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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF
KUPRINY v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 24827/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
25
February 2010
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Kupriny v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nina Vajić,
President,
Anatoly Kovler,
Elisabeth
Steiner,
Dean Spielmann,
Sverre Erik
Jebens,
Giorgio Malinverni,
George Nicolaou,
judges,
and Søren
Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 4 February 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 24827/06) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by four Russian nationals, Mr Viktor Ivanovich
Kuprin (“the first applicant”), Mrs Natalya Pavlovna
Kuprina (“the second applicant”), Mr Dmitriy Viktorovich
Kuprin (“the third applicant”) and Ms Darya
Viktorovna Kuprina (“the fourth applicant”), on 5 June
2006.
- The
Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
Mrs V. Milinchuk, former Representative of the Russian Federation at
the European Court of Human Rights.
- On
26 March 2007 the President of the First Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
first and the second applicants are spouses. They were both
born in 1952. The third and the fourth applicants are their children.
They were born in 1979 and 1983 respectively. The applicants live in
the Tula region.
- Since
1994 the applicants occupied a flat provided by the first applicant’s
employer (“the company”). In 1996 the first applicant was
dismissed. In 1997 the local administration provided the applicants
with another flat. The second applicant moved there with the children
and the first applicant continued to live in the first flat.
A. First examination of the case
- On
29 October 1997 the company brought a court action for eviction of
the applicants from the flat provided to them in 1994 before the
Suvorovskiy District Court of the Tula Region (“the District
Court”).
- On
6 March 1998 the applicants filed a counterclaim against the company
for the provision of another flat and compensation for non-pecuniary
damage. The case was assigned to Judge K.
- Between May 1998 and March 1999 the District Court
scheduled eight hearings. However, the hearings of 4 September, 15
October and 18 December 1998 did not take place because the
applicants did not attend them. Four hearings were adjourned because
the parties amended their claims. On one occasion the proceedings
were postponed because the judge was on sick leave.
- On
12 March 1999 the District Court granted the applicants’
objection to Judge K. and reassigned the case to Judge B. The latter
contested that decision before the Tula Regional Court (“the
Regional Court”). On 11 November 1999 the Regional Court
dismissed his complaint and referred the case to the District Court
for examination on the merits.
- On
31 March 2000 the company withdrew its claim for eviction of the
applicants and the District Court discontinued the proceedings in
that part.
- On
3 April 2000 the District Court decided to examine the applicants’
counter claims against the company in separate proceedings, adjourned
the case on the applicants’ request and scheduled the next
hearing for 4 August 2000. The Government submitted that it had not
been possible to schedule the hearing for an earlier date since the
judge had been busy in unrelated proceedings.
- The hearing of 4 August 2000 was
adjourned on the parties’ request and those of 8 September, 30
October and 27 November 2000 did not take place because the parties
did not attend them.
- On
10 April 2001 the Regional Court quashed the decision of
31 March 2000 to discontinue the proceedings in the part
concerning the eviction of the applicants and remitted the matter for
re-examination to the District Court.
- In
August 2001 the apartment building in which the disputed flat was
situated burnt down.
- On 24 August 2001 the case was adjourned because the
parties to the proceedings did not appear.
- On
26 September 2001, after a fresh examination, the District Court
discontinued the eviction proceedings.
- On 12 November 2001 the District Court dismissed the
applicants’ claims for the provision of housing and
compensation for non-pecuniary damage. On 12 March 2002 it referred
the case to the Regional Court for examination on appeal. The
Regional Court set the examination of the case for 26 March 2002.
However, on that date it had to refer the case back to the District
Court in order to decide on the reinstatement of the time-limit for
the applicants to lodge an appeal against the decision of 3 April
2000.
- On
5 June 2002 the District Court dismissed the applicants’
request for reinstatement of the time-limit for lodging an appeal
against the decision of 3 April 2000.
- On
19 September 2002 the Regional Court upheld
the decision of 26 September 2001 to discontinue the proceedings
in part relating to eviction and that of 5 June 2002.
- On
the same date the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 12 November
2001 on the ground that the District Court had failed to establish
all relevant facts of the case and remitted the case for
re-examination to the District Court.
