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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF KAZANTSEV v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 14880/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
3
April 2012
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Kazantsev v.
Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nina Vajić,
President,
Anatoly Kovler,
Peer
Lorenzen,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Mirjana Lazarova
Trajkovska,
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,
Erik
Møse, judges,
and André
Wampach, Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 13 March 2012,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 14880/05) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Aleksandr Sergeyevich
Kazantsev (“the applicant”), on 28 March 2005.
- The
Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
Mr G. Matyushkin,
Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of
Human Rights.
- The
applicant alleged that he had been subjected to ill-treatment in
police custody, and that there had been no effective investigation
into his allegations of ill-treatment.
- On
21 October 2009 the application was communicated to the Government.
It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the
application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1966 and lives in the town of Pokachi, Tyumen
Region.
- On
1 July 1999 the applicant was arrested and charged with sexual
assault of a minor. Immediately upon his arrest, at 3.15 a.m., the
applicant was subjected to a body search at the police station. The
report stated, inter alia, that no injuries were found on
the applicant.
- On
the same day at 5 a.m. the applicant underwent a physical examination
in the presence of attesting witnesses A.T. and P. No injuries were
noted in the examination report. The applicant alleges that during
the examination the officer of the detention facility of the Interior
of Pokachi (ИВС
Покаческого
ГОВД),
T., beat him up with a police truncheon and that investigator B.
abused him verbally.
- On
the same day at 9 a.m. the applicant was assigned legal counsel.
- On
the same day at 1 p.m. a forensic examination of the applicant was
carried out in connection with the criminal charges against him. He
was examined by a forensic expert who found two bruises on the right
side of the applicant’s back. The report stated that the
bruises were inflicted with a “blunt, hard, long object with a
round or oval cross-section, such as a police truncheon or a baton”,
and that they dated back to less than twenty-four hours before the
forensic examination.
- According
to the applicant, on 2 June 1999 he complained about his
ill-treatment to K., the investigator of the Pokachi prosecutor’s
office, who was investigating his case. She allegedly promised to
register his complaint and to bring the matter to the prosecutor’s
attention. The applicant claimed that he had complained to the
prosecutor’s office again a number of times, but received no
reply.
- On
24 September 1999 the applicant was given access to the results of
the forensic examination.
- On
27 December 1999 the applicant sent a written complaint to the
prosecutor’s office of Pokachi complaining about the
ill-treatment he allegedly received on the day of his arrest.
- Having
received no reply, on 20 January 2000 the applicant wrote to the
Pokachi prosecutor’s office asking for news on his complaint of
ill treatment.
- On
28 February 2000 and on 31 May 2000 the applicant complained to the
Prosecutor’s Office of the Khanty-Mansiyskiy Autonomous Circuit
about the lack of response to his complaint of ill-treatment. On 1
June 2000 they replied that his letter had been forwarded to the
Pokachi prosecutor’s office for a decision.
- On
3 July 2000 investigator K. decided not to investigate the
applicant’s allegations in criminal proceedings. The parties
have not provided any information about this part of the inquiry. The
Government stated, in particular, that the relevant files had been
destroyed after having reached the time-limit of their storage in
archives.
- The
applicant complained about the decision of 3 July 2000 to the
superior prosecutor’s office and also challenged it before a
court.
- On
6 September 2000 the Prosecutor’s Office of the
Khanty Mansiyskiy Autonomous Circuit replied to the applicant
that the inquiry into his allegations had been sufficient. It was
considered, in particular, that no breach of domestic law arose from
the fact that investigator K. had been in charge of the inquiry,
because she had not been personally implicated in the alleged
ill treatment.
- On
12 January 2001 the Langepasskiy Town Court of the Khanty Mansiyskiy
Autonomous Circuit convicted the applicant as charged. Having noted
that the applicant had committed the offence while on parole
following a previous criminal conviction, the court lifted the parole
and sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of fourteen years.
