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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF GENOVESE v. MALTA
(Application
no. 53124/09)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
11
October 2011
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Genovese v. Malta,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Ljiljana Mijović,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
George Nicolaou,
Ledi Bianku,
judges,
Geoffrey Valenzia, ad hoc judge,
and
Lawrence Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 20 September 2011,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 53124/09) against Malta lodged
with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a British national, Mr Ben Alexander Genovese (“the
applicant”), on 24 September 2009.
- The
applicant was represented by Dr K. Dingli, Dr A. Bencini and Dr L.
Mifsud Cachia, lawyers practising in Valletta. The Maltese Government
(“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Dr
Silvio Camilleri and later Dr Peter Grech.
- The
applicant alleged that the Maltese law provisions regulating
acquisition of citizenship by descent, discriminated against him on
the basis of his illegitimate status.
- On
9 February 2010 the President of the Fourth Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same
time (Article 29 § 1).
- The
Government of the United Kingdom, who had been notified by the
Registrar of their right to intervene in the proceedings (Article 36
§ 1 of the Convention and Rule 44), did not indicate that they
intended to do so.
- Mr V. De Gaetano, the judge elected in respect of
Malta, was unable to sit in the case (Rule 28 of the Rules of Court).
The President of the Chamber accordingly appointed Mr Geoffrey
Valenzia to sit as an ad hoc judge (Rule 29 §
1(b)).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
A. Background of the case
- The
applicant was born in 1996 and lives in Hamilton.
- The
applicant was born in Scotland and his birth was registered there. He
was born out of wedlock and is the son of a British mother and a
Maltese father. The latter’s paternity has been determined both
judicially and scientifically (see below). Mr G., the applicant’s
father, of Maltese citizenship, has refused to acknowledge his son or
to maintain a relationship with him.
- On
an unspecified date the applicant’s mother made a request for
her son to be granted Maltese citizenship.
- On
4 September 1996, the Malta High Commission informed the applicant’s
mother that since she was not a Maltese citizen and the father of the
applicant had not yet been declared to be a Maltese citizen on the
applicant’s birth certificate, the applicant was not entitled
to Maltese citizenship. She was informed that citizenship would be
granted only if the Maltese father recognised his son on the
applicant’s birth certificate.
- Subsequently,
the applicant’s mother instituted proceedings in Scotland for
the Maltese man with whom she had had a relationship to be declared
the applicant’s father on the applicant’s birth
certificate. By a decree of an unspecified date the Scottish courts
declared Mr G., a Maltese citizen, to be the applicant’s
biological father. Consequently, the applicant’s birth
certificate was amended to reflect the established paternity.
- According
to the Government, in the meantime the applicant’s mother was
informed that even if Mr G. was judicially declared to be the
applicant’s father the applicant would still not be eligible
for citizenship in view of section 5(2)(b) and 17(1)(a) of the
Maltese Citizenship Act, which stated that children born out of
wedlock were only eligible for Maltese citizenship if their mother
was Maltese.
- Subsequently,
the applicant’s mother again submitted an application under
section 5(2)(b) of the Maltese Citizenship Act (see Relevant Domestic
Law below) for her son to be granted Maltese citizenship.
- On
an unspecified date her application was rejected on the basis that
Maltese citizenship could not be granted to an illegitimate child in
cases where the illegitimate offspring was born to a non-Maltese
mother and a Maltese father, in accordance with section 17(1)(a) of
the Maltese Citizenship Act (see Relevant Domestic Law). Since the
applicant was not born to a married couple, as a result of the
application of Article 17(1)(a) any reference to the “father”
in section 5(2)(b) had to be deemed to be a reference to the mother.
- By
a judgment of 27 February 2003 the Civil Court (First Hall) in Malta
also declared Mr G. to be the applicant’s biological father and
he was ordered to pay maintenance.
