FIRST SECTION
CASE OF
VERSHININ v. RUSSIA
(Application no.
9311/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
11 April 2013
This judgment is final but
it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Vershinin v. Russia,
The European Court of Human
Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Elisabeth Steiner, President,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Ksenija Turković, judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 19 March 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no.
9311/05) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Leonid Vladimirovich Vershinin
(“the applicant”), on 18 February 2005.
The Russian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by Mrs V. Milinchuk, former Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
On 25 February 2008 the application was
communicated to the Government. In accordance with Protocol No. 14, the application was
allocated to a Committee.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Moscow.
The applicant inherited a house in the Moscow
Region from Ms B.M. in her will. On an unspecified date he moved into it.
In 1990 B.S., the stepson of B.M., brought an
action against the applicant for recovery of the property in issue, claiming
that his inheritance rights had been breached and that the will was illegal.
The matter was considered repeatedly by the courts
and on 23 May 1997 the Khimky Town Court (“the Town Court”) granted B.S.’s
claims. The applicant lodged a supervisory-review complaint.
On 23 June 1998 the Presidium of the Moscow
Regional Court quashed the judgment of 23 May 1997 for breach of procedural law
and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. It appears the property was
subject to an interim injunction which was still maintained by the court.
Three hearings fixed for between 7 October 1998
and 18 May 1999, were adjourned owing to both the applicant’s and plaintiff’s failure
to appear.
Hearings scheduled for 9 July 1999 and 16 October
1999 were postponed owing to the applicant’s failure to appear.
Seven hearings fixed for between 16 November
1999 and 11 July 2000 were adjourned owing to the third parties’ and the plaintiff’s
failure to appear, and the need to collect additional evidence.
On 12 May 2000 the Town Court dismissed the
applicant’s applications for the civil proceedings to be discontinued and the
interim injunction lifted. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision
which was upheld on 30 May 2000.
On 11 July 2000 the Town Court dismissed B.S.’s
claims.
On 10 May 2001 the Moscow Regional Court (“the Regional
Court”) quashed the judgment of 11 July 2000 on appeal and remitted the matter
for fresh consideration.
Three hearings fixed for between July and
December 2002 did not take place owing to the applicant’s failure to appear,
and one was held as planned.
A hearing scheduled for 15 March 2002 was
adjourned until 24 April 2002 owing to the applicant’s failure to appear.
A hearing scheduled for 24 April 2002 was
postponed until 4 June 2002 owing to the judge’s involvement in other
proceedings.
A hearing was held as planned on 4 June 2002.
The court rejected the applicant’s application for the discontinuation of the
proceedings.
Of eleven hearings fixed for between September
2002 and August 2004, three were adjourned owing to the applicant’s failure to
appear.
On 4 August 2004 the trial court held a hearing
in the applicant’s absence and granted B.S.’s claims. According to the
applicant, he had not been duly summoned to that hearing.
On 18 October 2004 the Moscow Regional Court
upheld the judgment of 4 August 2004 on appeal. The applicant brought a
supervisory-review complaint.
On 16 March 2005 the Presidium of the Moscow
Regional Court quashed the judgments of 4 August and 18 October 2004 by way of
supervisory review for breach of material and procedural law, and remitted the
matter for fresh consideration. The hearing was listed for 30 May 2005.
The hearing of 30 May 2005 was adjourned owing to
the third parties’ failure to appear.
A hearing scheduled for 28 June 2005 was
postponed until 1 August 2005 as the plaintiff was ill.
On 1 August 2005 the Town Court held a hearing
and left B.S.’s action without examination owing to his failure to appear
without valid reasons.
On the same date the applicant requested the
trial court to lift the injunction. On 15 August 2005 his request was granted.
On 31 March 2006 B.S. informed the Town Court that he had failed to attend the hearing because of illness and asked it to quash
the decision of 1 August 2005.
Of four hearings fixed for between May and July
2006, two were postponed owing to the applicant’s failure to appear and two
were held in his absence. According to the applicant, he was not duly summoned
to those hearings.
On 29 June 2006 the Town Court quashed the decision
of 1 August 2005.
On 27 July 2006 the Town Court decided to discontinue
the civil proceedings. The court found that B.S. had no legal standing under
domestic law to challenge the legality of B.M.’s will because his rights and
interests had not been affected by the impugned will: he was not related by kinship
to Ms B.M. and was not listed in her will.
On 26 October 2006 the Regional Court upheld that
decision on appeal.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant complained that the length of the
proceedings in his case had breached the “reasonable time” requirement as
provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which
reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...
everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ...
tribunal ...”
