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THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF IANOŞ v. ROMANIA
(Application
no. 8258/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
12 July
2011
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Ianoş v.
Romania,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Josep
Casadevall,
President,
Corneliu
Bîrsan,
Alvina
Gyulumyan,
Egbert
Myjer,
Ineta
Ziemele,
Luis
López Guerra,
Mihai
Poalelungi,
judges,
and Santiago
Quesada, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 21 June 2011,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 8258/05) against Romania
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Romanian national, Mr Daniel Ianos (“the
applicant”), on 18 February 2005.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr Ioan Dan, a lawyer practising in
Bucharest. The Romanian Government (“the Government”)
were represented by their Agent, Mr Răzvan-Horaţiu Radu, of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- The
applicant alleged that he had been mistreated by a police officer and
that the investigation into the incident had disregarded relevant
evidence. He also complained about the quashing, by means of an
extraordinary appeal (recurs în anulare), of the final
decision awarding him damages.
- On
5 December 2007 the President of the Third Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Timişoara.
A. The alleged ill-treatment against the applicant
- In
the evening of 12 May 2001, after 9 p.m., seven masked police
officers, who were members of the special intervention forces,
stopped a car in which the applicant was a passenger. The police were
searching for a group of suspected criminals.
- According
to the applicant, the police violently dragged the five people
out of the car, held them on the ground and handcuffed them. He also
claimed that one of the masked police officers hit him with his fist,
from the back, on the left side of his thorax. At that point, he
recognised his aggressor as being B.F., with whom he had had an
altercation two years earlier.
- The
police realised the persons they had stopped were not the suspects
they were looking for and they released them soon after they arrived
at the police headquarters. The applicant claimed that B.F. had said:
“We didn’t have you down for today, that’s just how
it turned out. The tables have turned, loser” (“nu
erai programat pentru astăzi, dar aşa s-a nimerit; vezi,
măi fraiere, ca s-a întors roata?”).
While
in custody, the applicant complained of
stomach pains.
- At
1.05 a.m. the next day the applicant went to hospital complaining of
stomach pains. The doctor on duty noted a post-traumatic diffused
swelling in the abdominal area, but considered that no surgical
intervention was required at that time.
- As
his condition deteriorated, on 15 May 2001 at 0.50 a.m. he
returned to the hospital. He was immediately operated on for a
ruptured spleen and the organ was removed. He remained in hospital
until 22 May 2001.
On
23 May 2001 the forensic doctor examined the applicant and issued a
report stating that he had suffered a ruptured spleen. He estimated
that the applicant needed 25 days to recover. He considered that the
injury had posed a danger to the applicant’s life, that it
could have dated from 12 May and possibly resulted from the applicant
having been hit with a hard object.
B. Investigations into the allegations of ill-treatment
-
The applicant lodged a criminal complaint against B.F., whom he
accused of having seriously endangered his physical integrity. He
sought damages.
- The
Military Prosecutor’s Office of the Timişoara Military
Court started an investigation. It took evidence from the applicant,
B.F. and the other persons who had been present on 12 May 2001. Two
passengers from the car and one police officer stated that they had
heard B.F. saying to the applicant: “We
didn’t have you down for today, that’s just how it turned
out”. The same police officer said that he had also heard B.F.
saying: “The tables have turned, loser”. One of the
passengers said that he had seen B.F. hit the applicant and two other
passengers said they had heard the applicant shouting with pain. The
other police officers denied that they had seen B.F. hit the
applicant.
- On
17 May 2002 the Timişoara Forensic Institute, consulted by the
prosecutor, confirmed that the ruptured spleen could have been caused
by a blow to the abdomen.
- On
24 September 2002 the Prosecutor’s Office committed B.F. for
trial on charges of seriously endangering the applicant’s
physical integrity and of abusive behaviour.
- The
applicant joined the proceedings as a civil party.
- On
30 October 2002 the Timişoara Military Court transferred the
case to the Timiş County Court, in accordance with Law on the
demilitarisation of the police.
The
County Court heard statements from the applicant and five witnesses,
of whom three were police officers. Several documents were adduced as
evidence in the case.
- On
28 May 2003 the County Court considered that the evidence in the file
proved that the attack had taken place and that there had been a
causal link between the attack and the applicant’s health
problems. It therefore found B.F. guilty as charged and sentenced him
to two years and six months’ imprisonment. B.F. was also
ordered to pay the applicant 100,000,000 Romanian lei for
non-pecuniary damage.
