In the case of Falter Zeitschriften GmbH v. Austria (no. 2),
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as
a Chamber composed of:
NinaVajić, President,
PeerLorenzen,
ElisabethSteiner,
MirjanaLazarova Trajkovska,
JuliaLaffranque,
Linos-AlexandreSicilianos,
ErikMøse, judges,
andSørenNielsen, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 28 August 2012,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no. 3084/07)
against the Republic of Austria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by Falter Zeitschriften GmbH, a limited liability company with its
registered office in Vienna(“the applicant”), on 27 December 2006.
The applicant company was
represented by MrA.J.Noll, a lawyer practising in Vienna. The Austrian Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ambassador H. Tichy, Head of the
International Law Department at the Federal Ministry for European and
International Affairs.
The applicant company alleged that a court
judgment under the Media Act ordering it to pay damages had infringed its right
to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention.
On 29 January 2009the application was communicated
to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits
of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant company is the owner and publisher
of the weekly newspaper Falter.
A. The background to the case
On 2
May 2005 the Wiener Neustadt Regional Court, sitting as a court with two
professional and two lay judges(Schöffengericht) under Presiding JudgeI.K.,
acquitted H.P., a security officer atthe Traiskirchen Reception Centre, of a
charge of raping K., an asylum seeker from Cameroon, basing its ruling on the
principle ofin dubio pro reo.
The reasoning of thejudgment contained the
following passage:
“Lastly, the statement made by witness K. during her
examination [recorded on video tape in a separate room – kontradiktorische
Einvernahme], to the effect that she had previously been engaged in
prostitution in her country of origin, allows inferences to be drawn with
regard to the statement by the accused [P.] that the witness might have become
involved with him because she expected – for whatever reason – to gain some advantage.”
B. The article published by the applicant company
In issue no. 19/05 of Falter, an article
was published on page 14 concerning thecriminal proceedings against P.,
which read as follows:
“‘Sex with a nigger woman’
The courts: An asylum seeker lodges a criminal complaint
alleging rape against a security officer. The case takes on a political
dimension because it exposes conditions in the Traiskirchen centre. One year later only the victim is still before the courts. The chronicling of a judicial
scandal.
F. K.
She thought she had made it to safety. Elaine B. (name changed,
ed.) had been ill-treated by police officers in Cameroon, kicked by them in the
abdomen and placed with 18 other women in ‘stinking, damp cells’ for having
demonstrated on behalf of her son, abducted by the authorities. She had
survived her escape on a container ship, during which she ‘nearly went mad’
because in mid-ocean she ‘no longer knew whether it was night or day outside’.
Finally, after a lorry journey lasting several days, she found herself in Vienna, where all at once, she was ‘surrounded by white people’. She thought she was safe.
Her case was so well documented that Austria, in the form of the normally very
strict Federal Refugee Office, granted her asylum quickly and without red tape.
But then this country revealed its other side. Elaine B., 35, a
well-groomed businesswoman and mother of three, holds on tight to her handbag
during the interview and breaks down in tears repeatedly, says her life is a
mess [and that] she can no longer trust the authorities here because they treat
her like a liar and a prostitute.
Elaine B. caused a media stir last year when she became
the first asylum seeker to lodge a complaint against a blind-drunk security
officer who she claims abused his authority in the Traiskirchen centre in order
to rape her. Now she faces trial for defamation. A few fellow Cameroonians, as
well as the campaigning lawyer W.R. and his colleague R.H., are continuing to
stand by her. ‘Otherwise I would have killed myself’, says Elaine.
It’s difficult to know where to begin in this case. With the
then Interior Minister E.S. who, while the proceedings were in progress,
told the National Assembly that the woman’s accusations were ‘unfounded’? With
the company European Homecare, engaged by him, which ostensibly ran the centre
on a much smaller budget than Caritas, but in fact used sub‑contractors
employing drunken nightwatchmen who had to be dismissed for sexual assault?
With centre director F.S., who later commented on the attacks in the washrooms
of the women’s quarters by telling the court: ‘According to our information
such incidents are very common and no one thinks anything of them’? Or with
Judge I.K., who at the end of the drama would no longer ‘refute’ the suggestion
that Elaine B. was just a ‘prostitute’ – although not even the accused security
officer claimed that that was the case?
Spring 2004. With a thousand asylum seekers, Traiskirchen
is hopelessly overcrowded. Another hundred arrive every day. The Interior
Ministry is coming under political pressure and discredits Caritas. Security
officers at the centre later state in court that female asylum seekers could be
paid for quick sex. They also tell of pimps rolling up to the centre in their
cars. The sexual exploitation seems to have been unbearable. In a series of
articles for profil, a female journalist published an email and
statements from several women complaining of sexual assaults by security staff.