The Court observes that the proceedings consisting
commenced on unspecified date in 1990 and ended on 27 July 2006. The part of
the proceedings that occurred before 5 May 1998, the date of entry of the Convention into force in respect
of Russia, has to be excluded from the overall length. The
periods from 5 May 1998 to 23 June 1998 and from 18 October 2004 to 16 March
2005 have to be also excluded from the overall length as the case was being
examined on application for supervisory review and not pending. Thus, the
aggregate length of the proceedings within the Court’s competence ratione
temporis amounts approximately to seven years when the applicant’s case was
considered three times by the first-instance and the appeal courts and twice by
the supervisory review court.
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The Government disagreed with the complaint. In
particular, they argued that the applicant’s case had been complex and required
participation of experts, witnesses and third parties. The complexity of the
case was evidenced by the fact that the courts had had to consider it on several
occasions. According to the Government, the domestic courts had not displayed
any negligence or procrastination. They further noted that the applicant was
responsible for the significant part of the delay caused by his failure to
attend numerous hearings.
The applicant maintained his complaint.
The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of
the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of
the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the
case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at
stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000VII).
The Court considers that even though the
applicant’s case involved participation of experts, witnesses and third parties,
as argued by the Government, it was not particularly complex. Notably, the
Court observes that the proceedings were ultimately discontinued owing to the finding
that plaintiff lacked legal standing under domestic law because he was not
related by kinship to his stepmother, Ms B.M., and was not listed in her will. The
Court does not consider that this question of fact was so complex to determine as
to justify the overall length of the proceedings.
As to the applicant’s conduct, the Court accepts
that during the proceedings he defaulted on numerous occasions, which thwarted
the progress of the case to a certain extent.
Turning to the conduct of the authorities, while
the Court it does not detect any obvious procrastination on the part of the
courts in scheduling the hearings and resolving the parties’ motions, it takes
cognisance of the fact that the first-instance judgments were set aside three
times either by the appeal or by the supervisory-review courts for breaches of
the law. In this respect the Court reiterates that the Convention and its
Protocols must be interpreted as guaranteeing rights which are practical and
effective as opposed to theoretical and illusory. The right to have one’s claim
examined within a reasonable time would be devoid of all sense if domestic
courts examined a case endlessly, even if at the end the length of proceedings
per instance did not appear particularly excessive (see, mutatis mutandis,
Svetlana Orlova v. Russia, no.
4487/04, § 47, 30 July 2009).
Although the Court is not in a position to
analyse the juridical quality of the domestic courts’ decisions, it considers
that multiple repetition of re-examination orders within one set of proceedings
may disclose a deficiency in the judicial system (see Falimonov
v. Russia, no. 11549/02, § 58, 25 March 2008). This is all the
more true in the present case where the proceedings were subsequently
discontinued due to the simple fact that they had been initiated by a party
that had had no legal standing. The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion
that the repeated referrals of the case to the first instance significantly
contributed to the length at hand.
While the Court acknowledges that the applicant delayed
the proceedings to a certain extent by defaulting on numerous occasions, it
considers that the above mentioned defects in the authorities’ handling of the
case were serious enough to lead to a breach of the “reasonable time”
requirement.
There has accordingly been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of unreasonable length of
proceedings.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant also complained that that the
domestic courts had delivered judgments on the basis of inadmissible evidence
and in contradiction with the applicable rules of territorial jurisdiction and
their failure to decide the case on the merits for over fifteen years amounted
to inhuman treatment.
Having regard to all the materials in its
possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within its competence, the
Court finds that there is no appearance of a violation of the rights and
freedoms set out in these provisions in that respect. It follows that this part
of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant
to Article 35 §§ 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there
has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial
reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”
A. Damage
In respect of pecuniary damage the applicant claimed
1,676,623 Russian roubles (RUB) and 463,500 United States Dollars (USD) which
represented his income and property loss and property tax payments. The
applicant also claimed RUB 10,000,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Government contested the amounts as
excessive and unfounded.
In respect of the claim for pecuniary damage,
the Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the
damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.
In respect of the claim for non-pecuniary
damage, the Court accepts that the applicant suffered some distress and
frustration caused by the unreasonable length of the proceedings. Deciding on
an equitable basis, the Court awards 2,100 euros (EUR).
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant also claimed RUB 5,118 and USD
11,500 for the costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings.
The Government disputed the amount as
unsubstantiated
Regard being had to the documents in its
possession and to its case-law, the Court rejects the applicant’s claim
for costs and expenses as there is no indication that
they were incurred in seeking redress in respect of the violation found.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint concerning the
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State
is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 2,100 (two thousand one
hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of
non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the
respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 April 2013,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André Wampach Elisabeth
Steiner
Deputy Registrar President
