient manner, i.e. by scheduling
time-limits for hearings well in advance, holding hearings on
Saturdays or severing charges against
co-accused to separate proceedings under Article 34 §
3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
if the joint examination proves difficult and time-consuming.
33. On
17 May 2007 the Council of Ministers (Rada
Ministrów) adopted the “Plan
of Actions of the Government for the execution of judgments of the
European Court of Human Rights in respect of Poland” (Program
Działań Rzqdu w sprawie wykonywania
wyroków Europejskiego
Trybunału Praw
Człowieka).
By virtue of that document
the
Minister of Justice was obliged to
disseminate among judges and prosecutors on a regular basis
information on the standards concerning the length of
pre-trial
detention stemming
from the Convention and the case-law of
the
Court in Polish cases and to include this topic in the programmes of
workshops and seminars for judges.
IV. RELEVANT COUNCIL OF EUROPE DOCUMENTS
A. The Committee of Ministers
- On 6 June 2007 the Committee of Ministers adopted
an Interim Resolution concerning the judgments of the European Court
of Human Rights in 44 cases against Poland relating to the
excessive length of detention on remand (“the 2007
Resolution”). It reads, in its relevant parts, as follows:
“... Having regard to the great number of
judgments of the Court finding Poland in violation of Article 5,
paragraph 3, of the Convention on account of the unreasonable length
of detention on remand (...)
Recalling that the obligation of every state, under
Article 46, paragraph 1, of the Convention, to abide by the judgments
of the Court involves an obligation rapidly to adopt the individual
measures necessary to erase the consequences of the violations found
as well as general measures to prevent new, similar violations of the
Convention;
Stressing the importance of rapid adoption of such
measures in cases where judgments reveal structural problems which
may give rise to a large number of new, similar violations of the
Convention;
Taking note of the steps taken so far by the authorities
to remedy the structural problems related to detention on remand in
Poland (...)
Noting also that, although some courts have begun to
refer to the Convention and the European Court's case-law in
rendering decisions on the use of detention on remand, this
preventive measure still seems often to be ordered without taking
into consideration the Convention's requirements;
Underlining that continued detention can be justified
only if there are specific indications of a genuine requirement of
public interest which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence,
outweighs the rule of respect for individual liberty;
Recalling that the persistence of reasonable suspicion
that a person arrested has committed an offence, although a condition
sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention,
may no longer suffice after a certain lapse of time and that
consequently other relevant and sufficient grounds must be presented
in order to extend such detention;
Noting that the number of cases in which the European
Court has found similar violations is constantly increasing,
ENCOURAGES the Polish authorities, in view of the extent
of the systemic problem concerning the excessive length of detention
on remand:
- to continue to examine and adopt further
measures to reduce the length of detention on remand, including
possible legislative measures and the change of courts' practice in
this respect, to be in line with the requirements set out in the
Convention and the European Court's case-law; and in particular
- to take appropriate awareness-raising
measures with regard to the authorities involved in the use of
detention on remand as a preventive measure, including judges of
criminal courts and prosecutors;
- to encourage domestic courts and
prosecutors to consider the use of other preventive measures provided
in domestic legislation, such as release on bail, obligation to
report to the police or prohibition on leaving the country;
- to establish a clear and efficient
mechanism for evaluating the trend concerning the length of detention
on remand;
...”
B. The Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human
Rights
- On 20 June 2007 the Council of Europe's Commissioner
for Human Rights released the Memorandum to the Polish Government
concerning, among other issues, the use of the detention measure in
Poland. It reads, in its relevant parts, as follows:
“36. The European Court of Human Rights
has repeatedly found violations of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention (right of a person subject to pre-trial detention to be
tried within a reasonable time) in respect of Poland. Examples of
cases brought to Strasbourg where pre-trial detention has lasted
between 4 to 6 years are not uncommon.
...
40. The Commissioner urges the Polish
authorities to review the application and functioning of pre-trial
detention in Polish law. The training of judges and prosecutors as
regards European standards and case-law of the Strasbourg Court is
crucial. The general rule should be the release rather than the
detention on remand and this message needs to be strongly underlined
to national judges...”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of his pre-trial detention had
been excessive. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
- The
Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Period to be taken into consideration
- The
applicant's detention started on 9 February 2000, when he was
arrested on suspicion of murder. On 11 December 2007 he was released
home while the criminal proceedings against him were pending before
the first-instance court.
Accordingly,
the period to be taken into consideration amounts to seven years,
ten months and three days.
2. The parties' submissions
(a) The applicant
- The
applicant submitted that the length of his pre-trial detention had
been excessive and that the measure had not been sufficiently
justified by the authorities.
In
particular, the applicant pointed out that the task of the trial
court was to hear thirty-four witnesses and merely read out the
testimonies of the other witnesses. Consequently, the time which the
trial court took to examine the applicant's case was far too long.
