In the case of Topić v. Croatia,
The European Court of Human
Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Isabelle Berro-Lefčvre, President,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Julia Laffranque,
Ksenija Turković,
Dmitry Dedov, judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 17 September 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no.
51355/10) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article
34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Croatian
national, Mr Zlatko Topić (“the applicant”), on 3 August 2010.
The applicant was represented by Mr S. Poldan, a
lawyer practising in Rijeka. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik.
The applicant alleged, in particular, that he had
not had a fair trial, as required by Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the
Convention, because he had not been able to obtain the attendance and
questioning of witnesses on his behalf.
On 5 September 2011 the application was
communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Rijeka.
On 29 December 2005 the Rijeka Municipal State
Attorney’s Office (Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Rijeci,
hereinafter “the State Attorney’s Office”) indicted the applicant and one other
person, F.M., in the Rijeka Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Rijeci)
on charges of drug possession.
The charges were based on a police report
alleging that on 1 November 2005 at about 11.30 p.m. the applicant had
been in possession of 1.2 grams of marijuana wrapped in a sheet of newspaper,
which he had thrown into a rubbish bin when he saw three policemen approaching
him.
On 23 February 2006 the Rijeka Municipal Court
issued a penal order (kazneni nalog) finding the applicant guilty of the
offence of drug possession and ordering him to pay a fine of 1,458 Croatian
kunas (HRK).
The applicant objected to the penal order on 13
March 2006, asking the Rijeka Municipal Court to hold a hearing. He also
requested the court to commission a DNA or fingerprint forensic analysis of the
newspaper sheet in order to obtain evidence as to whether he had been in
contact with that object.
The Rijeka Municipal Court held a hearing on 29
May 2006. At the hearing the applicant denied the charges and argued that what
he had thrown into the rubbish bin was a beer can and not the package of
marijuana which was later found there. He had, therefore, refused to sign the
seizure record of the package and had requested a DNA or fingerprint forensic
analysis of the package.
After the questioning of the applicant, the
Deputy State Attorney requested the trial court to call three police officers,
J.M., A.B. and S.J.-V., who had been present at the scene, to give evidence.
F.M.’s defence lawyer asked the trial court to call three other persons, I.Š.,
U.V. and T.M., who had also been present at the scene, to give evidence. The
applicant and his defence lawyer agreed with the submissions of the Deputy
State Attorney and F.M.’s defence lawyer, and made no submissions of their own.
At the same hearing, the Rijeka Municipal Court
granted the parties’ requests and decided to hear the three police officers and
two other witnesses, I.Š. and U.V.
Another hearing was held on 4 December 2006, at
which the applicant again denied all the charges against him. The three police
officers appeared at the hearing, but the other two witnesses did not, because
U.V. was studying abroad and I.Š. was serving in the army.
At the hearing, police officer A.B. testified
that during a regular patrol in the area they had seen a group of young people
hanging about. When they had approached them he had seen the applicant making a
move as if he was about to tie his shoelace and at that moment throwing a
package into a rubbish bin. They had found the package in the bin and saw that
it contained a green herbal substance.
Police officer J.M. also testified that he had
seen the applicant throwing a package into the rubbish bin while he was making
a move as if he was about to tie his shoelace. However, J.M. had then examined
the bin and found the package in it. There were also some beer cans in the bin,
but the package was on top of the content of the bin. He excluded any
possibility that the applicant had thrown a beer can into the bin, because he
had seen the applicant throwing the package.
Police officer S.J.-V. testified to the same
effect as the other police officers. He confirmed that he had seen the
applicant throwing a piece of newspaper into the rubbish bin, which one of his
colleagues had then found in the bin.
After the police officers had been questioned,
the Deputy State Attorney made no further request for the taking of evidence,
while the defence insisted on witnesses I.Š., U.V. and J.M. being questioned.
The trial court dismissed the request for those witnesses to be heard and
concluded the hearing, finding that all relevant facts had been sufficiently
established.
