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FIRST
SECTION
DECISION
Application no.
8154/04
Claude Louis DUBOC
against Austria
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on
5 June 2012 as a Chamber composed of:
Nina Vajić,
President,
Anatoly
Kovler,
Elisabeth
Steiner,
Khanlar
Hajiyev,
Julia
Laffranque,
Linos-Alexandre
Sicilianos,
Erik
Møse,
judges,
and Søren
Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
regard to the above application lodged on 27 February 2004,
Having
regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and
the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having
deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
- The
applicant, Mr Claude Louis Duboc, is a national of the United States
of America and France, who was born in 1942. He is currently detained
in a prison in the United States of America. He is represented before
the Court by Dr. J. Hock, a lawyer practising in Vienna. The Austrian
Government (“the Government”) were represented by their
Agent, Ambassador H. Tichy, Head of the International Law Department
at the Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs. The
Government of France were given notice of the application, and they
informed the Court on 11 June 2008 that they would not exercise their
right to intervene in the present case.
A. The circumstances of the case
- The
facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as
follows.
- In
November 1988 the applicant opened a bank account with an Austrian
bank, bank G. The account was registered under his name and all
movements on the account were able to be followed. By 1998 the
applicant’s account had a positive balance of approximately
17 million euros (EUR).
1. Criminal proceedings in the United States of America
- In
1994 the applicant was indicted in the United States on various drug
and money laundering charges relating to drug trafficking on a
particularly large scale, which he was involved in from 1982 until
his arrest in 1994. The applicant entered into a Plea and Cooperation
Agreement with the prosecution on 17 May 1994. Under that agreement,
the applicant voluntarily forfeited to the United States
approximately 50 million United States dollars (USD) in assets. He
was also obliged to identify all his assets. However, the applicant
did not disclose his account with bank G.
- While
in prison the applicant was induced by one of the other fellow
inmates, who was cooperating with the FBI, to bribe a judge. The
inmate also arranged a meeting between the applicant and W., an
undercover law enforcement officer, who presented himself as
being able to assist the applicant. Subsequently, W. arranged several
money transfers for the applicant from bank G. in Austria.
- Thereupon,
on 7 May 1998, the United States Department of Justice requested the
Austrian authorities under letters rogatory to freeze the applicant’s
assets as a preliminary step to forfeiture under US law, subject to
the operation of Austrian law. It stated that the applicant’s
funds deposited with bank G. were the proceeds of money laundering
and drug offences to which the applicant had pleaded guilty in 1994.
It further held that these funds had also been used in additional
money laundering offences for which the applicant would be indicted
later.
- This
request was based on the treaty regulating judicial assistance
between Austria and the United States, namely the Treaty of Mutual
Legal Assistance (“the MLAT”), which entered into force
on 1 August 1998.
- On
23 September 1999 the District Court for the Northern District of
Florida issued a Final Order of Forfeiture including the applicant’s
assets at bank G. (“the first forfeiture order”).
Apparently, the applicant’s appeal against this decision was to
no avail.
- In
a second set of criminal proceedings in the United States, the
applicant was indicted for conspiracy to bribe a federal judge,
conspiracy to tamper with a witness, conspiracy to money laundering
and for money laundering.
- On
1 February 2000 the District Court for the Northern District of
Florida acquitted the applicant of bribery, but convicted him of all
other charges. The court also ordered the forfeiture of his assets
(“the second forfeiture order”).
- On
26 August 2004 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit partly granted the applicant’s appeal against the
decision of 1 February 2000 and acquitted him with respect to
money laundering. His conviction for conspiracy to tamper with a
witness was affirmed. The court also reversed the second forfeiture
order.
2. Proceedings in Austria
- Based
on the United States’ letters rogatory of 7 May 1998, the
Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Landesgericht für Strafsachen)
issued an interim measure on 23 June 1998 enjoining the applicant
from disposing of all assets deposited with bank G. It also held that
the interim measure would be suspended on deposit of USD 325,000. The
applicant did not pay that deposit and did not appeal against the
court’s decision. This interim measure was twice altered to
reflect the increased value of the assets subject to it.
