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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF BLACKGROVE v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
(Application
no. 2895/07)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
28 April
2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Blackgrove v. the United Kingdom,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Lech Garlicki, President,
Nicolas
Bratza,
Giovanni Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
David Thór Björgvinsson,
Ledi
Bianku,
Mihai Poalelungi, judges,
and Lawrence
Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 7 April 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 2895/07) against the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a British
national, Mr John Blackgrove (“the applicant”), on 21
December 2006.
- The
United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mr C. Whomersley of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, London.
- By a decision of 4 September 2008 the President of the
Fourth Section of the Court decided to communicate the application.
Subsequently, under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it was decided to examine the merits of the application
at the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Kent.
- The
applicant and his wife had two children, born in 1982 and 1987. The
applicant’s wife died on 2 June 1999.
- On
5 October 2000 the applicant applied to the Benefits Agency for the
payment of social security benefits. He applied for benefits
equivalent to those which a widow, whose husband had died in similar
circumstances to those of his wife, would have been entitled, namely
a Widow’s Payment (“Wpt”) and a Widowed Mother’s
Allowance (“WMA”), payable under the Social Security and
Benefits Act 1992 (“the 1992 Act”). On 17 October 2000
his application was rejected as these benefits were only available to
women. This decision was reconsidered without alteration on 25
October 2000.
- The
applicant appealed to the Social Security Tribunal on 10 July 2001
and again his claim was rejected. In November 2001 the applicant
applied for leave to appeal to the Appeal Commissioner. Eventually
permission was granted but his appeal was again rejected on 28 May
2004. The applicant again appealed to the Commissioner who rejected
the applicant’s appeal on 13 December 2006.
- Finally,
the applicant submitted an appeal to the Court of Appeal (Civil
Division), which was refused on 16 March 2007.
- At
the time of his claim in 2000 the applicant was in receipt of child
benefit.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
- The
relevant domestic law and practice are described in the Court’s
judgment in the case of Willis v. the United Kingdom, no.
36042/97, §§ 14 26, ECHR 2002-IV.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN
IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 AND/OR ARTICLE 8
OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the United Kingdom authorities’
refusal to pay him the social security benefit to which he would have
been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position, namely Wpt
and WMA constituted discrimination against him on grounds of sex
contrary to Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and/or Article 8 of the Convention.
Article
14 of the Convention provides:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set
forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.”
Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 provides:
“1. Every natural or legal person is
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall
be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and
subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law.
2. The preceding provisions shall not,
however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws
as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
Article
8 provides (as relevant):
“1. Everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life...
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of ... the economic well-being of the country...”
A. Widow’s Payment
1. Admissibility
- The Court recalls that a widow was not automatically
entitled to survivors’ benefits, but had to claim them from the
relevant authority. Various time-limits applied: after 1997, a widow
had to make a claim for Wpt within three months of her husband’s
death.
- The
Court considers, as it held in Cornwell v. the United Kingdom
(no. 36578/97, (dec.), 11 May 1999) that unless or until a
man has made a claim to the domestic authorities for bereavement
benefits, he cannot be regarded as a “victim” of the
alleged discrimination involved in the refusal to pay such benefits,
because a woman in the same position would not automatically be
entitled to widows’ benefits until she had made a claim (see
also White v. the United Kingdom, no. 53134/99 (dec.), 7 June
2001, where the Court clarified that, as long as an applicant had
made clear to the authorities his intention to claim benefits, the
precise form in which he did so was not important). Similarly, a man
who failed to apply within the time-limits as they applied to a woman
claimant could not, in most cases, claim to be a victim of
discrimination, since a woman in the same position would not have
been entitled to the benefit in question (see Rogan v. the United
Kingdom, no. 57946/00, (dec.), 8 September 2001).
- Consequently,
the applicant’s claim for Wpt made in 2000 had been made out of
time. Thus, the applicant
cannot claim to have been a victim of a violation of his rights under
the Convention and Protocol No. 1.
15. Accordingly,
this part of the application is incompatible
ratione personae with
the provisions of the Convention and must be declared inadmissible in
accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
B. Widowed Mother’s Allowance
1. Admissibility
- The
Court finds that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention, or inadmissible
on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
- The
Court has previously examined cases raising issues similar to those
in the present case and found a violation of Article 14 of the
Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see
Willis, cited above, §§ 41-43).
