FIRST SECTION

CASE OF JAĆIMOVIĆ v. CROATIA

(Application no. 22688/09)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

31 October 2013

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Jaćimović v. Croatia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
	Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, President,
	Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
	Julia Laffranque,
	Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,
	Erik Møse,
	Ksenija Turković,
	Dmitry Dedov, judges,
and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 8 October 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1.  The case originated in an application (no. 22688/09) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a national of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr Đoko Jaćimović (“the applicant”), on 2 March 2009.
2.  The applicant was represented by Mrs M. Trninić, a lawyer practising in Slavonski Brod. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik.
3.  The applicant alleged in particular that the decisions of the domestic authorities terminating his right to payment of unemployment benefit had violated his right to a fair trial and peaceful enjoyment of possessions, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
4.  On 6 July 2011 the application was communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1). On 11 July 2011 the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina were informed of their right to intervene in the proceedings in accordance with Article 36 § 1 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 1 (b). They chose not to avail themselves of this right.
THE FACTS
I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Bosanski Brod, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
6.  On 12 December 1983 the Slavonski Brod Office of the Workers’ Pension and Invalidity Insurance Fund (Samoupravna interesna zajednica mirovinskog i invalidskog osiguranja radnika Hrvatske, Područna služba u Slavonskom Brodu, hereinafter “the Republic Workers’ Fund”) recognised the applicant’s reduced capacity for work and ordered his employer, company M., to find him a post suitable to his condition.
7.  On 22 June 1987 the Republic Workers’ Fund issued a decision granting the applicant the right to work part-time on account of his reduced capacity for work, and the right to payment of special benefits for that reason.
8.  After the institution of insolvency proceedings against the company, M., on 13 December 1990 the Republic Workers’ Fund issued a new decision, granting the applicant unemployment benefit with effect from 1 December 1990. In order to retain the benefit the applicant had to report to the Republic Workers’ Fund at regular (monthly) intervals.
9.  On 25 June 1991 the Croatian Parliament declared Croatia independent of Yugoslavia.
10.  According to the applicant’s record in the Republic Workers’ Fund, the applicant reported regularly every month to the Republic Workers’ Fund until 24 March 1992, when he reported by sending a letter. Thereafter, due to the applicant’s non-compliance with the duty to report, the payment of the unemployment benefit was discontinued.
11.  On 9 June 2000 the applicant submitted a request to the Slavonski Brod Office of the Croatian Pension Fund (Hrvatski zavod za mirovinsko osiguranje, Područna služba u Slavonskom Brodu) for payment of unemployment benefits. He argued that because of the escalation of the war in Croatia, following its declaration of independence, he had not been able to come to Croatia after February 1992.
12.  On 5 September 2000 the Slavonski Brod Office of the Croatian Pension Fund issued a decision terminating the applicant’s right to unemployment benefits, and discontinued payments with effect from 31 March 1992. The relevant part of that decision read as follows:
“The insured [the applicant] last contacted the regional office on 24 March 1992. His right to unemployment benefit is therefore terminated and payment of unemployment benefit was discontinued from 31 March 1992, in accordance with section 128 of the Pension and Disability Insurance Act.”
13.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision with the Central Office of the Croatian Pension Fund (Hrvatski avod za mirovinsko osiguranje, Središnja služba) on 20 September 2000, arguing that he had been unable to come to Croatia after March 1992 because of the escalating war there. He considered that he should not lose his right to unemployment benefits because of circumstances beyond his control.
14.  On 11 April 2001 the Central Office of the Croatian Pension Fund dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The relevant part of the second-instance decision read as follows:
“The appellant ... submits that before and during the [Homeland] War he had been living in Bosanski Brod and that after March 1992 he could no longer contact the Slavonski Brod Office because of the war. He argues that his right to benefits was terminated because of circumstances beyond his control, within the meaning of section 128 of the Pension and Disability Insurance Act.
The appeal is unfounded.
After consulting the entire case file, it was established that the appellant received unemployment benefit from 1 December 1990 on the basis of the first-instance decision of 13 December 1990.