On the same day, the Rijeka Municipal Court
found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to a suspended sentence of three
months’ imprisonment with one year’s probation. The Rijeka Municipal Court relied
on the witness statements of the police officers, seizure records and a
forensic expert report confirming that the green substance was marijuana. In
connection with the refusal to take further evidence, that court noted:
“This court dismissed the defence’s request for witnesses I.Š., U.V. and J.M. to be questioned, since it
considered that all the relevant facts had been sufficiently established and
that therefore questioning of these witnesses would be redundant. The request
of the second accused, Zlatko Topić, for a fingerprint analysis of the
package, was also dismissed since, given all the established facts, taking of
that evidence would also be redundant.”
On 27 December 2006 the applicant lodged an
appeal against the first-instance judgment of the Rijeka Municipal Court,
arguing that without witnesses I.Š., U.V. and J.M. being questioned and a
fingerprint forensic analysis it was impossible to draw any conclusions on the
allegation that the applicant had thrown the package containing drugs into the
rubbish bin.
In the meantime, the minor-offences proceedings
instituted against the applicant before the Rijeka Minor Offences Court (Prekršajni
sud u Rijeci) concerning the same event were stayed on 29 August 2006
pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings, and then on 21 December 2007
discontinued as time-barred.
On 9 April 2009 the Bjelovar County Court (Županijski
sud u Bjelovaru), as the court of appeal, having analysed the applicant’s
defence and all the evidence from the case file, dismissed the applicant’s
appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment of the Rijeka Municipal Court.
The relevant part of the judgment reads:
“... The first-instance court correctly dismissed the request
of the defence to take further evidence by questioning persons who had been in
the accused’s company and for a fingerprint analysis of the package to be
commissioned. The questioning of the witnesses was an irrelevant request within
the meaning of Article 322 § 4(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the fingerprint
analysis was inapplicable, within the meaning of Article 322 § 4(3) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, given that traces of fingerprints had never been
retrieved from the package.”
On 9 October 2009 the applicant lodged a
constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud
Republike Hrvatske), reiterating his arguments that his defence rights had
been violated by the refusal of the trial court to hear witnesses for the
defence.
On 13 January 2010 the Constitutional Court
declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly
ill-founded. The decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 12
February 2010.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
The relevant provision of the Constitution
of the Republic of Croatia (Ustav Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette
nos. 56/1990, 135/1997, 8/1998, 113/2000, 124/2000, 28/2001, 41/2001,
55/2001, 76/2010, 85/2010) reads as follows:
Article 29
“In the determination of his rights and obligations or
of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court established by
law.
In case of any criminal charge brought against him,
the suspect, defendant or accused shall have the following rights ...
- to question or to have witnesses for the prosecution
questioned and to have witnesses for the defence questioned under the same
conditions as witnesses for the prosecution ...”
The relevant provision of the Criminal Code (Kazneni zakon, Official
Gazette nos. 110/1997, 27/1998, 129/2000, 51/2001, 105/2004, 84/2005) provides:
Article 173
“(1) Whoever
unlawfully possesses substances which are proscribed as narcotics shall be
fined or sentenced to a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year.”
The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in force at the
time (Zakon o kaznenom postupku, Official Gazette nos. 110/1997,
27/1998, 58/1999, 112/1999, 58/2002, 143/2002, 63/2002, 62/2003 and 115/2006)
provided:
Article 321
“(1) Taking of evidence concerns matters which the
trial court considers relevant for the judgment ...”
Article 322
“(1) The parties and the victim may lodge requests for
the taking of further evidence up to the end of the hearing ...
(4) A request for the taking of evidence may be
dismissed if ..
2) if the facts of the matter at issue have already
been established or are irrelevant, or if there is no link between the matter
the facts of which are supposed to be established and the operative matters in
the case, or if such a link cannot be established because of some legal
impediment (irrelevant request)
3) if there is a suspicion that with the proposed
evidence the facts of the relevant matter could either not be established at
all or this could be done only with significant difficulties, or if the
evidence at issue could not have been obtained in the course of the proceedings
and it is probable that it cannot be obtained within a reasonable time
(inapplicable request) ...”
The relevant provisions of the amended Code of Criminal Procedure (Zakon
o kaznenom postupku, Official Gazette nos. 152/2008, 76/2009, 80/2011, 121/2011, 91/2012, 143/2012) provide:
Article 502
“...
(2) The relevant provisions concerning the reopening
of the criminal proceedings shall be applicable in the case of a request for
revision of any final courts’ decision in connection with the final judgment of
the European Court of Human Rights by which, in respect of the defendant, a violation of the rights and freedom under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms has been found.