B. Second examination of the case
- On
18 October 2002 the case was remitted to the District Court and was
assigned to Judge Ka.
- In
March 2003 the applicants applied to the Regional Court for
supervisory review of the decisions of 3 April 2000, 26 September
2001 and 5 June 2002.
- The hearing of 29 May 2003 did not take place because
the applicants did not attend it.
- On
9 June 2003 the case was referred to the Regional Court in order to
decide on the applicants’ request for supervisory review of the
decisions of 3 April 2000, 26 September 2001 and 5 June 2002. By a
decision of 30 September 2003 the Regional Court refused to
refer those decisions for examination on the merits to the
supervisory review court and on 9 October 2003 it sent the case back
to the District Court.
- The
District Court scheduled the next hearing for 3 December 2003.
However, on that date the case was adjourned on the applicants’
request in order to have additional time to prepare for the hearing.
- The hearings scheduled between January 2004 and
September 2005 were adjourned for various reasons. In particular, on
20 January 2005 the case was adjourned until 9 March 2005 because the
applicants did not appear and that of 15 April 2005 was adjourned
because the applicants requested additional time to amend their
claims. Four hearings were adjourned on the requests by the parties
to the proceedings. The hearings of 12
September 2005 did not take place because the parties did not appear.
- On
28 September 2005 the District Court dismissed the applicants’
claims for provision of housing and compensation for non-pecuniary
damage as lodged against an improper defendant and held that it was
open to the applicants to bring their claims against a proper
defendant.
- On
15 December 2005 the Regional Court upheld that judgment.
C. The applicants’ complaints about the length of
the proceedings
- The
applicants complained about the length of the proceedings to
different domestic authorities.
- On 6 September 2001 the
Judiciary Qualification Board of the Tula Region replied to the
applicants that the examination of the case had been delayed because
they or their representative had failed to appear at the hearings,
because the judge had been on sick leave and also because the court
had summonsed additional witnesses.
- On
3 December 2004 the President of the District Court replied to the
applicants that the case had been adjourned several times due to
their failure to appear or because they needed additional time to
prepare for the hearings.
- On 19 January 2005 the Judiciary
Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation replied to
the applicants that their case had been scheduled for examination
several times. However, the hearings had been adjourned either
because the applicants needed more time to prepare for the hearings
or because they had not attended them.
- On
5 June 2005 the applicants requested the Regional Court to take
disciplinary measures in respect of Judge Ka. for the lengthy
examination of their case. On 9 August 2005 the Regional Court
replied that the verification which had been carried out on the
applicants’ complaints established that the District Court had
failed to comply with the procedural time-limits in examination of
their case. However, the Regional Court noted that Judge Ka. had
taken measures to examine the applicants’ case on the merits.
In particular, she had scheduled hearings, summonsed the parties to
the hearings and had collected additional evidence for the case.
Having regard to the above, the Regional Court considered that there
had been no grounds to take disciplinary measures in respect of Judge
Ka.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicants complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the
length of the civil proceedings had been
excessive. Article 6 of the Convention, in so far as relevant,
provides as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
- The
Court observes that on 29 October 1997 the company brought a court
action for eviction of the applicants from the flat provided to them
in 1994 and on 6 March 1998 the applicants lodged a counterclaim
against the company for provision of another flat and compensation
for non-pecuniary damage. By a final decision of 19 September 2002
the domestic courts discontinued the proceedings relating to the
eviction of the applicants. The applicant lodged their application to
the Court on 5 June 2006. Therefore, in so far as the applicants may
be understood to complain about the length of the proceedings
concerning their eviction, they lodged this complaint more than six
months after the final decision in those proceedings was taken.
Therefore, this complaint must be rejected in accordance with
Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
- The
Court further notes that the applicants’ complaint about the
length of the proceedings instituted by them against the company for
provision of housing and compensation for non-pecuniary damage is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any
other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Period to be considered
- The
proceedings commenced on 6 March 1998, when the applicants lodged
their claim against the company with the District Court. However, the
Court only has competence ratione temporis to examine the
period after 5 May 1998, when the Convention entered into force in
respect of Russia. In assessing the reasonableness of the time that
elapsed after that date, account must be taken of the state of the
proceedings at the time. In the present case the proceedings were
pending until 15 December 2005, when the Regional Court delivered a
final decision in the case. Taking into account the above, the period
to be considered is approximately seven years
and seven months. During that period the
case was examined two times at two levels of jurisdiction.