B. Constitutional redress proceedings
- Pending
the above judgment, in 2002, the applicant’s mother in her own
name and on behalf of the applicant, as his curator ad litem,
instituted constitutional redress proceedings, complaining that the
said provision was discriminatory and contrary to both the Maltese
Constitution and the Convention.
- On
25 January 2006 the Civil Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction,
found that the said provisions were in violation of the Maltese
Constitution, because they discriminated against the applicant by
depriving him of Maltese citizenship. It further abstained from
taking a decision on the compatibility of the provisions with the
Convention.
- On
18 July 2006, on appeal, the Constitutional Court reversed the
first-instance judgment in respect of the compatibility of the
provisions with the Constitution. However, it sent the case back to
the Civil Court for a determination on the compatibility of those
provisions with the Convention.
- On
4 November 2008 the Civil Court in its constitutional jurisdiction
held that section 17(1)(a) of the Maltese Citizenship Act was null
vis-á-vis the applicant because it breached his rights
under Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. It held that, in the
circumstances of the case, the issue of paternity concerned private
life, if not family life, and that the applicant had suffered
discrimination on the ground of birth, his illegitimate status, and
the sex of his Maltese parent.
- On
27 March 2009, on appeal, the Constitutional Court reversed the
first-instance judgment. Noting the amendments in 2007 (see Relevant
Domestic Law), it considered that its judgment had to be limited to
the parameters of the application before it. It held that the right
to citizenship was not a substantive Convention right. The grant or
denial of citizenship would not facilitate or create obstacles to the
applicant’s family life since his father categorically refused
to have any contact with him. Moreover, since the Convention did not
oblige a State to allow a non-national spouse to reside in its
territory, it could not be said that the State was obliged to grant
citizenship to a non-national.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- The
Maltese Citizenship Act, Chapter 188 of the Laws of Malta, in so far
as relevant, reads as follows:
Section 5
“(2) A person born outside Malta on or after the
appointed day (21 September 1964) shall be deemed to have become or
shall become a citizen of Malta at the date of his or her birth:
(b) in the case of a person born on or after 1
August 1989, if at the date of such person’s birth, his or her
father or mother is a citizen of Malta ...”
Section 17
“(1) In this Act - (a) any reference to the
father of a person shall, in relation to a person born out of wedlock
and not legitimated, be construed as a reference to the mother of
that person; ...”
By
means of Act X of 2007 the following subsections were added to
section 5 of the Maltese Citizenship Act:
“(3) A person born outside Malta on or after the
appointed day who proves he is a descendant in the direct line of an
ascendant born in Malta of a parent likewise born in Malta shall be
entitled, upon making an application as may be prescribed and upon
taking the oath of allegiance, to be registered as a citizen of
Malta:
Provided that when the said person is a minor, any such
person who according to law has authority over that minor, may submit
an application for the registration of the said minor as a citizen of
Malta.
(4) Any ascendant as provided in subarticle (3) who dies
before the 1st August 2007 and who would, but for his death, have
been entitled to acquire Maltese citizenship under this article,
shall be deemed to have acquired such citizenship for the purposes of
subarticle (3).
(5) Where any of the parents of a person applying to be
registered as a citizen of Malta by virtue of subarticle (3) was
alive on 1st August 2007 (for the purposes of this article referred
to as "the relevant parent") and the relevant parent is
also a descendant in the direct line of an ascendant born in Malta of
a parent likewise born in Malta, such person shall not be entitled to
be registered as a citizen of Malta by virtue of subarticle (3)
unless the relevant parent had at any time acquired Maltese
citizenship under this article or under article 3; so however that
any such relevant parent who dies before 1st August 2010 and who
would have been entitled to acquire such citizenship under subarticle
(3) or under subarticle (3) of article 3 shall be deemed to have
acquired such citizenship for the purposes of that subarticle.
(6) Where any of the parents of a person applying to be
registered as a citizen of Malta by virtue of subarticle (3) was born
on or after 1st August 2007 (for the purposes of this article
referred to as "the relevant parent") and the relevant
parent is also a descendant in the direct line of an ascendant born
in Malta of a parent likewise born in Malta, such person shall not be
entitled to be registered as a citizen of Malta by virtue of
subarticle (3) unless the relevant parent had at any time acquired
Maltese citizenship under this article.