The applicant also claimed that the Government's argument that there
was a risk that he would obstruct the proceedings because he had
pleaded 'not guilty' breached the principle of the presumption of
innocence and was unjustified. Finally, the applicant argued that
during the proceedings he had been acting in compliance with his
statutory rights as a defendant and none of his actions should have
contributed to the protraction of the trial and his detention. The
applicant concluded that the reasons for his pre-trial detention
provided by the authorities had been laconic and vague. They had no
justification in the circumstances of the case, especially in the
light of the fact that the applicant's pre-trial detention had lasted
nearly eight years and that his criminal case was still pending
before the first-instance court.
(b) The Government
- The
Government considered that the applicant's pre-trial detention
satisfied the requirements of Article 5 § 3. It was justified by
“relevant” and “sufficient” grounds, in
particular the existence of a reasonable suspicion throughout the
entire period of the applicant's pre-trial detention that he had
committed the offences with which he had been charged. Moreover, the
Government considered that the applicant's protracted detention
pending trial was justified by a genuine public interest requirement,
namely the fact that the applicant had been charged with serious
offences and was facing a lengthy prison sentence. Finally, the
Government noted that the applicant's pre-trial detention was
justified by the risk that he would obstruct the proceedings and
tamper with evidence. The latter was particularly important in the
light of the fact that the applicant had pleaded 'not guilty', that
the case was complex and that the advancing investigation had
uncovered new aspects of the case which, in turn, required additional
examination.
3. The Court's assessment
(a) General principles
- The
Court reiterates that the general principles regarding the right “to
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial, as
guaranteed by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, have been stated
in a number of its previous judgements (see, among many other
authorities, Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96,
§ 110 et seq., ECHR 2000 XI; and McKay
v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 543/03, §§
41-44, ECHR 2006-..., with further references).
(b) Application of the above principles in
the present case
- In
their detention decisions, the authorities, in addition to the
reasonable suspicion against the applicant, relied principally on
three grounds, namely (1) the serious nature of the offences with
which he had been charged; (2) the severity of the penalty to which
he was liable; (3) the need to secure the proper conduct of the
proceedings. The latter was derived from the fact that, at the
initial phase of the investigation, the applicant had been suspected
of having been aided in committing the offence charged and that the
alleged accomplices had been sought by the authorities.
- The
Court accepts that the reasonable suspicion against the applicant of
having committed serious offences could initially warrant his
detention. Also, the need to obtain voluminous evidence and the need
to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, in particular the
process of obtaining evidence from witnesses, constituted valid
grounds for the applicant's initial detention.
- However,
with the passage of time, those grounds became less and less
relevant. The Court must then establish whether the other grounds
adduced by the courts, namely the severity of the anticipated
sentence and the risk that the applicant would tamper with evidence,
were “relevant” and “sufficient” (see Kudła,
cited above, § 111).
- According
to the authorities, the likelihood of a severe sentence being imposed
on the applicant created a presumption that the applicant would
obstruct the proceedings. However, the Court would reiterate that,
while the severity of the sentence faced is a relevant element in the
assessment of the risk of absconding or reoffending, the gravity of
the charges cannot by itself justify long periods of pre-trial
detention (see Michta v. Poland, no. 13425/02, §§
49, 4 May 2006).
Furthermore,
the Court observes that the risk that the applicant would tamper with
the evidence was not sufficiently justified by the authorities when
deciding to extend his pre-trial detention. The Court notes that the
Government relied on a presumption that the applicant would obstruct
the proceedings and tamper with evidence because he had not pleaded
guilty to the offences charged. In so far as the domestic courts
appear to have drawn adverse inferences from the fact that the
applicant had not pleaded guilty, the Court considers that their
reasoning showed a manifest disregard for the principle of the
presumption of innocence and cannot, in any circumstances, be relied
on as a legitimate ground for deprivation of the applicant's liberty
(see Garycki v. Poland, no. 14348/02, § 48, 6 February
2007 and Górski v. Poland, no.
28904/02, § 58, 4 October 2005).
- Having
regard to the foregoing, the Court concludes that the grounds given
by the domestic authorities could not justify the overall period of
the applicant's detention. In these circumstances it is not necessary
to examine whether the proceedings were conducted with special
diligence.
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of
the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant further complained that the length of the proceedings was
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
- The
Government refrained from making comments on that complaint.
- The
period to be taken into consideration began on 9 February 2000 and
has not yet ended. It has thus lasted more than eight years and six
months at a single level of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It
further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above). Furthermore, the Court
considers that, in dismissing the applicant's complaint that the
proceedings in his case had exceeded a reasonable time, the Katowice
Court of Appeal failed to apply standards which were in conformity
with the principles embodied in the Court's case-law (see Majewski
v. Poland, no. 52690/99, § 36, 11 October 2005).
- Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. In
particular, the Court notes that during the first two years after the
indictment the hearings before the trial court were scheduled not
more often than once every two or three months and that many of them
had been adjourned. In addition, on 21 May 2003 the trial had to
begin de novo because the judge rapporteur had retired. There
was a period of inactivity in the months to follow. Even though the
hearings have been scheduled more frequently since 2005, the
proceedings appear still to be pending before the first instance
court.