- On
the same date the court examined the applicant’s complaint
about a lack of an effective investigation into his allegations of
ill-treatment. It quashed the decision of the prosecutor’s
office dispensing with criminal proceedings on the grounds that
investigator K., who had taken the decision, was also an investigator
in the applicant’s criminal case and could therefore be
regarded as an interested party; she was therefore precluded from
conducting the inquiry into the applicant’s allegations of
ill-treatment.
- The
prosecutor’s office resumed the inquiry and assigned the file
to Ms I., an investigator of the Pokachi Prosecutor’s Office.
On 15 October 2001 Ms I. questioned A.T., who had acted as an
attesting witness during the applicant’s physical examination.
He explained that on that night he had been remanded in custody, and
that he had been in the state of alcoholic intoxication when he was
requested by the facility officers to act as an attesting witness
during the applicant’s physical examination. He said that the
applicant had been “anxious”, but he had not been beaten
with a truncheon or otherwise ill-treated. He did not remember much
about the events at issue because of the time that had elapsed since;
however, he remembered that the applicant had made no complaints of
having been beaten. On the same day Ms I. questioned the implicated
policemen, T. and B., and they denied the allegations of having used
force in general and a truncheon in particular. They admitted that
there had been a police truncheon in the room, hanging on the wall,
but stated that it had not been used. Ms K., the investigator of the
applicant’s criminal case who had formerly conducted the
inquiry, was also questioned. She stated that she had not seen any
injuries and had not received any complaints from the applicant.
- On
16 October 2001 the prosecutor’s office decided not to open a
criminal investigation into the applicant’s allegations of
ill-treatment. The decision referred to the statements of A.T., T.,
B. and K. and concluded that there was no evidence in support of the
applicant’s claims.
- On
17 October 2001 the prosecutor’s office sent the applicant a
letter, attaching a copy of the above-mentioned decision. The
applicant claimed that he did not receive this notification and did
not know about the decision until February 2002. He therefore sent
several complaints to the prosecutor’s office about their
failure to comply with the court order and investigate his
ill-treatment. He also requested access to the inquiry file.
- On
25 April 2002 investigator I. replied to the applicant that she had
conducted an inquiry into his allegations of ill-treatment within the
statutory time-limit of ten days. She indicated that the inquiry file
was with the prosecutor’s office of the Khanty-Mansiyskiy
Autonomous Circuit.
- On
22 May 2002 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Court of the
Khanty-Mansiyskiy Autonomous Circuit about the failure to investigate
his ill-treatment in criminal proceedings. He requested that the
court find the refusal to open criminal proceedings unlawful, grant
him access to the inquiry file and award him compensation for
non-pecuniary damage on account of the authorities’ alleged
failure to provide him redress for a violation of his Convention
rights. The court returned the applicant’s complaint, stating
that it fell under the jurisdiction of the Pokachi Town Court, and
instructed the applicant to apply to that court under the procedure
provided for by the Code of Criminal Procedure.
- On
12 August 2002 the applicant submitted his complaint to the Pokachi
Town Court and requested it to consider his complaint under the rules
of civil procedure.
- On
19 August 2002 the Court of the Khanty-Mansiyskiy Autonomous Circuit
sent the applicant another reply to his complaint, advising him that
his action against the decision of the prosecutor’s office had
to be lodged under the rules of criminal procedure.
- On
27 August 2002 the Pokachi Town Court returned the applicant’s
complaint and indicated that he had to specify his claims and to
distinguish the grounds for his request under civil procedure from
those under criminal procedure. On 2 October 2002 it again refused,
by letter, to accept the complaint for examination, stating that it
could not be considered in civil proceedings. The applicant had to
challenge the decision of the prosecutor’s office in criminal
proceedings first and then, on the basis of that decision, claim
damages under the civil procedure. On 26 December 2002 the same court
took a formal decision refusing to accept the applicant’s
complaint, citing the aforementioned grounds.
- The
applicant reformulated his complaint under the rules of criminal
procedure, and on 20 January 2003 it was accepted for examination.