- Additional
criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on
suspicion of money laundering on 19 June 1998.
- On
23 April 1999 the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior
(Bundesministerium für Inneres) issued a
report listing all credits and debits on the applicant’s
account that had been carried out via bank transfer or by means of
crossed cheques (Verrechnungsschecks).
- On
14 April 2000 the Regional Criminal Court dismissed the applicant’s
request for the suspension of the criminal proceedings and for the
lifting of the interim measure. It held that only the Public
Prosecutor’s Office could suspend the proceedings at this stage
and that the interim measure was still justified.
- On
17 August 2000 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht)
rejected the applicant’s request that it hold a hearing and
dismissed his complaint against the Regional Criminal Court’s
decision of 14 April 2000. It held that according to the
findings of the United States authorities the applicant could
reasonably be suspected of having committed the crime of receiving
stolen property (Hehlerei) and, after the entry into force of
the relevant amendment to the Austrian Criminal Code, the crime of
money laundering.
- Subsequently,
the applicant applied to have the interim measure lifted three
additional times between 27 June 2001 and 18 August 2003. All of his
requests were to no avail.
- Following
the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit of 26 August 2004 and the applicant’s acquittal of the
charges of money laundering, the applicant applied again to have the
interim measure lifted.
- On
22 March 2005 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court dismissed this
request and upheld the interim measure. It held that a distinction
had to be made between the two different proceedings in the United
States. The first forfeiture order was still in force and
consequently the interim measure in Austria could not be quashed.
Even if the second forfeiture order had been lifted, the
corresponding judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit had stated that at least some of the money in the
applicant’s account with bank G. had “doubtlessly derived
from drug related money”. The interim measure was therefore
still justified.
- This
decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 22 September 2005
and served on the applicant’s counsel on 10 October 2005.
- On
18 May 2005 the Vienna Public Prosecutor’s Office asked the
Regional Criminal Court to enforce the first forfeiture order.
Furthermore, it discontinued the criminal proceedings against the
applicant on the same date. It renewed the request on 26 February
2006.
- Upon
the request of the Vienna Regional Court of 16 March 2006, the U.S.
Department of Justice submitted a certified written version of the
judgment issued against the applicant. However, it did not do so
until 6 March 2007.
- On
25 April 2006 the Vienna Regional Court dismissed the Public
Prosecutor’s request for the execution of the first forfeiture
order for formal reasons.
- On
19 June 2007 the Vienna Court of Appeal allowed the Public
Prosecutor’s appeal and remitted the case back to the Regional
Court.
- On
1 February 2008 the Vienna Regional Court asked the U.S. authorities
to inform the applicant of the request of the U.S. Department of
Justice for enforcement of the first forfeiture order and to give him
the opportunity to comment on it.
- On
23 April 2008 the applicant and his former wife, both represented by
counsel, requested in their comments that the first forfeiture order
not be executed in Austria.
- On
4 June 2008 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court, without holding a
hearing, decided to take over the enforcement of the first forfeiture
order and ordered the forfeiture of the applicant’s Austrian
assets. The applicant appealed against this decision on 24 June 2008.
- On
30 December 2008 the Vienna Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s
subsequent appeal. That decision was served on the applicant’s
counsel on 27 January 2009.
B. Relevant domestic law
1. The Extradition and Legal Assistance Act
Section
1 of the Extradition and Legal Assistance Act (Federal Law Gazette
no. 529/1979) stipulates that the Act applies where international or
bilateral agreements do not provide otherwise.
Section 3
Section 3
carries the heading “reciprocity” and, so far as
relevant, provides as follows:
“(1) Foreign requests may be granted
only if it is ensured that the requesting State would also grant an
equivalent Austrian request.
...
(3) If there are doubts regarding compliance
with reciprocity, information shall be obtained from the Federal
Minister of Justice.”
