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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF UOTI v. FINLAND
(Application
no. 61222/00)
JUDGMENT
(just
satisfaction)
STRASBOURG
13 January
2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Uoti v. Finland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas
Bratza,
President,
Giovanni
Bonello,
David
Thór Björgvinsson,
Ján
Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Ledi
Bianku,
Nebojša
Vučinić,
judges,
and
Lawrence Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 9 December 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
I. PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 61222/00) against the
Republic of Finland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Finnish national, Mr Kari Uoti
(“the applicant”), on 14 September 2000.
- In
a judgment delivered on 9 January 2007 (“the principal
judgment”), the Court held as follows. The question of whether
the redress afforded by the District Court was sufficient to make
good a violation, if any, based on the entire length of the
proceedings, could only be decided after the termination of the
proceedings. These were still pending before the national courts and
the redress that had been, or could in the future be offered was
therefore inchoate. The Court found that the applicant could
therefore still claim to be a victim. This conclusion was without
prejudice to the question, to be decided at the end of the
proceedings, of whether the applicant may be regarded as having
obtained sufficient redress for any violation of Article 6. The Court
found that the length of the proceedings up to that moment had been
excessive and had failed to meet the “reasonable time”
requirement. Therefore, there was a breach of Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention (Uoti v. Finland, no. 61222/00, 9 January
2007).
- Under
Article 41 of the Convention the applicant sought just satisfaction
of, inter alia, 20,000 euros (EUR) for distress.
- Since
the question of the application of Article 41 of the Convention was
not ready for decision as regards non-pecuniary damage, the Court
reserved it and invited the Government and the applicant to submit,
within six months from the date on which its judgment became final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention,
their written observations on the matter and, in particular, to
notify the Court of any agreement that they might reach or any final
redress afforded in the domestic proceedings; (ibid., §§ 31
and 44, and point 3 of the operative provisions).
- The
applicant and the Government each filed observations. The applicant's
request that his application no. 9640/07 be dealt with together with
the present application was refused.
II. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
- When the Court delivered its principal judgment, the
case was pending before the Court of Appeal. On 16 January 2007 the
Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's procedural complaint to the
effect that the proceedings should be terminated in the light of the
Court's finding of a violation. On 13 February 2007 the Supreme Court
refused leave to appeal.
- The Court of Appeal held two
preparatory hearings in November 2006. In the main hearing the
case was heard over five days in January 2007. On 22 October 2007 the
court, after its own proceedings lasting 18 months,
gave its judgment. It concurred with the lower court that the
“reasonable time” requirement had not been respected and
that the applicant was therefore entitled to redress, which had to be
significant and substantial. It also had to be given in a
clear and measurable manner. No reason not to impose a sentence had
emerged. The court however found that the applicant had contributed
to the length of the proceedings.
It stated that it was reducing the applicant's sentence by half owing
to the lengthy proceedings.
- Having noted the length of
the standard sentence for the two counts of aggravated fraud in
question and having as a mitigating factor taken into account that
the sentence could have been imposed at the time of the
imposition of the applicant's previous sentences (which would
have been more advantageous for the applicant) and in that connection
the so-called maximum sentence rule laid down by Chapter 7,
article 2, of the Penal Code (rikoslaki, strafflagen; as
amended by Act no. 697/1991), the
Court of Appeal noted that six months and 20 days'
imprisonment would have been appropriate had the proceedings not
been excessively lengthy. However, owing to the breach of the
“reasonable time” requirement, the Court of Appeal
sentenced him to an immediate term of three
months and ten days' imprisonment. It applied Chapter 6,
article 7, point 3, of the Penal Code (as
amended by Act no. 515/2003 which took effect on 1
January 2004). Having regard to the seriousness of the applicant's
offence, the damage thereby caused and the advantage pursued and
achieved, the court considered that the maintaining of general
obedience to the law required that the prison term be an immediate
one. The two latter factors led the court to conclude that community
service was not an option.
- The applicant requested leave to appeal. On 22 May 2008
the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. The proceedings thus
lasted some 13 years and 9 months.
THE LAW
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. The parties' submissions
- The
Government submitted that, in its judgment, the District Court
mitigated the applicant's sentence owing to the excessive length of
the proceedings. The Court of Appeal, after its own proceedings
lasting 18 months, afforded further redress in reducing the
applicant's sentence further, that is, by half of the appropriate
sentence. In its reasoning the Court of Appeal expressly discussed
the length of the proceedings both generally and then separately for
each defendant. It clearly stated what the standard sentence would be
for each defendant and then stated by how much, due to the
unreasonable length of the proceedings, it was reducing their
sentences. The judgment of the Court of Appeal became final when the
Supreme Court, in its own proceedings lasting only five months, did
not grant the applicant leave to appeal. In sum, not only had the
unreasonable length of the proceedings been acknowledged, but the
applicant had also been afforded express and quantifiable redress
sufficient to make good any violation of Article 6 of the Convention
for the entire length of the proceedings.
- The
applicant argued that the Court of Appeal should have terminated the
proceedings in the light of the Court's finding of a violation on
account of the length of the proceedings. He criticised the
Government for not having taken any measures with a view to ending
the violation, alleging that they had actively opposed his requests
to that effect. By refusing to negotiate with a view to settling the
claim for non-pecuniary damage, the Government's actions had
increased the applicant's suffering and distress as the Government
had not treated him as an innocent person, as required by Article 6
§ 2 of the Convention, but as somebody who would be made to
suffer, by making his life impossible, by continuing the proceedings
forever. It appeared to the applicant that the fact that he had
claimed his rights before the Court had been detrimental to him. In
this respect, he referred to a friendly settlement reached by the
Government and third parties which had been made under the condition
that no appeal would subsequently be made to the Court on account of
the excessively lengthy proceedings. The applicant submitted that
there was a structural problem in the Finnish legal system and
practice, which led to excessively lengthy proceedings.
B. The Court's assessment
- The
applicable principles concerning redress for a breach of the
“reasonable time” requirement have been set out in the
principal judgment (§§ 29 and 31).
- Applying
these principles in the present case, the Court observes that the
Court of Appeal expressly upheld the substance of the applicant's
length complaint when it stated that it was taking into account the
length of the proceedings in reducing his sentence by half. It can
therefore be said that the applicant was afforded express and
quantifiable redress for the breach of the reasonable time
requirement (see Beck v. Norway, no. 26390/95, §§
27-29, 26 June 2001; also Jensen v. Denmark (dec.),
no. 48470/99, ECHR 2001 - X). The Court notes
that the judgment discussed the various alternatives, finding that
the applicant's sentence could not be waived. Nor was suspended
imprisonment considered sufficient. Hence, the Court of Appeal took
into account the various possibilities and explained how it afforded
the applicant address for the excessively lengthy proceedings. The
Court, exercising its supervisory function, is satisfied that the
redress given was sufficient.
15. In
the light of this conclusion, the Court finds that it is not
necessary to award just satisfaction.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Dismisses the applicant's claims for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 January 2009, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
