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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF BUĽKOVÁ
v. SLOVAKIA
(Application
no. 35017/03)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
12 May
2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Buľková v. Slovakia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Ljiljana Mijović,
David Thór
Björgvinsson,
Ján Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Mihai Poalelungi, judges,
and
Lawrence Early,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 16 April 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 35017/03) against the
Slovak Republic lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Slovak national, Mrs Monika
Buľková (“the applicant”), on 24 October
2003.
- The
applicant was represented by Mrs I. Rajtákova, a lawyer
practising in Košice. The Slovak Government
(“the Government”) were represented by Mrs A. Poláčková
and M. Pirošíková, their successive Agents.
- On
14 February 2006 the
President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article
29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Košice.
A. Proceedings concerning the purchase of a flat
- On
30 March 1999 the applicant filed a civil action with the Košice
II District Court. She claimed that the defendant should be
ordered, in accordance with his earlier written undertaking, to sell
a flat to her.
- The
applicant replied to the defendant on 23 July 1999 and
8 February 2000.
- In
the course of the proceedings the applicant discovered that the
defendant had transferred the ownership of the flat in issue to a
different person in 1999. The transfer of ownership had been formally
registered on 3 March 1999. On 24 February 2000 the applicant
therefore requested that the new owner of the flat should join the
proceedings as a defendant. She also expressed her wish to extend the
action, claiming that the purchase contract of 1999 was void.
- Three
hearings were adjourned because of the defendant's absence.
- On
13 March 2001 the District Court dismissed the applicant's request of
24 February 2000. The decision stated that the purchase contract had
been concluded prior to the introduction of the applicant's action of
30 March 1999, and that nothing had prevented the applicant from
bringing separate proceedings on the question of its validity. The
hearing was held in the defendant's absence. The defendant submitted
a medical opinion certifying that he had serious health problems and
could not leave his flat.
-
Three hearings were again adjourned due to the defendant's failure to
appear. Because of the defendant's medical condition, a District
Court official heard the defendant at his home on 15 August 2002.
- The
judge dealing with the case was on sick leave between 4 September
and 31 October 2002.
- On
17 December 2002 the case was adjourned at the request of the
applicant's lawyer.
- On
4 February 2003 the District Court delivered a judgment by which it
dismissed the applicant's action. The court noted that the defendant
had transferred the ownership of the flat in question to a third
party on 9 March 1999, that is prior to the introduction of the
proceedings by the applicant. As he was not the owner of the flat, he
could not be obliged to conclude a purchase contract as requested by
the applicant. On 21 February 2003 the judgment was served
on the applicant's lawyer.
- The
applicant appealed. She subsequently withdrew the appeal and, as a
result, the Košice Regional Court
discontinued the proceedings on 12 September 2003.
B. Constitutional proceedings
- On
19 March 2003 the Constitutional Court concluded that the applicant's
right to a hearing within a reasonable time had not been violated in
the proceedings before the Košice II
District Court. It held that the case was not complex and that
the applicant's conduct had not contributed to the length of the
proceedings. It further held that the proceedings had been
substantially protracted as a result of the defendant's repeated
failure to appear before the District Court. It established that the
District Court had, in principle, taken appropriate action to ensure
the defendant's attendance. The Constitutional Court found a period
of inactivity of approximately six months in 2001 imputable to the
District Court. That period was not, however, capable of
significantly interfering with the applicant's right to a hearing
within a reasonable time.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of the District Court's
proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time”
requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which
in its relevant part reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
- The
Government contested the applicant's argument that the length of the
proceedings had been excessive. They concurred with the
Constitutional Court's findings and expressed the view that the
alleged delays had been caused by the defendant and that they could
not be imputable to the respondent State.
- The
applicant argued that it had taken the District Court more than one
year, without any justification, to decide on her request that a
second defendant join the proceedings. She further stated that the
court had dismissed her action after almost four years on the basis
of a fact which had already been at its disposal in 1999, namely that
the defendant did not own the flat in issue.
- Before
the Court the applicant complained about the length of the
proceedings before the District Court. The period to be taken into
consideration began on 30 March 1999 and ended on 21 February 2003
when the judgment was served on the applicant's lawyer. It thus
lasted three years and almost eleven months at one level of
jurisdiction.
- The
Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above).
- Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 4,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.
- The
Government contested the claim.
- The
Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary
damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards her EUR 2,000 under
that head.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant also claimed EUR 494 for costs and expenses incurred before
the Constitutional Court and EUR 1,185 for those incurred before the
Court.
-
The Government contested these claims.
- According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are
reasonable as to quantum. The Court observes that the applicant was
represented by a lawyer before the Constitutional Court as well as
before the Court. Having regard to the materials submitted, the Court
considers it reasonable to award the applicant the sum of EUR 1,000
under this head.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts:
(i) EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 May 2009, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