Section 64
“(1) Enforcement or further enforcement
of a decision by a foreign court which was pronounced with final and
legal effect, in the form of a money fine or prison sentence, a
preventive measure or a pecuniary measure (vermögensrechtliche
Anordnung), is admissible at the request of another State if:
- the
decision of the foreign court was taken in the course of proceedings
in compliance with the principles of Article 6 of the European
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(the Convention) (Federal Law Gazette No. 210/1958);
- the
decision was taken for an act that is sanctioned by a court sentence
under Austrian law;
- the
decision was not taken for one of the offences listed in § 14
and § 15;
- no
time lapse has occurred under Austrian law regarding enforceability;
- the
person concerned by the decision of the foreign court –
regarding this offence – is not prosecuted in Austria, was
finally and effectively convicted or adjudicated in this matter or
otherwise released from prosecution.
...
(4) Enforcement of a decision by a foreign
court which results in pecuniary measures is admissible only to the
extent that the requirements under Austrian law for a money fine, a
withdrawal of enrichment or forfeiture apply, and that no
corresponding Austrian measure has yet been taken.
...
(7) Fines, forfeited assets or enrichment
withdrawn shall fall to the Republic of Austria.”
2. The Treaty between the Government of the Republic of
Austria and the Government of the United States of America on Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
- The
Treaty was signed on 23 February 1995 and, following ratification,
entered into force on 1 August 1998 (Federal Law Gazette Part III,
no. 107/1998).
Article 1
“(1) The Contracting Parties shall
provide mutual assistance, in accordance with the provisions of this
Treaty, in connection with the investigation and prosecution of
offences, the punishment of which at the time of the request for
assistance would fall within the jurisdiction of the judicial
authorities of the Requesting State, and in related forfeiture
proceedings.
(2) Assistance shall include:
...
(h) assisting in proceedings related to
forfeiture and restitution; ...”
Article 17
“(1) If the Central Authority of one
Contracting Party becomes aware of fruits or instrumentalities of
offences which are located in the territory of the other Party and
may be forfeitable of otherwise subject to seizure under the laws of
that Party, it may so inform the Central Authority of the other
Party. If the other Party has jurisdiction in this regard, it may
present this information to its authorities for a determination as to
whether any action is appropriate. These authorities shall issue
their decision and shall, through their Central Authority, report to
the other Party on the action taken.
(2) The Contracting Parties shall assist each
other to the extent permitted by their respective laws in proceedings
relating to the forfeiture of the fruits and instrumentalities of
offences, restitution to the victims of crime, and the collection of
fines imposed as sentences in criminal prosecutions.
(3) A Requested State in control of forfeited
proceeds or instrumentalities shall dispose of them in accordance
with its law. To the extent permitted by its laws and upon such terms
as it deems appropriate, either Party may transfer forfeited assets
or the proceeds of their sale to the other Party.”
Article 20
“(3) This Treaty shall apply to
requests whether or not the relevant offences occurred prior to the
entry into force of this Treaty.”
COMPLAINTS
- Citing
Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant complained of the lack of
a public hearing in the proceedings concerning the interim measure
freezing his assets in Austria. He asserted that he had not been
given the opportunity to present any evidence on his behalf as to the
legitimacy of his Austrian assets and as regards the question of
reciprocity under the Treaty of Mutual Legal Assistance between
Austria and the United States (“the “MLAT”).
Furthermore, the Austrian courts’ refusals to lift the interim
measure had been unfair because they had not been sufficiently
reasoned.
- Under
the same provision the applicant complained about the length of the
criminal proceedings in Austria. He submitted that they had started
in 1998 and had lasted until 18 May 2005.
- The
applicant also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the
Austrian courts’ refusal to lift the interim measure had
constituted a violation of his right to the free enjoyment of his
property. He claimed that the interim measure had been entirely
devoid of any legal basis, in that the condition of reciprocity which
he asserted was required by the MLAT had been not fulfilled and that
the Austrian authorities’ interpretation of Article 17 of
the MLAT had been contrary to the clear wording and meaning of this
provision.
