SECOND SECTION
CASE OF
FEHÉR v. HUNGARY
(Application no.
69095/10)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
2 July 2013
This judgment will become
final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Fehér v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human
Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Guido Raimondi, President,
Peer Lorenzen,
Dragoljub Popović,
András Sajó,
Nebojša Vučinić,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
Helen Keller, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 11 June 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no.
69095/10) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article
34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Mr Sándor Fehér (“the
applicant”), on 22 November 2010.
The applicant was represented by Mr G. Magyar, a
lawyer practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were
represented Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and Justice.
The applicant alleged that his detention in
overcrowded cells amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, in breach of
Article 3 of the Convention.
On 5 September 2011 the application was
communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Szolnok.
When introducing the application, he was detained at Állampuszta Prison.
On 19 September 2006 the applicant was detained
on charges of robbery and other offences. On 28 October 2009 he was finally
convicted and sentenced to six years and eight months’ imprisonment.
Between 19 September 2006 and 23 October 2008 he
was held in pre-trial detention at Szolnok Prison (Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok
Megyei Büntetés-végrehajtási Intézet) in cells with ground surfaces ranging
from 6.33 to 7.25 m2 for four inmates (that is, approximately
1.7 m2 per person on average).
The applicant stated that he could leave the cell for only one
hour daily and submitted corroborating statements to that effect from two
fellow inmates.
The Government submitted that, during almost one year and nine
months out of this period, the applicant was allowed to spend three hours daily
outside his cell and another hour outdoors.
Under section 239(2) of Decree no. 6/1996. (VII.12.) IM of the
Minister of Justice, it is at the prison governor’s discretion whether or not
to keep open during the day the doors of cells accommodating those in pre-trial
detention.
After a short stay at Tököl Prison Hospital, the
applicant was moved to Állampuszta Prison. Between 3 November 2008 and 23 July
2009 he was detained in cells whose ground surfaces were 24 m2 for ten
inmates (according to the applicant; that is, 2.4 m2 per person) or
30.24 m2 for fourteen inmates (according to the Government; that is,
2.16 m2 per person). The inmates were free to leave their cells
during the day.
Between 24 July and 21 December 2009 the
applicant was held at Tiszalök Prison in good conditions.
Between 21 December 2009 and 10 September 2010
he was held at Budapest Prison (Budapesti Fegyház és Börtön) in a 25 m2
cell for ten inmates (that is, 2.5 m2 per person). He could freely
move within the block during the day.
After a short stay at Fővárosi
Büntetés-végrehajtási Intézet, the applicant was returned to Állampuszta
Prison on 20 September 2010, where he has stayed ever since.
cell with ten other inmates (that is, 2.75 m2 per person). He can
move around freely in the block during the day.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant complained that his detention
under cramped conditions amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment in breach
of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.”
The Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that the application is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The applicant submitted that his detention in
overcrowded cells, especially in the period between 19 September 2006 and 23
October 2008, had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, aggravated by
the fact that the time he could spend outside the cell had been very limited.
The Government contested these views in general
terms and submitted that the applicant’s situation had been mitigated by the
fact that he could spend a substantial amount of time outside the cells,
crowded or not, the material conditions of which were otherwise satisfactory.
As the Court has held on many occasions, Article
3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a
democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the
victim’s behaviour (see Labita v. Italy
[GC], no. 26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000-IV).
The Court further recalls that, according to its
case-law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to
fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. The assessment of this
minimum level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of
the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental
effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim.
Furthermore, in considering whether treatment is “degrading” within the meaning
of Article 3, the Court will have regard to whether its object is to
humiliate and debase the person concerned and whether, as far as the
consequences are concerned, it adversely affected his or her personality in a
manner incompatible with Article 3. However, the absence of such a purpose
cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3 (see Peers v. Greece, no. 28524/95,
§§ 67-68, 74, ECHR 2001-III).