- B.F.
appealed against the County Court’s decision.
- On
20 October 2003 the Timişoara Court of Appeal reversed the
decision on the ground that there was not enough evidence in the file
to prove that B.F. had injured the applicant or to establish the
cause of the applicant’s injury.
The
court noted that the incident had occurred in circumstances which
made it impossible for the applicant to recognise his alleged
attacker: it had happened very quickly, visibility had been bad and
the police officers had been wearing intervention suits and masks. It
considered that the applicant could have injured himself when he had
been pulled out of the car – and B.F. had not taken part in
that operation – or even before the incident with the police.
It considered that the evidence in the file indicated that B.F. had
been the driver of one of the two police cars involved in the
incident and that, according to his remit, he was responsible for
ensuring his colleagues’ protection; in that capacity he had
not been involved in removing the applicant and the others from their
car.
The
court also considered that the investigation had not been properly
conducted, that the prosecutor had failed to identify other
witnesses, notably passers-by who had been reported as being in the
area where the incident had taken place.
- The
applicant appealed on points of law. In a final decision of 24 March
2004 the High Court of Cassation and Justice, sitting in a
three judge panel, quashed the Court of Appeal’s decision
and upheld the County Court’s judgment.
It
considered that the witness testimonies, including the one given by a
police officer, concurred to prove B.F.’s guilt. The High Court
concluded that B.F. had hit the applicant in revenge for their
previous dispute and that nothing in the events of 12 May 2001 had
justified such a violent attack.
C. The extraordinary appeal against the final decision
(recurs în anulare)
- B.F.
sought the Procurator’s General intervention to have the final
decision annulled (recurs în anulare). The Procurator
General lodged the extraordinary appeal sought by B.F., as he
considered that the High Court and the County Court had committed
serious errors in assessing the evidence.
- On
15 November 2004 the High Court, in a nine-judge bench, examined the
extraordinary appeal, quashed the final decision and returned the
case to the Prosecutor’s Office of the Timiş County Court
to continue the investigation.
The
High Court noted that B.F.’s conviction was based mostly on the
passengers’ statements, to the detriment of the police’s
version of the incident which had shown that there had been no
physical contact between B.F. and the applicant. It considered that
the prosecutor should have pursued the investigation further in order
to establish beyond doubt who had injured the applicant. The
prosecutor should have also questioned the passers-by, who could have
provided an unbiased account of the incident.
Its
decision was final.
D. New investigations into the allegations of
ill-treatment
- The
prosecutor started a new investigation. He re-examined the events of
12 May, took statements from and organised confrontations between the
applicant and the police officers who had participated in the
incident, including B.F. They all maintained their previous
positions.
B.F.
took a polygraph test, the result of which was: absence of simulated
behaviour. The applicant refused to take the test, arguing that it
was not reliable evidence.
- At
the prosecutor’s request, the Timişoara Forensic Institute
re examined the medical evidence. On 27 July 2005 it concluded
that there had been a causal link between the incident of 12 May and
the applicant’s ruptured spleen. However, the expert report did
not exclude the existence of other traumas that could have caused the
spleen to rupture.
- On
19 October 2005 the Prosecutor’s Office decided to end the
investigation against B.F. and continue to try identifying the real
attacker. It considered that the evidence gathered was not
sufficiently strong to reverse the presumption of innocence in B.F.’s
favour. It noted, in particular, the absence of direct proof of a
violent attack, the applicant’s hesitations during the
investigation, as well as the conclusion of the expert medical report
which did not exclude the existence of other traumas that could have
caused the spleen to rupture.
- The
applicant complained against the prosecutor’s decision. On
28 November 2005 the chief prosecutor dismissed his objection.
- The
applicant further complained before the Timiş County Court. He
claimed that the evidence against B.F., including the conclusions of
the medical report, had been ignored or misinterpreted and that the
prosecutor had overlooked the fact that it was difficult to
accurately recall what had happened four years after the incident,
which explained his hesitations. He also pointed out that the
polygraph test was not recognised as evidence by the Code of Criminal
Procedure and that he had refused that test because it would have
been carried out by B.F.’s colleagues.
On 5
June 2006 the applicant reiterated those arguments before the County
Court.
