K.S. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM - 62110/10 - HEDEC [2012] ECHR 1677 (10 July 2012)

“It is clear that [K.S.] loves [M] a great deal. In my view she has fairly profound psychological difficulties which are both subtle and central to her functioning. In my view such problems are masked by [K.S]’s obvious intelligence. That is, she appears to function at a higher level because she is bright and, in many ways, a resourceful survivor.

If [K.S.] is to care for [M] on a full time basis, she will require a great deal of support, assistance and guidance. She has the intellectual capacity to make use of services and to understand what it is to be a good parent. However, [K.S.] is a very vulnerable young woman who is at risk of episodes of depression, an unstable lifestyle and possibly abusive intimate relationships.

... [If M] is returned to [K.S.]’s care, I am of the view that such an approach would have significant risks attached. [S.K.] may regress and her functioning may deteriorate as she becomes more in touch with the damage that has been caused to her.”

On 8 December 2009 the applicant applied for an adjournment of the care proceedings to allow for an independent social worker to be instructed. The applicant did not have legal representation at that hearing, so Allweis H.H. Judge adjourned the matter until 16 December to allow her to find a representative. At the hearing on 16 December, the applicant, who was represented by a solicitor, submitted that she recognised that she needed help and had applied for counselling. She had an extensive support network of family members, friends and professionals. All the professional assessments so far had reported that she was making progress in her ability to care for M. The applicant accepted that M could not be returned directly to her care but considered that, long-term, M would be better off with her birth mother, and that it was justifiable to allow time for an independent assessment before placing the child for adoption. The judge, however, decided that he could not rule on this application until he had heard all the evidence in the case at the full hearing, which would take place on 25 January 2010.

Initially, the applicant had the support of the Guardian ad litem. In an initial position statement made in January 2010 the Guardian found, inter alia, that “[K.S.] is consistently able to demonstrate that she is able to meet [M]’s emotional needs for love, comfort, acceptance, reassurance and affection”. Although she did not consider that M should immediately be returned to her mother, she considered that an independent report might be justified.

The final hearing took place between 25-29 January 2010. The applicant had legal aid and was represented by experienced counsel. After hearing evidence from the applicant and professionals over three days, the Guardian changed her position. She informed the court that she considered that the work that had been undertaken established that the applicant was able to offer, at best, only an inconsistent standard of care for M. She believed that it would be in M’s best interests for the court to approve the plan for adoption and she no longer thought that an adjournment for any further assessment would serve a useful purpose.

In his judgment, dated 3 February 2010, Judge Allweis rejected the applicant’s request for an adjournment to allow for further attachment work and assessment. He considered that it was necessary to balance the likelihood that further work or assessment would achieve “the wonderful prize of rehabilitation of mother and daughter” against the child’s need for stability and a final decision. Having heard evidence from the applicant and the various professionals involved in the case, he concluded that rehabilitation was not a viable option. For many months, professionals had worked sympathetically and intensively with the applicant to help her improve the bond with her daughter. The applicant had not been able to develop a consistent level of care and to show that she would be able to cope with the inevitable stresses and difficulties involved in raising a child. Unless the applicant’s underlying problems were properly addressed, any further attachment work would be “putting a sticking plaster on a huge wound” and would achieve nothing of real substance. The judge accepted that it was a draconian step to remove the child from her mother, who was entitled to respect for her right to family life. However, the child was also entitled to a family life in which all her needs would be met and the applicant would not be able to meet those needs within the child’s timescale. The judge therefore accepted the local authority’s analysis of the welfare checklist. The child’s interests were overwhelmingly in favour of adoption. He made a care order and dispensed with the applicant’s consent to a placement order, on the ground that the welfare of the child so required. He declined to make any order regarding post-adoption contact, because he considered that the applicant’s reaction to his judgment and ability to work with the adoptive parents and professionals would be important factors to be taken into account.