(3) The request for reopening of the proceedings in
connection with the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights can be
lodged within a thirty-day time limit starting from the moment of the finality
of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights.”
Article 574
“...
(2) If prior to the entry into force of this Code a
decision was adopted against which a legal remedy is allowed pursuant to the
provisions of the legislation relevant to the proceedings [in which the
decision was adopted], ..., the provisions of that legislation shall be
applicable [to the proceedings concerning the remedy], unless otherwise
provided under this Code.
(3) Articles 497-508 of this Code shall be accordingly
applicable to the requests for the reopening of the criminal proceedings made
under the Code of Criminal Procedure (Official
Gazette nos. 110/1997, 27/1998, 58/1999, 112/1999, 58/2002, 143/2002, 62/2003,
and 115/2006).”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 §§ 1 AND 3 (d)
OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant complained that the criminal
proceedings against him had been unfair because he had been deprived of an
opportunity to prove his defence and had not been able to obtain the attendance
of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him,
as provided in Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal
...
... 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has
the following minimum rights
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against
him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf
under the same conditions as witnesses against him ... “
A. Admissibility
1. The parties’ arguments
The Government submitted that the applicant had
failed to properly exhaust domestic remedies as he had not sufficiently
reasoned his constitutional complaint. The Constitutional Court had therefore
declared his constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded.
In addition, the applicant had failed to lodge criminal and
disciplinary complaints against the police officers.
The applicant argued that during the proceedings
he had properly exhausted all available domestic remedies including the
constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court, which had not been
declared inadmissible on any formal ground but because the Constitutional Court
had considered it to be manifestly ill-founded.
2. The Court’s assessment
The Court reiterates that, in accordance with
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, it may only deal with an issue after all
domestic remedies have been exhausted. The purpose of Article 35 is to afford
the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right the
violations alleged against them before those allegations are submitted to the
Court (see, for example, Hentrich v. France, 22 September 1994, § 33, Series A no. 296-A, and Remli v. France, 23 April 1996, § 33, Reports 1996-II).
Nevertheless, the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies requires only that
an applicant make normal use of remedies which are effective, sufficient and accessible in respect of his Convention grievances (see Balogh v. Hungary, no. 47940/99, § 30, 20 July 2004, and John Sammut and Visa Investments Limited v. Malta (dec.), no. 27023/03, 28 June 2005). The existence of the remedies must be sufficiently certain, in practice as well as in theory, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and
effectiveness.
Therefore, Article 35 § 1 does not require that recourse should be had to
remedies which are inadequate or ineffective (see Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, §§ 51-52, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI, and Barta v. Hungary, no. 26137/04, § 45, 10 April 2007). Remedies available to a
litigant at the domestic level are considered effective if they prevent the
alleged violation or prevent it from continuing, or if they provide adequate
redress for any violation that has already occurred (see Mifsud v. France
(dec.) [GC], no. 57220/00, § 17, ECHR 2002-VIII).
The Court notes that in the course of the criminal proceedings against him
the applicant used all available domestic remedies, including the
constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court, arguing that his
right to a fair trial had been violated by the refusal of the Rijeka Municipal
Court to hear witnesses for his defence. It follows
that in the course of the domestic proceedings the applicant afforded the
domestic authorities sufficient opportunity to address his Convention
grievances.
. As to
the Government’s argument that the applicant had failed to lodge criminal and
disciplinary complaints against the police officers, the Court notes that the
applicant’s complaint concerns only the alleged lack of fairness of the
criminal proceedings at issue. In the Court’s view, such issues should be
considered in the context and course of those proceedings and not in pursuing a
number of other proceedings (see Erkapić v. Croatia, no. 51198/08, § 64, 25 April 2013).
Against the above background, the Court rejects the Government’s objection.
The Court considers that this part of the
application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3
(a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any
other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ arguments
The applicant argued that the criminal proceedings against him had been
unfair because the trial court had based its decision only on the evidence
adduced by the prosecution. At the same time his request for witnesses to be
examined and for a fingerprint analysis to be commissioned had been dismissed.
