GUKOVYCH v. UKRAINE - 2204/07 (Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction) : Court (Fifth Section)) [2016] ECHR 914 (20 October 2016)

In the case of Gukovych v. Ukraine,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

          Angelika Nußberger, President,
          Ganna Yudkivska,
          Erik Møse,
          Faris Vehabović,
          Yonko Grozev,
          Síofra O’Leary,
          Mārtiņš Mits, judges,
          Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 27 September 2016,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 2204/07) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Ukrainian national, Mr Andriy Igorovych Gukovych (“the applicant”), on 20 September 2006.

2. The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr V.Yaremko, a lawyer practising in Lviv. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented, most recently, by their Agent, Mr I. Lishchyna.

3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that on 20 February 2002 he had been arbitrarily placed in a sobering-up centre.

4. On 1 August 2012 the application was communicated to the Government.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

A. The applicant’s confinement in the sobering-up centre on 20 February 2002

5. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Lviv.

6. According to the applicant, at about 7 p.m. on 20 February 2002 he was stopped in the street by officers of the municipal guard (муніципальна дружина) and brought to the Lviv medical sobering-up centre, in spite of the fact that he was sober. Y.B., a paramedic working at the centre, concluded, after merely examining the applicant’s appearance and without administering any laboratory tests, that he was suffering “from alcohol intoxication of an intermediate degree.” Accordingly, the applicant was confined in the centre in order to sober up.

7. At about 7 a.m. on 21 February 2002 the sobering-up centre’s staff informed the applicant’s mother on the telephone of her son’s whereabouts and invited her to pick him up from the centre.

8. At about 8 a.m. on the same day the applicant’s mother arrived and escorted the applicant home, having paid a service charge of 34.80 hryvnias (UAH) (around 7 euros).

9. Before being discharged, the applicant signed a report on his confinement (“the confinement report”), which stated that he had been placed in the sobering-up centre at 10.20 p.m. on 20 February 2002 after having consumed 250 millilitres of vodka and that he had no complaints in respect of the sobering-up centre’s staff. This report also contained illegible handwritten observations of the centre’s paramedic concerning the applicant’s pulse and other health-related indicators taken upon his placement in the centre.

B. Official investigation into the applicant’s complaints concerning the actions of the municipal guard officers and other sobering-up centre authorities

10. At about 1 p.m. on 22 February 2002 the applicant complained to a doctor at Lviv Municipal Clinic No. 3 (“the Municipal Clinic”) that on 20 February 2002 he had been arbitrarily confined in the sobering-up centre, even though he had been sober, and beaten by officers of the municipal guard in response to his peaceful protests.

11. On the same date the applicant was certified as having no alcohol in his urine. He was also found to be suffering from contusions on one of his elbows and in the eyebrow area. Also on the same date, the police were notified by the medical staff that the applicant had complained about having been beaten.

12. From 25 February 2002 until 18 March 2002 the applicant continued to be treated as an outpatient at his local polyclinic for the above injuries.

13. On 15 April 2002 the Lviv Regional Police addressed a letter to the applicant, indicating that the Municipal Clinic’s notification to the police of 22 February 2002 concerning the applicant’s complaint regarding his alleged beating had been registered in their log. It further noted that K., a police officer, had been assigned to conduct an inquiry into that complaint. He had been found liable to be disciplined for inaction on his part, notably for not having questioned the parties concerned. The applicant was also given assurances that the complaint would be investigated further.

14. On 3 July 2002 the applicant received a letter from the Lviv Prosecutor’s Office stating that an inquiry into his complaints concerning the actions of the municipal guard officers and the sobering-up centre paramedic had concluded that those complaints were ill-founded.

15. On numerous occasions between July 2002 and April 2003 the applicant complained to various departments in the prosecutors’ office that his allegations of ill-treatment had not been properly investigated - notably, that none of the parties concerned had ever been questioned.

16. On various dates the prosecutor’s office responded that those complaints had been ill-founded and that on 3 July 2002 the applicant had already received a proper response.

17. After receiving the final letter (dated 11 July 2003) to this effect, the applicant no longer pursued his attempts to instigate an investigation by the prosecutor’s office.

18. On 20 August 2007 the Lviv Regional Prosecutor’s Office, having archived the case file material, destroyed it; it did so because the statutory time-limit for archiving a case file following the termination of the relevant investigation had lapsed.

C. Compensation proceedings against the sobering-up centre and municipal guard authorities

19. In July 2002 the applicant lodged a civil suit with the Shevchenkivsky District Court in Lviv against the Lviv municipal guard, the municipal guard officers who had brought him to the sobering-up centre and paramedic Y.B. He sought non-pecuniary damages, alleging that his confinement had been arbitrary and that he had been ill-treated.