‘Please help us!’ pleaded the women. The Interior Ministry stated at the time
that the police were confronted with a ‘wall of silence’.
At that time Elaine B. from Cameroon demanded an interview with
the head of the Traiskirchen [branch of the]Gendarmerie. She placed a pair of
torn red underpants on the interview room table and described ‘through her
tears’ how a drunken security officer had pursued her for days, pointing to his
uniform and threatening to have her thrown out of the centre and to slit her
throat. One night he had crept into the room, switched on the light and told
her to go with him. Elaine B., who had not yet been granted asylum and feared
his authority, wrapped a towel around herself and followed the uniformed
officer into the office, where there was a bed and a roll of kitchen towel. He
had prepared the kitchen towel for ‘ejaculating into’, as he later admitted.
‘At first I didn’t realise what the man wanted. I thought I’d done something
wrong. But there in that room I realised that he was going to rape me’, stated
Elaine B. She could smell the drink on his breath and didn’t dare cry out.
The practising Christian from Cameroon is called upon to
describe the incident many more times in the most intimate detail, without
contradicting herself. She describes with precision how the man locked the door
and removed the key. She tells of the pains in her lower abdomen afterwards and
how she washed herself with warm water for weeks. She immediately identifies
the security officer in a photo. The officials record in the minutes that
Elaine B. appears disturbed.
‘We were in no doubt that it happened as she described it. The
woman was intimidated and seemed very anxious’, recalls District Inspector
W.S., who investigated the case, a year later in court. His statement, like
that of the victim, is disregarded.
Disturbing errors occur. For the first interview in the
interview room no trained interpreter can be found; moreover, the traumatised
woman is initially interviewed by a man. In their minutes the police officers
at times refer to Elaine B. not by her name but as ‘the nigger woman’. She is
repeatedly linked to prostitution.
H.P., 48, is interviewed as the presumed perpetrator. When
first questioned the trained bricklayer with the thick moustache states: ‘I
didn’t have sex with the nigger woman.’ The next time his recall is more
accurate: ‘It’s possible that I had intercourse with the nigger woman. I’d had
twelve and a half litres of beer and one and a half litres of herb lemonade
mixed with red wine.’ He claims it was entirely consensual. However, he doesn’t
recognise Elaine in a photo. Police officer: ‘Could the woman have left the
room if she’d wanted to?’ Answer: ‘No, only I had a key’. Again the question:
‘Did you pay the nigger woman for sexual intercourse?’ Answer: ‘No way!’ Third
[interview] record: ‘I’d noticed the nigger woman about a week before we had
sex. I fancied her from the beginning. I went into her room and gestured to her
to come out.’ According to him, she followed him out of her own accord,
undressed in front of him, took hold of his penis, inserted it and then got
dressed again. Then she disappeared for good – without making any demands.
‘Maybe she thought she’d be given asylum sooner’ speculates the security
officer. Something else occurs to him. He had offered to buy the woman a drink
in the bakery a few days before. She had stroked his back and ‘cosied up’ to
him.
Elaine B. denies this version of events. She says that she
had other things on her mind at the time. She is not a whore. She felt repelled
by this fat man with a moustache who smelled of alcohol, she was afraid of him.
Also: if she had really been hoping to be granted asylum, why would she then
have defamed the security officer?
Next to take the witness stand are the employees of the bakery.
The first to be examined is saleswoman R.Z.: ‘She gave him a kiss. She was
fairly young, I’d say between 20 and 25. The two of them were talking quietly.
I couldn’t describe the woman.’ When confronted with Elaine B. Z. says: ‘I’m
not quite sure whether it’s her.’ At the second confrontation a year later she
suddenly says: ‘Yes, that’s her!’ She has something else to get off her chest:
‘I have to say that we’re losing a lot of customers because of the black
Africans. It’s bad for business!’ Likewise the second saleswoman. The first
time she gives evidence: ‘I’m not sure’. The second time: ‘I’m 99 per cent
certain.’
Elaine B. is 35 years old and speaks neither German nor
English – only French. The quiet talk described could not have taken place. One detail, however, is never mentioned: at the time, the bakery was delivering tens of
thousands of bread rolls to the reception centre.
The Wiener Neustadt Public Prosecutor’s Office, which sees the
Africans from Traiskirchen most often in connection with drug dealing, wants to
discontinue the proceedings on the basis of the statements by the bakery
employees. Elaine’s lawyer, W.R., then brings a ‘subsidiary private
prosecution’ (Subsidiaranklage) before the Court of Appeal. The victim
can take over the role of the public prosecutor at his or her own risk. The
unexpected happens: the Court of Appeal finds in the woman’s favour and orders
the Justice Ministry to prosecute the security officer. ‘As the case file
currently stands, both the factual element of the offence of rape and the
element of coercion appear to be made out beyond doubt’, states the judgment.