- On
25 September 2006 the County Court dismissed the applicant’s
complaint. It considered that there was no evidence in the file to
support the allegations of guilt. The court did not reply to the
applicant’s arguments.
- The
applicant appealed against the County Court’s decision,
reiterating the evidence in the file that supported his version of
events. He also complained that he had not been re-examined by the
Forensic Institute.
On 5
March 2007 the Timişoara Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
It considered that the doubts as to B.F.’s guilt justified the
prosecutor’s decision and that B.F. enjoyed the presumption of
innocence. The Court of Appeal did not give specific responses to the
applicant’s arguments.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention about the
quashing, by means of an extraordinary appeal, of the final decision
of 24 March 2004. Article 6 reads as follows, in so far as relevant:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a]
... tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ arguments
- The
applicant submitted that the quashing of the final decision by means
of an extraordinary appeal had infringed the right to a fair trial.
- The
Government contested that a violation of the applicant’s rights
had occurred, in so far as the reopening of the proceedings had, at
that time, been allowed by Article 410 (I) 8 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure for “serious error of fact” and as the
Procurator had observed the one-year time-limit for lodging the
application.
- In
the Government’s view, the High Court’s intervention had
been needed in order to allow the clarification of the elements of
fact that had been left unexplained by the ordinary courts and had
not infringed the principle of legal certainty.
2. The Court’s assessment
a) General principles
- At
the outset, the Court notes that in joining the proceedings as civil
party, the applicant lodged a civil action for reparation of damage
caused by an offence and considers that those proceedings are
decisive for his “civil rights” triggering thus the
applicability of Article 6 to the case (see Perez v. France
[GC], no. 47287/99, §§ 62 and 66, ECHR 2004 I).
- The Court further refers to the general principles it
has established in its case-law concerning the quashing of a final
decision and its consequences for the principle of legal certainly.
In particular, it reiterates that it has already examined the
compliance with the requirements of the Convention of the quashing of
final decisions whereby, as in the case currently under examination,
damages have been awarded to civil parties in a criminal case
(SC Plastik ABC v. Romania, no. 32299/03, § 15,
7 April 2008; Igna and Igna (Valea) v. Romania, nos. 1526/02
and 1528/02, §§ 44 56, 14 February 2008; and
Lenskaya v. Russia, no. 28730/03, §§ 29 44,
29 January 2009). In such cases, while addressing the notion of “a
fundamental defect”, the Court stressed that the mere
consideration that the investigation in an applicant’s case had
been “incomplete and one-sided” or had led to an
“erroneous” acquittal cannot in itself, in the absence of
jurisdictional errors or serious breaches of court procedure, abuses
of power, manifest errors
in the application of substantive law or any other weighty reasons
stemming from the interests of justice, indicate the presence of a
fundamental defect in the previous proceedings (see Lenskaya,
cited above, §§ 34; and
Radchikov v. Russia, no. 65582/01, § 48,
24 May 2007).
b) Application of these principles to the
case
- In
the case under examination, in quashing the decision of 24 March 2004
by means of an extraordinary appeal, the High Court of Cassation and
Justice set at naught an entire judicial process which had ended in a
judicial decision that was res judicata.
From
the applicant’s perspective, the case concerns an award of
civil damages, and shall therefore be examined under the civil head
of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Court is
nevertheless mindful of the fact that the final decision was rendered
in a criminal case.
- Accordingly,
it notes that the grounds for the re-opening of the proceedings were
based neither on new facts nor on serious procedural defects, but
rather on the Procurator General’s disagreement with the
assessment of the facts by the County Court and the High Court, who
concluded that witness testimonies, including the one given by a
police officer, concurred to prove B.F.’s guilt. In the Court’s
view, these grounds, as well as the reasons invoked by panel of nine
judges of the High Court for allowing the re-opening of the
proceedings, were insufficient to justify challenging the finality of
the judgment and using that extraordinary remedy to that end.
- Furthermore,
the High Court requested further investigations and the questioning
of passers-by. However, it appears that the prosecutor did not pursue
those indications. In any case the utility of investigating
passers-by has already been raised by the Court of Appeal in the
ordinary proceedings, but the court of last resort did not deem it
necessary to seek additional evidence, including that of eye
witnesses.
- Therefore
there is no ground to consider that the lower courts’ decisions
were tainted by fundamental defects that would justify reopening the
investigations. It appears to be a mere question of the coexistence
of two different views on the subject, which cannot be a legitimate
ground for reopening the proceedings (see Lenskaya, cited
above, §§ 30-33).