On 16 March 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The applicant did not apply for legal aid for the hearing and was represented by a “McKenzie friend”, who was not legally qualified. She had lodged the appeal following the refusal of Judge Allweis on 16 December 2009 to decide on her application for an adjournment. Wall LJ, in the Court of Appeal, decided instead to consider the refusal of an adjournment in judgment of Judge Allweis of 3 February 2010. He held that Judge Allweis had not made any error of law. In the light of the evidence, which he had analysed carefully in his long judgment, Judge Allweis had been entitled to make the care and placement orders.

A second appeal, this time formally against the 3 February 2010 judgment, was heard and dismissed without a hearing on 29 April 2010. Wilson LJ considered that the matter had already been dealt with by Wall LJ on 16 March 2010, and said “it would for practical purposes not be open to this court to reverse that decision”, but added, “for the record”, that independently of Wall LJ he had reached the same conclusion that, in accordance with the unanimous opinion of the professionals involved in the case, an order for further assessment and delay in making the final order would run counter to M’s interests. He also made an order that, since the appeal was totally without merit, it could not be renewed at an oral hearing. The refusal of the appeal was, therefore, final.

On 7 May 2010 Judge Allweis made an adoption order in favour of the couple who had been caring for M since June 2009. The applicant did not attend the hearing. She had been sent notice of it on 30 March 2010, and had sent a number of emails asking for it to be adjourned. The court clerks had telephoned the solicitors who had previously acted for the applicant, but had been informed that they were no longer instructed and that the applicant had issued a claim in negligence against them following the making of the placement order. The judge decided to go ahead in the applicant’s absence because she had not explained why she could not be present. Moreover, she had no valid appeals or applications outstanding in other courts and, given the recent judgments in her case, there was no possible basis for her to challenge the making of an adoption order. The evidence showed that M was thriving and happy and that it would be detrimental to her to upset the placement. The applicant’s behaviour since the making of the placement order showed that she had not accepted it and the judge therefore considered that it would be unsettling and contrary to the child’s interests to allow her direct contact. However, all the professionals in the case recommended that the applicant maintain indirect contact with her daughter, through letters which would be passed on through the local authority.

On 14 May 2010, the applicant’s legal aid certificate in respect of the care and placement proceedings was discharged. On 17 May 2010 the applicant appeared before Judge Allweis and unsuccessfully applied to set aside the adoption order and for Judge Allweis to recuse himself. On 21 May 2010 Judge Wilson LJ refused the applicant’s request for leave to appeal against the adoption order, as totally without merit. He held that even if the applicant had attended the hearing on 7 May, it would not have been possible to oppose or delay the adoption. On 26 August 2010 Judge Allweis refused two further applications by the applicant: for him to recuse himself and for her to have direct contact with her daughter pending the resolution of her application to this Court.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

A summary of the relevant domestic law and practice can be found in Y.C. v. the United Kingdom, no. 4547/10, §§ 92-113, 13 March 2012 (not yet final).

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complained about the care proceedings under Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention.

THE LAW

A. The parties’ submissions

1. The applicant

The applicant submitted that her case involved serious, life-long interferences with the rights of two vulnerable individuals, herself and her child. She had been in the care of the local authority as a child and moved to ten different placements. While in care, the need for therapy and counselling to allow her to deal with her chaotic and abusive childhood was identified but not provided. The applicant’s perception during the care proceedings was that these earlier failings by the local authority had prejudiced her chances of being allowed to care for her daughter, in breach of Articles 8 and 14.

The proceedings had not complied with the procedural requirements of Articles 6 and 8. The decision of Judge Allweis to make the placement order was based on incomplete and unreliable evidence. The first assessment, made by the Abbeyfield Residential Family Centre, was flawed because it did not take into account the fact that the applicant was suffering from severe post-natal depression. The second assessment, made by the Goodman Team, was also unreliable because it relied heavily upon the earlier flawed Abbeyfield assessment and because the Team were geared from the outset towards the choice of adoption and made a number of unfair assumptions based on their knowledge of the applicant’s difficult childhood and lack of stability. Given the problematic nature of this evidence, Judge Allweis should have sought further assessments before taking such an important decision.