According to the court, the bakery employees could not have identified Elaine.
The trial with judges and lay assessors before Wiener Neustadt
Criminal Court does not last long. No evidence is taken either from other
asylum seekers or from the female staff in the women’s quarters. Judge I.K.
acquits the security officer. Of course, if she has doubts as to the
defendant’s guilt, she has to do so. But this judge and her lay assessors are
in no doubt as to the woman’s guilt. They have unfinished business with the
African woman and attribute the basest intentions to her – without furnishing
any proof. The reasoning is diametrically opposed to that of the Court of
Appeal: ‘It cannot be established that the accused performed sexual intercourse
against the will of Elaine B.’ And what of the statements of the bakery
employees, called into question by the Court of Appeal? ‘Clear proof’ that
Elaine B. had also been lying about the sexual encounter. The fact that the
bakery employees got her age wrong by ten to fifteen years? ‘The difficulty of
correctly estimating the age of persons with a different skin colour is known
to the courts.’ And the constantly changing replies of the security officer?
‘He is a very simple man’ and it therefore spoke in his favour ‘that he himself
admitted that intercourse with the witness was not easy to achieve.’ The ‘black
African’ on the otherhand, appeared ‘very confident’, with the result that ‘it
is hard to imagine that she could have felt so intimidated by the accused, who
appears somewhat unsure of himself, that she left her quarters against her
will.’ And what of the only piece of physical evidence, the torn red
underpants? ‘These have no evidentiary value’ according to Judge K. Why not?
Because the accused said that the underpants had been ‘beige’.
Not another word from the detectives who had been faced with a
crying, completely intimidated woman. No mention of the fact that the security
officer himself admitted locking Elaine in [the room] and removing the key. Not
a single line about the predicament in which female asylum seekers found
themselves at the time. Complete understanding, on the other hand, for the
accused: ‘The accused’s objection that the woman may have hoped, since her
asylum claim had not been decided, to obtain Austrian citizenship by marrying
him, has not been completely refuted’. Even if this were true, why would she
then lodge a complaint against him two weeks later?
The judgment fails to give rise to a scandal. ‘Flirtation in
Traiskirchen’ runs the title in the Kurier. Then, what women’s shelters
have been complaining of for years happens: the woman becomes the presumed
perpetrator. With the approval of Justice Minister K.M., the principal public
prosecutor’s office institutes preliminary proceedings for defamation. Elaine
B. must appear before the investigating judge ‘or be brought by force’. She
could face up to five years in prison. ‘That’s just routine, nothing unusual’
says a Justice Ministry spokesman. According to principal public prosecutor
P.:‘After [the] acquittal we have no choice but to initiate proceedings.’
Justice Minister K.M. has promised to do more to protect the
victims of crime. She should study this case. She is the highest-ranking public
prosecutor. She has the right to give instructions. She bears the political
responsibility if this woman, in addition to everything else, faces charges.”
C. The compensation proceedings under the Media Act
Subsequently, Judge I.K. brought an action for
defamation against the applicant company under section 6 of the Media Act and
Article 111 of the Criminal Code, and requested that the applicant company be
ordered to pay compensation and retract the following statements made in the
article, which she claimed amounted to a statement that she had grossly misused
her office as a judge:
“Judge I.K. alleges that the asylum seeker had immoral
motives.”
Judge I.K. alleges in the judgment – without giving any reasons
– that the asylum seeker was driven by the basest motives.
“Judge I.K. acquits the security officer. Of course, if she has
doubts as to the defendant’s guilt, she has to do so. But this judge and her
lay assessors are in no doubt as to the woman’s guilt. They have unfinished
business with the African woman and attribute the basest intentions to her –
without furnishing any proof.”
Judge I.K. had no doubt about the woman’s guilt.
The judge ignored relevant evidence and delivered a scandalous
judgment (“The judgment fails to give rise to a scandal.”)
On 1 September 2005 the first hearing in the
defamation proceedings was held. The applicant company argued that the impugned
statements were true and sought to prove the truth of those statements by
asking the court to call several witnesses and admit as evidence the files of
the proceedings concerning K.’s asylum request and the criminal proceedings
against H.P. It considered that by publishing the impugned statements it had
merely expressed criticism, protected by the freedom of speech, which had not
concerned the acquittal itself but rather the way in which the victim of the
crime had been treated in the written version of the judgment, which had
neglected important evidence and had accused the victim, K., of having been a
prostitute.
