FIRST SECTION
CASE OF NOZHKOV v.
RUSSIA
(Application no. 9619/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
19 February 2013
This judgment is final. It may be
subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Nozhkov v. Russia,
The European Court of Human
Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Elisabeth Steiner, President,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 29 January 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no.
9619/05) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Albert Nozhkov (“the applicant”),
on 25 February 2005.
The applicant was represented by Ms E. Goncharova,
a lawyer practising in Yekaterinburg. The Russian Government (“the Government”)
were represented by Mrs V. Milinchuk, former Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
On 22 October 2007 the application was
communicated to the Government. In accordance with
Protocol No. 14, the application was allocated to a Committee.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant lives in the town of Polevskoy in the Sverdlovsk Region.
On 6 September 1999 the applicant lodged an
action before the Polevskoy Town Court (“the Town Court”) against his employer,
a municipal housing company, seeking wage arrears and compensation for
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage due to delays in the payment of his wages.
The case was assigned to Judge U.
It appears that no hearings were held until 5
June 2000. Meanwhile, the applicant amended his claims and submitted additional
evidence on two occasions. He also complained to the Sverdlovsk Regional
Judicial Qualifications Board about inactivity on the part of Judge U.
On 5 June 2000, the Town Court adjourned the
proceedings in order to allow the applicant to correct certain procedural
defects in his claim.
On 5 September 2000 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court
(“the Regional Court”), following a complaint by the applicant, quashed the
decision of 5 June 2000 as unlawful and remitted the case to the Town Court for examination on the merits. The first hearing was scheduled for 22 January
2001. Meanwhile, the applicant amended his claims.
The hearing of 22 January 2001 was adjourned
because of the judge’s involvement in other proceedings and the next hearing
was listed for 28 March 2001.
The hearing of 28 March 2001 was postponed following
an application by the applicant to have his claims amended.
The next hearing, scheduled for 15 May 2001, was
adjourned at the respondent’s request.
The following hearing, listed for 8 November
2001, was adjourned because the respondent failed to appear.
Three hearings fixed for between 13 November
2001 and 17 December 2001 were adjourned at the respondent’s request.
The hearing of 17 December 2001 was cancelled owing
to the judge’s involvement in other proceedings.
The next hearing, scheduled for 19 December 2001,
was adjourned until 11 March 2002 at the applicant’s request, as he was going
away.
Of four hearings scheduled for March and April
2002, one was adjourned at the respondent’s request.
The following hearing, scheduled for 14 June
2002, was adjourned until 4 November 2002 owing to the judge’s involvement in
other proceedings.
Hearings scheduled for 4 and 5 November 2002
were cancelled because the applicant failed to appear, and on 5 November 2002
the Town Court decided to leave the applicant’s action unexamined because he
had failed to appear at two hearings without providing any explanation for his
absence. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, complaining that
in fact he had not been summoned to the two hearings in question.
On 25 March 2003 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court
quashed the decision of 5 November 2002, finding that there was no evidence
that the applicant had been duly summoned to the hearings of 4 and 5 November
2002. The case was returned to Judge U. for an examination on the merits. The
hearing was scheduled for 24 April 2003 and was held as planned.
The hearing scheduled for 19 May 2003 was
adjourned until 20 May 2003 following a request by the applicant to study the
case file.
The next three hearings, scheduled for between
20 May 2003 and 18 June 2003, were adjourned because the respondent failed
to appear.
Hearings fixed for between 30 June 2003 and 2
October 2003 were cancelled owing to the judge’s involvement in other
proceedings. For the same reason, no hearings were held during the periods 21
October 2003 to 13 November 2003 and 24 December 2003 to 20 February 2004.
A hearing scheduled for 12 March 2004 was
adjourned until 15 March 2004 at the applicant’s request.
On 15 March 2004 the applicant amended his
claims. Six further hearings were held as planned.
A hearing scheduled for 7 April 2004 was
adjourned until 9 April 2004 at the applicant’s request.
Three hearings fixed for between 22 April 2004
and 4 June 2004 were cancelled owing to the judge’s involvement in other
proceedings or because he was ill.
On 10 June 2004 the case was reassigned to judge
G. A hearing was scheduled for 23 September 2004.
On 23 September 2004 the Town Court dismissed
the applicant’s action.
On 9 November 2004 the Regional Court upheld the
judgment on appeal.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
Federal Law No. 68-FZ of 30 April 2010, which
entered into force on 4 May 2010, provides that in case of a violation of the
right to trial within a reasonable time or of the right to enforcement of a
final judgment, Russian citizens are entitled to seek compensation for
non-pecuniary damage. Federal Law No. 69-FZ, adopted on the same date,
introduced the pertinent changes into Russian legislation.
Section 6.2 of Federal Law No. 68-FZ provides
that everyone who has a pending application before the European Court of Human
Rights concerning a complaint of the type described in that Law has six months
to bring the complaint before the domestic courts.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant complained that the length of the
proceedings in his case had breached the “reasonable time” requirement of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...
everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ...
tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that the application is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The Government submitted that the length of
proceedings in the present case complied with the “reasonable time” requirement
of Article 6. They noted that the applicant had contributed to the delay in the
proceedings by requesting an adjournment of the proceedings, by amending his
claims and by failing to appear at hearings.
The applicant maintained his complaint.