- On
2 July 2004 the Pokachi Town Court examined the applicant’s
complaint and decided that the decision of 16 October 2001 was
lawful and well-founded. It found that the initial decision
dispensing with a criminal investigation had been quashed because the
investigator had been an interested party, and that in the new
inquiry no shortfalls could be found. It noted that the investigator
had questioned the police officers implicated, T. and B., as
well as the attesting witness, all of whom had denied that the
applicant had been subjected to violence or verbal assault. The court
found that the prosecutor’s office had sent the applicant a
copy of the decision of 16 October 2001 and rejected the applicant’s
claims that he should have been informed about the course of the
inquiry as lacking any basis in law.
- The
applicant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that he had not been
duly informed of the decision dispensing with a criminal
investigation, that he had not been given access to the inquiry file,
that neither the investigator nor the court had commented on the
injuries recorded in the forensic report and that the date of his
first complaint to the prosecutor’s office was 27 December
1999 and not 14 February 2000, as stated in the judgment.
- On
1 September 2004 the Court of the Khanty-Mansiyskiy Autonomous
Circuit upheld the judgment of 2 July 2004. It found, in particular,
that the existence of injuries, in the absence of other evidence
supporting the applicant’s allegations, was not sufficient to
find T. guilty of having inflicted them. The court also stated that
the failure to notify the applicant of the decision did not render it
unlawful, and that during the first instance hearing the
applicant had not requested access to the inquiry file.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that he was ill-treated on 1 June 1999 and that
no effective investigation was conducted into his allegations. He
referred to Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. Admissibility
1. Government’s objection as to the date of the
lodging of the application
- The
Government submitted that there was no proof that this application
had been lodged on 28 March 2005, as indicated in the Statement of
Facts prepared by the Registry. They pointed out that the date of the
application form was 10 August 2005, that is, more than six months
from 1 September 2004, the date of the final domestic decision taken
in the applicant’s case. They therefore requested the Court to
dismiss the application as having been lodged out of time.
- The
applicant disagreed with this objection. He firstly stated that his
preliminary letter to the Court had been submitted on 28 March 2005,
and it contained a succinct statement of the facts and complaints. He
therefore considered that the running of the six-month limitation
period had been interrupted by the sending of the letter. He also
disagreed with the Government that the six-month period in his case
had run from 1 September 2004. He pointed out that he had not been
present at the appeal hearing, and had only received that judgment
later. He referred to the Pokachi Town Court’s cover letter
accompanying a copy of that decision, which was sent to the
prosecutor’s office on 27 September 2004 and forwarded to the
applicant on 6 October 2004.
- The
Court finds, on the basis of the documentary evidence produced by the
applicant, that he was notified of the final domestic decision on
6 October 2004 or later. It also notes that the Government was
in possession of the cover letter of 27 September 2004 referred to by
the applicant. The Court further observes that the applicant’s
first letter was indeed submitted to the Court on 28 March 2005, and
considers that the applicant thus lodged the application within six
months of the receipt of the final domestic decision. The
Government’s objection must therefore be dismissed.
2. The Court’s conclusion on the admissibility of
this complaint
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Government contested the allegation that the applicant had been
ill-treated while in police custody. They suggested that the bruises
noted in the forensic report could have been caused before his
arrest, for example, at the crime scene, a construction site; they
stated that he had been in a state of alcoholic intoxication at the
time of the arrest and therefore could have sustained the injuries
accidentally.
- The
Government further pointed out that the applicant did not complain
about the alleged ill-treatment for several months, and when he did,
an inquiry was conducted that found no proof of police violence. They
further stated that the injuries in question were so minor that they
were not capable of proving any ill-treatment reaching the minimum
level of severity laid down by Article 3 of the Convention. As
regards the obligation to conduct an effective investigation, they
contended that the inquiry into the applicant’s allegations of
ill-treatment had been prompt, thorough and conclusive on the point
that the applicant’s claims could not be proved.
