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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF KRAWIECKI v. POLAND
(Application
no. 49128/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
9 June
2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Krawiecki v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Giovanni Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
David Thór Björgvinsson,
Ledi
Bianku,
Mihai Poalelungi, judges,
and
Lawrence Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 19 May 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 49128/06) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Polish national, Mr Stanisław
Krawiecki (“the applicant”), on 13 November 2006.
- The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
- On
23 May 2008 2006
the President of the Fourth Section of the Court decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It also decided to rule
on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time
(Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Lubiąż.
- On
6 January 2006 the applicant was remanded in custody. The
grounds for this decision are unknown, since the applicant has not
produced a copy of the order.
- On
7 November 2006 the Swiebodzin
District Court (Sąd
Rejonowy) extended the applicant's
detention. On the same day the court decided to discontinue
the criminal proceedings against him. The court held that the
applicant at the time of the commission of the offence had been
incapable of recognising its significance or controlling his conduct
because of his mental illness. The applicant had been diagnosed with
schizophrenia (paranoid subtype).
- On
1 October 2007 the applicant was placed in a mental hospital.
- On
22 April 2008 the Świebodzin District Court decided to extend
the applicant's detention at the mental hospital. The court held that
he was still suffering from severe schizophrenia.
- On
22 July and 20 November 2008 the Świebodzin District Court
decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings against the applicant
due to his mental illness. The applicant's state of health was
confirmed by a medical certificate of 1 October 2008.
- In
the light of the applicant's submissions, it is impossible to
establish the facts relating to his detention.
- On
4 December 2006 the Court received a letter from the applicant dated
23 November 2006. The letter was sent while the applicant
was detained in the Szamotuły Remand Centre (Areszt Śledczy).
It bears the following stamp: “District Court in Świebodzin,
censored” (Sąd Rejonowy Świebodzin,
Cenzurowano), a handwritten date: “28.11.06” and an
illegible signature.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
- The
relevant domestic law concerning censorship of detainees'
correspondence is set out in the Court's judgment in the case of
Kliza v. Poland, no. 8363/04, §§ 29-34, 6
September 2007.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
Court raised of its own motion an issue under Article 8 of the
Convention on account of the fact that the applicant's correspondence
with the Court had been censored. This provision, in its relevant
part, reads:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect
for ... his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.”
A. Admissibility
1. The Government's preliminary objection on exhaustion
of domestic remedies
- The
Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted available
domestic remedies. He had failed to bring an action under Article 24
§ 2, in conjunction with Article 448 of the Civil Code. These
provisions would have allowed him to assert that by censoring his
correspondence the authorities had breached his personal rights
protected by the Civil Code and to make a claim in respect of
non-pecuniary damage.
- In
this connection, the Government relied on the Warsaw Regional Court's
judgment of 27 November 2006 in which a prisoner had been awarded
5,000 Polish zlotys in damages from the State Treasury for a breach
of the confidentiality of his correspondence with the Central Board
of the Prison Service and the Central Electoral Office. The Regional
Court held that the confidentiality of correspondence was a personal
right protected under Article 23 of the Civil Code, whose breach
could entitle the claimant to an award in respect of non-pecuniary
damage. The judgment of 27 November 2006 was subsequently upheld in
the relevant part by the Warsaw Court of Appeal's judgment of 28 June
2007.
- Moreover,
the Government relied on the Śrem District Court judgment of 21
December 2005, upheld by the Poznań Regional Court on 19 May
2006. The plaintiff was awarded 1,000 Polish zlotys by the
second instance court as just satisfaction for the prison
authorities' having opened a letter sent to him by the European Court
of Human Rights.
- The
applicant did not comment.
2. The Court's assessment
- The
Court notes that the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention
concerning the alleged censorship of the applicant's correspondence
was raised of its own motion. The letter at issue was sent by the
applicant to the Court and he could not have been aware that it had
been censored by the authorities. In those circumstances, the
applicant cannot be required to bring any domestic proceedings to
obtain redress for the alleged breach of his right to respect for his
correspondence.
- For
this reason, the Government's plea of inadmissibility on the ground
of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed.
3. The Government's preliminary objection on abuse of
the right of the application
- The
Government further raised an objection as to the language used by the
applicant in pursuing his case before the Court. They specified that
the application contained provocative and insulting language
concerning their Agent, the Government's civil servants and domestic
judges. In the Government's opinion even the mental disorder could
not create an excuse for such actions and the applicant's intolerable
conduct was contrary to the spirit of the right of individual
petition. They concluded that the application should therefore have
been rejected under Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
4. The Court's assessment
- The
Court notes that the applicant sent a number of letters making
serious defamatory and groundless accusations against civil servants
and domestic judges. However, the Court points out that the applicant
is suffering from a severe mental disorder, which has been confirmed
by a medical certificate. For the same reasons several criminal
proceedings against the applicant were discontinued by the domestic
courts. Consequently, he is incapable of recognising the significance
of his words or controlling his conduct.
The
Court therefore rejects this preliminary objection by the Government.
5. Conclusion as to admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Existence of an interference
- The
Court notes that the applicant's letter dated 23 November 2006
bears a stamp marked “District Court in Świebodzin,
censored” (Sąd Rejonowy Świebodzin,
Cenzurowano), a handwritten date: “28.11.06” and an
illegible signature (see paragraph 11 above).
- The
Court has held on many occasions that as long as the Polish
authorities continue the practice of marking detainees' letters with
the “censored” stamp, the Court has no alternative but to
presume that those letters have been opened and their contents read
(see Matwiejczuk v. Poland, no. 37641/97, §
99, 2 December 2003; Pisk-Piskowski v. Poland,
no. 92/03, § 26, 14 June 2005; and Michta
v. Poland, no. 13425/02, § 58, 4 May 2006).
It follows that in respect of both of the applicant's letters there
was an “interference” with his right to respect for his
correspondence under Article 8.
2. Whether the interference was “in accordance
with the law”
- The
Government did not indicate a specific legal basis in domestic law
for the interference. The Court notes that the interference took
place on one occasion when the applicant was in detention.
- The
Court observes that, according to Article 214 of the Code of
Execution of Criminal Sentences, detained persons should enjoy the
same rights as those convicted by a final judgment. Accordingly, the
prohibition of censorship of correspondence with the European Court
of Human Rights contained in Article 103 of the same Code, which
expressly relates to convicted persons, was also applicable to
detained persons (see Michta v. Poland, cited above, §
61, and Kwiek v. Poland, no. 51895/99, § 44,
30 May 2006). Thus, the censorship of the applicant's letter to
the Court's Registry was contrary to domestic law. It
follows that the interference in the present
case was not “in accordance with the law”.
- Having
regard to that finding, the
Court does not consider it necessary to ascertain whether the other
requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 were complied with.
Consequently, the Court finds that there has
been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
II. OTHER
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- Lastly,
relying on all Articles of the Convention, the applicant submitted
that he had been ill-treated during his detention. However, the
applicant's submissions are very confused and it is impossible to
establish the facts related to his detention.
- It
follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must
be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly,
the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on
that account.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant did not make any claim for costs and expenses involved in
the proceedings.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the monitoring
of the applicant's correspondence admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
8 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 9 June 2009, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