. The
Court observes that the proceedings in the applicant’s case commenced on
6 September 1999 and ended on 9 November 2004. Their
length thus amounted to five years and two months, during which period the
domestic courts examined the claims at two levels of jurisdiction.
. The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be
assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to
the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the
applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant
in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96,
§ 43, ECHR 2000-VII). In addition, only delays attributable to the State may
justify a finding of a failure to comply with the "reasonable time"
requirement (see, among other authorities, Zimmermann
and Steiner v. Switzerland, 13 July 1983, § 24, Series A no.
66, and Pélissier and Sassi v. France
[GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II).
The Court notes, firstly,
that the issues decided by the courts do not appear to have been particularly
complex.
In so far as the applicant’s conduct is
concerned, the Court accepts that he delayed the
proceedings to some extent by requesting adjournments.
As to the applicant’s lodging of additional claims and applications, it has been the Court’s constant approach that an applicant
cannot be blamed for taking full advantage of the resources afforded by
national law in the defence of his interests (see Skorobogatova
v. Russia, no. 33914/02, § 47, 1 December 2005). Accordingly, the delays attributable to
the applicant amounted to some six months, which appears insignificant in
relation to the overall length of the proceedings.
Turning to the conduct of the authorities, the
Court observes that they were responsible for the
majority of the delays in the proceedings. Firstly, no explanation was provided
with respect to the following periods of inactivity on the part of the District
Court: between 6 September 1999, when the applicant lodged his action, and 5
June 2000, when the proceedings were adjourned; between 5 September 2000, when
the Regional Court remitted the case to the Town Court, and
22 January 2001, the date on which the first hearing was scheduled. There
is nothing in the facts of the case or in the Government’s observations which
would justify such lengthy periods of inactivity, which amounted to thirdteen
months.
Secondly, the Court observes that on 5 December
2002 it was decided to leave the applicant’s action unexamined owing to his
failure to appear at the hearings of 4 and 5 November 2002. However, it appears
that the Regional Court resumed the proceedings on 25 March 2003, after
establishing that there was no evidence that the applicant had been duly
summoned to those hearings by the District Court. Accordingly, the Court
considers that the period of delay between 4 November 2002 and 25 March
2003, caused by a failure to notify the applicant of the hearing dates, was
also attributable to the national authorities.
Lastly, it is clear that numerous hearings were
postponed, leaving wide gaps in the proceedings, on account of the judge’s
other commitments: between January and March in 2001; between June and November
in 2002; between June and October in 2003; and between April and June in 2004.
These postponements caused further delays of some thirteen months. In this
connection, the Court reiterates that it is the States’ duty to organise their
judicial systems in such a way that their courts can meet the requirements of
Article 6 § 1 (see Muti v. Italy, 23 March 1994, § 15, Series A no. 281-C).
As regards what was at
stake for the applicant, the Court notes that the proceedings against his
employer concerned the recovery of wage arrears. It should be reiterated in
this context that special diligence is required in cases relating to labour
disputes in view of the possible consequences which the excessive length of
proceedings may have. Such issues should be dealt with speedily (see Ruotolo v. Italy, 27
February 1992, § 17, Series A no. 230-D).
. Regard
being had to the substantial delays attributed to the authorities and to what
was at stake for the applicant in the case, the Court finds that there was a
violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the excessive length
of the proceedings.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant complained under Article 13 that
he did not have an effective remedy in respect of the length of the proceedings
in his case. The relevant provision reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the]
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national
authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity.”
The Court takes cognisance of the existence of a
new remedy introduced by Federal Laws No. 68-FZ and No. 69-FZ in the wake of
the pilot judgment adopted in the case of Burdov v. Russia (no. 2) (no. 33509/04, ECHR 2009-...). These statutes,
which entered into force on 4 May 2010, set up a new remedy enabling those
concerned to seek compensation for damage sustained as a result of unreasonably
lengthy proceedings or the delayed enforcement of court judgments (see
paragraph 30 above).
The Court observes that in the present case the
parties’ observations in respect of Article 13 were received at the Court
before 4 May 2010 and did not contain any references to the new legislative
development. However, it accepts that since 4 May 2010 the applicant has had a
right to use the new remedy (see paragraph 31 above).
The Court notes that in the pilot judgment cited
above it stated that it would be unfair to request applicants whose cases had
already been pending for many years in the domestic system and who had come to
seek relief at the Court to bring their claims again before domestic tribunals
(Burdov (no. 2), cited above, § 144). In line with this
principle, the Court decided to examine the present application on its merits
and has found a violation of the substantive provision of the Convention.
Having regard to these special circumstances,
the Court does not find it necessary to examine separately the applicant’s
complaint under Article 13 of the Convention (see Utyuzhnikova v. Russia,
no. 25957/03, § 52, 7 October 2010).
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there
has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial
reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The applicant claimed 3,000 euros (EUR) in
respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Government did not make any comments on the
claims.
Referring to its established case-law, the Court
accepts that the applicant suffered some distress and frustration on account of
the unreasonable length of the proceedings. Deciding on an equitable basis, the
Court awards the applicant EUR 2,600.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant did not make a claim in respect of
costs and expenses. Accordingly, there is no call to make an award under this
head.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there is no need for a separate
examination of the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State
is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 2,600 (two thousand six
hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of
non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the
respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 19 February
2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André Wampach Elizabeth
Steiner
Deputy Registrar President
