FRANEK v. SLOVAKIA - 14090/10 - Chamber Judgment [2014] ECHR 132 (11 February 2014)

In the case of Franek v. Slovakia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

          Josep Casadevall, President,
          Alvina Gyulumyan,
          Ján Šikuta,
          Luis López Guerra,
          Nona Tsotsoria,
          Johannes Silvis,
          Valeriu Griţco, judges,
and Santiago Quesada, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 21 January 2014,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 14090/10) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, Mr Ján Franek (“the applicant”), on 18 February 2010.

2. The applicant was represented by Mr R. Slamka, a lawyer practising in Dolný Kubín. The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Pirošíková.

3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that his right to a fair hearing by a tribunal had been breached in the context of civil proceedings and their subsequent review by the Constitutional Court.

4. On 17 January 2013 the application was communicated to the Government.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Liptovský Mikuláš.

6. The applicant is an enforcement officer. In the context of enforcement proceedings, he seized movable property of a company with a view to having it sold. Subsequently bankruptcy (insolvency) proceedings were brought against the debtor. The administrator in bankruptcy asked the applicant to transfer the property to him in accordance with the required legal procedure in such cases. The applicant stored some of the items at the premises of one of the creditors. The representatives of the latter decided to retain the property until the debtor discharged the debt. They later revoked that decision.

7. On 21 October 2003 the Liptovský Mikuláš District Court, on an application by the administrator, ordered the applicant to transfer the property to the administrator within fifteen days. It further ordered the applicant to pay his costs amounting to EUR 1,130.

8. On 14 April 2005 the Žilina Regional Court quashed the judgment. It held that the first-instance court had not duly examined whether the applicant had standing in the case as a defendant, given that the property in question was being retained by a third party.

9. A hearing was scheduled for 21 March 2006, but on 14 March 2006 the applicant asked the District Court for an adjournment “on account of his incapacity for work”.

10. On 21 March 2006 the District Court, after taking further evidence, again ordered the applicant to transfer the property to the administrator, with reference to sections 14 and 18 of the Bankruptcy Act 1991. He was further ordered to reimburse the administrator’s costs amounting to EUR 1,964. The District Court held that, under the relevant law, the property had been at the applicant’s disposal. The creditor company where the applicant had stored the property had no obligation towards the bankruptcy administration. In those circumstances, the applicant’s argument, that the creditor had availed itself of its right to retain the property, could not be upheld.

11. The judgment indicated that the applicant had not submitted any documentary evidence to prove that he had been unable to attend the hearing. The District Court had therefore proceeded with the case in his absence.

12. The applicant appealed. He indicated, among other things, that he had been bedridden and unable to submit relevant documentary evidence of his sick leave for the period 16 February to 2 May 2006. He enclosed a medical certificate drawn up on 17 February 2006 confirming his inability to work until 2 May 2006 because of an accident.

13. On 6 September 2007 the Žilina Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment. The decision on the claim in issue became final on 10 December 2007.

14. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. Relying on Article 237(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure, he argued that the first-instance court had not accepted his excuse and had proceeded with the case in his absence. He further argued, among other things, that he had no standing in the case as a defendant, and that the lower courts had applied the law incorrectly and had decided arbitrarily. In particular, the applicant maintained that he could not have been ordered to transfer the movable property to the administrator as it was not in his possession. The decision against the applicant was therefore unenforceable.

15. In addition, the applicant argued that the administrator also lacked standing to bring the claim, as the law did not entitle him to realise property which one of the creditors had exercised its right to secure a debt by retaining. Since, in the course of the proceedings, the company which had been storing the property had indicated that it no longer wished to exercise that right, the courts should have discontinued the proceedings, as nothing had prevented the administrator from recovering the property.

16. The Supreme Court rejected the appeal on points of law on 7 April 2009. It noted that on 14 March 2006 the applicant had sent a written excuse and a request for the District Court hearing on 21 March 2006 to be adjourned. However, he had not submitted any documentary evidence to that court in support of his argument that ill-health had prevented him from attending the hearing. In those circumstances, the District Court had been entitled to proceed with the case, and it had not prevented the applicant from asserting his rights in the proceedings within the meaning of Article 237(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

With reference to its case-law, the Supreme Court further held that the alleged lack of standing of both the applicant and the administrator was not a relevant reason for an appeal on points of law within the meaning of Article 237(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. That provision extended exclusively to situations where a person lacked legal capacity. That was not the situation in the applicant’s case.