In October 2005 the applicant company sought the
disqualification of Judge N.F., the judge assigned to the media proceedings,
for bias. It submitted that the lawyer representing the claimant, I.K., had
also represented N.F. in the past in court proceedings. As Judge N.F. had to
decide on a case in which her previous lawyer was acting as representative of
one of the parties, there was reasonable doubt that she would not decide the
case objectively. The president of the Vienna Regional Court dismissed the
motion on 17 October 2005and held that the issue raised by the applicant was
not sufficient to give rise to doubt that Judge N.F. would not decide the case
objectively.
On 17 October 2005 a further hearing was held in
the defamation proceedings. The hearing was adjourned in order to hear three
witnesses proposed by the applicant company. The Regional Court refused to hear
other witnesses proposed by the applicant company, as it considered that those
persons could not make any statements relevant to the proceedings. The
applicant company had sought to callR., who had been K.’s lawyer in the
criminal proceedings, in order to clarify the meaning of statements that K. had
given during her examination as a witnesswhich had been recorded on video in
order to prevent her as the victim having to face the accused (kontradiktorische
Einvernahme). This request was refused by the Regional Court on the grounds
that the transcript of K.’s examination had been included in the case file and
therefore no additional witness was required.
On 12 December 2005 the Regional Court held
another hearing in the defamation proceedings in which it examined two of the
witnesses proposed by the applicant company. The third witness proposed did not
appear. On the same date the Regional Court found against the applicant
company. It held that the impugned statementshad constituted defamation under
Article 111 of the Criminal Code and that I.K. was therefore entitled to compensation,
which it set at 7,000 euros (EUR). It also orderedthe applicant company to
publish a summary of the judgment.
The Regional Court found that the contents of
the article had given a biased account of the taking of evidence at the trial
of H.P., taking the side of K. and characterising any statement of a witness
which did not coincide with hers as lacking credibility. According to the
article, the judge had acted arbitrarily and out of racist motives and had
disregarded evidence produced, whereas the rape asserted by K. had been
described as proven and the assessment of evidence by the Regional Court as
absurd. Such an account was not an objective critique of the judgment.
As regards the criminal proceedings against
H.P., the Regional Court observed that: (a)they had been discontinued by the
Public Prosecutor; and (b) upon a subsequent decision by the Senior Public
Prosecutor H.P. had been committed for trial (Versetzung in den Anklagestand).
Following three hearings at which a total of seven witnesses had been heard,
the tape recording of the questioning of the victim had been viewed in part by
the court and a confrontation between two witnesses and K. had taken place, the
court had acquitted the accused.
In its judgment of 2 May 2005 the court had
found that it could not be excluded that the sexual intercourse which had taken
place between K. and the accused had been consensual, in accordance with the
version of events given by the accused and which had, to some extent, been
corroborated by the statements of witnesses who had seen the accused and K.
together in a coffeeshop in town. K.’s assertion that she had been the victim
of an assault had not been excluded but because it contradicted the statements
of witnesses it had been considered to be partially implausible. The accused
had not therefore been acquitted because his innocence had been proven but
rather on the basis of the principle ofin dubio pro reo.
The Regional Court also referred to one passage
of the written judgment on which the article had put much emphasis, namely a
reference to a statement by K. made in the course of her questioning as a
witness to the effect that she had previously been engaged in prostitution in
her country of origin, which the judgment stated had allowedinferences to be
drawn with regard to the statement by the accused that the witness might have become
involved with him because she expected – for whatever reason – to gain some advantage.
The Regional Courtfound that the applicant
company had not succeeded in proving the truth of the impugned statements. From
the case file concerning the proceedings against H.P. and, in particular, the
written version of the judgment it appeared that Judge I.K. had dealt with all
the evidence taken and had assessed each item of evidence extensively.
Therefore, it could not be established that Judge I.K. had made base
insinuations (üble Unterstellungen) or disregarded evidence. The
judgment had clearly indicated the court’s reluctance to accept the version of
events given by K. also. In addition, the indication of K. having been a
prostitute in the past had been based on a statement from the questioning of
that witness and had not been made up out of thin air. The relevant part of the
transcript in question read as follows:
<Original>
“Untersuchungsrichter: Es gibt einen Zeugen. Er
sagt aus: “im Haus Nr. 8 gibt es Frauen die auf den Strich gehen.” Wissen Sie
was davon?
Zeugin:Keine Ahnung, ich nicht, nein. Seit meiner
Heimat habe ich es nie gewagt.”
<English translation>
“Investigating judge: There is one witness. He said: “at no. 8
there are women who walk the streets.” Do you know anything about it?
Witness K.: No idea, not me, no. Since leaving my country I
haven’t dared it.”
An error in the translation of that statement could not be
excluded, but that did not allow the conclusion that there had been no basis in
the file for the above finding of Judge I.K.