- Relying
on Article 7 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the
preliminary investigation against him and the confiscation of his
assets had been conducted on the basis of money laundering, which had
not been punishable in Austria at the material time.
- Finally,
he complained under Article 13 of the Convention that he had not been
able to bring his case before the Constitutional Court in order to
challenge the conformity of the relevant domestic provisions with the
Convention.
THE LAW
1. Complaint under Article 6 § 1 about the lack of
a public hearing
- The
applicant complained, relying on Article 6 of the Convention, of the
lack of an oral hearing in the proceedings concerning the interim
measure.
Article 6,
insofar as relevant, reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
- The Government submitted that the right to a public
hearing or any hearing at all was not absolute. In the present case,
the courts had been justified in dispensing with a hearing, as the
cross-border enforcement proceedings had exclusively concerned
questions of law. Moreover, a personal appearance by the applicant
had neither been necessary, as the issues to be resolved had not
required the court to gain a personal impression of him, nor had it
been feasible, as he was serving a prison term in the United States.
A requirement of personal attendance would severely hamper
international cooperation in cases such as the present one. Moreover,
the applicant had been sufficiently involved in the proceedings, in
that he had been informed of all steps taken and had submitted
comprehensive statements through counsel.
- This
was disputed by the applicant, who submitted that neither the Vienna
Regional Criminal Court nor the Vienna Court of Appeal had held a
public hearing, although there had been no special circumstances that
would have justified dispensing with a hearing. Moreover, he
submitted that he should have been heard in person in order to show
that his assets had originated from lawful business activities.
- The
Court observes at the outset that the proceedings relating to the
enforcement of a foreign forfeiture order by the Austrian courts fall
to be considered under the civil head of Article 6 § 1 (see
Saccoccia v. Austria, no. 69917/01, § 65, 18
December 2008).
- As
regards the necessity of holding a public hearing in such
proceedings, the Court found in the above-cited Saccoccia case
as follows:
“77. Turning to the circumstances of
the present case, the Court observes that the courts had to examine
whether the conditions laid down in the relevant provisions of the
Extradition and Legal Assistance Act (“the ELAA”) and the
1998 Treaty for execution of the forfeiture order were met. The
issues to be examined included questions of reciprocity, the question
whether the acts committed by the applicant were punishable under
Austrian law at the time of their commission, compliance with
statutory time-limits and whether the proceedings before the Rhode
Island District Court, which had issued the confiscation order, had
been in conformity with the standards of Article 6 of the Convention.
78. In the Court’s view, the present
proceedings concerned rather technical issues of inter-State
cooperation in combating money-laundering through the enforcement of
a foreign forfeiture order. They raised exclusively legal issues of a
limited nature. All the Austrian courts had to establish was whether
the conditions set out in the ELAA and the 1998 Treaty for granting
the execution of the confiscation order were met. As has already been
established, the proceedings did not involve any review of the merits
of the forfeiture order issued by the Rhode Island District Court.
79. The present proceedings did not require
the hearing of witnesses or the taking of other oral evidence.
Furthermore, the Court agrees with the Government that the courts
were not called upon to hear the applicant in person. The proceedings
did not raise any issue of his credibility, nor did they concern any
circumstances which would have required the courts to gain a personal
impression of the applicant. In these circumstances, the courts could
fairly and reasonably decide the case on the basis of the parties’
written submissions and other written materials. They were therefore
dispensed from holding a hearing.”
- Given
that the same kind of proceedings were conducted in the present case,
in which the same kind of issues had to be examined by the Austrian
courts, the Court considers that the above reasons also apply to the
present case. It therefore concludes that, in these circumstances,
the courts could fairly and reasonably decide the case on the basis
of the parties’ written submissions and other written materials
and were dispensed from holding a hearing. Accordingly, there is no
appearance of a violation of Article 6 on account of the lack of
an oral hearing.
- It
follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a)
and 4 of the Convention.
