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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF MARCHENKO v. UKRAINE
(Application
no. 4063/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
19 February 2009
This judgment will become
final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2
of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Marchenko v.
Ukraine,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Peer Lorenzen, President,
Rait
Maruste,
Karel Jungwiert,
Renate Jaeger,
Mark
Villiger,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,
judges,
Stanislav Shevchuk, ad hoc judge,
and
Claudia Westerdiek,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 27 January 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 4063/04) against Ukraine
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Ukrainian national, Mr Mykhaylo Illarionovych
Marchenko (“the applicant”), on 19 December 2003.
- The
Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Mr Y. Zaytsev.
- The
applicant alleged, in particular, that he had been subjected to an
unfair trial resulting in his unfair conviction for defamation.
- On
12 April 2007 the President of the Fifth Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Pasiky-Zubrytski.
A. Events which led to criminal charges
against the applicant
- Since
1974 the applicant has worked as a teacher in the Lviv Boarding
School no. 6 for Children with Language Disorders (“the
School”). In 1995 he was elected head of the school branch of
the “VOST” - one of the two trade unions represented in
the School.
- On
12 January 1996 the local Board of Education employed Mrs P. to serve
as a director, notwithstanding opposition from some staff, in
particular the VOST members.
- In
May 1996 Mrs P. dismissed an employee, who was a VOST member, without
the consent of the VOST. Subsequently, in 1998, this employee was
reinstated as a result of a court action brought on her behalf by the
VOST.
- On
6 June 1996 Mrs P. refused to sign a collective agreement, signed by
the VOST and the head of the second trade union present at the
School.
- On
an unspecified date in late 1996, a former School driver who had been
dismissed by Mrs P. for incompetence submitted a written statement to
the applicant, alleging that in April 1996 Mrs P. had ordered him to
unload ten boxes of humanitarian aid intended for the School at her
father's estate and that on many occasions she had used the school
vehicle for personal purposes.
- In
early 1997 the applicant in his capacity as a trade union leader made
several applications to the Control Inspection Department
(Контрольно-ревізійне
управління,
a public audit service, scrutinising the
use of funds by State-owned entities, “the KRU”),
alleging that Mrs P. had abused her office and misused School
property and funds. In particular he stated that Mrs P. had
appropriated ten boxes of humanitarian aid, the School's TV set,
other video equipment and bricks from the school boundary wall which
had been demolished. On several occasions the applicant also
complained about the situation to Mr U., the regional leader of
the VOST.
- In
response to these complaints in 1997 the KRU held several inquiries
into the use of the School funds.
- In
its report of 28 February 1997, the KRU stated that there were no
serious instances of mismanagement of the School's property.
- The
KRU's report of 26 March 1997, however, revealed certain shortcomings
on the part of the School administration in the handling of
humanitarian aid, charity and the bricks.
However, no evidence was found that any of the
humanitarian aid or charity monies or any bricks had been
appropriated by Mrs P.
- In
April 1997 the applicant on behalf of the School branch of the VOST,
Mr U. on behalf of the Regional VOST, and Mr N. on behalf
of the local branch of the Ukrainian Conservative Party made a
criminal complaint against Mrs P. to the Lychakivsky District
Prosecutor's Office (“the Prosecutor's Office”) a
criminal complaint against Mrs P., referring largely to the same
circumstances as in the VOST's complaints to the KRU. On 28
April 1997 the Prosecutor's Office dismissed this complaint for want
of evidence of criminal conduct on Mrs P.'s part. On
17 June 1997 a second criminal complaint was dismissed on
the same ground. However, criminal proceedings were initiated into
the circumstances of the disappearance of the TV set and the video
equipment.
- On
26 May 1997 several representatives of the Regional VOST picketed the
Lychakivsky District Administration protesting against the alleged
abuses by Mrs P. The participants in the picket carried placards with
various slogans criticising Mrs. P. and her deputy Mrs N., as well as
their supporters within the local administration. The slogans
concerning Mrs P. read as follows: “Mrs P. and Mrs N. -
return humanitarian aid and 20,000 bricks from the school wall to the
disabled children”; “Boarding school no. 6
director Mrs P. and her clique of VOST persecutors [should be
submitted] to court”; and “Mrs P. and Mrs N.,
sticky hands off the disabled children of Boarding school no. 6”.