The accusation that a judge, who was under the
duty to act objectively and impartially, had without any factual basis and out
of racist motives deliberately disregarded evidence in order to acquit an
accused from the same country (inländischen Angeklagten) had to be
qualified as defamation and there was hardly a more severe accusation which
could be levied against a judge. The term scandal of justice was a value judgement,
which, however, was based on assertions of fact which had been disproven in the
proceedings.
Insofar as the applicant company had relied on
Article 10 of the Convention, the Regional Court referred to the case of Prager
and Oberschlick v. Austria(26 April 1995, Series A no. 313), and
observed that the press had the right and the duty to impart information on
matters of public interest, including questions concerning the functioning of
the justice system, and to criticise any shortcomings found, but in doing so it
had to be mindful of the special role of the judiciary in society. It was
therefore necessary to protect public confidence in the judiciary against
destructive attacks that were essentially unfounded. Taking these principles
into account, the sharp critique of Judge I.K. in the impugned article, which
had lacked any sufficient factual basis, had been excessive.
Taking the gravity of the attacks on the
claimant’s professional reputation, the broad public attention the article had
received and the consequences it had had for the claimant, the Regional Court found that the amount of EUR 7,000 in compensation was appropriate.
The applicant company appealed on 8 March 2006
against the Regional Court’s judgment.On 19 June 2006 the Court of Appeal
dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment. This judgment was served on the
applicant’s company lawyer on 29 June 2006.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
Section 6 of the Media Act (Mediengesetz),
as in force at the time of the events, read as follows:
“6 (1) If the factual
elements of the offence of defamation ... are established in a medium, the
person affected shall be entitled to claim compensation from the owner of the
mediumfor [any] damage sustained. ...
(2) No claim shall lie
under (1), if:
...
(ii) in the case of defamation:
(a) the statements
published are true;
...”
Article 111 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch)
reads as follows:
“1. Anyone who accuses another of having a
contemptible character or attitude, or of behaving contrary to honour or
morality, in such a way as to make the person concerned appear contemptible in
the eyes of a third party or otherwise lower him in the public esteem, shall be
liable to imprisonment not exceeding six months or to a fine ...
2. Anyone who commits this offence in a printed
document, in a broadcast or otherwise in such a way as to make the defamatory statement
accessible to a broad section of the public, shall be liable to imprisonment
not exceeding one year or to a fine ...
3. The person making the statement shall not be
punished if it is proved to be true. As regards the offence defined in
paragraph 1, he shall also not be liable if circumstances are established which
gave him sufficient reason to assume that the statement was true.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant company complained under Article 10
of the Convention thatthe judgment of the Regional Court of 12 December 2005,
upheld by the Court of Appeal, had violated its right to freedom of
expression.Article 10 reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless
of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent states from requiring the
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries
with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security,
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.”
The Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The Court notes that it is common ground between
the parties that the Vienna Regional Court’s judgment of 12December 2005,
upheld by the Court of Appeal, which ordered the applicant company to pay
compensation to I.K. on account of defamation, constituted an interference with
the applicant company’s right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 § 1
of the Convention.
An interference contravenes Article 10 of the
Convention unless it is “prescribed by law”, pursues one or more of the
legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2 and is “necessary in a democratic
society” for achieving such an aim or aims.
The Court considers, and this was acknowledged
by the parties, that the interference was prescribed by law, namely by Article
111 of the Criminal Code and section 6of the Media Act. Further, the Court sees
no reason to doubt that the decision in issue wasintended to protect the
reputation of others, in this case Judge I.K., and to maintain the authority of
the judiciary, which are legitimate aims for the purposes of Article 10 § 2.
The parties’arguments concentrated on the
question of whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”
within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.
1. The parties’ submissions
The applicant company maintained that the
interference with its right to impart informationhad not been necessary in a
democratic society. The article in question hadconstituted a contribution to an
ongoing public debate on an issue of public concern, namely the conditions in
accommodation facilities for asylum seekers such as the Traiskirchen Reception
Centre and the treatment of asylum seekers therein. The article had
concentrated on one particular facet of this discussion, namely the treatment
of asylum seekers before the courts. It submitted further that the impugned
statements had been value judgments which, as such,were not susceptible tobeing
proved true. Therefore, the Regional Court should not have asked the applicant
company to prove the truth of the impugned statements.However, in any event, there
had been a sufficient factual basis for the statements made in the article.