2. Reasonableness of the length of proceedings
- The
Government submitted that the length of the proceedings in the
present case had been reasonable. The case had been particularly
complex. The domestic courts had examined the case in several rounds
of proceedings. The applicants had delayed the proceedings by
amending their claims, lodging motions and appeals. The proceedings
had been adjourned several times because either the applicants or
their representatives had not attended the hearings. The domestic
authorities had taken all measures to examine the case within a
reasonable time.
- The
applicants maintained their claims.
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII). In addition, only delays attributable to the
State may justify a finding of a failure to comply with the
“reasonable time” requirement (see Pedersen and
Baadsgaard v. Denmark [GC], no. 49017/99, § 49, ECHR
2004-XI).
- The
Court agrees with the Government that
the proceedings at issue were of a certain complexity. However, it
cannot accept that the complexity of the case, taken on its own, was
such as to justify the overall length of the proceedings.
- As
to the applicants’ conduct, the Court does not accept the
Government’s argument that the applicants should be held
responsible for amending their claims and lodging motions and
appeals. It has been the Court’s constant approach that an
applicant cannot be blamed for taking full advantage of the resources
afforded by the national law in the defence of his interests (see,
mutatis mutandis, Yağcı and Sargın v.
Turkey, 8 June 1995, Series A no. 319 A, § 66). On the
other hand, it was not disputed that at least five hearings did not
take place because the applicants did not attend them (see
paragraphs 8, 23 and 26 above) and five more hearings were adjourned
because the applicants and the defendants did not appear (see
paragraphs 12, 15 and 26 above). In this respect the Court reiterates
that the applicants are required to show diligence in carrying out
the procedural steps relating to them in the domestic proceedings, to
refrain from using delaying tactics and to avail themselves of the
scope afforded by domestic law for shortening the proceedings (see,
for instance Unión Alimentaria Sanders S.A. v.
Spain, 7 July 1989, § 35, Series A no. 157, and Humen v.
Poland [GC], no. 26614/95, § 66, 15 October 1999).
In the present case the applicants failed to appear at several
hearings without providing any justification for their
absences. Therefore, the resulting delays are attributable to the
applicants.
- Regarding
the conduct of the judicial authorities, the Court notes the
Government’s argument that during the period under
consideration the domestic authorities examined the case in two
rounds of proceedings. The Court observes in this respect that the
need for the second round of the proceedings was attributable to the
District Court’s failure to properly establish important
circumstances of the case. In any event the fact that the domestic
courts heard the case several times did not absolve them from
complying with the reasonable time requirement of Article 6 § 1
(see Litoselitis v. Greece, no. 62771/00, § 32, 5
February 2004).
44. Furthermore, the Court does not
agree with the Government that the domestic courts conducted the
proceedings properly. The Court observes that on 12 March 1999 the
District Court allowed the applicants’ objection to Judge K.
and reassigned the case to Judge B. The latter contested that
decision before the Regional Court. It was not until November 1999
that the Regional Court dismissed his request and referred the case
to the District Court for examination on the merits. As a result the
proceedings were delayed by seven months. The proceedings were
delayed by another four months when on 3 April 2000 they were
adjourned until 4 August 2000. According to the Government, it had
not been possible to schedule the hearing for an earlier date because
the judge was busy in unrelated proceedings. Furthermore, another
delay of four months occurred during the transfer of the case from
the District Court to the Regional Court for examination on appeal in
the first round of proceedings. The Court reiterates that it
is for Contracting States to organise their legal systems in such a
way that their courts can guarantee the right of everyone to obtain a
final decision within a reasonable time (see, for instance, Löffler
v. Austria, no. 30546/96, §
21, 3 October 2000). The manner in which
a State provides for mechanisms to comply with this requirement –
whether by increasing the numbers of judges, or by automatic
time-limits and directions, or by some other method – is for
the State to decide. If a State lets proceedings continue beyond the
“reasonable time” prescribed by Article 6 of the
Convention without doing anything to advance them, it will be
responsible for the resultant delay (see Price
and Lowe v. the United Kingdom,
nos. 43185/98 and 43186/98, §
23, 29 July 2003). The
Court finds that in the present case the authorities did not take due
measures to speed up the proceedings. The Court therefore
considers that the domestic courts were responsible for the most
significant delays in the proceedings.