Given that the appellant last contacted the regional office on 24 March 1992, the payment of the unemployment benefit was therefore correctly discontinued by the contested decision with effect from 31 March 1992, in accordance with section 128 of the Pension and Disability Insurance Act.”
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal must be dismissed as unfounded.”
15.  On 28 May 2001 the applicant brought an action in the Administrative Court (Upravni sud Republike Hrvatske) contesting the decision of the Central Office of the Croatian Pension Fund. The applicant reiterated that he had been unable to come to Croatia until the end of 2000, because of the war and the suspension of relations between Croatia and the Republika Srpska entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where he lived. He also complained that he had been unable to participate effectively in the administrative proceedings, and that the administrative decision had not been sufficiently reasoned.
16.  The Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s action on 23 November 2005. The relevant part of the Administrative Court’s judgment reads as follows:
“Section 128 paragraph 1 subparagraph 3 of the Pension and Disability Insurance Act provided that an insured [person] who had acquired ... the right to work, with related benefits, would lose that right if he or she did not use it within the specified time, unless he or she was prevented from doing so by circumstances beyond his or her control, and this would apply if he or she terminated their employment relationship without a valid reason, in the job he or she had been provided with or transferred to.
From the case file, in particular from the decision of the Republic Workers’ Fund of 22 June 1987, it follows that the plaintiff was granted, with effect from 22 June 1987, due to illness, the right to work reduced hours ... By a decision of the body of 13 December 1990, the plaintiff was granted unemployment benefit (because insolvency proceedings were pending against the company).
From the reasoning of the first-instance [decision] and the contested [second-instance] decision, it follows that the plaintiff lost the right [to work reduced hours] and [consequently] the right to unemployment benefit, payment of which was discontinued with effect from 31 March 1992, on the basis of section 128 of the above-cited Pension and Disability Insurance Act.
After examining the relevant facts of the present case, this court finds that the contested decision cannot be viewed as incorrect or unlawful. Specifically, it follows from the plaintiff’s statement given before the Slavonski Brod Office of the Croatian Pension Fund on 9 April 2000, and included in the record of the hearing, that he did not contact [that Office] again until June 2000. The last entry in the employment booklet indicates that he was employed until 30 November 1990. The court therefore finds that section 128 paragraph 1 subparagraph 3 of the Pension and Disability Insurance ... is applicable in the present case.”
17.  On 18 March 2006 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) against the Administrative Court’s judgment, complaining, inter alia, that he had been unable to come to Croatia until the end of 2000 because of the escalating war and discontinuation of relations between the part of Bosnia and Herzegovina where he lived (the Republika Srpska entity) and Croatia, that he had not been able to participate effectively in the proceedings before the lower administrative bodies, and that the administrative decisions had not been sufficiently reasoned.
18.  On 3 July 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint and endorsed the reasoning of the Administrative Court. This decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 2 September 2008.
II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A.  Relevant domestic law
1.  Constitution
19.  The relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (Ustav Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette nos. 56/1990, 135/1997, 8/1998, 113/2000, 124/2000, 28/2001, 41/2001, 55/2001, 76/2010, 85/2010) read as follows:
Article 29
“In the determination of his rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court established by law.”
Article 48
“The right of ownership shall be guaranteed.”
2.  Constitutional Court Act
20.  The relevant part of section 62 of the Constitutional Court Act (Ustavni zakon o Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette no. 49/2002) reads as follows:
Section 62
“1. Anyone may lodge a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court if he or she deems that an individual act on the part of a state body, a body of local and regional self-government, or a legal person with public authority, concerning his or her rights and obligations, or a suspicion or an accusation of a criminal act, has violated his or her human rights or fundamental freedoms or his or her right to local and regional self-government guaranteed by the Constitution (hereinafter “a constitutional right”) ...
2. If another legal remedy exists in respect of the violation of the constitutional right [complained of], a constitutional complaint may be lodged only after that remedy has been used.”