Having
regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in
the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and
failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 46 OF THE CONVENTION
- Before examining the claims for just satisfaction
submitted by the applicant under Article 41 of the Convention, and
having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Court considers
it necessary to determine what consequences may be drawn from Article
46 of the Convention for the respondent State.
Article
46 of the Convention provides:
“1. The High Contracting Parties
undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to
which they are parties.
2. The final judgment of the Court shall be
transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its
execution.”
- In
this context, the Court observes that it has recently delivered a
considerable number of judgments against Poland in which a violation
of Article 5 § 3 on account of the excessive length of detention
was found. In 2007 a violation of that provision was found in
thirty-two cases and in 2008, the number was thirty-three. In
addition, approximately 145 applications raising an issue under
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention are currently pending before the
Court. Nearly ninety of these applications have already been
communicated to the Polish Government. The latter number comprises
some sixty applications which were communicated within the last
twelve months with a specific question as to the existence of a
structural problem related to the excessive length of pre-trial
detention.
- It is to be noted that this issue has been recently
considered by the Committee of Ministers in connection with the
execution of judgments in cases against Poland where a violation of
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention was found. In its 2007
Resolution the Committee of Ministers concluded that the great number
of the Court's judgments finding Poland in violation of Article 5 §
3 of the Convention on account of the unreasonable length of
pre-trial detention revealed a structural problem (see paragraph 34
above). Similarly, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human
Rights raised that issue in his Memorandum to the Polish Government
of 20 June 2007 (see paragraph 35 above).
- The
2007 Resolution taken together with statistical data referred to
above (see paragraphs 28 and 56 above) demonstrate that the violation
of the applicant's right under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention
originated in a widespread problem arising out of the malfunctioning
of the Polish criminal justice system which has affected, and may
still affect in the future, an yet unidentified, but potentially
considerable number of persons charged in criminal proceedings.
- Thus,
in many similar previous cases in the recent years the Court has held
that the reasons relied upon by the domestic courts in their
decisions to extend pre-trial detention were limited to paraphrasing
the grounds for detention provided for by the Code of Criminal
Procedure and that the authorities failed to envisage the possibility
of imposing other preventive measures expressly foreseen by the
Polish law to secure the proper conduct of the criminal proceedings
(see among many other examples Jablonski v. Poland, no.
33492/96, § 83, 21 December 2000; Jarosław Jakubiak
v. Poland, no. 39595/05, §§ 37-45, 3 June 2008 and
Kucharski v. Poland, no. 51521/99, §§ 60-63, 3 June
2008). Moreover, while the relevant provisions of the domestic law
define detention as the most extreme preventive measure, it appears
that it is applied most frequently by the domestic courts (see
paragraphs 25 and 28 above).
- The
Court thus concludes, as the Committee of Ministers did, that for
many years, at least as recently as in 2007, numerous cases have
demonstrated that the excessive length of pre-trial detention in
Poland reveals a structural problem consisting of “a practice
that is incompatible with the Convention” (see mutatis
mutandis Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96,
§§ 190 191, ECHR 2004 V; Scordino
v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 229-231,
ECHR 2006 ...; Bottazzi v. Italy [GC], no. 34884/97,
§ 22, ECHR 1999 V with respect to the
Italian length of proceedings cases).
- In this connection, it is to be reiterated that, where
the Court finds a violation, the respondent State has a legal
obligation under Article 46 of the Convention not just to pay those
concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction under Article
41, but also to select, subject to supervision by the Committee of
Ministers, the general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to
be adopted in their domestic legal order to put an end to the
violation found by the Court and to redress so far as possible the
effects. The respondent State remains free, subject to monitoring by
the Committee of Ministers, to choose the means by which it will
discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention,
provided that such means are compatible with the conclusions set out
in the Court's judgment (see Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy
[GC], nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 249, ECHR 2000-VIII, and
Broniowski v. Poland cited above).
- It
is true that the respondent State has already taken certain steps to
remedy the structural problems related to pre-trial detention (see
paragraphs 27 and 30-33 above). The Court welcomes these developments
and considers that they may contribute to reducing the excessive use
of detention as a preventive measure. However, as already noted by
the Committee of Ministers (see paragraph 34 above), in view of the
extent of the systemic problem at issue, consistent and long-term
efforts, such as adoption of further measures, must continue in order
to achieve compliance with Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 71,253 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and
non-pecuniary damage.
- The
Government refrained from making comments on that matter.
- The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violations found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, it awards the applicant EUR 10,000 in respect of
non pecuniary damage suffered on account of the violation of
Articles 5 § 3 and 6 § 1 of the Convention.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant did not make a claim for any costs and expenses incurred.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 3 of the Convention;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 10,000 (ten
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that
may be chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 February 2009, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President