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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF KOLOSKOVA v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 53051/08)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
21 October
2010
This
judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Koloskova v.
Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Commitee
composed of:
Nina Vajić,
President,
Anatoly Kovler,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
judges,
and André Wampach,
Deputy Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 30 September 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 53051/08) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms Tatyana Aleksandrovna
Koloskova (“the applicant”), on 30 September 2008.
- The
Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation
at the European Court of Human Rights.
- On
8 April 2009 the President of the First Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. In accordance with
Article 26 § 1 of the Convention as amended by Protocol No.
14, the application was assigned to a Committee of three Judges. It
was also decided that the Committee would rule on the admissibility
and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1
of the Convention).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Elektrostal, a town in the
Moscow Region. Before retirement she used to work in hazardous
industry. She had a dispute with a pension authority about the scope
of her privileged pension and appealed to the Elektrostal Town Court.
- On
30 October 2006 the court held for the applicant and ordered the
pension authority to recalculate her pension. The court based its
findings on the Law on Labour Pensions. The judgment became binding
and was executed.
- On
the pension authority’s request, on 31 March 2008 the Town
Court quashed its judgment due to discovery of new circumstances. The
court found, in particular, that the judgment had ignored the
interpretation of the Law on Labour Pensions given by the Supreme
Court in December 2005 and March 2007.
- The
applicant’s case was remitted for a rehearing and eventually
dismissed.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION AND OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
- The
applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 that the quashing of the binding judgment was
unjustified. Insofar as relevant, these Articles read as follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a]
... tribunal ...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
A. Admissibility
- The
Government argued that the application was inadmissible. The Supreme
Court’s interpretations of the Law on Labour Pensions revealed
fundamental errors in the Town Court’s reasoning, and hence
that judgment had had to be quashed. The quashing had been
legitimate, lawful, and compliant with the principle of legal
certainty. The quashing had been meant to ensure a uniform and
coherent functioning of the State pension scheme and to protect the
public purse from undue depletion.
- The
applicant argued that her application was admissible.
- The
Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court reiterates that for the sake of legal certainty implicitly
required by Article 6, final judgments should generally be left
intact. They may be disturbed only to correct fundamental defects
(see Ryabykh v. Russia, no. 52854/99, §§ 51–52,
ECHR 2003-IX). Quashing of judgments because of newly-discovered
circumstances is not by itself incompatible with this requirement,
but the manner of its application may be (see Pravednaya v.
Russia, no. 69529/01, §§ 27–34, 18 November
2004).
- In
present case, the domestic court justified the quashing with the
Supreme Court’s two interpretations of the Law on Labour
Pensions.
As to
the interpretation of 2005, the Court considers that differing
judicial interpretations of a law represent a ground for an ordinary
appeal, rather than a discovery warranting a quashing of a binding
judgment (see Yerogova v. Russia, no. 77478/01, § 34, 19
June 2008).
As to
the interpretation of 2007, the Court reiterates that
newly-discovered circumstances are circumstances that exist during
the trial, remain hidden from the court, and become known after
trial. Since the interpretation of 2007 was posterior to the town
courts’ judgments, it did not justify the quashing either (see
Yerogova, cited above, § 33).
- It
follows that the quashing of the applicant’s judgment was
unjustified, and that there has, accordingly, been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage, costs, and expenses
- The
applicant has failed to submit a claim for just satisfaction at the
appropriate stage of the proceedings, and the Government argued that
therefore no award should be made.
- The
Court notes, however, that the application belongs to the series of
cases where the Court has adopted a unified approach to just
satisfaction (see Ryabov and 151 other
“Privileged pensioners” cases v. Russia,
nos 4563/07 et seq., §§ 21–22, 17 December
2009). To ensure parity between the
applicant in the present case and the similarly placed applicants,
the Court awards the applicant EUR 2,000 in respect of
non-pecuniary damage, and costs and expenses.
B. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months,
EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and costs and
expenses, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable
at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 21 October 2010, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André Wampach Nina Vajić
Deputy Registrar President
