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SECOND
SECTION
DECISION
Application no.
39105/09
Semra KARAKAŞOĞLU and Sündüs
KARAKAŞOĞLU
against Turkey
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 10 April
2012 as a Chamber composed of:
Françoise Tulkens,
President,
Danutė
Jočienė,
Isabelle
Berro-Lefèvre,
András
Sajó,
Işıl
Karakaş,
Paulo
Pinto de Albuquerque,
Helen
Keller, judges,
and
Stanley Naismith, Section
Registrar,
Having
regard to the above application lodged on 10 July 2009,
Having
deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
- The
applicants, Ms Semra Karakaşoğlu and Ms Sündüs
Karakaşoğlu, are Turkish nationals who were born in 1965
and 1947 respectively and live in Istanbul. They were represented
before the Court by Mr A. Yazıcıoğlu, a lawyer
practising in Istanbul.
A. The circumstances of the case
- The
facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised
as follows.
- The
first applicant is the daughter of the second applicant. On an
unspecified date, the first applicant issued a cheque in the name of
the second applicant. Subsequently, in April 2004, alleging that she
had lost the cheque, the second applicant applied to the Kadıköy
Commercial Court to have it cancelled. The cheque was accordingly
cancelled by the Kadıköy Commercial Court.
- In
the meantime, a third person, Ms H.K.Ç. (hereinafter referred
to as “the creditor”), who is the niece of the second
applicant, presented the cheque in question to the bank for payment;
however, she was informed that the cheque had been cancelled. The
creditor then applied to the Istanbul Execution Office and alleged
that the second applicant had endorsed the cheque in her name to pay
a debt to her. The amount of the cheque in dispute was 70,000 Turkish
liras (TRY) and the due date was set at 12 August 2004. On 8
October 2004 a payment order was sent to the applicants. On 12
October 2004 the applicants filed an objection with the Execution
Office, stating that they did not have a debt to the creditor and
alleging that the creditor had stolen the cheque from their house.
- Thereafter,
the creditor initiated proceedings before the Istanbul Commercial
Court, requesting the annulment of the objection filed by the
applicants. Relying on section 67 of the Execution and Bankruptcy Act
(Law no. 2004), she further claimed compensation amounting to 40% of
the sum due, as the applicants had denied paying their debt in an
unjust manner.
- On
18 October 2004 the applicants initiated another set of proceedings
before the Istanbul Commercial Court, seeking a declaratory judgment
to the effect that they did not have any debt to the creditor in
respect of the cheque in question. They also requested the creditor
to pay them compensation amounting to 50% of the sum in dispute for
acting in bad faith. On 29 June 2005 the Istanbul Commercial Court
rejected the applicants’ case on account of insufficient
evidence. In its decision, the court held that the applicants had
failed to provide the basis of an arguable claim in support of their
allegations. On 24 April 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the
judgment of the first-instance court, holding that that court should
have examined whether the refusal to pay the amount due had caused
unjust enrichment to the applicants. The case was accordingly
remitted to the Istanbul Commercial Court.
- On
an unspecified date, the Istanbul Commercial Court decided to join
the two cases. During the hearings held before the
Commercial Court, the applicants were represented by a lawyer and
were able to put forward all their arguments. The court also heard
witness statements. In her submissions before the court, the creditor
maintained that she had lent TRY 70,000 to the second applicant
and had in return taken a cheque with a due date set for 12 August
2004. She further claimed that in order to avoid paying the cheque,
the second applicant had applied to the court to have it cancelled.
On 14 November 2007 the Commercial Court held that as the creditor
was in possession of a cheque, the burden of proof lay on the
applicants to prove that they did not have a debt to her. Having
regard to the case file as a whole, the court decided that the
applicants had failed to prove that they did not have any debt to the
creditor. It therefore dismissed the case initiated by the applicants
and annulled their objection against the payment order. Pursuant to
section 67 of Law no. 2004, the court further ordered the applicants
to pay compensation, amounting to 40% of the sum due, for unjustly
filing an objection against the payment order. On 30 June 2008 the
Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. A
request by the applicants for rectification was subsequently rejected
and this final decision was served on the applicants on 11 January
2009.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
- Section
67 of the Execution and Bankruptcy Act (Law no. 2004) provides that
the court may order the payment of compensation amounting to at least
40% of the sum in dispute, upon a request by the other party, if at
the end of execution proceedings it concludes that the debtor has
unjustly filed an objection against the payment order, or that the
creditor acted in bad faith in initiating the execution proceedings.