- The
Court concludes that the Government did not prove that a fair balance
had been struck between the various interests at stake justifying the
reopening of the proceedings with the effect of setting at naught the
outcome of the case, including the civil head of the proceedings,
which is at stake for the applicant in the instant case.
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that B.F. had behaved abusively towards him and
that his behaviour had gone unpunished despite the evidence against
the police officer. The Court will examine this complaint under
Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ arguments
- The
applicant pointed out that he had had to have an organ removed as a
consequence of the violence to which he had been subjected at the
hands of the police. He also argued that evidence against B.F. had
been disregarded by the courts. Furthermore, he and his lawyer had
not been invited to attend all the procedural hearings following the
quashing of the final decision. Lastly, he stressed that he had not
been re examined by the medical authority that had issued the
second medical report.
- The
Government asserted that the police officer had not used force during
the intervention on 12 May 2001. Without denying the existence of
injury, they argued that the evidence showed that the act of violence
had not occurred during the police intervention.
- They
put forward several arguments to that end, in particular: that the
doubts benefited the accused police officer; that the expert evidence
showed that the act of violence could have taken place at a time
other than that of the police intervention; that despite the
authorities’ efforts, the exact cause of the injury could not
be determined, but the investigation was still pending.
They
argued that Article 3 did not necessarily entail the punishment at
all costs of the State agents involved in the alleged ill-treatment
and pointed out that, in the present case, the fact that the persons
responsible for the violent act had not yet been identified was not
imputable to the authorities, but rather to the circumstances of the
incident: the incident had happened very quickly, visibility had been
bad and the police officers had been wearing intervention suits and
masks.
- Relying
on Klaas v. Germany (22 September 1993, § 29, Series A
no. 269) and Ribitsch v. Austria (4 December 1995, § 32,
Series A no. 336), they contended that the Court should not
substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic
courts.
- The
Government further submitted that the investigation into the
allegations of ill-treatment had been effective, adequate and
independent. The prosecutors and courts acted upon the applicant’s
allegations and examined all available evidence within a reasonable
time. They pointed out that, unlike in Bursuc v. Romania (no.
42066/98, § 104, 12 October 2004), in the present case there
were no doubts about the prosecutor’s independence and
impartiality, as there were no hierarchical links between the
investigators and the suspects.
2. The Court’s assessment
a) Relevant general principles
- The
Court reiterates its case-law on Article 3, in particular concerning
the Court’s assessment of the minimum level of severity that
the ill-treatment has to attain in order for it to fall within the
scope of this Article (see Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28
October 1998, § 93, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1998 VIII; Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January
1978, § 162, Series A no. 25; Kudła v. Poland [GC],
no. 30210/96, § 91-92, ECHR 2000-XI; Peers v. Greece,
no. 28524/95, § 67-74, ECHR 2001-III; and Raninen
v. Finland, 16 December 1997, § 55, Reports 1997 VIII).
- Furthermore,
it reiterates that where an individual raises an arguable claim that
he has been seriously ill-treated by the police or other such agents
of the State unlawfully and in breach of Article 3, that
provision requires that there should be an effective official
investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment
of those responsible (see Selmouni v. France [GC],
no. 25803/94, § 87, ECHR 1999-V; Assenov and
Others, cited above, § 102; and, mutatis mutandis,
Velikova v. Bulgaria, no. 41488/98, § 70,
ECHR 2000-VI).
- The
Court is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role and
recognises that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a
first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered
unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see, for
example, McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883/95, 4
April 2000). Nonetheless, where allegations are made under Article 3
of the Convention the Court must apply a particularly thorough
scrutiny (see, mutatis mutandis, Ribitsch v.
Austria, cited above, § 32, and Avşar, cited
above, § 283) even if certain domestic proceedings and
investigations have already taken place (Cobzaru v. Romania,
no. 48254/99, § 65, 26 July 2007; as well as
Ireland, cited above, § 161; Salman v. Turkey
[GC], no. 21986/93, § 100, ECHR 2000 VII; and
Boicenco, cited above, § 104, on the standard of
proof applied in such cases).