- The
applicant maintained his complaints, claiming that he had been beaten
by the police and that the authorities had failed to conduct an
effective investigation following his complaints. He contested, in
particular, the assertion that he had waited for several months
before lodging his complaint, claiming that he had complained to the
investigator but that his complaints had not been transmitted to the
prosecutor’s office.
1. Alleged ill-treatment in police custody
- The
Court reiterates that allegations of ill-treatment must be supported
by appropriate evidence. In assessing evidence, the Court has
generally applied the standard of proof “beyond reasonable
doubt” (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January
1978, § 161, Series A no. 25). However, such proof may follow
from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant
inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Where the
events in issue lie wholly or in large part within the exclusive
knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons under their
control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect
of injuries occurring during such detention. Indeed, the burden of
proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a
satisfactory and convincing explanation (see Salman v. Turkey
[GC], no. 21986/93, § 100, ECHR 2000-VII).
- Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the
Court observes that, according to the applicant, on 1 July 1999 he
was brought to the police station at 3.15 a.m., and the body search
conducted immediately after that did not establish any injuries on
him. Later on the same day, a forensic expert found two fresh bruises
on him that looked like marks left by a police truncheon. The
applicant claimed that between the two events he was subjected to
another physical examination, during which he was beaten in the
presence of two attesting witnesses.
- The
Government challenged the credibility of these allegations claiming
that the applicant had waited for too long before filing an
ill treatment complaint. The Court observes that the alleged
ill-treatment took place on 1 July 1999. It also observes that the
expert report which recorded the injuries was only made available to
the applicant on 24 September 1999. The applicant claimed that
even before he saw the report he had complained to the investigator
about the ill-treatment, although he did not submit any proof of
that. However, even assuming that the applicant first lodged a
complaint on 27 December 1999, that is, three months after he
received the forensic report, the Court considers that this delay was
not so excessively long as to allow any negative conclusions to be
drawn as regards the credibility of the applicant’s account of
events. The Court further observes that once the applicant had lodged
this complaint with the prosecutor’s office, he consistently
maintained his allegations in the proceedings before the domestic
authorities, as well as before the Court.
- The
Court further observes that neither the authorities conducting the
inquiry into the applicant’s allegations nor the Government
have provided a plausible explanation of the origin of injuries
established by the forensic expert. In particular, the Court cannot
accept that the bruises had already existed at the time of arrest
because such a finding would be inconsistent with the report on the
body search conducted immediately upon his arrest, at 3.15 a.m., or
with the report on the applicant’s physical examination which
took place at 5 a.m. on the same day, both of which expressly stated
that he had no injuries.
- The
Court also notes that the policemen had confirmed having been in
possession of a police truncheon that was present in the room where
the applicant claimed to have been beaten, although they denied
having used it.
- It
follows that on 3.15 a.m. the applicant was taken into custody with
no traces of injuries and ten hours later he was found with bruises
that, in the expert’s words, looked like traces of a police
truncheon, and that the authorities have failed to account for their
occurrence. The Court will therefore accept the applicant’s
allegation that the police truncheon had indeed been used on him at
the police station.
- As
to the nature of the ill-treatment at issue, the Court cannot share
the Government’s view that the injuries in question were so
slight that the treatment causing them could not possibly attain the
minimum level of severity proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention.
It reiterates its well established case-law that in respect of a
person deprived of his liberty, any recourse to physical force which
has not been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes
human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the rights set
forth in Article 3 of the Convention (see Tomasi v. France,
27 August 1992, § 115, Series A no. 241-A, and Ribitsch
v. Austria, 4 December 1995, §§ 38-40, Series A no.
336). The Court observes that the applicant claimed to have been
beaten on the police premises during a physical examination. The
authorities did not claim that the police were compelled to resort to
the use of a truncheon in self-defence or to discipline the
applicant, and, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, the
Court finds that they used it unnecessarily.