As a result, the applicant’s appeal on points of law was declared inadmissible, and the Supreme Court could not deal with his arguments as to the alleged errors of fact and law by courts at a lower level of jurisdiction.

17. On 12 June 2009 the applicant submitted a constitutional complaint. He alleged a breach of Article 6 of the Convention in the proceedings leading to the above decisions being taken by the three levels of ordinary court. In particular, the applicant alleged that (i) the first-instance and appellate courts had committed errors of fact and law when determining the merits and had decided in an arbitrary manner, (ii) he had had no standing in the case as a defendant, and (iii) the District Court had proceeded with the case in his absence. As to the last-mentioned complaint, he submitted that he had been immobilised because of a broken leg and had therefore been unable to attend the hearing or to enclose a medical certificate in support of his request for its adjournment.

18. The Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint on 17 September 2009. It held that the complaint had been lodged outside the statutory time-limit of two months in so far as it concerned the first-instance and appellate courts’ decisions, which had become final on 10 December 2007. As the Supreme Court had declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible, and since the Constitutional Court found no reason to disagree with that conclusion, the applicant’s use of that remedy could not affect the running of the above time-limit in respect of the judgments of the District Court and the Regional Court.

19. The Constitutional Court further carried out a detailed examination of the reasons for the Supreme Court’s decision, and concluded that it was neither arbitrary nor otherwise contrary to the applicant’s right to a fair hearing.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

A. Code of Civil Procedure and the Supreme Court’s practice

20. Article 101 § 1 provides that parties are obliged to assist the court in achieving the purpose of the proceedings by, inter alia, complying with the court’s instructions. Article 101 § 2 entitles the court to proceed with a case even when the parties remain inactive. When a party to the proceedings fails to appear at a hearing despite the fact that he or she has been duly summoned, and when such a party requests that the hearing be adjourned without a legitimate excuse, the court may proceed with the case in the absence of that party, having regard to the contents of the file and the evidence which has already been taken.

21. Article 237(b) allows for an appeal on points of law to be lodged on the grounds that a person acting as a party to proceedings lacked capacity to do so.

22. Under Article 237(f), an appeal on points of law against an appellate court judgment is available when a court, by its conduct, prevented a party from having access to it.

23. Further statutory rules concerning appeals on points of law are summarised in the Court’s judgment in the case of Ringier Axel Springer Slovakia, v. Slovakia (no. 41262/05, §§ 61-68, 26 July 2011).

24. The Supreme Court has acknowledged as contrary to Article 237(f) the courts’ practice of proceeding with a case despite a party’s timely request for the adjournment of a hearing, where such a request is based on the party’s medically certified inability to work (Collection of Judicial Decisions and Opinions, R 31/1995).

B. Constitutional Court Act 1993 and the Constitutional Court’s practice

25. Under section 53(1) of the Constitutional Court Act 1993, a complaint to the Constitutional Court is admissible only where the claimant has exhausted the effective remedies provided for by law to protect his or her fundamental rights. Section 53(3) provides that a complaint to the Constitutional Court can be lodged within two months of a decision taking final effect, or from the date of a contested measure or notification of another interference with a person’s rights.

26. As a rule, the Constitutional Court has required, with reference to the principle of subsidiarity, that a party should lodge an appeal on points of law where the alleged breach of his or her rights is of such a nature that an appeal on points of law is available under the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

27. In a number of earlier cases, the Constitutional Court’s assessment of admissibility of a complaint depended on the nature of the decision which the Supreme Court had given on a party’s appeal on points of law.

28. Thus, where the Supreme Court rejected an appeal on points of law as inadmissible, the Constitutional Court refused to take that decision into account when determining the compliance with the two-month time-limit in respect of an alleged breach of a claimant’s rights at first instance or before the appellate court (see, for further details, Stavebná spoločnosť TATRY Poprad, s.r.o. v. Slovakia, no. 7261/06, § 44, 3 May 2011, and Zborovský v. Slovakia, no. 14325/08, §§ 24-26, 23 October 2012).

29. At a later point the Constitutional Court modified its practice with reference to judgments which the Court had delivered on several cases against the Czech Republic giving rise to a similar issue (see Zvolský and Zvolská v. the Czech Republic, no. 46129/99, ECHR 2002-IX; Bulena v. the Czech Republic, no. 57567/00, 20 April 2004; and Soffer v. the Czech Republic, no. 31419/04, 8 November 2007).