(7) The person applying to be registered as a citizen of
Malta under subarticle (3) shall be entitled to be registered as a
citizen of Malta if the relevant parent dies after the 31st July,
2010 and the relevant parent had applied for and would have been
entitled to be granted Maltese citizenship under this article or
under article 3.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 IN CONJUNCTION WITH
ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that Maltese law provisions regulating
acquisition of citizenship by descent, discriminated against him
contrary to the provision of Article 14 of the Convention in
conjunction with Article 8, which, in so far as relevant, read as
follows:
Article 8
“1. Everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
Article 14
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set
forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.”
- The
Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
1. Preliminary objections
- The
Government submitted that in 2007 there had been amendments to the
law rendering the applicant eligible for citizenship. This
notwithstanding, the applicant had failed to apply. They further
submitted that the applicant’s submissions in the domestic
proceedings had been focused on “family life” and not
“private life”.
- In
so far as these submissions can be considered as amounting to
objections in respect of victim status and non-exhaustion of domestic
remedies respectively, the Court notes the following:
In
the first place, as confirmed by the Constitutional Court (see
paragraph 20 above) the scope of the application relates to the
applicant’s eligibility for citizenship in the period prior to
the amendments in 2007. In consequence, the fact that the applicant
has not applied for citizenship following the amendments, which were
enacted, more than ten years after the original application for
citizenship, has no bearing on the present application.
Secondly,
in respect of the submissions made before the domestic courts, the
Court considers that the applicant raised a complaint under Article
14 in conjunction with both the private and family aspects of Article
8 before the appropriate national courts, in substance and in
accordance with the formal requirements of domestic law.
- It
follows that the Government’s preliminary objections must be
dismissed.
2. Applicability
- The
Government submitted that the facts of the case did not fall within
the ambit of Article 8 as there existed no family life as interpreted
in the Court’s case-law, namely, the existence in practice of
close personal ties between the applicant and his father. The
biological reality was not enough to constitute family life.
Moreover, there was no legal impediment to developing family life.
Being a European Union (“EU”) citizen, the applicant
could visit Malta freely and unlimitedly, reside and also work there.
More importantly, the Government submitted that citizenship and
nationality were not Convention rights, and thus as held in Family
K. and W. v. The Netherlands (no. 11278/84, Commission decision
of 1 July 1985, Decisions and Reports (DR) 43, p. 216),
Article 14 could not apply.
- The
applicant submitted that the circumstances of the case fell within
the ambit of “private life”, irrespective of the father’s
lack of will to foster a relationship with him. In practice,
citizenship would enable the applicant to spend an unlimited time in
Malta which he could devote to fostering and deepening a relationship
with his father. The fact that the applicant was also a EU citizen
had no bearing on the facts of the case since this did not allow him
to acquire Maltese citizenship. The relevant EU directives created a
series of residence rights subject to conditions and formalities and
could not be comparable to outright citizenship.
- The
Court, noting that the applicant based his application on Article 14
of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8, reiterates
that the notion of “family life” in Article 8 is not
confined solely to marriage-based relationships and may encompass
other de facto “family” ties. The application of
this principle has been found to extend equally to the relationship
between natural fathers and their children born out of wedlock.
Further, the Court considers that Article 8 cannot be interpreted as
only protecting “family life” which has already been
established but, where the circumstances warrant it, must extend to
the potential relationship which may develop between a natural father
and a child born out of wedlock. Relevant factors in this regard
include the nature of the relationship between the natural parents
and the demonstrable interest in and commitment by the natural father
to the child both before and after the birth (see Nylund
v. Finland (dec.), no. 27110/95, ECHR 1999 VI).