- Therefore,
the Court cannot but conclude that the applicant was subjected to
inhuman and degrading treatment by the police. Accordingly, there has
been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its
substantive limb.
2. Alleged failure to carry out an effective
investigation
- The Court reiterates that where an individual makes a
credible assertion that he has suffered treatment infringing Article
3 at the hands of the police or other similar agents of the State,
that provision, read in conjunction with the State’s general
duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ...
[the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be
an effective official investigation. As with an investigation under
Article 2, such an investigation should be capable of leading to the
identification and punishment of those responsible. Otherwise, the
general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading
treatment and punishment would, despite its fundamental importance,
be ineffective in practice and it would be possible in some cases for
agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control
with virtual impunity (see Jasar v. the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia, no. 69908/01, § 55, 15 February 2007; Matko
v. Slovenia, no. 43393/98, § 84, 2 November 2006;
Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, §
102, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 VIII; and
Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 131, ECHR 2000-IV).
- An obligation to investigate “is not an
obligation of result, but of means”: not every investigation
should necessarily be successful or come to a conclusion which
coincides with the claimant’s account of events; however, it
should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the
facts of the case and, if the allegations prove to be true, to the
identification and punishment of those responsible (see Paul and
Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no. 46477/99, § 71,
ECHR 2002-II; Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, no. 22535/93, §
124, ECHR 2000-III; and Mikheyev v. Russia, no. 77617/01,
§ 107, 26 January 2006).
- The minimum standards of “effectiveness”
defined by the Court’s case-law also require that the
investigation must be independent, impartial and subject to public
scrutiny, and that the competent authorities must act with exemplary
diligence and promptness (see Isayeva and Others v. Russia,
nos. 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00, §§ 208-13, 24
February 2005, and Menesheva v. Russia, no. 59261/00, §
67, ECHR 2006 III).
- Turning
to the circumstances of the present case, the Court has found above
(see paragraph 42) that the applicant
complained to the prosecutor’s office without excessive delay
and presented them with a forensic report corroborating his
allegations. It considers that the matter was appropriately brought
before the competent authorities at a time when they could reasonably
have been expected to investigate the circumstances in question. The
domestic authorities were thus placed under an obligation to conduct
an effective investigation satisfying the above requirements of
Article 3 of the Convention.
- The
Court notes that the prosecution authorities, who were made aware of
the applicant’s alleged beating, carried out a preliminary
inquiry which did not result in the criminal prosecution of the
policemen. In the Court’s opinion, the issue is consequently
not so much whether there was an investigation, since the parties did
not dispute that there was one, but whether it was conducted
diligently, whether the authorities were determined to identify and
prosecute those responsible and, accordingly, whether the
investigation was “effective”.
- The
Court observes that six months after the applicant’s complaint
to the prosecutor’s office a decision was taken, allegedly
after appropriate checks, not to investigate the issue further. It is
not clear what measures this inquiry involved, as the relevant
documents had apparently been destroyed when the time-limit for
keeping them in the archives expired. However, it is clear that the
person in charge of that inquiry was the same official who
investigated the applicant’s criminal case, and the Court finds
it striking that in the present case the initial investigative steps,
which usually prove to be crucial for establishing the truth in cases
of brutality committed by State officials, were conducted by the
official in charge of the applicant’s prosecution. It was later
established by the Langepasskiy Town Court in its decision of 12
January 2001 that Ms. K. had failed to meet the objective criteria of
independence (see paragraph 19 above), and the Court cannot but
endorse this conclusion. In this connection the Court reiterates its
finding, made on a number of occasions, that the investigation should
be carried out by competent, qualified and impartial experts who are
independent of the suspected perpetrators and the agency they serve
(see Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC],
no. 52391/99, § 325, ECHR 2007-II, and Oğur
v. Turkey [GC], no. 21594/93, §§ 91-92,
ECHR 1999-III).
