FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF
B.B. AND F.B. v. GERMANY
(Applications nos.
18734/09 and 9424/11)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
14 March 2013
This judgment will become final in
the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may
be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of B.B. and F.B. v. Germany,
The European Court of Human
Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mark Villiger, President,
Angelika Nußberger,
Boštjan M. Zupančič,
Ganna Yudkivska,
Paul Lemmens,
Helena Jäderblom,
Aleš Pejchal, judges,
and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 19 February 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in two applications
(nos. 18734/09 and 9424/11) against the Federal Republic of Germany lodged
with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Austrian nationals,
Mr B. B. and Mrs F. B. (“the applicants”), on 31 March 2009 and 22 December
2010 respectively. The President of the Section acceded to the applicants’
request not to have their names disclosed (Rule 47 § 3 of the Rules of Court).
The applicants, who had been granted legal aid,
were represented by Ms S. Thomas, a lawyer practising in Duisburg. The German
Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Mr H.-J.
Behrens and Ms K. Behr, of the Federal Ministry of Justice.
The applicants alleged, in particular, that the decisions
on the withdrawal of parental authority violated their right to respect for their
family life, contrary to Article 8 of the Convention.
On 1 March 2012 the applications were
communicated to the Government. Having been informed of their right to submit
written observations, the Austrian Government replied that they did not wish to
exercise this right.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicants,
who were originally of Turkish origins, were born in 1966 and 1976 respectively
and live in Duisburg.
A. Proceedings relating to the withdrawal of parental authority
On 23 May 2008 the Municipal Authority of Krefeld
lodged a request with the Krefeld Family Court to withdraw the applicants’
parental rights over their two children, a daughter (born in 1996) and a son
(born in 2000). According to information provided by the girl’s headmistress,
their father systematically beat both children if they did not achieve good
school grades. The school had already received information during the previous
semester that the girl had been beaten. As the girl’s parents appeared to be
well adjusted and overly polite, the school did not react immediately, but
decided to observe the child more closely. It was thus observed that the
children’s family closely supervised the girl via her mobile phone.
Furthermore, the father had taken the girl out of biology class because the
curriculum provided for sexual education. The girl was not allowed to leave on
a school trip and was reported sick instead.
When a teacher caught the girl in the act of
manipulating the marks of a school exam, she opened up to her teacher. The girl
further reported that her brother was under even more pressure to achieve good
grades and was punished “draconically” if he did not comply. The headmistress
contacted the Society for the Protection of Children in Krefeld, which had
informed the Youth Office.
By interim order of 23 May 2008 the Krefeld
District Court, in its capacity as a family court, and referring to the reasons
submitted in the Municipal Authority’s request, temporarily withdrew the
applicants’ parental rights over their two children and transferred them to the
Youth Office.
On 28 May 2008, the Youth Office fetched the two
children from their respective schools and brought them to a children’s home.
On that same day, the Youth Office informed the second applicant by telephone
and in person about the reasons for the placement. The children’s whereabouts
were not disclosed to the applicants. The second applicant insisted that they
had never beaten the children.
On 2 June 2008 the applicants, in the main
proceedings, represented by counsel, submitted to the District Court that it
was true that they considered it important that their children performed well
at school. However, they had never been violent towards the children. They
further submitted two medical attestations by their family physician Dr D.
dated 29 May 2008, certifying that she had seen both children regularly in
her medical practice. Both children had made a balanced, stable and cheerful
impression. There was no indication that they had suffered from any violent
acts. The physician further noted that she had further examined the boy by
sonograph. There were no indications of any use of force against the boy, there
had been neither hematoma, nor injuries nor bruises. The applicants further
submitted medical attestations to demonstrate that the girl had indeed been ill
at the dates she had not attended the school trip. They further submitted a
number of school reports in order to demonstrate that the children had good
grades, showed adequate social behaviour and had rarely been absent from
school. They finally submitted that the children regularly attended sports
classes. The applicants suggested that there was the possibility that the girl
had made the whole story up when she was caught in the act of manipulating
school grades.
On 8 July 2008, during a first hearing before
the District Court, the parties agreed that the court should hear the children
in person.
On 16 July 2008, the District Court judge heard
the two children in the absence of the other parties to the proceedings.
According to the court minutes, both children were heard separately. The girl stated
that the applicants exerted considerable pressure on her to achieve good school
grades. As soon as she did not deliver the requested results, her father beat
her both with his hands and with objects. In the previous years, her father had
beaten her on the soles of her feet with an iron rod. Following this, she had
to put her feet into cold water in order to avoid marks. At one occasion, her
mother had whipped her legs. She further submitted that she was feeling at ease
in the children’s home and that she did not want to return home for fear of
further violence.