B. Criminal proceedings against the applicant
- In May 1998 Mrs P. brought a private prosecution
against the applicant. She complained, in particular, that in his
letters to the KRU and the Prosecutor's Office the applicant had
falsely accused her of abuse of office and misappropriation of public
funds and that he had organised and participated in the picket of
26 May 1997, during which the demonstrators displayed
offensive placards. Mrs P. further concluded that the
applicant's actions fell within the ambit of Article 125 § 2
(defamation in print) and § 3 (false accusation of serious
crimes) and Article 126 (insult) of the Criminal Code of 1960 in
force at the material time.
- On
14 May 1998 a judge of the Lychakivsky District Court of Lviv found
that the applicant's conduct vis-à-vis Mrs P. fell
within the ambit of Article 125 § 1 of the Criminal Code
(simple defamation) and Article 126, and initiated criminal
proceedings against the applicant. The judge further ordered that the
applicant be placed under an undertaking not to abscond.
- In
the course of the investigation, the charges against the applicant
were re-qualified from Article 125 § 1 to Article
125 § 3.
- On
12 November 1999 the Prosecutors' Office notified the applicant of
his indictment under Article 125 § 3 and Article 126 of the
Criminal Code.
- On
15 November 1999 the investigation prepared a final bill of
indictment under these provisions and gave the applicant access to
the case file before its transfer for court proceedings.
- On
26 January 2000 the Lychakivsky District Court held the
first hearing in the applicant's case.
- In
March 2000 the applicant's case was transferred to the Shevchenkivsky
District Court of Lviv (“the Shevchenkivsky Court”).
- On
26 June 2001 the Shevchenkivsky Court found the applicant guilty of
an offence under Article 125 § 3 as charged and
dropped charges under Article 126 as redundant. It sentenced him to
one year's imprisonment suspended for one year and to a fine of
200 Ukrainian hryvnas (UAH). The court also allowed Mrs P.'s
civil claim in part and ordered the applicant to pay her UAH 1,000 in
non-pecuniary damages and UAH 100 in legal fees.
- In
its judgment the court established that in numerous letters signed by
the applicant, Mrs P. had been baselessly accused of misappropriation
of public funds. The court also found that the applicant had
initiated and participated in the picketing of 26 May 1997, referring
to various pieces of evidence, including submissions by several
School employees that they had seen him during the picket holding a
slogan.
- The
applicant appealed against the judgment of 26 June 2001. He alleged
in particular that the prosecution had failed to prove that he had
intentionally disseminated falsehoods. Furthermore, no attention had
been accorded to the fact that he had acted in his official capacity
as a local VOST leader, empowered by the union members to inform the
authorities about Mrs P.'s official misconduct and that
according to the findings of the KRU and the law-enforcement
authorities his accusations had not been entirely baseless. The
applicant further denied any involvement in the picketing, referring
to his absence on the photographs of the picket made by the plaintiff
as well as to a doctor's certificate concerning his inpatient
treatment until 27 May 1998. He also alleged that the case could not
be considered under § 3 of Article 125 of the Criminal
Code, as pursuant to the decision of 14 May 1998 criminal
charges filed by Mrs P. under this provision had been
re-qualified as charges under § 1 of Article 125.
- On
21 August 2001 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal heard the case in
the applicant's absence and upheld the judgment of 26 June 2001. It
found, in particular, that the applicant's guilt, including in
respect of participation in the picketing, had been proved by
numerous sources of evidence. In particular, several School employees
attested to having seen the applicant holding a slogan during the
picketing and his doctor stated that his treatment had not precluded
him from leaving the hospital premises.
- The
applicant filed eleven cassation appeals, which were dismissed due to
his failure to follow formalities envisaged by law. On 25 April 2003
a judge of the Supreme Court declared the applicant's twelfth appeal
in cassation, in which he raised essentially the same arguments as in
his appeal, admissible.
- On
13 November 2003 the Supreme Court upheld the previous judgments.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
1. Criminal Code of 1960
- The
text of Article 125 of the Code read as follows:
Defamation [Наклеп],
namely the intentional dissemination of falsehoods aimed at damaging
the reputation of another shall be punishable by ...
