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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF TALYSHEVA v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 24559/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
22
December 2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Talysheva v.
Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nina Vajić,
President,
Anatoly Kovler,
Elisabeth
Steiner,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Dean
Spielmann,
Sverre Erik Jebens,
Giorgio
Malinverni, judges,
and Søren
Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 3 December 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 24559/04) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms Emma Vladimirovna
Talysheva (“the applicant”), on 26 May 2004.
- The
Russian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Ms V. Milinchuk, former Representative of
the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
- On
10 July 2007 the President of the First Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
- The
applicant and the Government each submitted observations on the
merits (Rule 59 § 1).
THE FACTS
- The
applicant, Mrs Emma Vladimirovna Talysheva, is a Russian national who
was born in 1934 and lives in Krasnodar.
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
A. Housing disputes
- The
applicant sued her relative, Mr T., claiming sole ownership of a
house. By a judgment of 1 March 2001 the Pervomayskiy District Court
of Krasnodar granted her claims. No appeal was lodged.
- Subsequently,
the applicant sued Mr T. and the Krasnodar Town Council, seeking
annulment of their title to the ramshackle buildings adjacent to the
house.
- On
18 June 2003 the Justice of the Peace in the 64th Circuit
of the Tsentralniy District of Krasnodar granted her claims. No
appeal was lodged.
- In
2004 Mr T. applied for supervisory review of the judgments of 1 March
2001 and 18 June 2003.
- On
12 February 2004 the Presidium of the Krasnodar Regional Court
quashed the judgment of 18 June 2003 because the Justice of the Peace
had misapplied the domestic law. Having re-examined the case, the
Presidium issued a new judgment, rejecting the applicant's claims.
- On
the same date in the other case the Presidium also set aside the
judgment of 1 March 2001 on account of procedural defects. In the
Presidium's view, the first-instance court had misinterpreted the
applicant's claim, had not supplied a legal basis for its findings,
and had erroneously found that the defendant had admitted the claims.
The Presidium re-examined the case and issued a new judgment
rejecting the applicant's claims.
- Both
of the Presidium's judgments indicated that the parties had been
notified of the hearing and had appeared before it.
B. The land dispute
- On 21 July 2001 Mr T. applied
for a court injunction to prevent the applicant from using a plot of
land. By a default judgment of 30 October 2001, the Justice of
the Peace in the 61st
Circuit of the Tsentralniy District of Krasnodar granted the
injunction. Upon the applicant's request, the Justice of the Peace
revoked that judgment on 3 September 2002. On 21 November 2002
the Pervomayskiy District Court, sitting on appeal, decided that the
default judgment should remain in force.
- On 10 April 2003 the Presidium
of the Krasnodar Regional Court quashed the judgment of 21 November
2002 and remitted the case to the Justice of the Peace.
- On 14 December 2004 the District
Court discontinued the proceedings because the parties had repeatedly
failed to attend hearings.
16. The proceedings were resumed on an
unspecified date. On 11 April 2006 the District Court endorsed a
friendly settlement which had been reached by the parties.
C. Other disputes
- On
27 February 2001 the Krasnodar Regional Court took a final
decision rejecting the applicant's claims in an inheritance dispute.
- The
applicant was also an unsuccessful party to another land dispute. The
final decision on that matter was taken by the Krasnodar Regional
Court on 22 April 2003.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- The
relevant domestic law governing the supervisory review procedure at
the material time is summed up in the Court's judgment in the case of
Sobelin and Others v. Russia (no. 30672/03 et seq., §§
33-42, 3 May 2007).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION AND OF
ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 ON ACCOUNT OF SUPERVISORY REVIEW
- The
applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the judgments of 1 March 2001
and 18 June 2003 in her favour had been quashed by way of supervisory
review on 12 February 2004. She also complained under Article 6
§ 1 that her procedural rights had been violated in the
supervisory review proceedings. In so far as relevant, these Articles
read as follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ...
by [a] ... tribunal...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.[...]”
- The
Government contested that argument. They argued that the supervisory
review had been compatible with the Convention as the lower courts
had made judicial errors in applying the substantive law. They also
noted that the Presidium, when reversing the final judgments, in fact
acted as a court of second instance.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The Court reiterates that for the sake of legal
certainty implicitly required by Article 6, final judgments should
generally be left intact. They may be disturbed only to correct
fundamental errors. Their review should not be treated as an appeal
in disguise, and the mere possibility of there being two views on the
subject is not a ground for re examination (see Ryabykh v.
Russia, no. 52854/99, §§ 51-52, ECHR 2003 IX).