30. Thus, from 2009 it held in a number of cases that, where a party simultaneously lodges an appeal on points of law and a constitutional complaint, the principle of subsidiarity prevented the Constitutional Court from dealing with the case pending the determination of the former remedy. In such cases, the Constitutional Court rejected the claimants’ complaints in respect of the first and second-instance decisions as premature. It emphasised that the statutory two-month time-limit would be respected in respect of those decisions if the Supreme Court ultimately declared the appeal on points of law inadmissible and the unsuccessful party submitted a fresh constitutional complaint (decision nos. I. ÚS 169/09; I. ÚS 237/09; III. ÚS 462/2011; I. ÚS 312/2011; and II. ÚS 65/2012).

31. At the same time, in a number of cases decided in 2010 and later (for example decision nos. IV. ÚS 245/2010; II. ÚS 324/2010; IV. ÚS 406/2011; III. ÚS 237/2011; IV. ÚS 468/2011; III. ÚS 87/2012; and III. ÚS 316/2012) the claimants had lodged their constitutional complaints against judicial decisions of the appellate court and court of appeal on points of law within two months of the delivery of the Supreme Court’s decision declaring their appeal on points of law inadmissible. The Constitutional Court examined the merits of their complaints under Article 6 of the Convention in respect of the proceedings leading to the decisions of the appellate court and the Supreme Court in its capacity as the court of appeal on points of law. It held, in particular, that in such cases a constitutional complaint was admissible only after the Supreme Court’s decision on the appeal on points of law, while the time-limit in respect of both the Supreme Court’s and appellate court’s decisions started running from the service of the former. The above-mentioned decisions indicate that such an approach has corresponded to the current practice of the Constitutional Court.

C. Bankruptcy Act 1991

32. The following provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1991 (Act No. 328/1991 Coll.) are relevant in the present case.

33. Pursuant to section 14(1)(a), upon the declaration of bankruptcy all rights related to the assets of the bankrupt pass over to the administrator. At the same time, any pending judicial, enforcement or other proceedings are stayed to the extent that they concern the assets of the bankrupt or claims which are to be satisfied from those assets (section 14(1)(d)).

34. Section 18(2) obliges all those who have at their disposal property belonging to the assets of a bankrupt to inform the administrator as soon as they learn of the declaration of bankruptcy. They are further obliged to allow the administrator to include such property in the schedule of assets and to have them valued. Failure to comply renders such parties liable for damages.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

35. The applicant complained that his right to a fair hearing by a tribunal had been breached in the proceedings before the ordinary courts and the Constitutional Court. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

36. The Government contested that argument.

A. Admissibility

37. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. Alleged breach of the applicant’s “right to a court”

(a) The arguments of the parties

38. The applicant argued that several of the shortcomings in the proceedings of which he complained constituted statutory grounds for an appeal on points of law. With a view to exhausting the remedies as required by the Constitutional Court Act 1993, he had been obliged to lodge an appeal on points of law. The Constitutional Court’s decision to reject his complaint in respect of the first-instance and appellate courts’ decisions as belated had been contrary to both the Constitutional Court’s practice in a number of cases and the Court’s case-law under Article 6 § 1.

39. The Government referred to a document submitted by the Registry of the Constitutional Court and maintained that the applicant should have simultaneously lodged a constitutional complaint and an appeal on points of law against the appellate court’s decision. In such cases the statutory time-limit for lodging the former remedy would have been respected in respect of the appellate court’s decision following the Supreme Court’s decision to declare the appeal on points of law inadmissible. In that connection the present application differed from the case of Stavebná spoločnosť TATRY Poprad, s.r.o. (cited above) where the applicant company had used the constitutional remedy both in parallel with its appeal on points of law and after the Supreme Court had declared the latter inadmissible.

40. The Government further argued that the Supreme Court, in its capacity as the court of appeal on points of law, had examined the alleged shortcomings which, according to the applicant, had constituted grounds for that remedy. The Supreme Court had given relevant and sufficient reasons for disagreeing with the applicant’s arguments. In the Government’s view, its conclusions had not been arbitrary and the applicant’s right to a fair hearing by a tribunal had been respected in the proceedings complained of taken as a whole.

(b) The Court’s assessment

(i) Recapitulation of the relevant principles

41. The relevant principles as regards the right of access to a court are set out, for example, in Stavebná spoločnosť TATRY Poprad, s.r.o.(cited above, §§ 35-37); Zborovský (cited above, §§ 44-48); and Ferenčíková (no. 39912/09, 25 September 2012, §§ 50-51); all with further references. They may be summarised as follows.

42. Article 6 § 1 does not guarantee a right of appeal as such. However, where several levels of jurisdiction do exist, each of those levels must comply with its guarantees, including the right of effective access to court.