In addition, the proceedings were unfair because, when deciding to make a placement order followed by an adoption order, the judge did not set out how the threshold criteria in section 31 of the Children Act 1989 were met nor give adequate reasons for dispensing with the applicant’s consent. Moreover, although the applicant was unrepresented at some hearings by choice, the court failed to take adequate steps to rectify the situation, either by allowing her time to consider and get representation, or by adjourning to allow her to prepare her case as a litigant in person. In particular, the adoption order should not have been made when the applicant was neither present nor represented.

Finally, given the extreme steps it was taking, the court acted in a precipitate fashion in concluding the care proceedings, followed by the adoption proceedings, within a period of only three months, in breach of Articles 6 and 8. There had been no necessity to press ahead with the adoption in the best interests of M. The child was in a safe place and the applicant was not seeking her immediate return; instead, she wanted time for further work that would positively promote her parenting skills. Her commitment to and love for her daughter were not questioned and she had already shown a real improvement in her ability to care for her. She had no problems with drug or alcohol dependency, involvement with the police or violence. The judge made the adoption order because he considered that the applicant would not be able to resolve the emotional difficulties she had as a result of her upbringing within the child’s timescale. However, there was no analysis of this or discussion of the actual timescales involved. The decision to make the placement order without further supportive intervention was disproportionate in the circumstances, and failed properly to balance M’s short- and long-term interests.

The applicant also complained under Article 8 about the lack of contact with her daughter. She submitted that the judge’s decision not to deal with contact when he made the placement order had the effect of stopping all contact between the applicant and M. Subsequently, when he made the adoption order, the judge used the applicant’s increasing and desperate attempts to get the case reviewed as an excuse to refuse contact, since he was of the view that the applicant’s opposition would unsettle M.

2. The Government

The Government submitted that the summary of the facts and the file of documents initially provided to the Court by the applicant were incomplete and gave a slanted picture of the care proceedings. The proceedings were fair and in compliance with Article 6 § 1; the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for family life was proportionate to the aim of protecting the child’s rights; and the applicant was not the victim of discrimination contrary to Article 14.

In particular, the Government rejected the allegation that the applicant was the victim of discrimination or bias as a result of her history and upbringing. Documents provided by the Government clearly showed that, contrary to the applicant’s belief, the pre-birth assessment was not administered because of her status of having been brought up in care. It was carried out because at the time she became pregnant she had recently left care and was receiving continued support from a local authority after-care worker, who was concerned that the applicant had no fixed home or support network. At this point, the local authority did not intend to become further involved and helped the applicant to engage with the local healthcare and support services available to all pregnant women. Furthermore, there was no causal link between the pre-birth assessment and the commencement of the care proceedings. The pre-birth assessment ended upon M’s birth, and the care proceedings were triggered by a referral from the hospital following the applicant’s re-admittance, five days after having given birth, apparently under the influence of drugs given to her by her mother. The various assessments and reports made reference to the applicant’s childhood as part of the relevant factual background, because the professionals had to make decisions about how to protect the child’s best interests based on all the evidence, not because they were prejudiced against the applicant.

The Government did not accept that the assessments relied on by Judge Allweis were flawed. They denied that the Abbeyfield assessment was unreliable because of a failure to take into account the applicant’s undiagnosed post-natal depression. In fact, the depression had been diagnosed by a doctor while the applicant was at Abbeyfield and she was prescribed anti-depressants. The Abbeyfield and Goodman assessments were carried out independently of each other and of the local authority. Both Goodman reports were long and careful, based on extensive first-hand observation. The applicant’s allegation that the Goodman reports were biased in favour of adoption was not supported by the documents. In particular, the initial Goodman report dated 29 August 2009 was positive in a number of respects. This led to increased and less supervised contact for a time, which unfortunately had to be reduced again. Part of the Goodman ethos was that “parents can change and learn from their mistakes and go on to become good-enough parents” and, as Judge Allweis emphasised, the desired outcome of the Goodman assessment was that M would be rehabilitated to her mother. However, by late 2009 the conclusion had been reached that it would not be safe for M to be returned to the applicant’s care in the community, even with a very high level of support. All members of the applicant’s family who could possibly have cared for M were also assessed.