Defamation in print ... shall be punishable by ....
Defamation linked with an unfounded accusation of
committing a grave offence shall be punishable by up to five years'
imprisonment.
- Article
126 of the Code provided as follows:
“Insult [Образа],
namely the intentional humiliation of the honour and dignity of a
person expressed in an indecent form shall be punishable by ...”
- Following
a process of legislative reform, the New Ukrainian Criminal Code of 5
April 2001 no longer classifies defamation and insult as criminal
offences.
2. Code of Criminal Procedure
- The
text of Article 27 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (governing the
private prosecution proceedings, as in force before 21 June 2001)
may be found in the judgment of 10 August 2006 in the case of Lyashko
v. Ukraine (no. 21040/02, § 23).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION ON
ACCOUNT OF FORMULATION OF THE CHARGES
- The
applicant complained that he had been found guilty of an offence with
which he had not been charged. He referred to Article 4 of
Protocol No. 7 in this regard. The Court, which is master
of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case,
finds that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 §§ 1
and 3 (a) and (b) of the Convention, which read as follows:
“...Everyone charged with a criminal offence has
the following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language
which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for
the preparation of his defence;....”
- The
Government argued that the applicant's complaint, as formulated,
could not be read as stating that fair trial guarantees had been
compromised. They further submitted that the applicant's rights under
Article 6 of the Convention had been duly observed in every way.
- The applicant disagreed. He maintained that the
criminal proceedings against him were generally unfair. He further
noted that he had not been able to understand fully the nature and
the scope of charges against him and to prepare his defence
accordingly. In particular, he had been indicted under
Article 125 § 3 of the Criminal Code, while the
criminal proceedings had been initially instituted with reference to
Article 125 § 1 of the same Code.
- The
Court reiterates that the rights guaranteed under Article 6 § 3
(a) must in particular be assessed in the light of the more general
right to a fair hearing guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention. It further notes that in criminal matters the provision
of full, detailed information concerning the charges against a
defendant, and consequently the legal characterisation that the court
might adopt in the matter, is an essential prerequisite for ensuring
that the proceedings are fair (see Pélissier and Sassi v.
France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 52, ECHR 1999 II).
The Court also considers that sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 6
§ 3 are connected and that the right to be informed of the
nature and the cause of the accusation must be considered in the
light of the accused's right to prepare his defence (ibid., § 54).
- Turning
to the facts of the case, the Court notes that the court hearings in
the applicant's case, leading to his eventual conviction under
Article 125 § 3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 in force at the
material time, were held between January 2000 and June 2001. In the
meantime, the applicant had been notified of his indictment under the
above criminal provision on 12 November 1999 and had
further been given full access to the case file on 15 November 1999.
In these circumstances the Court finds that the applicant has not
made out a valid claim concerning lack of proper notification of the
charges against him or availability of necessary time and facilities
for preparation of his defence. This part of the application is
therefore manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance
with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant further complained that his conviction for defamation was
contrary to Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. The Court finds
that the applicant's right to freedom of expression is at the heart
of this complaint, which falls to be examined under Article 10
of the Convention. The relevant provision reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom
of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it
carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
A. Admissibility
- The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Submissions by the parties
- The
applicant contended that his conviction was not “necessary in a
democratic society”. As a union leader, not only did he have
the right, but he was under a direct duty to bring up the information
concerning Mrs P.'s purported abuses. His complaints about her
official misconduct directed to the competent authorities and to the
Head of the Regional VOST had been drafted in good faith and pursued
legitimate public interest. As regards the picketing, the applicant
had neither organised it nor had taken part in it or designed the
slogans. He could not therefore be held responsible for any
dissemination of defamatory information during this action, which,
according to his information, had been organised by the Regional VOST
and the local branch of the Conservative Party.
- The
Government acknowledged that the applicant's conviction for
defamation constituted interference with his rights guaranteed under
Article 10 of the Convention. They maintained, however, that
this interference was in accordance with the law, pursued a
legitimate aim, namely the protection of Mrs P.'s reputation, and was
necessary in a democratic society. In this regard they submitted that
the applicant had overstepped the limits of permissible criticism of
a civil servant, in particular, as he had directly accused Mrs P. of
having committed serious criminal offences, thereby undermining her
right to presumption of innocence. Furthermore, the financial
penalties imposed on the applicant had not been disproportionate to
his income, and the prison sentence was not long and in any case the
applicant had not served it.