43. Parties to proceedings must be able to exercise usefully the rights of appeal or other remedy available to them. The “right to court”, of which the right of access is one aspect, is not absolute; it is subject to limitations permitted by implication, in particular where the conditions of admissibility of an appeal are concerned, since by its very nature it calls for regulation by the State, which enjoys a certain margin of appreciation in this regard. Nonetheless, a restrictive interpretation of the right of access to court guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 would not be consonant with the object and purpose of that provision. The limitations applied must not restrict or reduce the individual’s access in such a way or to such an extent as to impair the very essence of the right. Furthermore, limitations will only be compatible with Article 6 § 1 if they pursue a legitimate aim and there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued.

44. In a number of cases, the Court has found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention because of lack of access to court, when a procedural rule was construed in a way that was unpredictable and at variance with the principle of legal certainty or where the domestic court showed excessive formalism (see Bureš v. the Czech Republic, no. 37679/08, § 144, 18 October 2012, with further references).

45. The Court has noted earlier that in the Slovakian legal system an appeal on points of law is an extraordinary remedy which is only available as long as any of the admissibility grounds are given in a particular case. While the existence of some admissibility grounds is easy to establish, the existence of others, for example that under Article 237(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure, depends on the assessment by the Supreme Court in its capacity as the court of appeal on points of law. The Court held that, in view of the applicable statutory rules and the existing practice of their application in respect of admissibility of appeals on points of law, its determination is susceptible of raising various Convention issues, in particular under its Articles 6 § 1 and 35 § 1 (see Ferenčíková, cited above, § 58).

46. The guarantees of Article 6 § 1 were found to extend to proceedings before the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic related to complaints concerning breaches of the right to a fair hearing by a tribunal in proceedings before the ordinary courts. Thus in the cases of Stavebná spoločnosť TATRY Poprad, s.r.o. and Zborovský (both cited above) the Court found a breach of Article 6 § 1. In those cases the Constitutional Court had rejected the first complaint (which the applicants had lodged after the appellate court’s decision) as premature on the grounds that, in parallel, they had lodged an appeal on points of law. After the Supreme Court had declared the latter remedy inadmissible, the Constitutional Court held, when dealing with the applicants’ second complaint, that the statutory two-month time-limit allowed it to examine the Supreme Court’s decision exclusively.

(ii) Application of those principles to the present case

47. In the present case, the situation is different from the two cases mentioned in the preceding paragraph, in that the applicant sought redress before the Constitutional Court in respect of all the levels of ordinary courts involved only once, after the Supreme Court had declared his appeal on points of law inadmissible. The Court must therefore determine whether this justifies reaching a different conclusion from that in Stavebná spoločnosť TATRY Poprad, s.r.o. and Zborovský. The following considerations are relevant in that context.

48. The Constitutional Court has required, with reference to the principle of subsidiarity, that a party should lodge an appeal on points of law where the alleged breach of his or her rights is of such a nature that an appeal on points of law is available under the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. It held initially that, where the Supreme Court had rejected an appeal on points of law as inadmissible, that decision could not be taken into account when determining the compliance with the two month time-limit in respect of a complaint concerning a breach of a claimant’s rights in proceedings leading to the decision of the appellate court (see paragraphs 26-28 above).

49. The Constitutional Court subsequently modified its practice in that it considered the above time-limit to have been respected in cases where an appeal on points of law was rejected as inadmissible and a constitutional complaint had been lodged in parallel with the appeal on points of law. In cases where the parties used those two remedies simultaneously the Constitutional Court rejected the constitutional complaint against the appellate court’s decision as premature, as the proceedings on appeal on points of law were pending. It emphasised that the statutory two-month time-limit under the Constitutional Court Act 1993 would be respected in cases where the appeal on points of law was declared inadmissible and the unsuccessful party lodged a fresh constitutional complaint (see paragraphs 29-30 above).

50. The Court acknowledges that it is essentially for the domestic courts to interpret and apply domestic law, including rules on admissibility and the use of domestic remedies. Nevertheless, the documents before it suggest that it would serve no practical purpose to require parties to use the two remedies in question in parallel with the inevitable consequence of (i) having the first constitutional complaint rejected as premature and (ii) the obligation to lodge a second complaint against the appellate court’s decision after the Supreme Court’s decision declaring an appeal on points of law inadmissible.

