SECOND SECTION
CASE OF
KRISTON v. HUNGARY
(Application no.
39154/09)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
24 September 2013
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Kriston v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human
Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Peer Lorenzen, President,
András Sajó,
Nebojša Vučinić, judges,
and Atilla Nalbant, Acting Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 3 September 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an
application (no. 39154/09) against the Republic of
Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Mr István Kriston (“the applicant”),
on 16 July 2009.
The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and
Justice.
On 16 November 2011 the President of the Second
Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. In
accordance with Protocol No. 14, the application was allocated to a Committee
of three judges.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Dunaharaszti.
On 20 December 1993 criminal proceedings were
instituted against the applicant on charges of fraud.
The investigation was suspended between 14 May
1997 and 4 June 2003, because international legal assistance needed
to be sought from several foreign States.
A bill of indictment was preferred on 27 June
2003 on charges of fraudulent bankruptcy, embezzlement and forgery of public
documents.
After ten hearings between 20 June 2006 and 28 September
2009, on 2 November 2009 the Pest Central District Court convicted the
applicant of fraudulent bankruptcy and forgery of public documents and sentenced
him to a fine. The applicant waived the right to appeal; and the judgment
became final on the same day. It contained only a short reasoning which was confined
to the facts of the case and the applicable law. The reasoning did not
appreciate the length of the proceedings as a mitigating factor.
In the course of these criminal proceedings, on
27 February 1995 the applicant’s passport was withdrawn under
section 2(1a) of Act no. XXVIII of 1989 on Travelling Abroad and Passports,
because criminal proceedings involving serious charges were pending against him.
. From
1 September 1998 onwards, the travel ban was maintained under a new provision, namely,
section 16(1a) of Act no. XII of 1998 on Travelling Abroad. As of 1 July 2003,
the travel ban was annulled under this latter legislation. The Government
submitted that, in principle, the applicant had therefore become able to travel
with his identity card to Switzerland and Croatia and after 1 May 2004, to the
Member States of the European Economic Area. The applicant submitted that, in
reality, he could not do so, because the court in charge had not duly notified
the passport authority of the abolition of the travel ban, which thus remained
a formal legal obstacle to travelling abroad as such, in accordance with
sections 146(3) and 146(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as in force in
the relevant period.
THE LAW
The applicant complained that the length of the
proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention.
The Government contested that argument.
The period in question began on 20 December 1993
and ended on 2 November 2009. It thus lasted fifteen years and ten months before
one level of jurisdiction.
In view of such lengthy proceedings, this complaint must be
declared admissible.
The Court has frequently found violations of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in
the present application (see Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no.
25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II). Having examined all the material submitted to
it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or
convincing argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in
the present circumstances. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 §
1.
The applicant also complained that the
authorities had prevented him from travelling abroad for a disproportionately
long period. He relied on Article 2 § 2 of Protocol No. 4 and Articles 13 and
17 of the Convention.
The Court considers that this complaint falls
to be examined under Article 2 § 2 of Protocol No. 4 alone.
The Government submitted that the travel ban
complained of had lasted until 1 July 2003; therefore
this complaint had been introduced out of time, contrary to Article 35 § 1.
. The
applicant was of the opinion that since the competent court had not duly notified
the passport authority of the abolition of the travel ban, it still constituted
a legal obstacle to his leaving the country at the time of the introduction of
his application and even afterwards.
. The
Court notes that the impugned travel restriction was lifted on 1 July 2003
by virtue of a change of legislation. However, it also notes the applicant’s
unrefuted submission that, irrespective of the passport rules, a formal travel
ban was in place on account of the pending criminal proceedings, that is, at
least until 2 November 2009 (see paragraph 8 above), in the context of
sections 146(3) and 146(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, constituting an
on-going situation. Since the application was lodged on
16 July 2009, this complaint has been introduced within the six-month time-limit
prescribed by Article 35 § 1. Furthermore, no other grounds of inadmissibility
can be established. The complaint must thus be declared admissible.
The applicant submitted that he was subjected to
a travel ban for more than fourteen years between the revocation of his
passport and the termination of the criminal proceedings, which in his view was
unacceptable in the face of his rights under Article 2 § 2 of Protocol No. 4.
The Government did not address the merits of this issue.
The Court recalls that a very similar situation
gave rise to finding a violation of that provision in Földes and Földesné
Hajlik v. Hungary (no. 41463/02, §§ 32 to 36, ECHR 2006-XII). It
finds no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present application.
It follows that there has been a violation of Article 2 § 2 of
Protocol No. 4.
The applicant claimed altogether approximately
216,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 70,500 in respect of
non-pecuniary damage, plus accrued interests.
The Government contested this claim.
The Court does not discern any causal link
between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore
rejects this claim. However, it considers that the applicant must have
sustained some non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards
him EUR 13,000.
The applicant also claimed altogether
approximately EUR 2,850 in relation to various expenditures linked to the
alleged violations.
The Government contested this claim as well.
. According
to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs
and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually
and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case,
regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the
Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant, who was not represented
by a lawyer, the sum of EUR 500 for costs under all heads.
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article
2 § 2 of Protocol No. 4;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant
within three months the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 13,000 (thirteen
thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in
respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 500 (five
hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 24 September
2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Atilla Nalbant Peer
Lorenzen
Acting Deputy Registrar President