2. The Court's assessment
- The
Court notes at the outset that the domestic judicial authorities
referred to two sets of facts as the basis for the applicant's
conviction: the letters which he had sent to the KRU and the
prosecutor's office demanding investigations into Mrs P.'s purported
official misconduct and the picket of 26 May 1997, which he had
organised and taken part in.
- The
Court finds it indisputable that the applicant's conviction for
defamation under Article 125 § 3 of the Criminal Code
constituted interference with his rights guaranteed under Article 10
of the Convention; and that this interference was in accordance with
the law and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting Mrs P.'s
reputation. It remains to be determined whether this interference was
“necessary in a democratic society” or whether, in the
circumstances of the present case, a fair balance was struck between
the protection of the applicant's freedom of expression and Mrs P.'s
reputation, a right which, as an aspect of private life, is protected
by Article 8 of the Convention (see Cumpǎnǎ and
Mazǎre v. Romania [GC], no. 33348/96, §§ 90-91,
ECHR 2004 XI).
- In this regard the Court considers at the outset that
the applicant was directly accusing Mrs P. of misappropriation
of public funds and property, as well as abuse of her office as a
director of a State boarding school. Notwithstanding the particular
role played by the applicant in his capacity as union representative,
as well as that his statements, which related to official conduct of
a public employee, were as such a matter of public concern, the Court
finds that he had a duty to react within limits fixed, inter alia,
in the interest of “protecting the reputation or rights of
others”, including the presumption of innocence (see
Constantinescu v. Romania, no. 28871/95, § 72,
ECHR 2000 VIII). Moreover, the applicant was obliged to have
regard to the duty of loyalty, reserve and discretion owed by him to
his employer (see, for example, Guja v. Moldova [GC], no.
14277/04, § 70, ECHR 2008 ...).
- The Court further states that the signalling by an
employee in the public sector of illegal conduct or wrongdoing in the
workplace must be protected, in particular where the employee
concerned is a part of a small group of persons aware of what is
happening at work and is thus best placed to act in the public
interest by alerting the employer or the public at large (see Guja,
cited above, § 72). In the light of the duty of discretion
referred to above, such disclosure should be made in the first place
to the person's superior or other competent authority or body. It is
only where this is clearly impracticable that the information could,
as a last resort, be disclosed to the public (see Guja, § 73).
- In light of these principles, the Court finds that, as
regards the fact that the applicant signed several letters to the KRU
and the prosecutors' office demanding investigations into Mrs P.'s
official conduct, he cannot be reproached for doing so in bad faith,
in particular, as he had acted on behalf of his trade union and
presented various materials in support of his allegations. The Court
finds, therefore, that, in so far as the interference with the
applicant's freedom of expression was based on the above letters
addressed to the competent authorities, its “necessity”
in the present case has not been established.
- In
so far as the applicant's conviction was, however, based on his
participation in the picketing of 26 May 1997, the Court notes that
the applicant's contention that he had personally not organised and
not participated in the action was rejected by the domestic courts of
three levels of jurisdiction following adversary proceedings, in the
course of which a wide range of evidence, including witness
statements, was examined. In the absence of any prima facie
evidence of procedural unfairness, the Court is not in a position to
review this factual conclusion.
- The
Court further notes that the picketing took place following the
inquiry by the KRU, revealing some mismanagement of the school
property and a further investigation by the prosecutors' office into
the allegation of official misconduct against Mrs P. On 28 April 1997
the latter, however, resulted in refusal to institute criminal
proceedings against Mrs P. for want of inculpating evidence. One
allegation (appropriation of the School video equipment) subsequently
led to initiation of criminal proceedings. However, no evidence had
been either adduced by the applicant or collected by the prosecution
to implicate Mrs P. in the incident. According to the case file
materials neither the applicant nor his supporters ever attempted to
employ any procedural means available under domestic law to challenge
the inefficiencies of the investigations by the KRU or the
law-enforcement officials and the refusals to institute criminal
proceedings against Mrs P.