The Government pointed out that the judgment of Judge Allweis of 3 February 2010 ran to over 100 paragraphs and contained a detailed and careful analysis of the issues to be balanced under Article 8 and those contained in the welfare checklist, including the child’s welfare throughout her life; the impact of delay; and the likely effect on M throughout her life of having ceased to be a member of her original family. In the Court of Appeal, Wall and Wilson LJJ, the two most senior family law judges in the jurisdiction, concluded that Judge Allweis had not made any error of law and had plainly acted within his discretion in the light of all the evidence.

The Government did not accept that the domestic authorities acted in a precipitate fashion. M was not placed with foster carers until June 2009, when she was almost 7 months old, following a full assessment at Abbeyfield. By the time the placement order was made, professionals had been working intensively to help the applicant for some 12 months. Judge Allweis concluded, quite clearly, having heard all the evidence, that further work would assist minimally at best, so that it was not in M’s interests to delay the decision further. The issue of contact was considered at the appropriate time and indirect contact was maintained.

B. The Court’s assessment

The Court considers that the core of the applicant’s complaints is best characterised as falling under Article 8 of the Convention. She complains that the care proceedings were initiated because of her status as a person who had been brought up in care; that they were tainted by prejudice against her on that ground throughout; that they were procedurally unfair; and that the result, the removal of her child, was a disproportionate interference with her right to respect for family life.

Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life ...

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

There is no doubt that the orders made in the present case constituted a serious interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her family life within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. It must therefore be determined whether the interference was justified under Article 8 § 2, namely whether it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society.

The general principles established in the Court’s case-law can be summarised as follows (see Y.C. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, §§ 133-139 (not yet final)):

“The Court’s case-law regarding care proceedings and measures taken in respect of children clearly establishes that, in assessing whether an interference was ‘necessary in a democratic society’, two aspects of the proceedings require consideration. First, the Court must examine whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the reasons adduced to justify the measures were ‘relevant and sufficient’; second it must be examined whether the decision-making process was fair and afforded due respect to the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention (see K and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702/94, § 154, ECHR 2001-VII; R.K. and A.K. v. the United Kingdom, no. 38000/05, § 34, 30 September 2008; T.S. and D.S. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 61540/09, 19 January 2010; A.D. and O.D. v. the United Kingdom, no. 28680/06, § 82, 16 March 2010; Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, § 134, 6 July 2010; and R. and H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 35348/06, §§ 75 and 81, 31 May 2011).

The Court reiterates that in cases concerning the placing of a child for adoption, which entails the permanent severance of family ties, the best interests of the child are paramount (see Johansen v. Norway, 7 August 1996, § 78, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑III; Kearns v. France, no. 35991/04, § 79, 10 January 2008; and R. and H., cited above, §§ 73 and 81). In identifying the child’s best interests in a particular case, two considerations must be borne in mind: first, it is in the child’s best interests that her ties with her family be maintained except in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit; and second, it is in the child’s best interests to ensure her development in a safe and secure environment (see Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 136; and R. and H., cited above, §§ 73-74). It is clear from the foregoing that family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and that everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, where appropriate, to ‘rebuild’ the family (see Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 136; and R. and H., cited above, § 73). It is not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for her upbringing (see K and T., cited above, § 173; and T.S. and D.S., cited above). However, where the maintenance of family ties would harm the child’s health and development, a parent is not entitled under Article 8 to insist that such ties be maintained (see Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 136; and R. and H., cited above, § 73).

The identification of the child’s best interests and the assessment of the overall proportionality of any given measure will require courts to weigh a number of factors in the balance. The Court has not previously set out an exhaustive list of such factors, which may vary depending on the circumstances of the case in question. However, it observes that the considerations listed in section 1 of the 2002 Act ... broadly reflect the various elements inherent in assessing the necessity under Article 8 of a measure placing a child for adoption. In particular, it considers that in seeking to identify the best interests of a child and in assessing the necessity of any proposed measure in the context of placement proceedings, the domestic court must demonstrate that it has had regard to, inter alia, the age, maturity and ascertained wishes of the child, the likely effect on the child of ceasing to be a member of his original family and the relationship the child has with relatives.

