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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF MATOŃ v. POLAND
(Application
no. 30279/07)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
9
June 2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Matoń v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Giovanni Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
Päivi Hirvelä,
Ledi
Bianku,
Nebojša Vučinić, judges,
and
Lawrence Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 19 May 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 30279/07) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Polish national, Mr Adam Matoń
(“the applicant”), on 4 July 2007.
- The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
- On
23 June 2008 the
President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time
(Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Kraków.
1. Criminal proceedings against the applicant
- On
19 June 2000 the Katowice District Prosecutor issued a bill of
indictment against the applicant on charges of drug trafficking,
unlawful possession of firearms and membership of an organised
criminal gang. There were 36 accused and 147 witnesses in the case.
- On
20 February 2001 the Katowice District Court held a first hearing in
the case. From that date to 30 March 2004 the court scheduled two
hundred hearings in the case. During that period of time the court
held one hundred thirty and two hearings.
- On
13 February 2008 the Katowice District Court gave judgment in the
case convicting the applicant. The applicant appealed.
- The
proceedings are currently pending before the Katowice Regional Court.
2. Proceedings under the 2004 Act
- On
31 May 2005 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Katowice Court
of Appeal under the Act of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach
of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze
na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu
sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004
Act”). He also claimed just satisfaction in the amount of
PLN 10,000.
- On
20 July 2005 the Katowice Court of Appeal dismissed the length
complaint. Although the court found that the proceedings had lasted a
very long time, it concluded that this had not amounted to an
“excessive length” as defined by the 2004 Act. The Court
of Appeal pointed out that the court had scheduled 58 hearings in
2001, 66 in 2002, 73 in 2003, 64 in 2004 and 85 in 2005. However,
several hearings had had to be postponed because defence lawyers,
co-accused and witnesses were absent and assessors and judges were
ill.
- On
19 October 2006 the applicant lodged another complaint with the
Katowice Court of Appeal.
- On
31 January 2007 the Katowice Court of Appeal again dismissed the
length complaint. The court found that the proceedings had been
handled properly and the delays had been attributable to other
persons and unexpected circumstances rather than to the court. The
Court of Appeal pointed out that since July 2005 the court had held
over 30 hearings and over 30 hearings had had to be postponed because
defence lawyers and experts had been absent, assessors, a judge and
certain co-accused had been ill, renovation works had been carried
out in the hearing room and there had been a shortage of police
officers to convey the accused to the court. The Court of Appeal
acknowledged that the proceedings were of a complex character and
noted that the court had taken many appropriate steps in order to
speed them up.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
- The
relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the
excessive length of judicial proceedings, in particular the
applicable provisions of the 2004 Act, are stated in the Court's
decisions in the cases of Charzyński v. Poland
no. 15212/03 (dec.), §§ 12-23, ECHR 2005-V
and Ratajczyk v. Poland no. 11215/02 (dec.), ECHR
2005-VIII and the judgment in the case of Krasuski v. Poland,
no. 61444/00, §§ 34-46, ECHR 2005-V.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
- The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
- The
Government contested that argument.
- The
period to be taken into consideration began on 19 June 2000 and has
not yet ended. It has thus lasted eight years and eight months at two
levels of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It
further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties' submissions
18. The Government underlined that the case had been extremely
complex. It had concerned an organised criminal group and 56 charges
brought against 36 defendants. In 2008 the case-file comprised 187
volumes. They relied on the volume of evidence obtained by the
prosecuting authorities and on the difficulties in conducting the
investigation, given the considerable number of defendants, as well
as the serious nature of the offences committed by the criminal gang.
-
The Government submitted that the conduct of the proceedings had been
hindered by the excessive exercise of procedural rights by the
defendants and their defence counsel. They had lodged numerous
applications and appealed against almost every decision. The trial
court had been required to examine all those applications and the
prolongation of the proceedings had thus been inevitable.
- As
regards the conduct of the authorities, the Government maintained
that they had shown special diligence in the case. The trial court
had held hearings at regular intervals, even up to nine hearings
every month, five hearings per month on average. Some of the hearings
had to be adjourned due to the illness of the other co-defendants,
convergence with hearings in other cases, the absence of defendants
who were at liberty and defence counsel as well as problems with
transporting the crown witnesses to the court. The trial court had
taken all available measures to ensure their presence at the
hearings.