Moreover, the impugned article had fully
complied with journalistic ethics. It was true that the author had not attended
the trial which had led to the judgmentthat had been criticised in the article,
but he had carefully studied the written version of the judgment and the case
file. On that basis, he had concluded that the judgment had contained numerous
faults and inconsistencies. It had also not been necessary to give Judge I.K.
an opportunity to respond because it was highly improbable that a judge would
comment on a case he or she had decided upon.The result of the journalist’s
investigation had been sufficient to conclude that Judge I.K. had not properly
assessed the evidence before her.As regards the statement of K., which had been
considered a basis for the finding that she had been a prostitute in her
country of origin, it was grammatically incorrect and therefore meaningless. No
such conclusion as had been made by Judge I.K. could have been validly
based on what K. had said. In addition, the statements of the two witnesses
from the coffeeshop had been unclear and contradictory and ought not to have
led to the conclusion that the statements of K. had been wrong or
contradictory. Since there had been a sufficient factual basis for the
statements contained in the published article, the article had constituted fair
comment on the events reported on and the judgment of the Regional Court of 12
December 2005, upheld by the Court of Appeal, had breached the applicant
company’s rights under Article 10 of the Convention.
The Government, while acknowledging the
essential role played by the press as a “public watchdog”, asserted that in the
present case the interference with the applicant company’s freedom of
expression had been necessary within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the
Convention. Both the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal had not deprived
the applicant company of its right to report on a matter of public
interest,perform its public watchdog role or to critically comment on judicial
decisions and to express that criticism in a sharp and pointed manner. However,
there had to be a sufficient factual basis for the criticism voiced. The Regional Court had, after taking extensive evidence, arrived at the conclusion that there had
been no factual basis whatsoever for the serious accusations raised in the
article, which had been particularly disparaging and insulting as they had
presented the conduct of Judge I.K. as coming close to abusing her official
authority and thus committing a criminal offence.The criticism in the article
had not only concerned Judge I.K., but had also been liable to affect the
reputation of the Austrian judiciary as a wholein the eyes of the reader and to
undermine the authority of the judiciary’s decisions.
The Government submitted further that the
applicant company hadalso failed to give the judge in question, or the court
she belonged to, the opportunity to respond to the accusations. Proper
journalistic conduct would have required the author to give the judge or the
courtconcerned, the latterthrough its spokesperson who communicated regularly
with the media, an opportunity to comment. This had been all the more necessary
given that the author of the article had not attended the trial at which the
judgment which he had so vehemently criticised had been issued, but had merely
informed himself by studying the casefile.When weighing the right to freedom of
expression on the one hand against the protection of the reputation and
impartiality of the judiciary on the other hand, the Austrian courts had in the
present case explained, in a sufficient and relevant manner and following the
case-law of the Court on this matter, why the protection of the reputation and
independence of the judiciary had to be given precedence.
2. The Court’s assessment
(a) General principles
According to the Court’s well-established
case-law, the test of necessity in a democratic society requires the Court to
determine whether the interference complained of corresponded to a “pressing
social need”, whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and
whether the reasons given by the national authorities to justify it are
relevant and sufficient (see The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), 26 April 1979, § 62, Series A no. 30). In assessing
whether such a need exists and what measures should be adopted to deal with it,
the national authorities are left a certain margin of appreciation (see
Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway[GC], no. 21980/93, § 58,
ECHR 1999‑III).
An important factor for the Court’s
determination is the essential function of the press in a democratic society.
Although the press must not overstep certain bounds, in particular in respect
of the reputation and rights of others or of the proper administration of
justice, its duty is nevertheless to impart – in a manner consistent with its
obligations and responsibilities – information and ideas on all matters of
public interest (see Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas, cited above, § 59, and
as a recent authority, Flinkkilä and Others v. Finland, no. 25576/04, § 73, 6 April 2010). By reason of the
“duties and responsibilities” inherent in the exercise of the freedom of
expression, the safeguard afforded by Article 10 to journalists in relation to
reporting on issues of general interest is subject to the proviso that they are
acting in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and provide reliable and
precise information in accordance with journalistic ethics (see Fressoz and
Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, § 54, ECHR 1999‑I and, as a
recent authority, Eerikäinen and Others v. Finland, no. 3514/02, § 60,
10 February 2009).
Whilst it is true that the methods of objective
and balanced reporting may vary considerably and that it is therefore not for
this Court, nor for the national courts, to substitute its own views for those
of the press as to what technique of reporting should be adopted (Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, §
31, Series A no. 298), editorial discretion is not unbounded. Not only does the
press have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also
has a right to receive them. Were it otherwise, the press would be unable to
play its vital role of “public watchdog” (Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 26 November 1991,
§ 59, Series A no. 216; Thorgeir Thorgeirson
v. Iceland, 25 June 1992, § 63, Series A no. 239;Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway,
cited above, § 62; and, more recently, Gutiérrez
Suárez v. Spain, no. 16023/07, § 25, 1 June 2010).This undoubtedly
includes questions concerning the functioning of the system of justice, an
institution that is essential for any democratic society. The press is one of
the means by which politicians and public opinion can verify that judges are
discharging their heavy responsibilities in a manner that is in conformity with
the aim which is the basis of the task entrusted to them (Prager and Oberschlick
v. Austria, 26 April 1995, § 34, Series A no. 313).The freedom to
criticize judges and the judiciary clearly falls within the scope of Article
10.
