In the case of Garzó v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human
Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Peer Lorenzen, President,
András Sajó,
Nebojša Vučinić, judges,
and Atilla Nalbant, Acting Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 3 September 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an
application (no. 24485/07) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Mr Attila Garzó (“the applicant”), on 14
May 2007.
The applicant was
represented by Mr Zs. Csáky, a lawyer practising in Nyíregyháza. The Hungarian
Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent,
Ministry of Public Administration and Justice.
On 5 May 2010 the President of the Second Section
decided to give notice of the application to the Government. In accordance with
Protocol No. 14, the application was allocated to a Committee of three Judges.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Sarkad.
On 30 March 1992 criminal proceedings were
instituted against the applicant for fencing and other crimes. On 6
December 1994 a bill of indictment was preferred against him and ten others.
The Budapest XVIII/XIX District Court held several
hearings, at several of which the applicant did not appear. For his absconding,
an arrest warrant was issued against him.
On 5 October 2007 the District Court convicted
the applicant of fencing and forgery of private documents, but refrained from
imposing a sentence on him for a two-year probation period. The applicant
waived his right to appeal, so the judgment’s reasoning was shortened, and it
became final on the same day.
On the basis of the same investigation an
additional bill of indictment was preferred against the applicant for further
accounts of fencing and forgery of private documents on 17 March 1995.
After holding several hearings, the Nyíregyháza
District Court delivered a judgment on 5 November 1997 which was quashed by the
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County Regional Court on 18 March 1998.
The applicant did not appear at several hearings,
so an arrest warrant was issued against him.
On 6 October 2006 the District Court found the
applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to eight months of imprisonment. Due
to the applicant’s withdrawal of his appeal, the judgment became final on 25 January
2007.
The extraordinary protraction of the proceedings was mentioned
in the judgment as an aggravating circumstance. The Government, however,
claimed that the length had actually been taken into account as a weighty
mitigating factor.
THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant complained that the length of the
proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention.
The Government contested this argument. They argued
in particular that the applicant could not be considered as victim, as he had
been put on probation and his sentence had been mitigated due to the
protraction of the proceedings, therefore providing him sufficient redress.
Even though the shortened judgment putting him on probation had not expressly
contained the reasons for mitigation, and the other sentence referred to the
protraction by clerical mistake as an aggravating factor, the Government
highlighted that the protraction of criminal proceedings had been obviously taken
into consideration by the trial courts in both cases as a mitigating factor.
Finally, the Government considered that the applicant waived his right to
appeal against the judgment putting him on probation and therefore also waived
his right to an explicit acknowledgment of the protraction of the criminal
proceedings against him.
The Court recalls that the mitigation of a
sentence on the ground of the excessive length of proceedings does not in
principle deprive the individual concerned of his status as a victim within the
meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. However, this general rule is
subject to an exception when the national authorities have acknowledged in a
sufficiently clear way the failure to observe the reasonable time requirement
and have afforded redress by reducing the sentence in an express and measurable
manner (see Eckle v. Germany, 15 July 1982, § 66, Series A no. 51; and Beck
v. Norway, no. 26390/95, § 28, 26 June 2001). However, in the present case,
the reasons for mitigation cannot be established with certainty because in one of
the cases the trial court delivered a shortened judgment, and in the other proceedings
the length appeared in the judgment as an aggravating factor.
As regards the absence of appeal against the probation,
the Court is unable to share the Government’s view on this matter. It cannot be
imputed to the applicant that he did not lodge an appeal against the judgment, which
would have further contributed to the protraction of the proceedings. The
Government’s objection must therefore be rejected.
The Court observes that the period to be taken
into consideration began on 5 November 1992, when the recognition by Hungary of the right of individual petition took effect. However, in assessing the
reasonableness of the time that elapsed after that date, account must be taken
of the state of proceedings at the time. The Court notes that the case had been
pending for seven months on that date. The period in question ended on 5
October 2007. It thus lasted altogether fifteen years and six months before two
levels of jurisdiction, out of which fourteen years and eleven months following
ratification of the Convention by Hungary. In view of such lengthy proceedings,
the application must be declared admissible.
The Court has frequently found violations of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in
the present application (see Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no.
25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II).
Having examined all the material submitted to it
and despite the fact that the applicant was responsible for some delay, the
Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing
argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the
present circumstances. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court
considers that the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet
the “reasonable time” requirement. There has accordingly been a breach of
Article 6 § 1.
Relying on Article 41 of the Convention, the
applicant claimed
3,840 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 30,000 in respect of
non-pecuniary damage. The Government contested the claim, submitting that the
finding of a violation by the Court should in itself be regarded as
constituting just satisfaction for the applicant, having regard to the
mitigation, the complexity of the cases and the applicant’s absconding.
The Court is of the opinion that the grounds for
the applicant’s probation and light sentence cannot be established with
certainty; therefore the mitigation cannot constitute just satisfaction for the
protracted length of the proceedings. The Court does not discern any causal
link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged and therefore
rejects the claim. When assessing the non-pecuniary damage, the Court cannot
overlook that some protraction was imputable to the applicant’s conduct (see
paragraphs 6, 10 and 18 above). However, it considers that the applicant must
have sustained some non-pecuniary damage and awards him, on an equitable basis,
EUR 8,000 under this head.
The applicant also claimed 297,000 Hungarian forints
for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. The Government did not
express an opinion on the matter. Regard being had to the documents in its
possession and to its case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the
applicant the full sum claimed, that is, EUR 1,000.
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into Hungarian forints
at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 8,000 (eight thousand euros), plus any tax
that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax
that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 24 September
2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Atilla Nalbant Peer
Lorenzen
Acting Deputy Registrar President