- The
Court has examined the present case and finds that there are no facts
or arguments from the Government which would lead to any different
conclusion in this instance. Therefore the Court considers that the
difference in treatment between men and women as regards entitlement
to WMA, of which the applicant was a victim, was not based on any
“objective and reasonable justification” (see Willis,
cited above, § 42).
- There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention
taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
- The
Court, having concluded that there has been a breach of Article 14
of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 as regards the applicant’s non-entitlement to WMA, does not
consider it necessary to examine his complaints in that regard under
Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8.
C. Widow’s Pension
1. Admissibility
- The
Court held in its lead judgment regarding WP that at its origin, and
until its abolition in respect of women whose spouses died after 9
April 2001, WP was intended to correct “factual inequalities”
between older widows, as a group, and the rest of the population and
that this difference in treatment was reasonably and objectively
justified. Moreover, the Court considered that the United Kingdom
could not be criticised for not having abolished WP earlier and that
it was not unreasonable of the legislature to decide to introduce the
reform slowly (see Runkee and White v. the United Kingdom, no.
42949/98, §§ 40-41, 25 July 2007). The Court, consequently,
considering it was not necessary to examine separately the complaint
in respect of Article 8, did not find a violation of Article 14 taken
in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of the
non-payment to the applicants of Widow’s Pension or equivalent
(ibid § 42).
- Consequently,
the complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in
accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- In
respect of damage the applicant claimed a total of 98,000 British
pounds sterling (GBP):
(i) GBP
48,000 for Widow’s benefits to date;
(ii) GBP
50,000 for health problems suffered since pursuing this case and loss
if employment income.
-
The Government submitted that WMA ceased to exist as from 9 April
2001. It followed that had the applicant been a woman, he would only
have been entitled to WMA for the period from 5 October 2000 to 9
April 2001. The sum that would be due for that period would have been
GBP 3,565.77 together with interest of GBP 1.226.01 as calculated
according to established principles. The Government could not accept
that the loss of a relatively small sum of money for such a
relatively short period of time was the cause of the health problems
suffered by the applicant. Moreover, according to the Court’s
case-law an award of non pecuniary damage was not generally made in
cases were the breach arose from a failure to pay money, except where
there were serious aggravating circumstances which were not present
in the instant case.
- The
Court notes that it has only found a violation in respect of WMA. The
interest rate applicable has already been determined by the Court in
the case of Runkee and White (cited above, § 52).
In these circumstances, the Court awards compensation to the
applicant of 5,185 euros (EUR) in respect of the refusal to grant him
WMA up to 9 April 2001 as well as interest on that sum. The Court
does not find it established that the applicant was caused real
and serious health or emotional damage as a result of being
denied the benefit in question and therefore makes no award in
respect of those claims.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant claimed GBP 350 in costs for pursuing his claim before the
domestic jurisdictions and this Court, including GBP 200 for costs
incurred before the Court of Appeal.
- The
Government contested the claim, stating that it mainly referred to
domestic proceedings before the Court of Appeal which, in the
applicant’s case, did not have to be taken in order to exhaust
domestic remedies. Moreover, the bills submitted were dated 2007 and
therefore could not have been incurred in connection with the
application to the Court.
- The
Court considers that notwithstanding the allegedly poor prospects of
success, the applicant cannot be reproached for having taken his
claim to the Court of Appeal. As to the costs incurred in relation to
the proceedings in Strasbourg, the Court notes that the proceedings
started in 2006. Thus, it finds no reason to doubt that the
applicant’s bills dated 2007, which are not excessive, have
been incurred for the purposes of the Convention proceedings. It
therefore considers it appropriate to award the applicant EUR
370 under this head.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Decides to declare admissible the complaint
relating to the applicant’s non-entitlement to a Widowed
Mother’s Allowance and inadmissible the remainder of the
application;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 concerning the applicant’s non-entitlement to a Widowed
Mother’s Allowance;
- Holds that it is not necessary to examine
separately the complaint under Article 14 in conjunction with Article
8 of the Convention as concerns the applicant’s non-entitlement
to a Widowed Mother’s Allowance.
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts to be converted into the national currency of the respondent
State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR
5,185 (five thousand one hundred and eight-five euros) plus
any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR
370 (three hundred and seventy euros) plus any tax that may be
chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 28 April 2009, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Lech
Garlicki
Registrar President