- Where
a person is injured while under the control of the police, any such
injury will give rise to a strong presumption that the person was
subjected to ill-treatment; it is incumbent on the State to provide a
plausible explanation of how the injuries were caused, failing which
a clear issue arises under Article 3 of the Convention (Boicenco,
cited above, § 103).
b) Application of those principles to the
case
- At
the outset, the Court notes that the applicant’s injury
resulted in him losing an organ. The Government did not deny either
the existence or the severity of this injury. The Court considers
that it was sufficiently serious to constitute treatment prohibited
by Article 3.
It
remains to be considered whether the State should be held accountable
under Article 3 in respect of that injury.
- The
Court notes that in the evening of 12 May 2001 the applicant and four
others were dragged violently from their car and arrested by a group
of seven police officers from the Special Forces. The applicant
claimed that because he had been recognised by one of the agents, the
latter had hit him in revenge for a previous altercation.
The
police as well as the Government denied that the police officer was
responsible for the applicant’s injury.
- A
few days after the incident, the applicant’s spleen had to be
removed and the medical reports established in the case concurred
that there was a possible causal link between the incident of 12 May
and the ruptured spleen.
- The
Court notes that the criminal complaint lodged by the applicant was
followed by an investigation into the incident. The prosecutor, the
County Court and the High Court – acting as a court of last
resort – concluded, after examining the evidence in the file,
that B.F. hit the applicant. The courts thus convicted the police
officer (see paragraphs 17 and 20 above).
- However,
these decisions were subsequently quashed and a new investigation
into the incidents was carried out, with the result of B.F. being
acquitted.
- The
Court has found the quashing of the final decision of 24 March
2004 to be incompatible with the Convention guarantees, in so far as
it was not justified by the requirements of a proper administration
of justice (see paragraph 41 above).
As
the investigation conducted after the quashing of the final decision
fell short from the Convention standards, the Court sees no reason to
depart from the conclusions reached by the County Court on 28 May
2003 and upheld by the High Court on 24 March 2004. None of the
arguments put forward by the Government justify taking a different
approach.
- It
therefore considers that the Government have not satisfactorily
established that the applicant’s injuries were caused otherwise
than by the violence inflicted on him by a police officer and
concludes that these injuries were the result of ill-treatment (see
also Stoica v. Romania, no. 42722/02, § 80, 4 March
2008). Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the
Convention.
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- Lastly,
the applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention about the quashing, by means of an extraordinary appeal,
of the final decision of 24 March 2004.
- However,
in the light of the finding of a violation of Articles 3 and 6 of the
Convention (see paragraphs 40 and 64 above), the Court considers that
this complaint is admissible but that there is no need to examine if
there has been a violation of the Article invoked (see, mutatis
mutandis, Bota, cited above, § 59).
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed, in respect of pecuniary damage:
– 2,000 euros (EUR) for hospital fees and
medication; and
– EUR 600,000 in respect of loss of gains,
representing the salary he could have earned if he had continued as a
professional football player, which was no longer possible because of
the injury he had suffered. He adduced a copy of a contract he had
signed with a football club for the period 1995-1997.
He
also claimed EUR 1,500,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage caused
by the ill-treatment and its consequences on his life.
- The
Government considered that the applicant’s claims in respect of
pecuniary damage were speculations not supported by any
justification. They argued that the non-pecuniary damages sought were
excessive.
- The
Court considers that even assuming that there was a causal link
between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged, the
applicant failed to adduce enough evidence in support of his
allegations; it therefore rejects that claim. On the other hand, it
considers that the applicant suffered distress as a result of the
violations found above; it therefore awards him EUR 21,000 in respect
of non pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
- Lastly,
the applicant claimed EUR 1,200 for lawyer’s fees before the
domestic courts and 10% of the amount awarded for pecuniary and
non pecuniary damages, which he will have to pay to his counsel
before the Court. He adduced copies of invoices attesting that
between August 2004 and February 2007 he paid 18,000,000 Romanian lei
and 2,260 New Romanian lei to his lawyer.
- The
Government contended that the amount sought for costs and expenses in
the proceedings before the Court was speculative.
- According
to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to
the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court
considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,500 covering costs
under all heads.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
3 of the Convention;
- Holds that there is no need to examine the
complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention:
(i) EUR
21,000 (twenty-one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable, in respect of non pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR
2,500 (two thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable to the applicant, for costs and expenses;
(b) that
the above amounts are to be converted into the respondent State’s
national currency at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(c) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 July 2011, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Santiago Quesada Josep
Casadevall
Registrar President