The Court recognises that, in reaching decisions in so sensitive an area, local authorities and courts are faced with a task that is extremely difficult. Further, the national authorities have had the benefit of direct contact with all the persons concerned, often at the very stage when care measures are being envisaged or immediately after their implementation. There is therefore a need to allow them a certain margin of appreciation in deciding how best to deal with the cases before them and it is accordingly not the Court’s task to substitute itself for the domestic authorities but to review, in the light of the Convention, the decisions taken and assessments made by those authorities in the exercise of their margin of appreciation (see K and T., cited above, § 154; A.D. and O.D., cited above, § 83; Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 138; and R. and H., cited above, § 81). However, it must be borne in mind that the decisions taken by the courts in this field are often irreversible, particularly in a case such as the present one where a placement order has been made. This is accordingly a domain in which there is an even greater call than usual for protection against arbitrary interferences (see B. v. the United Kingdom, 8 July 1987, § 63, Series A no. 121; X v. Croatia, no. 11223/04, § 47, 17 July 2008; and R. and H., cited above, § 76).

The margin of appreciation to be accorded to the competent national authorities will vary in the light of the nature of the issues and the seriousness of the interests at stake, such as, on the one hand, the importance of protecting a child in a situation which is assessed as seriously threatening to his or her health or development and, on the other hand, the aim of reuniting the family as soon as circumstances permit (see K and T., cited above, § 155). The Court has indicated that the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in assessing the necessity of taking a child into care. However, a stricter scrutiny is called for in respect of any further limitations, such as restrictions placed by the authorities on parental rights of access, and of any legal safeguards designed to secure an effective protection of the right of parents and children to respect for their family life, as such further limitations entail the danger that the family relations between the parents and a young child are effectively curtailed (see K and T., cited above, § 155; R.K. and A.K., cited above, § 34; and A.D. and O.D., cited above, § 83; R. and H., cited above, § 81). The making of a placement order in respect of a child must be subject to the closest scrutiny.

As to the decision-making process, what has to be determined is whether, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and notably the serious nature of the decisions to be taken, the parents have been involved in the decision-making process, seen as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection of their interests and have been able fully to present their case (see Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 139; and R. and H., cited above, § 75). Thus it is incumbent upon the Court to ascertain whether the domestic courts conducted an in-depth examination of the entire family situation and of a whole series of factors, in particular of a factual, emotional, psychological, material and medical nature, and made a balanced and reasonable assessment of the respective interests of each person, with a constant concern for determining what would be the best solution for the child (see, mutatis mutandis, Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 139). In practice, there is likely to be a degree of overlap in this respect with the need for relevant and sufficient reasons to justify a measure in respect of the care of a child.

The need to involve the parents fully in the decision-making process is all the greater where the proceedings may culminate in a child being taken from his biological parents and placed for adoption (R. and H., cited above, § 76)”.

The Court has examined the very full files of documents provided to it by the parties following communication of the case. It appears from the documents that the professionals involved in the case reluctantly reached the conclusion that M would be at risk if left in the applicant’s care, following a long and intensive period of work with the applicant. When the applicant became pregnant she was still receiving advice and support from social workers as part of the local authority’s programme for young adults who had recently left care. The applicant’s social worker was aware that the applicant’s life was lacking in stability, in the form of a fixed home and a reliable support network of family and friends. During the pregnancy, therefore, the applicant was referred for a pre-birth assessment, with the aim of preparing her to care for her child. This assessment ended shortly before the birth. The Court accepts the Government’s submission that the pre-birth assessment had no causal connection to the care proceedings which were subsequently brought. Indeed, there is very little mention of the pre-birth assessment in the reports prepared during the care proceedings.