51. At the same time, a different practice on the same issue may be found in a number of the Constitutional Court’s decisions which are subsequent to the facts of the present case. In those cases, the parties lodged a single constitutional complaint after the Supreme Court’s decision on their appeal on points of law, and the Constitutional Court found the statutory time-limit to have been respected also as regards the appellate court’s decision (see paragraph 31 above). The Constitutional Court indicated in those decisions that such an approach corresponded to its current practice.

52. For the Court, such an approach is more appropriate from the point of view of a person’s right of access to a court in situations where, as in the present case, (i) in the appeal on points of law a party relies on arguments which are foreseen by the Code of Civil Procedure as grounds for an appeal on points of law, and (ii) the admissibility of that remedy in the particular circumstances depends on the discretion of the Supreme Court. It corresponds to the Court’s practice under which it is appropriate to examine compliance with the right to a fair hearing in the context of the proceedings taken as a whole (see Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, §§ 45-46, ECHR 1999-II, and Bulena v. the Czech Republic, no. 57567/00, § 33, 20 April 2004).

53. The preceding consideration is relevant in the present case, since some of the alleged shortcomings complained of by the applicant constituted grounds for an appeal on points of law, and since the Constitutional Court Act 1993 and the Constitutional Court’s practice required that the applicant should lodge an appeal on points of law in that respect prior to using the constitutional remedy.

54. As to the Government’s argument that the applicant should have lodged his appeal on points of law simultaneously with the constitutional complaint, that requirement seems to have been abandoned by the Constitutional Court shortly after the facts of the present case (see paragraph 31 above). That requirement amounted to excessive formalism, since the latter remedy was bound to be rejected as premature pending the determination of the former remedy. The Court does not see such a course of action as pursuing a legitimate aim, and considers that it did not offer an adequate solution (see, mutatis mutandis, Zvolský and Zvolská, cited above, § 53).

55. As a result of its rejection of the complaint in respect of the appellate court’s decision, the Constitutional Court excluded from its review part of the arguments the applicant made, namely the alleged unfairness in the context of the determination of the merits of the case by the courts at first and second instance and the alleged lack of standing of the parties.

56. In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that by rejecting part of the applicants’ complaint the Constitutional Court prevented him from asserting his right and effectively using the remedy available under Article 127 of the Constitution as regards relevant aspects of the proceedings in issue. The applicant’s “right to court” was thereby disrespected.

There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1 on that account.

2. Alleged unfairness of the proceedings

57. The applicant further complained that the proceedings had been unfair in that (i) the Regional Court had proceeded with the case in his absence and in disregard of his excuse, and (ii) the courts had not accepted his argument that he lacked standing as a defendant in the proceedings and that they had decided arbitrarily.

58. The Government argued that the proceedings taken as a whole had complied with the requirement of fairness laid down in Article 6 § 1.

59. Having regard to its conclusion that there was an infringement of the applicant’s right of access to a court, for the reasons stated above, and in view of the documents before it, the Court does not find it necessary to examine separately the applicant’s other complaints which relate to the alleged unfairness of the proceedings.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION

60. The applicant complained that he had had no effective remedy at his disposal in respect of his complaint under Article 6 § 1. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention which reads as follows:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

61. The Government contested that argument.

62. The Court notes that this complaint is linked to the ones examined above and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.

63. Having regard to the finding of a breach of the applicant’s right under of access to a court and its conclusion on the applicant’s remaining complaints under Article 6 § 1 (see paragraphs 56 and 59 above), the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine whether, in this case, there has been a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 (see A.B. v. Slovakia, no. 41784/98, § 71, 4 March 2003 or Komanický, cited above, § 60).

III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

64. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

65. The applicant claimed 200,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

66. The Government objected to the claim as excessive.

67. The Court considers that the above finding of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction in the circumstances for any non-pecuniary damage the applicant might have sustained.

B. Costs and expenses

68. With reference to the Ministry of Justice Regulation no. 655/2004, which governs lawyers’ fees, the applicant also claimed EUR 292.38 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Constitutional Court and EUR 457.94 for those incurred before the Court.

69. The Government argued that the applicant had not shown that the sums claimed had actually been incurred.

70. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the fact that the applicant was legally represented both before the Constitutional Court and in the proceedings under the Convention, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 700 covering costs under all heads.

C. Default interest

71. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY

1. Declares the application admissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as regards the applicant’s right of access to a court;

3. Holds that it is not necessary to examine separately the applicant’s remaining complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

4. Holds that there is no need to examine the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention;

5. Holds that the finding of a violation of Article 6 § 1 as regards the applicant’s right of access to a court constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage;

6. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 700 (seven hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

7. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 February 2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Santiago Quesada Josep Casadevall
Registrar President

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