Regard must, however, be had to the special role
of the judiciary in society. As the guarantor of justice, a fundamental value
in a State subject to the rule of law, it must enjoy public confidence if it is
to be successful in carrying out its duties. It may therefore prove necessary
to protect such confidence against destructive attacks that are essentially
unfounded, especially in view of the fact that judges who have been criticised
are subject to a duty of discretion that precludes them from replying (see Prager
and Oberschlick, cited above, § 34).
The assessment of these factors falls in the
first place to the national authorities, whoenjoy a certain margin of
appreciation in determining the existence and extent of the necessity of an
interference with the freedom of expression. That assessment is, however,
subject to European supervision and the Court’s task in exercising its
supervisory function is to look at the interference complained of in the light
of the case as a whole and to determine whether the reasons adduced by the
national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient” and whether
the measure taken was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see Koprivica
v. Montenegro, no. 41158/09, § 62, 22 November 2011).
Lastly, a careful distinction needs also to be made between facts and
value judgments. The existence of facts can be demonstrated, whereas the truth
of value judgments is not susceptible of proof (seeCumpǎnǎ
and Mazǎre v. Romania [GC], no. 33348/96, § 98, ECHR
2004-XI, and Kasabova v.
Bulgaria, no. 22385/03, § 58 in
limine, 19 April 2011).However, even where a
statement amounts to a value judgment, the proportionality of an interference
may depend on whether there exists a sufficient factual basis for the impugned
statement, since even a value judgment without any factual basis to support it
may be excessive (see Jerusalem v. Austria, no. 26958/95, §
43, ECHR 2001‑II).
(b) Application of these principles to the present
case
In the present case, the applicant company
published an article in issue no. 19/05 of its periodical Falter in
which it commented on criminal proceedings against H.P.,who had been accused of
raping K., an asylum seeker from Cameroon, at the Traiskirchen Reception
Centrebut who had been acquitted of that charge. The author of the article
commented extensively on the taking and assessmentof evidence in the
proceedings and criticised the acquittal of H.P. with harsh words. Thereupon,
the judge in the criminal proceedings, I.K., brought an action for defamation
against the applicant company on account of statements made in the impugned
article accusing her of having ignored relevant evidence and having given a
scandalous judgment and to the effect that the judge had unfinished business
with the asylum seeker. The Regional Court, in its judgment of 14 December
2005, granted the action and ordered the applicant company to pay compensation
in the amount of EUR 7,000, as well as to publish a summary of the judgment.
The Court considers that the issue concerned a
matter of public interest and the applicant company must therefore be deemed to
have been reporting on this issue. However, it also observes that the article
not only contained criticism of the trial against H.P but also a harsh
criticism of the presiding judge I.K. as having been biased.
Before the Court the applicant company argued
that, contrary to the findings of the Regional Court, the impugned statements
had not been statements of fact butrather value judgements, not susceptible to
being proved to be true. The Court, which must not lose sight of the article’s
overall contents and its very essence (see Perna v. Italy[GC],no. 48898/99, § 47, ECHR 2003‑V), agrees that the impugned statements must
be considered as statements of fact. This had also been the applicant company’s
position in the domestic proceedings and it was the applicant company which had
sought to have evidence admitted in order to prove the statements made in the
article. The Regional Court, after having obtained part of the evidence
requested by the applicant company, concluded that the applicant company had
failed to furnish proof that the relevant statements were true.
. The Court considers that the statements
in question clearly contained the core message that not only Judge I.K. had
failed to give sufficient weight to certain items of evidence and had given too
high a weight to others but, moreover, had done so on purpose. The Court agrees
with the domestic courts that such assertions were particularly serious and
needed a very solid factual basis. From the material before it, the Court does
not consider that the applicant company could have relied on such a factual
basis.
Moreover, the Court considers that the
interference with the applicant company’s right to impart information was
proportionate. The applicant company was not subject to a fine imposed in
criminal proceedings but ordered to pay compensation for the injury caused to
the person concerned by the article. The amount of compensation, EUR 7,000,
even though substantial, appears reasonable taking into account the length of
the article and its contents, which, as established by the Austrian courts, had
been particularly disparaging and damaging to the reputation of I.K.