3.  Pensions legislation
21.  Section 128 of the Pension and Disability Insurance Act (Zakon o mirovinskom i invalidskom osiguranju, Official Gazette nos. 28/1983, 48/1983, 5/1986, 42/1987, 34/1989, 40/1989, 57/1989, 40/1990, 9/1991, 11/1991, 26/1993, 96/1993, 44/1994 and 56/1996), applicable to the case at issue, reads as follows:
“An insured [person] who has acquired ... the right to work, with related benefits, shall lose that right if he or she does not use it within the specified time, unless he or she is prevented from doing so due to circumstances beyond his or her control, and so:
... 3.  if he or she terminates their employment in the job he or she has been provided with or transferred to, without a valid reason.”
22.  The relevant provision of the Workers’ Pension and Invalidity Insurance Fund Ordinance (Statut Samoupravne interesne zajednice mirovinskog i invalidskog osiguranja radnika Hrvatske, Official Gazette nos. 31/1983, 53/1985, 23/1986, 52/1986, 32/1989, 48/1989, 57/1989, 58/1990, 21/1992, 116/1993, 23/1995) reads:
Section 39
... (3) An insured [person] who makes contact with the appropriate body within the relevant time-limit shall have the right to payment of unemployment benefit for those months in which he has been in contact with [the appropriate body] concerning the employment, and for those months in which he has been prevented from reporting by circumstances beyond his control.”
4.  Administrative Disputes Act
23.  The relevant provision of the Administrative Disputes Act (Zakon o upravnim sporovima, Official Gazette nos. 53/1991, 9/1992 and 77/1992) provides:
Section 60
“If this Act does not contain specific provisions on the procedure concerning the administrative disputes, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply accordingly.”
24.  The relevant provision of the Administrative Disputes Act (Zakon o upravnim sporovima, Official Gazette nos. 20/2010 and 143/12) provides:
Section 76
“(1) The proceedings terminated by a judgment shall be reopened upon a petition of the party:
1. if, in a final judgment, the European Court of Human Rights has found a violation of fundamental rights and freedoms in a manner differing from the [Administrative Court’s] judgment, ... “
5.  Code of Civil Procedure
25.  The relevant part of the Code of Civil Procedure (Zakon o parničnom postupku, Official Gazette nos. 53/1991, 91/1992, 58/1993, 112/1999, 88/2001, 117/2003, 88/2005, 2/2007, 84/2008, 123/2008, 57/2011, 148/2011 and 25/2013) provides as follows:
Section 428a
“(1) When the European Court of Human Rights has found a violation of a human right or fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or additional protocols thereto ratified by the Republic of Croatia, a party may, within thirty days of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights becoming final, file a petition with the court in the Republic of Croatia which adjudicated in the first instance in the proceedings in which the decision violating the human right or fundamental freedom was rendered, to set aside the decision by which the human right or fundamental freedom was violated.
(2) The proceedings referred to in paragraph 1 of this section shall be conducted by applying, mutatis mutandis, the provisions on the reopening of proceedings.
(3) In the reopened proceedings the courts are required to respect the legal opinions expressed in the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights finding a violation of a fundamental human right or freedom.”
B.  Relevant information on communications between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
26.  According to a report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova i europskih integracija Republike Hrvatske), no. 004-01/10-01/03, 521-III-02-02-11/02 of 10 November 2011, in the period relevant to this case, between March 1992 and June 2000, communications between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina functioned as follows:
Initially, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina were able to come to Croatia on the basis of a certificate issued by Croatian diplomatic and consular missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
According to a decree of the Government of Croatia of 23 October 1992, refugees from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina were allowed to enter or transit Croatia on the basis of a certificate of the Refugees Office (Ured za prognanike i izbjeglice Vlade Republike Hrvatske);
From June 1993 holders of former Yugoslav passports issued by Bosnia and Herzegovina (valid until 31 December 1993), who were working in third countries were allowed to enter or transit Croatia; refugees could also enter or transit Croatia on the basis of a Refugees Office certificate;
From 20 April 1994 citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina could enter or transit Croatia for business purposes in Croatia or third countries on the basis of a certificate issued by Croatian diplomatic and consular missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and refugees were allowed to enter or transit Croatia on the same conditions as previously.