The boy stated that, since entering school, he
had been permanently beaten if he did not achieve the best school grades. His
father had also used objects like an iron rod. He did not want to return home
as long as his father remained violent.
On 22 July 2008, the applicants wrote a letter
to the District Court in which they denied having ever beaten the children.
They submitted that their daughter was lying and that she manipulated her
brother. Doctors who could confirm that they had never detected any sign of
physical abuse had regularly examined both children. They had regularly
attended school and sports classes without the teachers detecting any sign of
abuse. The applicants further referred to a staff member of the municipality’s
psychological service who had repeatedly examined the boy without detecting any
physical abuse.
On 4 August 2008, the Krefeld District Court, in
the main proceedings, withdrew the applicants’ parental authority over their
two children and transferred it to the Youth Office. Based on its own
examination, in particular the hearing of the two children, the court was
convinced that the applicants had repeatedly acted violently towards their
children. Following the children’s entry into school, the parents had exerted
considerable pressure that culminated in corporal punishment if the children
did not achieve the expected school results. Both children had inter alia
been beaten on the soles of their feet with an iron rod.
As the court was convinced that the children’s
statements reflected the truth, it did not deem it necessary to obtain expert
opinion on their credibility. Both children had confirmed their statements in
their mother’s presence before the Youth Office. It could be excluded that the
boy had been influenced by his older sister, as the Youth Office employees had
paid express attention that the children were not in a position to discuss the
events before the boy had also been interrogated. Even taking into account that
the girl might be endowed with a vivid imagination, the court ruled out that
the girl could have falsely accused her parents over such a long period of time.
Her statements were rather characterised by a tendency to exculpate her
parents.
Having regard to these facts, the court
considered that the applicants were currently incapable of raising their
children and that it would seriously jeopardise the children’s welfare to
return them to the applicants’ household.
On 17 September 2008, the applicants,
represented by counsel, lodged an appeal. On 8 October 2008, the applicants
submitted that the impugned decision was based on incorrect facts. In
particular, the children had never been interrogated in their mother’s
presence. Furthermore, the District Court had failed sufficiently to examine
the relevant facts before taking the decision on the definite withdrawal of
parental rights. In the present case, it was indispensable to hear expert
opinion on the children’s credibility.
At no point in time had there been any objective
facts such as bruises, injuries, frequent absences from school etc., which
might indicate physical abuse. Any medical practitioner could confirm that even
the submersion in cold water could not prevent the appearance of bruises if the
children had indeed been beaten with an iron rod. Furthermore, such treatment
would entail reduced mobility, feelings of numbness and pain. No such symptoms
had ever been observed on the children.
As the parents vehemently denied having ever
beaten their children, there was no objective indication for the alleged abuse
other than the children’s own statements. Before taking such a drastic decision
as the withdrawal of parental authority, the applicants thus deemed it
necessary to assess the children’s credibility by hearing expert opinion.
On 6 November 2008, the Düsseldorf Court of
Appeal rejected the applicants’ appeal. The Court of Appeal considered that the
District Court, having heard the applicants and the children in person, had put
forward relevant reasons justifying the withdrawal of parental authority under
section 1666 of the Civil Code (see relevant domestic law, below).
The Court of Appeal confirmed the District Court’s
assessment of the evidence. It did not consider it decisive that the District
Court had assumed that the statements had also been made in the mother’s presence.
There were no indications that the children, in
particular the girl, would wrongly accuse the applicants. This followed from
the reasons relied upon by the District Court and in particular from the fact
that the children, who were fully aware of the consequences of their
allegations, repeated these allegations over a longer period of time in a
self-consistent way. Under these circumstances, it could be ruled out that the
children had invented and maintained their allegations merely because they had
been afraid of the teacher’s reaction to the girl’s attempts to manipulate her
school marks.
According to the Court of Appeal, the District
Court had not been obliged further to examine the facts. It was, in particular,
irrelevant whether the attending medical practitioners had detected any
injuries in the course of regular consultations, as the abusive acts need not
have provoked any visible signs, furthermore as such signs could have been
overlooked or could have occurred at times when no medical consultation was
imminent.