The applicant explained that the trial court had at first granted his request
for witnesses I.Š., U.V. and J.M. to be questioned, but then, when it had heard
the police officer’s statement, it changed its decision. This consequently, in
view of the fact that the judgment had been based only on the evidence given by
the police officers, rendered the whole proceedings unfair. There had been no
reason for not hearing the witnesses I.Š., U.V. and J.M., who could have
provided relevant information concerning the case, and the trial court had
failed to take all necessary measures to secure their presence at the trial.
Lastly, the applicant pointed out that the relevant facts concerning the
accusations against him had not been sufficiently established. He therefore
considered, despite acknowledging that it was for the trial court to decide
which evidence to take, that the proceedings against him had fallen short of
the requirements of a fair trial.
The Government considered that the criminal proceedings against the applicant,
taken as a whole, had been fair. In particular, the Government pointed out that
the applicant had participated effectively in the proceedings, that he had been
legally represented, and that he had had every opportunity to present all his
evidence and arguments before the trial court and object to the evidence of the
prosecution. He had also had access to all relevant materials from the case
file and an opportunity to question all the witnesses against him. In the
Government’s view, all the decisions of the domestic authorities had been
sufficiently reasoned and had not disclosed any arbitrariness. As regards the
applicant’s complaints that the trial court had not heard his witnesses, the
Government pointed out that the trial court had carefully examined whether the
questioning of witnesses was necessary and after it had found that all relevant
facts had been sufficiently established it had dismissed the request for those
witnesses to be questioned. The domestic courts had provided sufficient reasons
for their decisions, and there had been no breach of the applicant’s right to a
fair trial in this respect.
2. The Court’s assessment
(a) General principles
The Court reiterates that the guarantees contained in Article 6 § 3,
including those enunciated in sub-paragraph (d), are constituent elements,
amongst others, of the concept of a fair trial set forth in Article 6 § 1 (see Bönisch
v. Austria, 6 May 1985, § 29, Series A no. 92). Its essential aim, as is
indicated by the words “under the same conditions”, is full “equality of arms”
in the matter. With this proviso, it leaves it to the competent national
authorities to decide upon the relevance of proposed evidence, in so far as this
is compatible with the concept of a fair trial, which dominates the whole of
Article 6 (see Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1976, § 91,
Series A no. 22, and Gregačević v. Croatia, no. 58331/09,
§ 60, 10 July 2012).
The admissibility of evidence is primarily a
matter for regulation by national law. The Court’s task under the Convention is
not to give a ruling as to whether statements of witnesses were properly
admitted as evidence, but rather to ascertain whether the proceedings as a
whole, including the way in which evidence was taken, were fair (see, among
many others, Van Mechelen and Others v. the Netherlands, 23 April 1997,
§ 50, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-III). In particular,
“as a general rule, it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before
them as well as the relevance of the evidence which defendants seek to adduce
... Article 6 § 3 (d) leaves it to them, again as a general rule, to assess
whether it is appropriate to call witnesses” (see Vidal v. Belgium, 22
April 1992, § 33, Series A no. 235-B).
It is accordingly not sufficient for a defendant
to complain that he has not been allowed to question certain witnesses; he
must, in addition, support his request by explaining why it is important for
the witnesses concerned to be heard and their evidence must be necessary for
the establishment of the truth (see Borisova v. Bulgaria, no. 56891/00,
§ 46, 21 December 2006). Thus, when the applicant has made a request to
hear witnesses which is not vexatious, and which is sufficiently reasoned,
relevant to the subject matter of the accusation and could arguably have
strengthened position of the defence or even led to the applicant’s acquittal,
the domestic authorities must provide relevant reasons for dismissing such
request (see Polyakov v. Russia, no. 77018/01, §§ 34-35, 29 January 2009;
and Gregačević, cited above, § 68).
(b) Application of these
principles to the present case
The Court notes that from the very
initial stages of the proceedings the applicant contended that the package
found in the rubbish bin did not belong to him, which was why he had refused to
sign the seizure record of the package and requested a forensic analysis in
order to obtain evidence as to whether he had had any contact with the package
(see paragraphs 9 and 10 above). He also argued that he had in fact thrown a
beer can into the bin, and in support of his arguments he insisted that three
persons, eyewitnesses to the event, be questioned (see paragraphs 11 and 17
above). In denying the charges against him the applicant insisted throughout
the proceedings that he had thrown a beer can into the rubbish bin and not the
package containing drugs.