The care proceedings were initiated because of concerns reported by hospital staff, health and social workers who visited the applicant in the community, and the applicant’s family members about the standard of care the applicant was providing to M during the first three or four months of her life. The concern was prompted by observation of the applicant with her daughter, not preconceived ideas about her abilities. Because of concern that the applicant was not providing a consistent level of care, in February 2009 it was proposed that the applicant live for approximately three months in a residential mother-and-child unit, where she was provided with 24-hour support and help with parenting. However, again on the basis of observation rather than preconception, the professionals at this centre concluded that even with such high levels of support the applicant’s care for M was inconsistent. She was unable consistently to meet M’s basic needs for regular food, interaction and play. On the basis of this assessment, an interim care order was granted on 27 May 2009 and M was placed with foster carers. For the following five months the applicant was again provided with intensive support and assistance from social workers, who advised and monitored her during three three-hour contact sessions a week. However, again observation of the applicant led to the conclusion that her ability to care for M was inconsistent. Since the applicant was not able consistently to care for M during the contact sessions, the conclusion was reached that if M would be put at risk if returned to her full-time care. The Court’s examination of the various reports and assessments in the file has left it with the impression that the professionals appreciated that the applicant loved her daughter and wanted to learn to care for her properly. They were therefore prepared to invest considerable time and energy into helping her attain that goal without, however, putting at risk the child’s well-being.

The Court does not, therefore, accept the applicant’s criticism that the reports were biased and that Judge Allweis was wrong to rely on them. Nor does it consider that the judge failed to give relevant and sufficient reasons for his decisions to make the placement and adoption orders. It is true that in his judgment of 3 February 2010, Judge Allweis made only limited express reference to the considerations that would be relevant under Article 8 of the Convention or to the various factors set out in section 1 of the Children Act 1989. However, it is clear that he directed his mind, as required, to the child’s best interests and that, in reviewing the applicant’s application for a further assessment, considered whether further work would be likely to lead to the rehabilitation of M to her mother. His conclusion that this outcome would not be achieved within the child’s timescales was fully explained and supported by the evidence of all the professionals who had worked with the applicant. Moreover, the applicant was able to seek a further review of her case by the Court of Appeal. Both appeal court judges were satisfied in the applicant’s case that the judge had reached a conclusion which was fully merited on the evidence.

The applicant was granted legal aid and was able to instruct solicitors. At the key hearing in January 2010, she was represented by experienced counsel. It is true that at certain hearings, for example the appeal hearings and the hearing which led to the making of the adoption order, the applicant was not represented by a solicitor or barrister. However, this appears to have been the applicant’s choice. The applicant has not demonstrated that she was refused legal aid or was unable to obtain legal representation in respect of these hearings. In any event, she has not demonstrated that the lack of legal representation resulted in unfairness to her. The applicant was given every opportunity to present her case and her arguments and interests were given due weight throughout.

The decision to refuse the applicant’s request for direct contact, following the making of the adoption order, was also fully reasoned and justified. The judge concluded, on the basis of the evidence, including his knowledge of the applicant’s opposition to the adoption, that it would be contrary to M’s need for stability with her new parents to allow the applicant direct contact.

In view of the foregoing, the Court is satisfied that the various assessments and orders were intended to safeguard the well-being of the applicant’s daughter, and were not disproportionate to that aim. In particular, there is no evidence in the file to suggest that the national authorities failed to respect the applicant’s right to family life because of any preconception that her own difficult childhood had left her unfit to care for her child. The Court reiterates that given the importance to be attached to the protection of children and the fostering of secure family environments, it must not rush to substitute its own judgment in place of the authorities who are best placed to assess and respond to the needs of society (see B. and L. v. the United Kingdom, no. 36536/02, § 36, 13 September 2005). In the circumstances of the case, and particularly taking into account the rights and interests of the child, the Court considers that the measures taken did not exceed the margin of appreciation afforded to the respondent State under Article 8.

In the light of the above conclusions, the Court does not consider that any separate issue falls to be considered under Articles 6 or 14 of the Convention and the reasons for the decision, taking into account the concerns expressed by the judge regarding the applicant’s ability to separate from P.C., were relevant and sufficient.

The Court finds that there is no appearance of a breach of any of the Articles relied on. For these reasons, the applicant’s complaints are manifestly ill-founded and therefore inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court by a majority

Declares the application inadmissible.

Lawrence Early Lech Garlicki
Registrar President

	[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	European Court of Human Rights
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> K.S. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM - 62110/10 - HEDEC [2012] ECHR 1677 (10 July 2012) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2012/1677.html Cite as: [2012] ECHR 1677