Neither was the District Court obliged to hear
expert opinion on the children’s trustworthiness. According to the Federal
Court of Justice’s case law, it was up to the courts to assess witness evidence
and to establish the trustworthiness of witnesses. Expert opinion was only
necessary if there were concrete indications that could call into question the
reliability of a witness statement and if specific expert knowledge was
necessary to establish these factors and their impact on the witness statement’s
content. Such a concrete indication could not be derived from the mere fact
that the witness was a child or juvenile. In the absence of any concrete
circumstances to the contrary, both the District Court and the Court of Appeal
were in a position to assess the credibility of the statements made by the
children before the District Court without having recourse to expert help.
On 3 March 2009, the Federal Constitutional
Court refused to accept the applicants’ constitutional complaint for
adjudication without giving further reasons.
B. Subsequent events
On 17 March 2009, the applicants lodged a
request with the District Court to be granted contact rights with the children.
During a hearing before that court on 7 July 2009, a first meeting between the
parents, the children and the Youth Office was arranged for 16 July 2009.
During the meeting on 16 July 2009, the daughter
confessed that she had lied and that the allegations she had made the previous
year had not been true. The son confirmed this. The daughter further submitted
one letter to her parents and one to the District Court, in which she confessed
to having lied and in which she expressed her wish to return to her family.
On 28 August 2009, both children confirmed
before the District Court Judge that their parents had never beaten them. The parties
agreed to extend contacts between the applicants and their children with a view
to return the children to the parental household.
On 9 October 2009, the children returned to the
applicants’ household. On 13 April 2010, the District Court lifted its decision
of 4 August 2008 and restored the applicants’ parental authority.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
Section 1666 of the Civil Code provides that in
cases of a danger to the child’s welfare the court shall order the necessary
measures. Pursuant to section 1666a § 1 measures which entail a separation of
the child from the parents are only permitted if the danger cannot be averted
by other means, including assistance by public authorities. The complete care
for the child (gesamte Personensorge) may only be withdrawn if other
measures proved unsuccessful or if it has to be assumed that they are
insufficient to avert the danger (section 1666a § 2).
Under section 26 of the Rules of Procedure on
Family Affairs, the family courts are obliged to carry out on their own motion all
investigations necessary to establish the relevant facts.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicants complained that the withdrawal of
parental authority violated their right to respect for their family life as
provided in Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
The Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that the applicants lodged two
applications with the Court, the first one (no. 18734/09) relating to their
children’s placement into public care and the second one (no. 9242/11) to their
having been denied compensation by the national authorities. Having regard to
the subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to join
them.
The Court considers that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The applicants’ submissions
The applicants complained, in particular, that
the domestic authorities had failed sufficiently to examine the relevant facts.
The Youth Office and the family courts exclusively relied on the children’s own
statements, which were not corroborated by any factual evidence. Conversely,
the parents had constantly denied any allegations of domestic violence.
In the instant case, there were sufficient
reasons to mistrust the children’s allegations. The girl’s diary, which had in
part been submitted to the courts, did not contain any indication that she had
suffered violence. The family physician did not find any indications of any
form of abuse. The medical attestations had been submitted to the courts. It
had further been established that the children regularly took part in leisure activities.
The same applied to the children’s class reports and to the fact that they had
only rarely missed school. If they really had been subjected to the alleged
abuse, they would necessarily have been absent from school for prolonged
periods of time.
The applicants further pointed out that the
domestic courts refused to raise any further evidence. Neither the children’s
teachers nor the family practitioner had been formally heard. The courts
ignored the medical attestations and did not make any enquiries in the children’s
sports clubs. Furthermore, they did not take into account that the staff member
of the municipality’s psychological service, who knew both children, did not
find any indication of physical abuse.
Furthermore, the domestic authorities had failed
to exclude the possibility of the children’s agreeing on what to say in court
in advance and to hear the children separately. Contrary to the District Court’s
assumption, the children had been able to communicate using the Turkish
language when they had been taken in the Youth Office’s care.
2. The Government’s submissions
According to the Government, the withdrawal of
parental authority had been necessary to protect the children’s welfare. The
Government pointed out that the Court, in its case-law, had emphasised the
primary importance of the children’s welfare when striking a fair balance
between the interests at stake. The domestic decisions in the instant case had
exclusively been taken to serve the children’s best interests.
The District Court had heard all parties to the
proceedings. The children’s statements made both before the Youth Office and
before the judge were sufficient to allow the court’s conclusions that the
children’s welfare was seriously jeopardised. Both children had described how
they had been beaten by their parents. There was no reason to take further
evidence. The Government pointed out that the examination of the facts by the
District Court had to be viewed from an ex ante perspective. Therefore
the fact that the children stated in 2009, one year later, that they had lied
in court, could not be taken into consideration.