21. The Government submitted that the domestic court had taken
measures to discipline the defendants and their defence counsel who
had failed to comply with the court's orders. Consequently, the
Government maintained that there had been no delays in the
proceedings for which the authorities could be held responsible. They
concluded that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1
in the present case.
22. The applicant disagreed with the Government. He submitted that he
had not contributed to the prolongation of the proceedings. The
applicant argued that his case could not be considered complex simply
on account of the significant volume of evidence. He maintained that
his case should have been examined separately as it had not been
complex and charges against him had been based only on testimonies of
two crown witnesses. Finally, he submitted that the case had been
examined with delays. As a result, he had been held in custody for
four years.
2. The Court's assessment
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96,
§ 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1
of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the
present case (see Frydlender, cited above).
-
The Court can accept that some delays in the procedure before the
trial court could be explained by the fact that the trial court had
to deal with a very complex case which involved a number of
defendants and voluminous evidence. However, it considers that this
in itself cannot justify the overall length of the proceedings.
- As
regards the conduct of the applicant, the Court, having regard to the
available evidence, does not find it established that the applicant
substantially contributed to the delays in the proceedings. The
Government emphasised that the defendants bore the main
responsibility for the length of the proceedings but they failed to
indicate any particular circumstances in respect of the applicant.
- As
regards the conduct of the relevant authorities, the Court notes that
the hearings were held regularly and when they were adjourned it had
been normally for reasons not attributable to the court. Furthermore,
the trial court took measures to ensure the presence of defence
counsel and co defendants at the hearings. The Court also notes
that there were delays in the proceedings caused by the renovation
works carried out in the hearing room and a shortage of police
officers to convey defendants and crown witnesses to the trial court.
-
The Court further observes that on 20 July 2005 and 31 January
2007 the Katowice Court of Appeal found, having examined the
applicant's complaints about the breach of his right to a trial
within a reasonable time, that the length of the proceedings had not
been excessive. The Court of Appeal noted that there had been no
delays caused by the trial court's inactivity. The Court considers
that the Court of Appeal, when examining the applicant's complaints,
generally applied standards which were in conformity with the
principles embodied in the Court's case law. The Court discerns,
however, one serious shortcoming in the review carried out by the
Court of Appeal, namely that the latter did not regard the fact of
the applicant's detention as a relevant factor for directing the
trial court to conduct the proceedings with particular diligence.
- In
this connection, it recalls that persons kept in detention pending
trial are entitled to “special diligence” on the part of
the authorities. Consequently, in cases where a person is detained
pending the determination of criminal charges against him, the fact
of his detention is itself a factor to be considered in assessing
whether the requirement of a decision on the merits within a
reasonable time has been met (see, for example, Abdoella v. the
Netherlands, judgment of 25 November 1992, Series A
no. 248-A, p. 17, § 24; Jabłoński v.
Poland, no. 33492/96, § 102, 21 December 2000;
Mõtsnik v. Estonia, no. 50533/99, § 40,
29 April 2003; Bąk v. Poland, no. 7870/04,
§ 81, 16 January 2007).
- In
this respect, the Court would point out that the duty to administer
justice expeditiously was incumbent in the first place on the
domestic authorities. Notwithstanding the significant difficulties
which they faced in the present case, the domestic authorities were
required to organise the trial efficiently and ensure that the
Convention guarantees were fully respected in the proceedings.
Moreover, the Court notes that the proceedings, which have already
lasted over eight years, are still pending before the second instance
court.
- Having
regard to all the circumstances of the case and the overall length of
the proceedings, the Court considers that the reasonable time
requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention has not
been respected. Consequently, there has been a violation of this
provision.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant submitted a claim for just satisfaction in respect of
non-pecuniary damage without specifying its amount.
- The
Government did not express an opinion on the matter.
- The
Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary
damage. Taking into account that the case was very complex and the
domestic authorities took steps in order to speed up the proceedings,
and making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the
applicant EUR 2,900 under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant did not make any claim for costs and expenses involved in
the proceedings.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 2,900 (two
thousand nine hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus
any tax that may be chargeable, to be converted into the currency of
the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 9 June 2009, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