20. On 17 August 2002 the chief officer of the municipal guard informed the District Court in a letter that on 20 February 2002 the applicant had been stopped by his officers because he “had been walking unsteadily, falling over, and shouting obscenities”.

21. At trial, the applicant submitted, inter alia, that he could not describe in detail when and how the injuries had been inflicted on him. He also maintained that on 21 February 2002, following his discharge from the sobering-up centre, he had had to attend a court hearing in an unrelated case. Having been occupied in court for the whole day, he had not been able to visit a doctor until 22 February 2002.

22. Y.B., the sobering-up centre’s paramedic, submitted that in determining the applicant’s degree of alcohol intoxication he had acted in accordance with “the instruction issued by the medical department of the Ministry of Interior”. According to this instruction, it was not necessary to perform laboratory tests to establish the level of a person’s alcohol intoxication. Such a conclusion was to be made by making a visual examination and by measuring such vital indicators as pulse rate and blood pressure. The paramedic further submitted that the applicant had had no injuries either upon his placement in the facility or upon his release.

23. On 6 June 2003 the court rejected the applicant’s claims as unsubstantiated. It referred, in particular, to the applicant’s own acknowledgment in the confinement report that he had drunk 250 milliliters of vodka and had no complaints against the staff of the sobering-up centre. As regards the applicant’s ill-treatment complaint, the court noted that the prosecutor’s office had refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the incident, having found the applicant’s complaint unsubstantiated. Likewise, the applicant had failed to explain convincingly in court why, having been released on the morning of 21 February 2002, he had first complained of his injuries and had undergone alcohol tests only on 22 February 2002, some thirty hours later. The court noted that the applicant’s claim that he had been occupied by a court hearing for the entire day on 21 February 2002 was unsubstantiated, as the relevant registry records indicated that on that day the applicant had been in court between 9.00 a.m. and 9.20 a.m. only. In these circumstances, the court found that the applicant had most likely sustained his injuries after his release.

24. The applicant appealed. He submitted, in particular, that the confinement report did not constitute reliable evidence, as it had been signed by him under duress. The report was largely illegible, and contained numerous inaccuracies (for example, the wrong time was given for his arrest). However, the applicant had agreed to sign it because he had been afraid that otherwise he might not be discharged. The applicant also complained that the first-instance court had unreasonably refused his request for the prosecutor’s office to be obliged to produce the results of its inquiry concerning the applicant’s complaints.

25. On 13 October 2003 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal, having found that he had failed to substantiate his allegations. It also noted that there had been no need to ask the prosecutor’s office for the results of its inquiry because the fact that it had refused to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant’s complaint had been sufficient to dismiss the matter.

26. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. He noted, in particular, that his arrest and confinement had been arbitrary, since neither the confinement report nor any other document stated the circumstances in which he had been arrested or the grounds for his confinement. He further noted that the method by which it had been determined that he had been suffering from alcohol intoxication of an “intermediate degree” had been based on a visual examination only, without any objective tests having been undertaken. This method was arbitrary and neither the defendant authority nor the courts had referred to any specific legal provision governing such a practice. The applicant also submitted that the authorities had acted arbitrarily in not notifying his family of his whereabouts until some twelve hours after he had been deprived of his liberty. He further complained that neither the prosecutor’s office nor the civil courts had made any effort in good faith to establish the circumstances in which he had sustained his injuries; thus, his version of events remained credible and unrebutted.

27. On 28 March 2006 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant’s request for leave to lodge a cassation appeal.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

A. Applicable laws and regulations in force as of 20 February 2002

28. Article 178 of the Code on Administrative Offences of 1984, as in force in February 2002, provided, in particular, that public appearance in a drunken state that was “offensive to human dignity and public morals” could be punished by a warning or a fine.

29. Section 11 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Militia” (no. 565-XII of 20 December 1990, repealed by the Law “On the National Police” (no. 580-VIII of 2 July 2015)), as worded in February 2002, stipulated, in particular, the right of the police to escort the individuals found in public in a state of drunkenness to specialised medical sobering-up centres or to their places of residence.

30. On 9 August 1999 the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted Regulation no. 1451 “On the question of the functioning of medical sobering-up centres” resolving to close down the medical sobering-up centres created in the U.S.S.R. times, which, in so far as relevant, read as follows:

“... the Cabinet of Ministers resolves:

1. to accept the proposal ... concerning the inexpediency of the operation of medical sobering-up centres (starting from 1 January 2000) relieving the ... police of [the duty of] fulfilling the inappropriate function of returning the citizens to sobriety.