COMPLAINTS
- Relying
on Article 6 of the Convention, the applicants argued that the
domestic courts had failed to assess the facts of the case properly,
and complained about the outcome of the proceedings. The applicants
further alleged under Article 6 that their right of access to court
had been breached. In this connection, they argued that they had had
to pay compensation amounting to 40% of the sum in dispute, on
account of the fact that they had filed an objection against the
payment order.
THE LAW
- The
applicants argued under Article 6 of the Convention that they had not
had a fair hearing. In this connection, they maintained that the
domestic courts that had examined their case had failed to assess the
facts of the case properly. Secondly, they stated that the
compensation ordered pursuant to section 67 of Law no. 2004 had
constituted a breach of their right of access to court since it was
to be construed as a penalty for having used their right to bring
their case before the domestic courts.
- In
so far as the applicants complained about the outcome of the
proceedings, the Court reiterates that it is not its task to act as a
court of appeal or, as is sometimes said, as a court of fourth
instance, for the decisions of domestic courts. According to the
case-law, the latter are best placed to assess the credibility of
witnesses and the relevance of evidence to the issues in the case
(see, among many other authorities, Vidal v. Belgium, 22 April
1992, § 32, Series A no. 235-B, and Edwards v. the United
Kingdom, 16 December 1992, § 34, Series A no. 247-B).
- In
the present case, it is observed that the national court decisions
were based on the domestic law and the particular circumstances of
the case. The Court finds no element which could lead it to conclude
that the domestic courts acted in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner
in their assessment.
- As
regards the second part of the applicants’ complaint, regarding
the compensation provided for by section 67 of Law no. 2004, the
Court reiterates that the Convention is intended to guarantee
practical and effective rights. This is particularly so of the right
of access to court in view of the prominent place held in a
democratic society by the right to a fair trial. It is central to the
concept of a fair trial, in civil as in criminal proceedings, that a
litigant is not denied the opportunity to present his or her case
effectively before the court and that he or she is able to enjoy
equality of arms with the opposing side (see Steel and Morris v.
the United Kingdom, no. 68416/01, § 59, ECHR
2005 II). In the present case it is clear that the applicants
had the opportunity to have their cases examined thoroughly at three
levels of jurisdiction. The Court observes that at the end of the
proceedings, the applicants were ordered to pay compensation pursuant
to section 67 of Law no. 2004. This type of compensation is provided
for by the law to avoid delays in payment of debts through the filing
of unjust objections. The Court further takes into consideration that
in order to strike a balance between the parties, the law also
provides for the possibility for the debtor to request compensation
if at the end of the proceedings the court finds that the creditor
had made a false allegation concerning the debt.
- In
the present case, the Court notes that the applicants were ordered to
pay compensation at the end of the proceedings as they failed to
provide the basis of any arguable claim that they did not have a debt
to the creditor. Moreover, the Court observes from their petition to
the Istanbul Commercial Court that in the proceedings which they had
initiated against the creditor, they also asked the domestic court to
order the defendant to pay compensation for sending a payment order
in bad faith, should the court find that they did not have a debt to
her. In the Court’s view, when, at the end of adversarial
proceedings, the domestic court finds that the debtor filed an unjust
objection against a payment order, the payment of a certain amount of
compensation to the creditor cannot be considered to constitute a
breach of access to court.
- The
Court concludes that during the proceedings the applicants were
represented by a lawyer and were able to submit arguments in support
of their allegations and challenge the evidence against them. For the
reasons set out above, there is also no indication in the case file
that the decision of the trial court failed to respect the
applicants’ procedural rights. Moreover, there are no elements
which could lead to the conclusion that the domestic courts acted in
an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.
- Regard
being had to the circumstances of the case as a whole, the Court
finds that the application is manifestly ill-founded and should be
rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Court by a majority
Declares the application inadmissible.
Stanley Naismith Françoise Tulkens
Registrar President