2. Complaint under Article 6 § 1 about the length
of the preliminary investigation proceedings
- The
applicant also complained under Article 6 of the Convention about the
length of the proceedings before the Austrian courts.
- The
Government submitted that a period of six years and eleven months for
the criminal proceedings against the applicant on suspicion of money
laundering had been reasonable in the circumstances of the case and
had not been in breach of the reasonable time requirement under
Article 6 § 1. The investigation had been particularly
complex because it had required verification of money flows between
numerous bank accounts, of which several had been opened with banks
outside Austria in Liechtenstein, Switzerland and the United States
of America, and the judicial authorities had sent out numerous
requests for judicial assistance which had been very time consuming.
While these proceedings had been pending the applicant had tried to
obtain possession of the funds in these accounts through civil
proceedings, which had further complicated the criminal proceedings.
- This
was disputed by the applicant. In his view, the investigation into
the allegation of money laundering could have been terminated much
earlier.
- The
Court observes that the period to be taken into consideration started
on 19 June 1998, when a preliminary investigation against the
applicant on suspicion of money laundering was opened and ended on
18 May 2005, when the investigation was discontinued.
- The Court reiterates that it is its settled case-law
that an applicant who complains of the length
of proceedings before the ordinary courts being unreasonably long is
normally required to file an application under section 91 of the
Courts Act (see (see, Holzinger v. Austria (no. 1),
no. 23459/94, §§ 21-23, ECHR 2001-I; and, with
respect to criminal proceedings, Talirz v. Austria
(dec.), no. 37323/97, 11 September 2001; Wurm v. Austria
(dec.), no. 57652/00 , 26 June 2003, Ecker v. Austria
(dec.), no. 32042/02, 1 February 2005; Tuma v. Austria (dec.),
no. 32942/03, 24 May 2007 and Saccoccia v. Austria
(dec.), no. 69917/01, 5 July 2007). The applicant did not
do so in the present case and has not given any explanation as to why
he failed to do so.
- The
Court thus concludes that the applicant has failed to exhaust
domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention and that this part of the application must, therefore, be
rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
3. Complaint under Article 1 Protocol no. 1
- Under
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 the applicant complained that the
Austrian courts’ decisions had violated his right to the
peaceful enjoyment of his property, in that they had lacked a legal
basis.
Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
- The
Government argued that the execution of the forfeiture order had not
interfered with the applicant’s right to peaceful enjoyment of
his property. He had failed to show that he was the owner of the
assets at issue, because, according to an enforceable notary deed of
1 April 2004, the applicant had acknowledged several claims made by
his former wife relating to the assets deposited in Austria as part
of their divorce settlement. Thus, he had no longer been the owner of
these funds and consequently could not argue that he had been the
victim of an alleged breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Even
assuming that the applicant had still been the owner of the assets in
issue, there had been nothing to indicate that they had originated
from any legal activities and an interference with the applicant’s
“possessions” had, in any case, been justified. The
execution of the forfeiture order had had a legal basis in Article 17
of the MLAT and section 64 of the ELAA. Moreover, the Austrian
courts had given detailed reasons when finding that the conditions
enumerated in these provisions had been met. The forfeiture had
served the legitimate aim of combating international drug
trafficking; the measure had also been proportionate, given that the
applicant had pleaded guilty to drug trafficking and money laundering
offences.
- The applicant asserted that he had been the owner of
the assets in issue. In the notary deed of 1 April 2004 he had only
acknowledged that he owed certain amounts to his wife, but that had
not meant that she had actually acquired ownership. He maintained
further that the Austrian courts’ decisions had lacked a legal
basis, firstly in that the condition of reciprocity contained in the
MLAT had not been fulfilled, secondly in that the first forfeiture
order had been time-barred, and thirdly in that Article 17 of the
MLAT had only permitted the forfeiture of “fruits and
instrumentalities” of an offence, but not the forfeiture of
“substitute assets”. The Austrian authorities’
interpretation of this provision had been contrary to the clear
wording and meaning of this provision.