- In
the meantime, some slogans displayed during the picketing in front of
the District Administration building were phrased in particularly
strong terms, directly accusing Mrs P. of misappropriation of
School property (see § 16 above). The Court finds that
these accusations could, in the circumstances, be taken as
allegations of fact, which, in the absence of sufficient proof of
their validity could reasonably be deemed defamatory and undermining
of Mrs P.'s right to be presumed innocent of serious offences.
- Regard
being had to the nature of the accusations against Mrs P. displayed
in the slogans, the applicant's duty of discretion vis-à-vis
his employer and the fact that he engaged in the public picketing
before exhausting other procedural means of complaining about
Mrs P.'s official misconduct, the Court accepts that the
domestic authorities acted within their margin of appreciation in
considering it necessary to convict the applicant for defamation, in
so far as his actions concerned organisation of and participation in
the picketing. What remains to be determined is whether the
interference in issue was proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued, in view of the sanctions imposed (see Constantinescu,
cited above, § 110).
- In
this regard the Court notes that, besides being ordered to pay fine
and a sum in compensation to Mrs P., the applicant was sentenced
to one year's imprisonment. The Court considers that, while the
Contracting States are permitted, or even obliged, by their positive
obligations under Article 8 of the Convention to regulate the
exercise of freedom of expression so as to ensure adequate protection
by law of individuals' reputations, they must not do so in a manner
that unduly hinders public debate concerning matters of public
concern, such as misappropriation of public funds (see, mutatis
mutandis, Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre, cited above,
§ 113). It further considers that the circumstances of the
instant case – a classic case of defamation of an individual in
the context of a debate on a matter of public interest –
presented no justification for the imposition of a prison sentence.
Such a sanction, by its very nature, will inevitably have a chilling
effect on public discussion, and the notion that the applicant's
sentence was in fact suspended does not alter that conclusion
particularly as the conviction itself was not expunged (see, mutatis
mutandis, Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre, cited above,
§ 116 and Salov v. Ukraine, no. 65518/01,
§ 115, ECHR 2005 VIII (extracts)).
- Overall,
the Court finds that, in convicting the applicant in respect of the
letters he sent to KRU and the prosecutor's office, and in imposing a
lengthy suspended prison sentence at the end of the proceedings, the
domestic courts in the instant case went beyond what would have
amounted to a “necessary” interference with the
applicant's freedom of expression.
- There
has therefore been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 and 3
(c) of the Convention that he had not been duly summoned for the
hearing before the Court of Appeal and that the criminal proceedings
against him had lasted an unreasonably long time. Lastly, he relied
on Article 13 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 7
without further specification.
- Having
considered the applicant's submissions in the light of all the
material in its possession, the Court finds that, in so far as the
matters complained of are within its competence, they do not disclose
any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in
the Convention.
- It
follows that this part of the application must be declared
inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to
Article 35 §§ 1, 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed pecuniary damage in the amount of the fine and the
compensation paid by him to Mrs P. as well as 820 euros (EUR) in
medical expenses allegedly sustained on account of stress caused by
his unfair criminal persecution. He also claimed EUR 5,000 in
respect of non-pecuniary damage.
- The
Government contested these claims as unsubstantiated.
- Regard
being had to the nature of the violation found in the present case,
the Court finds no causal link between it and the pecuniary damage
claimed by the applicant. It therefore dismisses the claim for
pecuniary damage. The Court accepts, on the other hand, that the
applicant has suffered non-pecuniary damage – such as distress
and frustration resulting from violation of his right under
Article 10 of the Convention – which cannot be
sufficiently compensated by the mere finding of a violation of the
Convention. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court
awards the applicant EUR 1,000 under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant also claimed UAH 5,800 in legal fees, translation and
copying expenses and UAH 336.74 in postal expenses incurred in
connection with his correspondence with the Court as well as with
various domestic authorities. He presented receipts for the postal
services.
- The
Government submitted that the applicant's claim was substantiated
only in so far as it related to his correspondence with the Court.
- According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to
the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court
considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 50 covering costs
under all heads.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint under Article 10
admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
10 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,000 (one
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 50
(fifty euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may
be chargeable to the applicant, to be converted into the currency of
Ukraine at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 19 February 2009,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President