- The
Court also reiterates that the concept of “private life”
is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers
the physical and psychological integrity of a person. It can
therefore embrace multiple aspects of the person’s physical and
social identity (see Dadouch v. Malta, no. 38816/07, §
47, ECHR 2010 ... (extracts)). The provisions of Article 8 do
not, however, guarantee a right to acquire a particular nationality
or citizenship. Nevertheless, the Court has previously stated that it
cannot be ruled out that an arbitrary denial of citizenship might in
certain circumstances raise an issue under Article 8 of the
Convention because of the impact of such a denial on the private life
of the individual (see Karassev v. Finland (dec.), no.
31414/96, ECHR 1999-II, and Slivenko v. Latvia (dec.)
[GC], no. 48321/99, § 78, ECHR 2002-II).
- With
regard to Article 14, the Court reiterates that it only complements
the other substantive provisions of the Convention and the Protocols
thereto. It has no independent existence since it has effect solely
in relation to “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms”
safeguarded by those provisions (see, among many other authorities,
Sahin v. Germany [GC], no. 30943/96, § 85,
ECHR 2003-VIII). The application of Article 14 does not necessarily
presuppose the violation of one of the substantive rights protected
by the Convention. It is necessary but it is also sufficient for the
facts of the case to fall “within the ambit” of one or
more of the Articles of the Convention (see Abdulaziz, Cabales and
Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, § 71, Series
A no. 94; Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, 18 July
1994, § 22, Series A no. 291-B; and Petrovic v.
Austria, 27 March 1998, § 22, Reports 1998-II).
- The
prohibition of discrimination enshrined in Article 14 extends beyond
the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms which the Convention and the
Protocols thereto require each State to guarantee. It applies also to
those additional rights, falling within the general scope of any
Convention Article, for which the State has voluntarily decided to
provide. This principle is well entrenched in the Court’s
case-law (see Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali, cited above,
§ 78; Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.)
[GC], nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, § 40, ECHR 2005-X;
and E.B. v. France [GC], no. 43546/02, § 48, ECHR
2008 ...).
- The
applicant argues that the denial of citizenship prevented him from
spending an unlimited time in Malta, which he could have devoted to
fostering a relationship with his biological father. However, the
Court notes that there currently exists no family life between the
applicant and his father, who has evinced no wish or intention to
acknowledge his son or to build or maintain a relationship with him.
The Court finds that, in these circumstances, the denial of
citizenship cannot be said to have acted as an impediment to
establishing family life or otherwise to have had an impact on the
applicant’s right to respect for family life. However, as the
Court has observed above, even in the absence of family life, the
denial of citizenship may raise an issue under Article 8 because of
its impact on the private life of an individual, which concept is
wide enough to embrace aspects of a person’s social identity.
While the right to citizenship is not as such a Convention right and
while its denial in the present case was not such as to give rise to
a violation of Article 8, the Court considers that its impact on the
applicant’s social identity was such as to bring it within the
general scope and ambit of that Article.
- Maltese
legislation expressly granted the right to citizenship by descent and
established a procedure to that end. Consequently, the State, which
has gone beyond its obligations under Article 8 in creating such a
right – a possibility open to it under Article 53 of the
Convention – must ensure that the right is secured without
discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 (see, E.B. v.
France, cited above, § 49).
- The
applicant’s primary complaint is that, in the exercise of a
right granted by domestic law, he was discriminated against on the
grounds, inter alia, of his illegitimate status. The latter is
a concept covered by Article 14 of the Convention (see Marckx v.
Belgium, 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, and Inze v. Austria,
28 October 1987, § 41, Series A no. 126).
- Accordingly,
Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8, is
applicable in the present case.
- In
these circumstances the Court dismisses the preliminary objection
raised by the Government.
