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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF GUDKOV v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 13173/03)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
22 December 2009
This judgment will become
final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2
of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Gudkov v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nina Vajić,
President,
Anatoly Kovler,
Elisabeth
Steiner,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Sverre Erik
Jebens,
Giorgio Malinverni,
George Nicolaou,
judges,
and Søren
Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 3 December 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 13173/03) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Sergey Yevgenyevich
Gudkov (“the applicant”), on 7 April 2003.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr V. Karashchuk, a lawyer practising in
Rostov-on-Don. The Russian Government (“the Government”)
were represented by their Agent, Mr P. Laptev, the
Representative of the Russian Federation at the Court.
- On
12 October 2006 the President of the First Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Rostov-on-Don.
- On
an unspecified date he sued his former wife for title to a half of
the flat which they had allegedly purchased while they were married.
The matter was repeatedly reviewed by courts at two levels of
jurisdiction.
- On
20 February 2001 the Leninskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don
dismissed the applicant's claim.
- On
11 May 2001 the Rostov Regional Court quashed the judgment of
20 February 2001 on appeal and remitted the matter for further
consideration.
- On
8 August 2001 the District Court granted the applicant's claim
in full.
- On
19 September 2001 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment
of 8 August 2001 on appeal.
- On
2 October 2002 the applicant's former wife asked the President of the
Rostov Regional Court to lodge an application for supervisory review
of the judgment of 8 August 2001 as upheld on 19 September
2001.
- On
24 December 2002 the acting President of the Rostov Regional Court
granted the request and sent the case to the Presidium of the Rostov
Regional Court for supervisory review.
- On 26 December 2002 the Presidium of the Rostov
Regional Court reassessed the evidence and quashed the judgments of
11 May, 8 August and 19 September 2001 by way of
supervisory review and reinstated the judgment of 20 February
2001. It considered that the applicant had failed to provide enough
evidence to substantiate his title to the disputed property.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- The
relevant domestic law governing the supervisory review procedure at
the material time is summed up in the Court's judgment in the case of
Ryabykh v. Russia (no. 52854/99, §§ 31-42,
ECHR 2003 X).
THE LAW
I. LLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION AND OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 ON ACCOUNT OF
SUPERVISORY REVIEW
- The
applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the judgment of 8 August
2001 as upheld on 19 September 2001 had been quashed via supervisory
review on 26 December 2002. In so far as relevant, these
Articles read as follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ...
by [a] ... tribunal...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.[...]”
- The
Government contested that argument. They argued that the supervisory
review had been compatible with the Convention as the lower courts
had made a fundamental judicial error. They did not specify the
substance of the error.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Article 6 of the Convention
(a) Supervisory review: legal certainty
- The
Court reiterates that, for the sake of legal certainty implicitly
required by Article 6, final judgments should generally be left
intact. They may be disturbed only to correct fundamental errors.
Their review should not be treated as an appeal in disguise, and the
mere possibility of there being two views on the subject is not a
ground for re examination (see Ryabykh, cited
above, §§ 51-52).
- The Court reiterates that it has
frequently found violations of the principle of legal certainty and
of the right to a court in the supervisory-review proceedings
governed by the former Code of Civil Procedure as it allowed final
judgments in the applicants' favour to be set aside by higher courts
following applications by state officials, whose power to make such
applications was not subject to any time-limit (see, among other
authorities, Ryabykh,
cited above, §§ 51-56;
Volkova v. Russia,
no. 48758/99, §§ 34-36, 5 April 2005; and
Roseltrans v. Russia,
no. 60974/00, §§ 27-28, 21 July 2005).
- Having
examined the materials submitted to it, the Court observes that the
Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present
case. The final judgment was quashed solely for a reassessment
of the evidence (see paragraph 12 above). No fundamental error
had been found. Therefore the reversal of the final judgment was not
justified by exceptional and compelling reasons and was therefore in
breach of the legal certainty requirement. Accordingly, there has
been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
(b) Supervisory review: procedural issues
- The
applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of an infringement
of his right to a fair hearing, in that he had not been informed
about the hearing in the supervisory-review proceedings on 26
December 2002.
- The Court notes that the very application of
supervisory-review proceedings constituted a violation of the
applicant's right to a fair hearing (see paragraphs 17-19 above).
Therefore, the Court does not consider it necessary to decide whether
the alleged lack of participation by the applicant, taken separately,
would render the proceedings before the supervisory-review court
unfair.
2. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
- The Court observes that under the final judgment, the
applicant obtained title to half of the contested flat. The
judgment thus created an asset within the meaning of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (see Vasilopoulou v. Greece,
no. 47541/99, § 22, 21 March 2002, and Malinovskiy
v. Russia, no. 41302/02, § 43, ECHR 2005 VII
(extracts)). The quashing of the judgment in breach of the principle
of legal certainty frustrated the applicant's reliance on the binding
judicial decision and deprived him of an opportunity to receive the
judicial awards he had legitimately expected to receive (see
Dovguchits v. Russia, no. 2999/03, § 35, 7
June 2007). Accordingly, there has also been a violation of Article 1
of Protocol No. 1.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
- The
Court points out that under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, any claim
for just satisfaction must be itemised and submitted in writing
together with the relevant supporting documents or vouchers, “failing
which the Chamber may reject the claim in whole or in part”.
- The Court notes that on 19 January 2007 the applicant
was invited to produce his claims for just satisfaction by 23 March
2007. The applicant did not submit any claims under Article 41. Thus,
the Court makes no award under Article 41 of the Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of
the quashing on 26 December 2002 via supervisory review of the final
judgment in the applicant's favour;
- Holds that there is no need to examine the
complaint under Article 6 of the Convention that the applicant was
not informed about the hearing of 26 December 2002.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 December 2009,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Nina Vajić
Registrar President