At the time the District Court took its
decision, there were no grounds for the judge to doubt the children’s
credibility. The court heard the children separately from one another and in
the absence of other persons. During the hearings, both children described the
same facts. If these statements were really false statements, the family judge
would have had to assume that the children had jointly agreed on their
testimony beforehand. This, however, was not a realistic assumption in the case
of an 8-year-old and a 12-year-old child. Beside this, the children’s
statements were in line with their earlier statements before the Youth Office. It
furthermore had to be considered that the children had already been separated
from their parents for two months. Accordingly, at least the 12-year-old
daughter must have been aware of the consequences of a false statement.
Finally, the children’s submissions were also considered credible by the
children’s teacher and by the head of counselling of the Society for the
Protection of Children in Krefeld, who had informed the Youth Office. The
children’s later submissions consistently matched those given in court.
The Government considered that the fact alone
that minors were heard in court did not automatically imply that they could not
be believed and that an expert opinion on their credibility had to be ordered. On
the basis of the children’s fully credible statements, the domestic courts had
to assume that the applicants had subjected them to severe violence. It follows
that the decision was necessary and proportionate at the time in order to
protect the children’s best interests.
3. Assessment by the Court
The Court observes, at the outset, that the
Government does not contest that the withdrawal of parental authority
interfered with the applicant’s right to respect for their family life under
Article 8 of the Convention. The Court endorses this assessment. Any such
interference will constitute a violation of Article 8 unless it is “in
accordance with the law”, pursued an aim or aims that are legitimate under
paragraph 2 of this provision and can be regarded as “necessary in a democratic
society”.
The Court observes that the challenged measure
conformed to the requirements of domestic law and pursued the legitimate aim of
protecting the rights of others, namely those of the applicants’ two children. The
Court reiterates that the question whether an interference was “necessary in a
democratic society” requires consideration of whether, in the light of the case
as a whole, the reasons adduced to justify the measures were “relevant and
sufficient” and whether the decision-making process was fair and afforded due
respect to the applicants’ rights under Article 8 of the Convention.
In considering the reasons adduced to justify
the measures, and in assessing the decision-making process, the Court will give
due account to the fact that the national authorities had the benefit of direct
contact with all of the persons concerned. It is not the Court’s task to
substitute itself for the domestic authorities in the exercise of their responsibilities
regarding custody issues (compare, among many other authorities, Haase v.
Germany, no. 11057/02, § 89, ECHR 2004-III). The Court reiterates
that the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation when assessing the
necessity of taking a child into care. A stricter scrutiny is called for,
however, in respect of any further limitations, such as restrictions placed by
those authorities on parental rights of access (see, for example, Elsholz v. Germany
[GC], no. 25735/94, § 64, ECHR 2000-VIII and A.D. and O.D. v.
the United Kingdom, no. 28680/06, § 83,
16 March 2010).
The Court further reiterates that mistaken
judgments or assessments by professionals do not per se render childcare
measures incompatible with the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention. The
authorities, both medical and social, have duties to protect children and
cannot be held liable every time genuine and reasonably held concerns about the
safety of children vis-à-vis members of their family are proved,
retrospectively, to have been misguided (R.K. and A.K. v. the United Kingdom, no. 38000/05, § 36, 30 September 2008 and A.D. and O.D., cited
above, § 84). It follows that the domestic decisions can only be examined in
the light of the situation such as it presented itself to the domestic authorities
at the time these decisions were taken.
Turning to the circumstances of the present
case, the Court observes that the domestic authorities were confronted with at
least prima facie credible allegations of severe physical abuse. The Court
thus considers that the Krefeld District Court, on the basis of the children’s
serious allegations, had sufficient reasons immediately to remove the children
from their family by interim order in order to prevent possible further abuse.
It follows that the interim order issued by the District Court on 23 May 2008
did not violate the applicants’ rights under Article 8 of the Convention.
It remains to be determined whether the decision
given in the main proceedings on the definite withdrawal of parental authority sufficiently
safeguarded the applicants’ rights under Article 8 of the Convention. The Court
observes that the only evidence relied upon by the Krefeld District Court when
giving its decision of 4 August 2008 were the personal statements made by the
two children before the Youth Office and before the District Court. There was
no objective evidence for the alleged abuse. The Court further observes that,
while the District Court had the benefit of direct contact with the children,
the Court of Appeal based its assessment exclusively on the content of the
case-file, without re-hearing the children in person. The applicants, for their
part, relied on the statement of the children’s attending physicians and of a
psychologist, who had examined the boy on several occasions and did not detect
any sign of abuse. They further pointed out that the children had regularly
attended school and sports activities. Furthermore, it was not contested before
the domestic courts that the girl had a vivid imagination. The Court considers
that these facts were capable of casting doubts as to the truthfulness of the
children’s allegations.