- In
the light of the criteria laid down in its case-law, and having
regard to all the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that
in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and
failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicants complained under Article 13 of the Convention that they
had not had an effective remedy against the length of the
proceedings. Article 13 of the Convention provides as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Government submitted that the applicants had had at their disposal
domestic remedies to complain about the length of the proceedings.
They had applied to the Judiciary Qualification Board of the Tula
Region and to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.
- The
applicants maintained their complaint.
- The
Court reiterates that Article 13 of the Convention guarantees an
effective remedy before a national authority for an alleged breach of
the requirement under Article 6 § 1 to hear a case within a
reasonable time (see Kudła v. Poland, no.
30210/96, § 156, ECHR 2000-XI). Furthermore, an effective remedy
required by Article 13 is intended to be capable of either expediting
the proceedings or providing the applicant with adequate redress for
delays that have already occurred (see Kudła, cited
above, §§ 157-159).
- The
Court finds that even if the verifications
carried out by the Judiciary Qualification Board and the Supreme
Court of the Russian Federation (see paragraphs 30 and 32 above) may
be considered as having expedited proceedings in the applicants’
case, they did not provide the applicants with adequate redress for
delays that had already occurred. The Court notes that the
Government did not indicate any other remedy that could have
expedited the determination of the applicants’ case or provided
them with adequate redress for delays that had already occurred (see
Klyakhin v. Russia, no. 46082/99, §§ 101-102, 30
November 2004, and Sidorenko v. Russia, no. 4459/03, §
39, 8 March 2007).
- Accordingly,
the Court considers that in the present case there has been a
violation of Article 13 of the Convention in that the applicants
had no domestic remedy under domestic law whereby they could enforce
their right to a hearing within a reasonable time as guaranteed by
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
1. Pecuniary damage
- Each
of the applicants claimed 1,200,000 Russian roubles (RUB) for the
loss of the flat and loss of their right to acquire that flat by way
of privatisation; RUB 63,000 in respect of the salary which they
could have received if they had not spent their time in courts and
RUB 42,000 for their belongings which had burnt in the flat.
- The
Government contested those claims.
- The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged for the loss of the flat and loss of
right to acquire it by way of privatisation, as well as the loss of
the applicants’ belongings in the fire. Regarding the
applicants’ claim for the loss of salary, the Court notes that
the applicants have not provided the Court with any document
confirming their salary rates on which they had based their
calculations. Having regard to the above, the Court rejects the
totality of the applicants’ claims for pecuniary damage.
2. Non-pecuniary damage
- The
first applicant claimed RUB 800,000 in respect of non-pecuniary
damage, the second and the third applicants claimed RUB 600,000
for each of them and the fourth applicant claimed RUB 500,000.
- The
Government contested those claims.
- The
Court considers that the applicants must have sustained non-pecuniary
damage as a result of the unreasonably long examination of their
claims by domestic courts and absence of an effective domestic remedy
in this respect. However, the amounts claimed appear to be excessive.
Ruling on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicants jointly
2,800 euros under that head, plus any
tax that may be chargeable on that amount.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicants claimed RUB 54,650 for the costs and expenses incurred
before the domestic courts and before the Court. They did not submit
any receipts in respect of those claims.
- The
Government contested those claims.
- According
to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. The Court observes that the applicants had
not provided any receipts in respect of their claims. Therefore,
their claims under that head should be rejected.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the applicants’ complaint about
the length of the civil proceedings which ended on 15 December 2005
as well as the complaint under Article 13 admissible and the
remainder of the application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 of the Convention in respect of the unreasonable length of the
civil proceedings which ended on 15 December 2005;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
13 of the Convention on account of absence of an effective remedy
against the unreasonable length of civil proceedings;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay to the applicants jointly, within
three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR
2,800 (two thousand eight hundred euros),
plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount, in respect
of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Russian roubles at the
rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 25 February 2010,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Nina Vajić
Registrar President
