THIRD SECTION

CASE OF MAJTAN v. SLOVAKIA

(Application no. 32273/12)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

19 July 2016

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Majtan v. Slovakia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
	Helen Keller, President,
	Johannes Silvis,
	Alena Poláčková, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 28 June 2016,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1.  The case originated in an application (no. 32273/12) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, Mr Stanislav Majtan (“the applicant”), on 23 May 2012.
2.  The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Pirošíková.
3.  On 12 January 2015 the complaint concerning the length of the proceedings was communicated to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.
4.  The Government objected to the examination of the application by a Committee. After having considered the Government’s objection, the Court rejects it.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Košice.
6.  The applicant, the father of a child, has been involved in domestic litigation concerning numerous claims on upbringing and maintenance of the child since 1993.
7.  The present application concerns three interrelated claims brought before the Čadca District Court on 12 March 2003 and subsequently on 3 July and 16 December 2003. These claims were all registered under the same case file no. P 170/93 and concerned the applicant’s rights of contact with his child and his request for custody of the child. The action of 3 July 2003 related to child maintenance and had been brought by the national authority, acting as a guardian ad litem for the child.
8.  In the course of the proceedings, the District Court examined extensive evidence. This included the assessment of several reports from the appointed guardian ad litem, an opinion from a psychology expert seeking to establish the circumstances of the relationship between the applicant and the child, personal and financial circumstances of the applicant, his medical condition as well as the medical reports of the child.
The District Court held nine hearings on the merits, out of which the applicant attended two. It also decided on an interim measure in relation to the contact between the applicant and the child, which was challenged and quashed on appeal twice.
During the course of the proceeding, the applicant asked for a court fee exemption. He also lodged seven motions, by which he had challenged the judges of the District Court as well as the Regional Court for bias. When he had challenged the judges of the latter court on ground of bias, the Supreme Court dealt with those motions.
9.  The District Court twice ruled on the merits of the case, on 20 August 2008 and 31 March 2011 respectively. This was due to the fact that the judgment was partly upheld and party quashed on appeal on the first occasion. It also stayed the proceedings in respect of the applicant’s right to contact with his child because the child had reached the age of majority in the meantime.
10.  The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint relying on several Convention as well as Constitution Articles. He challenged among others the length of proceedings held before the District Court.
11.  On 6 October 2011 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional complaint in respect of the length of the proceedings on the ground that the matter at stake was complicated due to the three aforesaid interrelated claims.
The Constitutional Court took into account the sensitive nature of the case and the District Court’s repeated requests for an expert opinion in order to assess the best interest of the child. It also considered the applicant’s behaviour during the proceedings, his seven absences during the nine scheduled hearings, as well as his seven challenges of the domestic courts’ judges for bias, which protracted the proceedings by three years and eight months.
In the light of the above, the Constitutional Court found no unreasonable delays in the District Court’s procedure.
12.  Subsequently, on 21 March 2012, the Žilina Regional Court dealt with the applicant’s second appeal and delivered the judgment on the merits of the case, which became final on 2 April 2012. It partly upheld the District Court’s judgment and partly amended it.
13.  The applicant then lodged an application for reimbursement of a court fee he had paid for one of his challenges of the judge for bias. This motion was dismissed by two levels of jurisdiction and the decision became final on 8 February 2013.
THE LAW
I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
14.  The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by a ... tribunal...”
15.  The Government contested that argument. They relied on the Constitutional Court’s reasons (see paragraph 11 above).
They invited the Court to consider the particular factual and procedural complexity of the case, the diligent behaviour of the State authorities in respect of the best interest of the child as well as the applicant’s significant contribution to the overall duration of the proceedings.
They referred to the Court’s decision in Jesenská and Jesenský v. Slovakia (no. 1876/074, 14 december 2010), in which it declared the application inadmissible, even though the length of proceedings relating to the child maintenance enforcement had amounted to more than 11 years at one level of jurisdiction. The Government emphasised the Court’s conclusion that on some occasions the domestic courts could not be held liable for the delays occurred, in particular, if those delays could be directly attributed to one of the parties to the domestic proceedings rather than to the domestic courts. In that case, one of the parties had kept evading child maintenance payments and his behaviour had been directly decisive for the delays in the enforcement of the claimed amount.
16.  The applicant disagreed and alleged that he had properly excused his absences in the seven hearings he had failed to attend. He also stated that the procedural rules allowed him to lodge all seven motions by which he had challenged the District as well as the Regional Court’s judges for bias. Therefore, his exercise of this procedural right should not be interpreted to his disadvantage.
17.  In the present case, the Court notes that the period to be taken into consideration began on 12 March 2003, when the first of the three claims had been lodged with the Čadca District Court and registered under the case file no. P 170/93. The case was decided on the merits on 2 April 2012 by a final judgment. During that period the merits of the case have been dealt with by two levels of jurisdiction twice. The proceedings were also held before the Supreme Court on several occasions, since it decided on the applicant’s motion by which he had challenged the judges of the lower jurisdiction for bias. The follow-up proceedings relating to the applicant’s motion on the reimbursement of the court fee ended by a final decision of 8 February 2013.
A.  Admissibility
18.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B.  Merits
19.  The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
20.  The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above).
21.  The Court accepts, on the one hand, that what was at stake in the case called for particular diligence on the part of the authorities involved. Admittedly, the case can be considered somewhat complex as it concerned three interrelated claims and it was necessary to obtain the opinions of experts. The applicant by his behavior also contributed to the length of the proceedings. In particular, the Court notes his procedural behavior, including his seven absences during the nine scheduled hearings, even if he had excused them.
On the other hand, as to the conduct of the District Court in particular, the Court notes that it had to rule on a part of the claim on the merits twice, since its first judgment was quashed on appeal. The Court also observes that during the course of the proceedings, the District Court’s decision on the interim measure concerning the contact of the applicant with his child was quashed on appeal twice. While such procedure may not appear to amount to excessive delays when taken separately, the Court considers that due to the District Court having to deal with certain matters repeatedly, they were prolonged.
22.  Having regard to what was at stake for the applicant and despite the factual and procedural complexities of the case, the Court considers that their length was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
II.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
23.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A.  Damage
24.  The applicant claimed 30,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.
25.  The Government contested the claim.
26.  The Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non‑pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis and taking into account the particular circumstances of the case, including the procedural complexity of the case and the applicant’s behaviour during the domestic litigation, it awards him EUR 1,900 under that head.
B.  Costs and expenses
27.  The applicant also claimed EUR 2,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and before the Court including EUR 37.23 for postage.
28.  The Government contested the claim as unsubstantiated.
29.  According to the Court’s case-law, the applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court awards the applicant, who was not represented by a lawyer before the Court, the sum of EUR 100 for his out-of-pocket expenses.
C.  Default interest
30.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1.  Declares the application admissible;

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

3.  Holds
(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months the following amounts:
(i) EUR 1,900 (one thousand and nine hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 100 (one hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 19 July 2016, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
	Fatoş Aracı 	Helen Keller
Deputy Registrar	President