- The
Court need not determine whether the applicant actually lost
ownership of the assets deposited in Austria following the notary
deed of 1 April 2004 because, even if he continued to be the
owner and could claim that the Austrian courts’ decisions had
interfered with his rights under Article 1 Protocol No. 1, this
complaint is manifestly ill-founded for the following reasons.
- In
the case of Saccoccia v. Austria (cited above), the Court
found in respect of a similar claim as follows:
“87. The Court notes that the execution
of the forfeiture order had a basis in Austrian law, namely section
64 of the ELAA and Article 17 of the 1998 Treaty. As to the
applicant’s claim that the requirements laid down in these
provisions were not complied with, it has to be borne in mind that
the Court’s power to review compliance with domestic law is
limited (see, among many other authorities, Jokela
v. Finland, no. 28856/95, § 51, ECHR 2002-IV, and
Fredin v. Sweden (no. 1), 18 February 1991, § 50,
Series A no. 192). In the present case, the Austrian courts dealt in
detail with the applicant’s arguments and gave extensive
reasons for their finding that the above-mentioned provisions
provided a legal basis for executing the final forfeiture order.
There is nothing to show that their application of the law went
beyond the reasonable limits of interpretation.
88. Furthermore, the Court observes that the
execution of the forfeiture order had a legitimate aim, namely
enhancing international co-operation to ensure that monies derived
from drug dealing were actually forfeited. The Court is fully aware
of the difficulties encountered by States in the fight against
drug-trafficking. It has already held that measures, which are
designed to block movements of suspect capital, are an effective and
necessary weapon in that fight (see Raimondo v. Italy,
22 February 1994, § 30, Series A no. 281-A). Thus the
execution of the forfeiture order served the general interest of
combating drug trafficking. However, a fair balance has to be struck
between these demands of the general interest and the applicant’s
interest in the protection of his right to peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions. In making this assessment due regard is to be had to the
wide margin of appreciation the respondent State enjoys in such
matters (see AGOSI, cited above, § 52, and Butler,
cited above).
89. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 contains no
explicit procedural requirements. It follows that they are not
necessarily the same as under Article 6. However, the Court has held
that the proceedings at issue must afford the individual a reasonable
opportunity of putting his or her case to the relevant authorities
for the purpose of effectively challenging the measures interfering
with the rights guaranteed by this provision. In ascertaining whether
this condition has been satisfied, the Court takes a comprehensive
view (see, for instance, Jokela, cited above, § 45, and
AGOSI, cited above, § 55).”
- In
the present case, the Court observes that the applicant was
represented by a lawyer throughout the proceedings and had the
opportunity, of which he made ample use, to submit his arguments. He
was therefore in a position to effectively challenge the measures
interfering with his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
Moreover, bearing in mind the respondent State’s wide margin of
appreciation in this area, the Court finds that the ordering of the
interim measure freezing the applicant’s assets and the
domestic courts’ subsequent enforcement of the first forfeiture
order do not disclose a failure to strike a fair balance between
respect for the applicant’s rights under Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 and the general public interest. Having regard to these
considerations, the Court considers that there is no indication that
the execution of the forfeiture order amounted to disproportionate
interference with the applicant’s property rights.
- Consequently,
this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and
must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4
of the Convention.
4. The other complaints
- The
applicant further complained under Article 6 that he had not been
given an opportunity to present any evidence on his behalf as to the
legitimacy of his Austrian assets and as regards the question of
reciprocity in the MLAT and that the Austrian courts’ refusals
to lift the interim measure had been unfair because they had not been
sufficiently reasoned. Under Article 7 of the Convention, the
applicant complained that the preliminary investigation against him
and the confiscation of his assets had been conducted on the basis of
money laundering, which had not been punishable in Austria at the
material time. Under Article 13 of the Convention he complained that
he had not been able to bring his case before the Constitutional
Court in order to challenge the conformity of the relevant domestic
provisions with the Convention.
- However,
in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as
the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds
that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights
and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
- It
follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and
4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Søren Nielsen Nina Vajić
Registrar President