The Court further observes that the domestic
courts, when deciding in the main proceedings, were not pressed to render an
overly hasty decision once the children had been placed in the safety of a
children’s home. The Court further observes that the German family courts,
under section 26 of their Rules of Procedure (see paragraph 33, above), are
under an obligation to carry out on their own motion all investigations
necessary to establish the relevant facts and that the Government have not
submitted any factual reasons which could have prevented the domestic courts
from further investigating the facts before taking a decision in the main
proceedings. Under these circumstances, and having regard to the serious impact
the complete withdrawal of the applicants’ parental rights had on the family as
a whole, the Court considers that the domestic courts, in the main proceedings,
did not provide sufficient reasons for withdrawing the applicant’s parental
rights.
There has accordingly been a violation of
Article 8 of the Convention.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The applicants further complained under Article 8 of the
Convention about having been denied any access to their children during their
placement in public care. They further complained under Article 14 of the
Convention about having been discriminated against vis à vis parents of
German origin. They finally complained under Article 3 of Protocol No. 7 to the
Convention about having been denied compensation for the erroneous decision of
the German courts.
However, in the light of all the material in its
possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its
competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a
violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its
Protocols.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4
of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there
has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial
reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The applicants claimed an overall sum of 35,923.74
euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage. They submitted that they had to
move to another town, as they could not bear continuing living in Krefeld after having lost their children. They financed the expenses for the move to a new apartment
including the acquisition of new furniture and additional expenses, and the
residential costs for their children to the Youth Office amounting to EUR 1,834.93,
by a loan amounting to EUR 21,095.34. They further submitted that the
first applicant lost employment due to considerable traumatisation and
calculated their loss in earnings to EUR 14,828.40.
The Government submitted that there was no
causal connection between the alleged violation and the move, the latter being
based on the applicants’ voluntary decision. They further submitted that the
applicants had failed to substantiate the alleged loss of earnings and the
causal connection between the alleged violation of their Convention rights and
the applicant’s loss of employment.
The Court does not discern any sufficient causal
link between the violation found, the applicants’ move, the acquisition of new
furniture, the costs of the personal loan and the alleged loss of earnings. On
the other hand, it awards the applicants EUR 1,834.93 in respect of the residential
costs paid for the children’s accommodation under public care.
The applicant further claimed the sum of EUR
55,000 each in respect of non-pecuniary damage. They submitted that they had
been separated from their children for 497 days, that they had to live with the
fact that their daughter had been sexually abused while in public care, that
they had to move home and that the first applicant lost his employment.
The Government considered the sum claimed by the
applicants to be excessive. Given the fact that the domestic courts did not
have any reasons to doubt the credibility of the children’s allegation, they
considered that it was not indicated to award non-pecuniary damages in the
instant case.
The Court considers that the applicants must have
felt a considerable amount of anxiety and frustration due to the violation of
their rights before the domestic courts. Having further regard to the
far-reaching consequences of the impugned decisions for the applicants’ family
as a whole, the Court, ruling on an equitable basis, awards each of the
applicants EUR 25,000 under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicants, relying on documentary evidence,
claimed EUR 3,078.74 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic
courts. They further claimed a lump sum of EUR 300 for transport costs,
postage, paper and doctor’s fees.
The Government considered that the applicants
had only substantiated legal expenses amounting to EUR 2,095.41.
According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant
is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has
been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the
documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it
reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,095.41 for costs and expenses in the
domestic proceedings.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Decides to join the applications;
2. Declares the complaint under Article 8 of
the Convention about the withdrawal of parental authority admissible and the
remainder of the applications inadmissible;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 8 of the Convention;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts:
(i) EUR 1,834.93 (one thousand eight hundred
thirty-four euros and ninety-three cents), plus any tax that may be chargeable,
jointly to both applicants in respect of
pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 25,000 (twenty-five thousand euros), plus
any tax that may be chargeable, to each applicant in respect of non-pecuniary
damage;
(iii) EUR 2,095.41 (two thousand and ninety-five
euros and forty-one cents), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants,
jointly to both applicants in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 March 2013,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia
Westerdiek Mark Villiger
Registrar President