In sum, the Court finds that, by awarding
compensation for defamation against the applicant company for the article in
issue, the respondent State acted within its margin of appreciation and is
satisfied that the judgments by the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal were
supported by reasons that were relevant and sufficient and that the
interference was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursed.
There has accordingly been no violation of
Article 10 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicantcompany complained that Judge N.F.,
who had sat on the bench hearing the proceedings under the Media Act, had not
been impartialbecause I.K.’s counsel had also represented Judge N.F.in previous
media-related proceedings. The applicant company relied on Article 6 of the
Convention which, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...
everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law.”
Admissibility
The Government submitted that in previous
proceedings under the Media Act not related to the ones at issue, Judge N.F.had
been represented as a claimant by the same lawyer who hadrepresented I.K. in
the proceedings which had given rise to the present application. This fact in
itself had not rendered Judge N.F. biased,as merely representing a client as a
lawyer would not lead to a close personal relationship,given that a lawyer’s
task was to represent parties, and the working relationship would end once the
proceedings for of which representation had been sought ended. If the applicant
company’s argument were accepted, this would lead to the consequence that any
lawyer who had once represented a judge as a party to proceedings was no longer
permitted to act in any other proceedings before that judge.
The applicant company argued that the
relationship between a client and his lawyer was one of trust which created a
bond lasting longer than just the period of time that a lawyer actually
represented his or her client and which might influence a judge in further
proceedings in which that same lawyer appeared if the proceedings were of a
similar kind as the ones in which the lawyer had represented the judge. For
this reason Judge N.F. should have withdrawn from sitting in the case.
. According to the Court’s settled
case-law, when the impartiality of a tribunal for the purposes of Article 6 § 1
is being determined, regard must be had to the personal convictions and
behaviour of a particular judge in a given case – the subjective approach – as
well as to whether the tribunal afforded sufficient guarantees to exclude any
legitimate doubt in this respect – the objective approach (see Švarc
and Kavnik v. Slovenia, no. 75617/01, § 37, 8 February 2007 with
further references).
Firstly, as to the subjective test, the tribunal
must be subjectively free of personal prejudice or bias. In this respect, the
personal impartiality of a judge must be presumed until there is proof to the
contrary (see, among other authorities, Padovani
v. Italy, 26 February 1993, § 26, Series A no. 257-B, and Morel v. France, no. 34130/96, §
41, ECHR 2000-VI).
In the present case, in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, there is no reason to doubt Judge N.F.’s personal
impartiality.
Secondly, under the objective test, it must be
determined whether, quite apart from the judge’s personal conduct, there are
ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to his impartiality, since
“justice must not only be done; it must also be seen to be done”. In this
respect even appearances may be of a certain importance. What is at stake is
the confidence which the courts in a democratic society must inspire in the
public (see Morris v. the United
Kingdom, no. 38784/97, § 58, ECHR 2002-I). Accordingly, any
judge in respect of whom there is a legitimate reason to fear a lack of
impartiality must withdraw. This implies that in deciding whether in a given
case there is a legitimate reason to fear that a particular judge lacks
impartiality, the standpoint of the party concerned is important but not
decisive. What is decisive is whether this fear can be held to be objectively
justified (see, among many other authorities, Pescador
Valero v. Spain, no. 62435/00, § 23, ECHR 2003‑VII).
In the case of Micallef v. Malta theCourt
found that the close family ties between a judge and a lawyer for the opposing
party (whose uncle he was) sufficed to objectively justify the applicant’s
fears that that judge lacked impartiality (see Micallef v. Malta [GC],
no. 17056/06, § 102, 15 October 2009).
In the present case, however, the lawyer for
I.K. had in the past representedJudge N.F. as a lawyer in proceedings under the
Media Act to which she had been a party and it is,moreover, not in dispute
that, at the time Judge N.F. had to hear the case involving the applicant
company,that lawyer-client relationship had already ended. The applicant
company has not provided any further information which would allow the Court to
question Judge N.F.’s impartiality.In these circumstances, the Court cannot
find that the applicant company’s fears as to Judge N.F.’s impartiality were
objectively justified.
It follows that this part of the application is
manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3
(a) and 4 of the Convention.
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 6
of the Convention that the proceedings concerning the claim for compensation
had been unfair because the Regional Courthad refused to hear witness R.
However, in the light of all the material in its
possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence,
the Court finds that this part of the application does not disclose any
appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention
or its Protocols.
It follows that this part of the application is
manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3
(a) and 4 of the Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint that the Austrian
court judgments ordering the applicant company to pay compensation infringed
its right to impart information admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
2. Holdsthat there has been no violation of
Article 10 of the Convention;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 September
2012, pursuant to Rule77§§2 and3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Nina
Vajić
Registrar President