From 8 April 1995, on the basis of the Visa Regime Agreement between the Government of Croatia and the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Protocol on Conditions of Entry and Transfer of Citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Through Croatia, both signed on 24 March 1995; holders of valid passports of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina could enter or transit Croatia for any reason on the basis of a certificate issued by Croatian diplomatic and consular missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The same conditions as previously were retained for refugees and those travelling to Croatia or third countries for business purposes;
From 4 March 1996, on the basis of the Protocol on Provisional implementation of the Visa Regime Agreement of 24 March 1995; citizens of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina could enter or transit Croatia without any visa requirements. Citizens of other parts (entities) of Bosnia and Herzegovina could not enter or transit Croatia;
From 1 June 1998, on the basis of a Decree of the Government of the Republic of Croatia of 28 May 1998, all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina with valid travel documents under the relevant domestic law of Bosnia and Herzegovina could enter or transit Croatia without any visa requirements.
27.  According to a report of the Ministry of the Sea, Traffic and Infrastructure (Ministarstvo mora, prometa i infrastrukture), no. 004-01/11-01/5, 530-01-11-2 of 9 November 2011, telephone communications between Croatia and the parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina which were under the Republika Srpska entity functioned as follows:
In the period between 24 March 1992 and 26 December 1995 there was no automatic telephone communication, meaning that communications could be established only by transferring calls through a third country, namely Slovenia, Hungary, Italy, Austria or Germany.
From 26 December 1995 automatic telephone communication was possible by dialling 381 (in Serbia);
From May 1999 full direct telephone communication was established.
THE LAW
I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
28.  The applicant complained that the decisions of the domestic authorities terminating his right to payment of unemployment benefit had not been sufficiently reasoned, as provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A.  Admissibility
1.  Compliance with the six-month time-limit
(a)  The parties’ arguments
29.  The Government submitted that there had been a discrepancy between the date indicated on the application form, which had allegedly been 2 June 2009, and the date indicated on the Registry’s stamp, 6 March 2009, when the application form had been received at the Court. The Government therefore considered the latter date to be the date of introduction of the application before the Court. Since the decision of the Constitutional Court had been served on the applicant’s representative on 2 September 2008, it followed that the applicant had lodged his application with the Court outside the six-month time-limit.
30.  The applicant made no observations in this respect.
(b)  The Court’s assessment
31.  The Court reiterates that it may only deal with an application if it is lodged with the Court within the six-month time-limit. The purpose of the six-month rule is to promote legal certainty and to ensure that cases raising issues under the Convention are dealt with within a reasonable time, as well as to protect the authorities and other persons concerned from being under any uncertainty for an extended period of time. Finally, it should ensure that the facts of the case are ascertained as promptly as possible, before the chance to do so fades away, making fair examination of the question at issue next to impossible (see Kelly v. the United Kingdom, no. 10626/83, Commission decision of 7 May 1985, Decisions and Reports (DR) 42, p. 205, and Baybora and Others v. Cyprus (dec.), no. 77116/01, 22 October 2002).
32.  As regards the date when the application is lodged with the Court, the Court has already held that the date of the postmark recording the day the application was sent is treated as the date of the application, and not the date of receipt stamped on the application (see, for example, Kipritçi v. Turkey, no. 14294/04, § 18, 3 June 2008).
33. The Court notes that the date on the postmark recording the day the application form was sent is 2 March 2009, and that the date indicated on the application form when the application was allegedly written (2 June 2009) is an obvious clerical error.
34.  Since the final domestic court’s decision, namely the decision of the Constitutional Court of 3 July 2008, was served on the applicant’s representative on 2 September 2008, it follows that the application was lodged with the Court within the six-month time-limit. Thus the Government’s objection must be dismissed.