- The
Court reiterates that it has frequently found violations of the
principle of legal certainty and of the right to a court in the
supervisory review proceedings governed by the Code of Civil
Procedure of 2003 (see, among other authorities, Sobelin
and Others, cited above, §§
57-58, and Bodrov v. Russia,
no. 17472/04, § 31, 12 February 2009)
- In
the present case the final judgment of 18 June 2003 was quashed on
the grounds of another interpretation of
substantive law, which is not in itself an exceptional circumstance
warranting the quashing of a binding and enforceable judgment (see
Kot v. Russia,
no. 20887/03, § 29, 18 January 2007).
- As
to the quashing of the final judgment of 1 March 2001, the procedural
defects that the Presidium put as a basis for the quashing cannot be
considered as fundamental errors (see paragraph 11 above). Thus,
these defects did not affect the defendant's procedural rights (see,
by way of contrast, Protsenko v. Russia, no. 13151/04,
§§ 30-33, 31 July 2008). Indeed, the
defendant was present at the hearing on 1 March 2001, had never
appealed against it and only lodged an application for supervisory
review in 2004. There is no other reason to consider these procedural
defects fundamental errors requiring a final judgment to be reversed.
- Therefore,
the reversals of the final judgments were not justified by
exceptional and compelling reasons and are in breach of the legal
certainty requirement. Accordingly, there has been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
- As
to the alleged violation of the applicant's procedural rights in the
supervisory review proceedings, the Court considers that given the
finding of a violation by the very use of supervisory review, it is
unnecessary to examine this complaint (see Ryabykh v. Russia,
no. 52854/99, § 59, ECHR 2003 IX).
- The Court further observes that under the final
judgments the applicant obtained title to the contested house. The
judgments thus created an asset within the meaning of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (see Vasilopoulou v. Greece,
no. 47541/99, § 22, 21 March 2002, and Malinovskiy
v. Russia, no. 41302/02, § 43, ECHR 2005 VII
(extracts)). The quashing of the judgments in breach of the principle
of legal certainty frustrated the applicant's reliance on the binding
judicial decision and deprived her of an opportunity to receive the
judicial awards she had legitimately expected to receive (see
Dovguchits v. Russia, no. 2999/03, § 35, 7
June 2007). There has accordingly been a violation of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1, too.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention that she was
not notified of the hearings on 30 October 2001 and 22 April 2003 and
therefore did not attend them. She also complains about the length of
proceedings in the first land dispute. Finally, she complains in
general terms that the courts were biased in favour of the other
party and delayed the proceedings.
- The
complaints about the applicant's absence from the hearings on
30 October 2001 and 22 April 2003 were raised for the first time
only on 26 May 2004, which is later than the six months
prescribed by the Convention for lodging a complaint before the
Court.
- As
to the length of the land dispute, only the periods when the case was
actually pending before the courts are taken into account (see,
for example, Markin v. Russia
(dec.), no. 59502/00, 16 September 2004). Consequently, the
proceedings lasted not more than three years and
six months (from 21 July to 30 October 2001, from 3 September
to 21 November 2002, from 10 April 2003 to 14 December
2004, and from an unspecified date after 14 December 2004 to 11 April
2006) at three levels of jurisdiction. Assessing the reasonableness
of the length, the Court takes into account the complexity of the
case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities
and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see,
among many other authorities, Frydlender
v. France [GC], no. 30979/96,
§ 43, ECHR 2000-VII). The dispute at issue was somewhat
complex. The applicant repeatedly defaulted in attendance (see
paragraph 15). No significant delays can be attributed solely to
the State. The applicant's right to a plot of land was at stake.
Regard being had to all the circumstances of
the case, the Court considers that the “reasonable time”
requirement has been complied with.
- Finally,
the complaints about the courts' bias and procrastination in other
proceedings are unsubstantiated, especially taking into account the
strong presumption of impartiality of judges (see, for example, Le
Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, 23 June 1981, §
58, Series A no. 43).
- Therefore the Court finds that
these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the
rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It
follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
and must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 §§
1, 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF
THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention
provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The applicant claimed 30,000
euros (EUR) in respect of non pecuniary damage.
- The Government contested this
claim.
- As to pecuniary damage, the
Court makes no award as there was no relevant claim made by the
applicant.
- As to non-pecuniary damage, the
Court considers that the applicant must have suffered distress and
frustration resulting from the quashing of the final and binding
judgments in her favour. However, the amount claimed appears
excessive. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court
awards the applicant EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary
damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.
B. Costs and expenses
- The applicant made no claims
under this head. Accordingly, the Court will make no award under this
head.
C. Default interest
- The Court considers it
appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal
lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added
three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares
the complaints concerning the supervisory review proceedings
admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
- Holds
that there has been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of the quashing by way of
supervisory review of the final judgments in the applicant's favour;
3. Holds
that there is no need to examine the complaints under Article 6 of
the Convention concerning the alleged violations of the applicant's
procedural rights in the supervisory review proceedings;
- Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final
in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax that may
be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted
into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 December 2009,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Nina Vajić
Registrar President