- The
Court further notes that the application is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
applicant submitted that he had suffered discrimination in the
enjoyment of his rights under Article 8 on the ground of his
illegitimate status and/or the sex of his Maltese parent. Indeed, had
the applicant’s parents been married, he would have fallen
within the parameters of section 5(2)(b) of the Maltese Citizenship
Act; However, he fell outside that provision because of his
illegitimacy. Moreover, had the applicant’s mother been Maltese
the applicant could have obtained citizenship; he failed to do so
because it was his father who was Maltese. The applicant was in an
analogous situation to any other child with a Maltese father and a
foreign mother and who fulfilled all the criteria of section 5(2)(b),
and like them would have become a Maltese citizen had it not been for
his illegitimate status. This status transpired from his birth
certificate, and irrespective of whether his father had voluntarily
recognised him or whether there had been a judicial determination to
that effect, he was not eligible for citizenship owing to his status.
- The
Government submitted that since citizenship was not a right covered
by the Convention differential treatment based on illegitimate status
could not violate Article 14 of the Convention. As to any distinction
based on sex, according to the Government this protection only
applied to persons claiming discrimination when compared with other
persons of a different sex. In the present case, the applicant was
not ineligible for Maltese nationality on the ground of his sex, and
the legal distinction based on the sex of his parent was a condition
applicable irrespective of his sex. They further submitted that there
was no distinction between voluntary acknowledgment of a child and
judicial acknowledgment, as even if a father was recognised on the
birth certificate, the child would not be eligible for citizenship on
the grounds that he or she was illegitimate.
- The
Government submitted that a distinction on the basis of legitimacy
was necessary since children born in wedlock had a link with their
parents resulting from the marriage the parents had contracted, while
this link was missing in cases of children born out of wedlock.
Indeed, while the identity of the mother was always certain it would
not be the case with that of the father. Thus, the social reality in
such cases objectively justified treating differently illegitimate
biological children of Maltese fathers born to non-Maltese mothers.
- Lastly,
they submitted that the applicant had not been in an analogous
situation and that bearing in mind the State’s margin of
appreciation, the Court should dismiss the applicant’s
complaint.
- The
Court reiterates that for the purposes of Article 14 a difference in
treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable
justification, that is, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if
there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the
means employed and the aim sought to be realised. The Contracting
States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether
and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations
justify different treatment in law; the scope of this margin will
vary according to the circumstances, the subject matter and its
background (see, Inze, cited above, § 41).
- The
Court reiterates that the Convention must be interpreted in the light
of present-day conditions (see, inter alia, E.B v. France.,
cited above, § 92). The question of equality between children
born in and children born out of wedlock was, at the time of the Inze
judgment (cited above) in 1987, already given importance in the
member States of the Council of Europe. This was shown by the 1975
European Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born out of
Wedlock, which at the time was in force in nine member States of the
Council of Europe. Today, twenty-three years later, this Convention
is in force in twenty-two member states. Thus, it is clear that the
domestic law of the member States of the Council of Europe has
evolved and is continuing to evolve, in company with the relevant
international instruments on the subject. The Court further observes
that in searching for common ground among the norms of international
law it has never distinguished between sources of law according to
whether or not they have been signed or ratified by the respondent
State (see Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97, §
78, 12 November 2008). Thus, in the case of Marckx v. Belgium
(cited above) concerning the legal status of children born out of
wedlock, the Court based its interpretation on two international
conventions of 1962 and 1975 that Belgium, like other States Parties
to the Convention, had not yet ratified at the time (§§ 20
and 41). Against this background, even though Malta has not ratified
the 1975 European Convention, the Court reaffirms that very weighty
reasons would have to be advanced before what appears to be an
arbitrary difference in treatment on the ground of birth out of
wedlock could be regarded as compatible with the Convention (see,
mutatis mutandis, Inze, cited above, § 41).
-
The Court notes that the applicant was in an analogous situation to
other children with a father of Maltese nationality and a mother of
foreign nationality. The only distinguishing factor, which rendered
him ineligible to acquire citizenship, was the fact that he had been
born out of wedlock.