- The
Court further observes that after the aforementioned decision of the
Langepasskiy Town Court, another inquiry was conducted by another
investigator of the Pokachi prosecutor’s office. The
investigator this time questioned both implicated policemen and A.T.,
one of the attesting witnesses who had been present during the
alleged ill-treatment. The latter admitted, however, that he had been
in a state of alcoholic intoxication at the time of the applicant’s
physical examination and that after the passage of time he could
remember very little of what had happened. He was confident, however,
that the applicant had not been ill-treated. Despite his reduced
ability to remember the events in question the authorities did not
seek evidence from the second attesting witness in order to obtain a
more detailed account. There is nothing in the file to suggest that
any attempts were made to question him, and the reasons for that
remain unclear. The Court, on its part, cannot overlook the
unexplained failure to question that person, because he was one of
the only two people, apart from the implicated policemen, with
first-hand knowledge of what had happened, and possibly the only one
who could make up for the deficiencies in A.T.’s account.
- Even
more fundamental is the failure of the inquiry to address the crucial
question of the cause of the applicant’s injuries recorded by
the forensic expert. It appears from the witness statements that this
question was not specifically raised at any point, and the inquiry
conclusions do not contain any explanation on steps taken to
establish the origin of the bruises. The Court considers the
investigators’ failure to pursue this central point in an
ill-treatment case to be incompatible with the notion of an effective
investigation.
- In
addition to that, the Court finds that the inquiry conducted by Ms I.
took place two years after the events complained of and thus lacked
the requisite promptness. It further notes that the applicant was not
involved in the inquiry, that he had difficulties in receiving the
relevant decisions and was virtually denied access to the inquiry
file, a fact confirmed, and even endorsed by, the judicial decision
of 2 July 2004. It follows that the inquiry also fell short of the
guarantees of public scrutiny.
- The
foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to
conclude that the authorities have failed to carry out an effective
investigation into the applicant’s allegations of
ill-treatment. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of
the Convention under its procedural limb.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 6 AND 13 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant further complained that the judicial proceedings did not
provide him with an effective domestic remedy for his complaints as
regards the authorities’ failure to conduct an effective
investigation into his allegations of ill-treatment by the police. He
relied on Article 6 of the Convention and Article 13 in conjunction
with Article 3 of the Convention.
- The
Government disagreed and asked the Court to reject this part of the
application.
- The
Court observes that in making this complaint the applicant
essentially alleged that the domestic courts had wrongfully upheld
the decisions dispensing with a criminal investigation into his
allegations of ill treatment. Since this relates to the same
factual circumstances as those leading to a violation of Article 3 of
the Convention the Court accepts this complaint as admissible.
However, having regard to its finding of a violation of Article 3 on
account of the lack of an effective investigation (see paragraph 57
above), the Court does not consider it necessary to examine this
complaint separately.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant requested the Court to award him compensation for
non-pecuniary damage and asked the Court to decide on an appropriate
amount.
- The
Government contested the applicant’s eligibility for an award
of compensation because they considered the application manifestly
ill founded. They claimed that an acknowledgement of a
violation, if any were found by the Court, would by itself constitute
sufficient just satisfaction.
- The Court notes that it has found a violation under
the substantive and the procedural limbs of Article 3 of the
Convention on account of the applicant’s ill-treatment and the
authorities’ failure to carry out an effective investigation
into the matter. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the
anguish and frustration caused to the applicant cannot be compensated
for by the mere finding of a violation. Having regard to the nature
of the violation and making its assessment on an equitable basis, the
Court awards the applicant 7,500 euros (EUR) in respect of
non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant stated that he was unable to estimate the costs and
expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Court. Accordingly,
the Court makes no award under this head.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should
be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,
to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
3 of the Convention under its substantive aspect;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
3 of the Convention under its procedural aspect;
- Holds that it is not necessary to examine the
complaints under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months of
the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 7,500
(seven thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into
Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 April 2012, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André Wampach Nina Vajić
Deputy Registrar President