2.  Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies
(a)  The parties’ arguments
35.  The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to expressly cite his right to a fair trial in his constitutional complaint, and had thus failed to observe the principle of subsidiarity before bringing the same complaints before the Court.
36.  The applicant considered that he had properly exhausted domestic remedies.
(b)  The Court’s assessment
37.  The Court reiterates that under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention it may only deal with an application after all domestic remedies have been exhausted. The purpose of Article 35 is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right the violations alleged against them before those allegations are submitted to the Court (see, for example, Mifsud v. France (dec.) [GC], no. 57220/00, § 15, ECHR 2002-VIII). The obligation to exhaust domestic remedies requires an applicant to make normal use of remedies which are effective, sufficient and accessible in respect of his Convention grievances. To be effective, a remedy must be capable of directly resolving the impugned state of affairs (see Balogh v. Hungary, no. 47940/99, § 30, 20 July 2004).
38.  The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies normally requires that complaints intended to be made subsequently at the international level should have been raised before the domestic courts, at least in substance and in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in domestic law. The object of the rule on exhaustion of domestic remedies is to allow the national authorities (primarily the judicial authorities) to address an allegation that a Convention right has been violated, and where appropriate to afford redress before that allegation is submitted to the Court. In so far as there exists at national level a remedy enabling the national courts to address, at least in substance, any argument as to an alleged violation of a Convention right, it is that remedy which should be used (see Azinas v. Cyprus [GC], no. 56679/00, § 38, ECHR 2004‑III).
39.  The Court notes that during the domestic administrative proceedings the applicant argued that he had not been able to participate effectively in the proceedings, and that the decisions of the administrative authorities had not been sufficiently reasoned (see paragraph 15 above). The applicant reiterated the same complaints in his constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 17 above). It was therefore open to the Constitutional Court to examine the substance of his complaints (see Lelas v. Croatia, no. 55555/08, § 49, 20 May 2010).
40.  In these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant, having raised the issue in substance in his constitutional complaint, did raise before the domestic courts the complaint which he has submitted to the Court (see, by contrast, Mađer v. Croatia, no. 56185/07, § 137, 21 June 2011).
41.  The applicant thereby provided the national authorities with the opportunity which is in principle intended to be afforded to Contracting States by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, namely of putting right the violations alleged against them (see Lelas, cited above, § 51; Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, §§ 144-146, ECHR 2010; Karapanagiotou and Others v. Greece, no. 1571/08, § 29, 28 October 2010; Bjedov v. Croatia, no. 42150/09, § 48, 29 May 2012; and Tarbuk v. Croatia, no. 31360/10, § 32, 11 December 2012).
42.  The Government’s objection therefore must be rejected.
3.  Conclusion
43.  The Court considers that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B.  Merits
1.  The parties’ arguments
44.  The applicant contended that in its decision of 5 September 2000 the Slavonski Brod Office of the Croatian Pension Fund had declared that he had lost his right to payment of unemployment benefit retroactively with effect from 31 March 1992, citing only section 128 of the Pension and Disability Insurance Act. Thereby the Slavonski Brod Office of the Croatian Pension Fund had presumed that he was responsible for not contacting the pension authorities, ignoring the fact that he had not been able to come to Croatia because of the escalating war. This had been upheld by the Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court, which had also failed to address that issue.
45.  The Government submitted that the applicant had never challenged the applicability of section 128 of the Pension and Disability Insurance Act to his case, and that therefore there had been no reason for the Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court to provide detailed reasons in that respect. The Government pointed out that the decisions of the administrative authorities had been duly examined by the Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court, which had found that they had been based on the correct interpretation of relevant law. The main issue had been whether the applicant had failed to report to the appropriate pension authorities as required, and whether that issue had been duly examined by the domestic authorities.
2.  The Court’s assessment
(a)  General principles
46.  The Court reiterates that the effect of Article 6 § 1 is, amongst others, to place a “tribunal” under a duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties, without prejudice to its assessment of whether they are relevant for its decision, given that the Court is not called upon to examine whether arguments are adequately met (see Perez v. France [GC], no. 47287/99, § 80, ECHR 2004‑I. and Buzescu v. Romania, no. 61302/00, § 63, 24 May 2005).