2. to instruct the Ministry of Healthcare to examine the issue and to take additional measures concerning the further improvement of the assistance offered to the population in respect of substance abuse. ...

3. to recommend to local government bodies that they examine the issue of [creation of] diagnostic, detoxification, rehabilitation and other substance abuse assistance facilities.”

31. On 27 September 1999 the Deputy Minister of Healthcare issued Order no. 235 “On additional measures concerning the further improvement of substance abuse assistance offered to the population of Ukraine” with a view to the execution of the aforementioned Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers. This Order instructed the regional departments of the Ministry of Healthcare to take measures aimed at transferring the premises vacated by the closing of the sobering-up centres to local substance abuse assistance establishments in order for them to create detoxification, rehabilitation and other departments. The functioning of these departments was to be financed from local budgets.

32. On 17 December 1999 the Lviv City Council adopted decision no. 667 “On the acceptance of the property of the sobering-up centre of the Lviv Regional Police by the municipal guard department”. Under this decision, the Council agreed to transfer the medical sobering-up centre previously managed by the Regional Police to the municipal guard, with a view to ensuring that it continued to function as a sobering-up centre, to be funded from the city budget. It further instructed that the municipal guard authority should submit a draft decision on the creation of a medical sobering-up centre as a department of the municipal guard.

B. Applicable laws and regulations adopted after 20 February 2002

33. On 13 June 2002 the Lviv City Council adopted a decision “On the creation of a Lviv municipal company on the basis of the municipal guard departments”. Under this decision, various departments of the municipal guard were to merge into a single municipal company, whose objective would be the protection of public order and safety and the administration of municipal taxes and dues, the fees relating to the sobering-up centre.

34. On 13 November 2002 the Lviv City Council approved by-laws regulating the reformed sobering-up centre, and an instruction on the provision of medical assistance to persons brought to medical sobering-up centres.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

35. The applicant complained that on 20 February 2002 he had been ill-treated by municipal guard officers and that he had sustained injuries as a result of this ill-treatment. He also complained that his complaint in this regard had never been properly investigated. He referred to Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

36. The Government submitted that the applicant’s ill-treatment complaint was manifestly ill-founded. In particular, the applicant’s account of the circumstances in which he had sustained the impugned injuries had been neither detailed nor consistent. Moreover, neither the applicant nor his mother had brought any complaints against the sobering-up centre at the time at which the applicant had been discharged. The disputed injuries had first been reported more than thirty hours after the applicant had left the sobering-up centre. In all likelihood, they had been sustained outside of that facility.

37. The Government further submitted that in any event, the present complaint had been lodged outside the six-month period. This period had to be calculated from the date on which the applicant had learned about the last decision of the prosecutor’s office not to investigate his complaints of ill-treatment. The latest date on which the applicant should have learned about this decision was 6 June 2003 (from the text of the first-instance court’s judgment in his civil case; see paragraph 23 above). However, the application with the Court was lodged only on 20 September 2006, that is to say more than three years later.

38. The applicant disagreed. He submitted that the injuries at issue had indeed been sustained at the hands of the municipal guard authorities. If he had complained about these matters in the confinement report, he would have risked not being discharged. It had also not been possible for him to attend an independent doctor immediately upon release because he had been occupied all day at a court hearing and had been too exhausted afterwards. The applicant also alleged that the six-month time-limit for lodging the present complaint had not started to run until the end of the civil proceedings against the sobering-up centre and the municipal guard officers. He maintained that he had duly lodged the present application within six months of the end of those proceedings.

39. The Court reiterates that, as a rule, the six-month period runs from the date of the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies (see, in particular, Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, § 157, ECHR 2009). Where an applicant avails himself of an apparently existing remedy and only subsequently becomes aware of circumstances which render the remedy ineffective, it may be appropriate for the purposes of Article 35§ 1 to take the start of the six-month period as the date on which the applicant first became or ought to have become aware of those circumstances (see Edwards v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 46477/99, 7 June 2001). The Court further reiterates that in cases where an individual raises an arguable claim concerning willful ill-treatment by the State authorities, a breach of Article 3 cannot be remedied exclusively through an award of compensation to the victim, as this provision requires, by implication, that there should be an effective official investigation into the relevant facts (see Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no. 41461/02, §§ 78 and 81, 24 July 2008).

40. As can be seen from the available materials, the applicant in the present case had abandoned any attempts to instigate an official investigation into his ill-treatment complaint by July 2003 (see paragraph 17 above) - that is to say more than six months before lodging the present application (20 September 2006). While the ill-treatment complaint was also a matter for consideration in civil proceedings, which lasted until 28 March 2006, the civil court was not in a position to conduct an official inquiry with a view to establishing the relevant facts or determining the persons responsible. The matter before it was compensation for damage to the extent that the case-file material provided by the parties would so warrant.