The Court has consistently stressed that a
breach of Article 3 of the Convention would generally involve suffering and humiliation
beyond that which is inevitably connected with a given form of legitimate
treatment or punishment. Measures depriving a person of his or her liberty may
often involve such elements. Thus, under this provision, the State must ensure
that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for
human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do
not subject the individual to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding
the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the
practical demands of imprisonment, the prisoner’s health and well-being are
adequately secured (see Kudła v. Poland
[GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 92-94, ECHR
2000-XI).
The Court notes that at Szolnok Prison, the
applicant was accommodated for over two years and one month in cells with 1.7 m2
ground surface per person on average (see paragraph 7 above). It observes by
contrast that the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“the CPT”) considers 4 m2
living space per inmate an acceptable minimum standard in multi-occupancy cells
(see, for example, in respect of other Hungarian prisons, paragraphs 65 and 80
of the Report to the Hungarian Government on the visit to Hungary carried out
by the CPT from 24 March to 2 April 2009).
For the Court, the living space available to the applicant in
this instance was so limited that it cannot be considered as sufficiently
mitigated by the time spent outside the cell, even if accepting the Government’s
version in this respect, referring to an allowance of four hours a day for the
greater part of the period.
The Court further notes that, in so far as the situation of
those in pre-trial detention is concerned, it is at the prison governor’s
discretion whether or not to keep the doors of cells open during the day, even
if there is obvious overcrowding (see paragraph 7 above). In the Court’s eyes,
this deference falls short of the requisite guarantees in circumstances such as
the present one, the overcrowding amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment.
As regards the remaining periods, the Court
observes that at Állampuszta Prison (3 November 2008 to 23 July 2009) the
applicant had 2.16 or 2.4 m2 living space at his disposal (see
paragraph 8 above); at Budapest Prison, 2.5 m2 (see paragraph 10
above); and at Állampuszta Prison (from 20 September 2010 onwards), 2.75 m2
(see paragraph 11 above). In all these instances, the applicant could spend the
greater part of the day outside the cells. This circumstance reduces in the
Court’s eyes the impact of the cramped conditions. However, it cannot overlook
the fact that the available living space fell in each case under 3 m2
per person, that is, substantially lower than the CPT standard (see paragraph
20 above).
. The Court therefore finds that the
applicant’s detention in such cramped conditions, especially at Szolnok Prison,
must have been prejudicial to his physical and mental state (see, mutatis
mutandis, Savenkovas v. Lithuania, no. 871/02, §§ 81-82,
18 November 2008; Sulejmanovic v. Italy, no. 22635/03, §§ 43 to 52, 16 July 2009). Accordingly, it concludes that the overcrowded
conditions of this detention amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment
in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.
Finally, mindful of the fact that the
seriousness of the problem of overcrowding and of the resultant inadequate
living and sanitary conditions in Hungarian detention facilities has been
acknowledged by the domestic authorities (see Szél v. Hungary, no. 30221/06, §§ 8 and 18, 7 June 2011), the Court considers that
an effective remedy responding to this issue could be offered by taking the
necessary administrative and practical measures. In the Court’s view, the
authorities should react rapidly in order to secure appropriate conditions of
detention for detainees.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there
has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial
reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in
respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Government contested this claim.
The Court considers that the applicant must have
sustained some non-pecuniary damage and awards him, on the basis of equity, EUR
12,000 under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant also claimed EUR 2,000 plus VAT for
the costs and expenses incurred before the Court, which corresponds to 10 hours
of legal work billable by his lawyer, charged at an hourly rate of EUR 200 plus
VAT.
The Government contested this claim.
According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant
is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has
been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable
as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its
possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award
the full sum claimed, that is, EUR 2,000.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the
application admissible;
2. Holds that
there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts, to be converted into the currency of the
respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 12,000 (twelve thousand euros), plus any
tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax
that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the
remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 July 2013,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley Naismith Guido
Raimondi
Registrar President