In this respect the Court notes that one of the
police officers who testified before the trial court, in fact the one who found
the package, confirmed that he had also found beer cans in the bin, thus making
the applicant’s line of defence not fully vexatious or improbable (see
paragraph 15 above).
Accordingly, the evidence of the police
officers, as witnesses for the prosecution, could have been refuted by the
statements of the other three eyewitnesses (see Borisova, cited above, §
47). In the absence of any material evidence such as fingerprint or DNA traces,
which were never retrieved from the package although the defence requested it, those
witness statements could have played a significant role in strengthening the
position of the applicant’s defence or even led to his acquittal (see, inter
alia, Dorokhov v. Russia, no. 66802/01, § 74, 14 February 2008),
given that the criminal court is bound by the in dubio pro reo principle
(see Melich and Beck v. the Czech Republic, no. 35450/04, § 49, 24 July
2008).
In this respect the Court reiterates that it is
not its task to decide on the applicant’s guilt or innocence or to establish whether
the domestic courts have correctly established the relevant facts and applied
the relevant law, but to examine whether the applicant had guarantees of a fair
trial (see Melich and Beck, cited above, § 50). It therefore confines
itself to noting that the applicant’s request for the eyewitnesses to the event
to be heard was not vexatious, that it was relevant to the subject matter of
the accusation, and that it could arguably have strengthened the position of
the defence or even led to the applicant’s acquittal, had it been confirmed
that he had in fact thrown a beer can and not the package containing drugs into
the rubbish bin (see Polyakov, cited above § 34).
However, the trial court dismissed the applicant’s
request by merely noting that all the relevant facts had been sufficiently
established (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above), which cannot be considered a
reasoned decision in itself (see Gregačević, § 56, and Polyakov,
§ 35, cited above), and could suggest that the witness statements heard by the domestic
court were one-sided (see Borisova, cited above, § 48).
The Court therefore considers that by dismissing
all requests by the defence and accepting all the prosecution arguments and
evidence the trial court created an unfair advantage in favour of the
prosecution and consequently deprived the applicant of any practical
opportunity to effectively challenge the charges against him.
There has accordingly been a violation of
Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 4
of Protocol No. 7, that he had been tried in minor-offences proceedings and in
criminal proceedings for the same offence, contrary to the ne bis in idem principle.
The Court notes that in none of
the avenues he pursued by way of remedies before the national authorities
during the proceedings at issue did the applicant raise any complaints as
regards the alleged violation of the ne bis in idem principle. In these
circumstances, the Court cannot speculate what the outcome of these proceedings
would have been had he raised the same complaint he is now bringing before the
Court.
. In this
respect the Court reiterates that a complaint submitted to it must first
have been made to the appropriate national courts, at least in substance, in
accordance with the formal requirements of domestic law and within the
prescribed time-limits. To hold otherwise would not be compatible with the
subsidiary character of the Convention system (see Gavril Yosifov v.
Bulgaria, no. 74012/01, § 42, 6 November 2008).
Accordingly, since the
applicant failed to bring the complaints he has raised before the Court before
the national authorities, he failed to exhaust the domestic remedies as
required under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
. It
follows that this complaint must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the
Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there
has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial
reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The applicant claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) in
respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Government considered the applicant’s claim
excessive, unfounded and unsubstantiated.
Having regard to all the circumstances of the
present case, the Court accepts that the applicant has suffered non-pecuniary
damage which cannot be compensated for solely by the finding of a violation.
Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant
EUR 4,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable
to him.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant also claimed 10,000 Croatian kunas
(HRK) for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.
The Government considered the applicant’s claim
unfounded and unsubstantiated.
According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant
is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has
been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the
documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it
reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,300 for costs and expenses in the domestic
proceedings before the Court plus any tax that may be
chargeable to the applicant on that amount.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the complaint concerning the lack
of fairness of the criminal proceedings, under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the
Convention, admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the
applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final
in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the
following amounts, to be converted into Croatian kuna at the rate applicable at
the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 4,000 (four thousand euros), plus any tax
that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,300 (one thousand three hundred euros),
plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and
expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 October 2013,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André Wampach Isabelle
Berro-Lefčvre
Deputy Registrar President