47.  Nevertheless, although Article 6 § 1 obliges courts to give reasons for their decisions, it cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument (see Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands, 19 April 1994, §§ 59 and 61, Series A no. 288. and Burg v. France (dec.), no. 34763/02, ECHR 2003-II). The extent to which this duty to give reasons applies may vary depending on the nature of the decision, and must be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 26, ECHR 1999‑I).
(b)  Application of these principles to the present case
48.  The Court notes that the case at issue concerns the termination of payment of unemployment benefit to the applicant under section 128 of the Pension and Disability Insurance Act. In particular, the domestic administrative authorities found, and the Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court upheld, that the applicant had failed to contact the appropriate pension authorities after 24 March 1992 and that therefore, according to the said provision, the payment of his unemployment benefit was terminated with effect from 31 March 1992.
49.  The Court reiterates at the outset that it is not its task to take the place of the domestic courts in interpreting the relevant domestic law (see, among many authorities, Brualla Gómez de la Torre v. Spain, 19 December 1997, § 31, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VIII).
50.  The Court therefore limits itself to observing that there are two central questions when an individual’s right to payment of social benefits under section 128 of the Pension and Disability Insurance Act is terminated. First, whether the insured person has failed to use his or her right within the specified time-limit (see paragraph 22 above and section 39 of the Workers’ Pension and Invalidity Insurance Fund Ordinance), and second, whether he or she has been prevented from using the right at issue by circumstances beyond his or her control (see paragraph 21 above).
51.  In this respect the Court observes that all the domestic authorities’ decisions in the applicant’s case addressed only the first of the above two questions in the application of section 128 of the Pension and Disability Insurance Act, namely whether the applicant contacted the appropriate pension authorities within the prescribed time-limit (see paragraphs 12, 14 and 16 above), while they remained silent on the second question. Although throughout the proceedings the applicant raised that issue, arguing that he had been unable to contact the pension authorities because of circumstances beyond his control, namely the escalating war in Croatia, neither the administrative authorities nor the Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court provided any reasons addressing the applicant’s specific argument.
52.  Given the decisive implications of this argument for the applicant’s case, the Court considers that the administrative authorities and the Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court were required to give a specific and express response, irrespective of what would be their final conclusion (see Lăcătuş and Others v. Romania, no. 12694/04, § 102, 13 November 2012). However, in the absence of any reasons provided by the domestic authorities in this respect the Court is not satisfied that the applicant received a fair hearing.
53.  Accordingly, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION
54.  The applicant complained that the termination of his right to unemployment benefit and the discontinuance of its payment had violated his right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions, as provided in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
55.  Having regard to its findings concerning Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the Court considers that it cannot speculate as to whether or not the applicant had any right to payment of unemployment benefits. In this connection the Court notes that the applicant now has an opportunity to request the reopening of the proceedings in accordance with the relevant domestic law (see paragraphs 23-25 above), which would allow for a fresh examination of his claim. In these circumstances the Court finds that this complaint is not ready for consideration at this stage and should be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention (see Biondić v. Croatia, no. 38355/05, § 31, 8 November 2007).
III.  OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
56.  Lastly, the applicant complained, citing Article 14 of the Convention, that he had been discriminated against in his efforts to obtain unemployment benefit; he also cited Article 13 of the Convention, but without further relevant substantiation.
57.  In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court considers that this part of the application does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention. It follows that it is inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 as manifestly ill-founded, and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
IV.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
58.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A.  Damage
59.  The applicant claimed 12,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage on account of termination of the payment of unemployment benefit. He did not claim compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
60.  The Government considered the applicant’s claim excessive, unfounded and unsubstantiated.
61.  The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.
B.  Costs and expenses
62.  The applicant failed to submit any claim for costs and expenses as required under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1.  Declares the complaint concerning the lack of reasoned judgment, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

3.  Dismisses the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 31 October 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
	Søren Nielsen	Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre
	Registrar	President