- The
argument put forward by the Government to justify this distinction
was the fact that children born in wedlock had a link with their
parents resulting from their parents’ marriage, a link which
did not exist in cases of children born out of wedlock. However, it
is precisely a distinction based on such a link which Article 14 of
the Convention protects against. The status of an illegitimate child
derives from the fact that his or her parents were not married at the
time of their child’s birth. It is therefore a distinction
based on such a status which the Convention prohibits, unless it is
otherwise objectively justified.
- The
Court notes that the only other reason put forward by the Government
is the social reality of such cases and the fact that, while a mother
is always certain, a father is not. The Court cannot accept this
argument. Indeed, as conceded by the Government (see paragraph 40
above), even in cases such as the present where the father was known
and registered on the birth certificate, whether voluntarily or by
judicial determination, the distinction arising from the provisions
of the Citizenship Act persisted.
- The
Court accordingly finds that no reasonable or objective grounds have
been adduced to justify such difference of treatment of the applicant
as a person born out of wedlock.
- There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention in
conjunction with Article 8.
- In
these circumstances it is unnecessary for the Court to examine
whether there has also been discrimination on the basis of the sex of
the applicant’s Maltese parent.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
- The
applicant did not submit any claim for just satisfaction.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
- Declares the application admissible unanimously;
- Holds by six votes to one that there has been a
violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the
Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 October 2011, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the
Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the dissenting
opinion of Judge Valenzia is annexed to this judgment.
N.B.
T.L.E.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE
VALENZIA
On
the separate question of admissibility (paragraph 38 of the judgment)
I voted in favour because I felt that if the applicant proved that
the breach of Article 14 could be pegged with Article 8, he would
succeed in his complaint. However, when the merits were examined I
considered that this was not the case, so I voted against the finding
of a violation with regard to Article 14 in conjunction with Article
8.
In
the present case there is no question that there was a breach of
Article 14 because of the distinction based on status – a child
born in wedlock as distinguished from a child born out of wedlock.
It is
accepted that only an arbitrary refusal of citizenship may raise an
issue under Article 8. In this case the arbitrariness has been
established under Article 14. This article, however, cannot stand
alone and has to be pegged to a Convention right.
Article
8 safeguards ‘family life’, but in this case there is no
question of family life as this is non-existent and has been
acknowledged by the parties since Mr G is excluding any type of
contact with the applicant and his mother. The applicant was not,
however, prevented in any way from fostering a relationship with Mr G
or claiming hereditary rights. This relationship does not depend on
the applicant being granted citizenship. It has also been pointed out
that as a European Union citizen, the applicant has freedom of
movement and other rights such as residence and work in Malta. Today
there is also no obstacle to his applying for citizenship due to a
change in the law. It seems that the free education that the
applicant is seeking in Malta by obtaining Maltese citizenship is
also available in the country where he was born.
In
the obvious absence of family life under Article 8, however, the
Court has said that the denial of citizenship in the present case may
raise an issue under this Article because of its impact on the
private life of the applicant, which concept is wide enough to
embrace aspects of his social identity.
The
Court, however, does not define social identity nor does it explain
how citizenship defines the applicant’s identity. The concept
of private life is so vast that it embraces everything, even things
pertaining to public law. Denial of citizenship always has an impact
in a general way on any person, so this alone cannot be taken as the
reason why social identity has been affected.
In
this particular case the applicant produced no proof to show how this
deprivation of Maltese citizenship has affected his private life and
impacted on his social identity. This effect is being presumed and
taken for granted by the Court. It is to be noted that the applicant
was born in 1996 and his mother had already started proceedings in
1996 with the Malta High Commission. Constitutional proceedings
started in Malta in 2006 when the applicant was nine years old.
Nowhere in the proceedings was there any proof of or claim made as to
how the applicant was affected.
Therefore
the facts in this case do not warrant the Court pushing this concept
too far. “The jaws of Article 8 have already
been opened wide enough”.
There are limits on the personal sphere and while certain measures by
the State can affect an individual from developing his personality,
it does not mean that all these measures shall be considered as an
interference with his private life. This is so in the present case.