41. However, even assuming that in the circumstances of the present case the applicant was justified in his decision to await the outcome of the civil proceedings before applying to the Court, it is notable that the ill-treatment complaint was dismissed as ill-founded in those proceedings. In particular, it was noted that the injuries complained about had first been documented more than thirty hours after the applicant’s discharge, thus suggesting the possibility that he had sustained them afterwards. It is also noted that neither before the domestic courts nor before the Court had the applicant ever provided a detailed and coherent account of the circumstances of his alleged ill-treatment.

42. Regard being had to the materials before it, the Court considers that, without prejudice to other admissibility requirements, the present complaint should on the whole be rejected as manifestly ill-founded.

43. Accordingly, the Court declares this complaint inadmissible, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

44. The applicant also submitted that on 20 February 2002 he had been sober and that his confinement in the sobering-up centre had been completely arbitrary. In this respect, he referred to Article 5 § 1 (e) of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

...

(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants ...”

A. Admissibility

45. The Government submitted that the present complaint had been duly considered by the domestic courts and dismissed as unsubstantiated. In their view, it had to be rejected as manifestly ill-founded.

46. The applicant disagreed.

47. In the Court’s view the present complaint is not manifestly ill-founded and not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

48. The applicant maintained, inter alia, that his confinement in the sobering-up centre had been neither lawful nor necessary and that the applicable law did not meet the quality of law criteria. Notably, neither the domestic courts nor the Government in their observations had provided a reference to any legal instrument governing the procedure for determining levels of alcohol intoxication by personnel at sobering-up centres. In the applicant’s case, a paramedic had concluded that he had been suffering from intoxication of an intermediate degree, but that paramedic had not performed any laboratory tests, and his handwriting in the relevant report had been completely illegible. The domestic courts, examining the applicant’s complaint in this respect, had never responded to his allegation that such a method of assessment had lacked objectivity. Likewise, they had never established why the municipal guard officers had decided that the applicant’s state had warranted his removal from a public street and his placement in the sobering-up centre.

49. The Government maintained that the applicant’s confinement had been lawful. They noted that the Lviv sobering-up centre was a municipal company, regulated by by-laws approved by the Lviv City Council. Those by-laws stipulated in detail all the relevant procedures. Inter alia, an instruction on providing medical assistance to persons brought to the medical sobering-up centres, which was part of these by-laws, contained rules on determining levels of intoxication. Should the applicant have wanted to challenge the findings concerning the level of his intoxication, he could have taken a medical test in an independent facility upon his discharge. However, the applicant had not taken this opportunity and had undergone such an examination only on the following day. In addition, the Government maintained that, as could be seen from the explanation given by the officers who had removed the applicant from the public street, such a removal had been warranted by his unsteady walking and indecent behaviour (notably, his shouting obscenities).

50. The Court notes that it is not in dispute between the parties that the applicant’s confinement in the Lviv sobering-up centre in February 2002 amounted to a “deprivation of liberty” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (e) of the Convention (see, in particular, Djundiks v. Latvia, no. 14920/05, §§ 85-86, 15 April 2014).

51. The Court next recalls that under this provision, persons who are not medically diagnosed as “alcoholics” but whose conduct and behaviour under the influence of alcohol pose a threat to public order or themselves can be taken into custody for the protection of the public or their own interests, such as their health or personal safety (see Witold Litwa v. Poland, no. 26629/95, §§ 61-62, ECHR 2000-III).

52. In the light of the above, the Court is prepared to accept that the applicant’s detention fell within the ambit of Article 5 § 1 (e) of the Convention.

53. The Court next recalls that, although the expressions “lawful” and “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” in Article 5 § 1 essentially refer back to national law, Article 5 § 1 also relates to the “quality of the law”, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law, a concept inherent in all the Articles of the Convention. “Quality of law” in this sense implies that where a national law authorises deprivation of liberty it must be sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in its application, in order to avoid all risk of arbitrariness (see Djundiks, cited above, §§ 89-90).

54. Lastly, the detention of an individual is such a serious measure that it is only justified where other, less stringent measures have been considered and found to be insufficient to safeguard the individual or the public interest which might require that the person concerned be detained. That means that it does not suffice that the deprivation of liberty is in conformity with national law; it must also be necessary in the circumstances (see Witold Litwa, cited above, § 78; Hilda Hafsteinsdottir v. Iceland, no. 40905/98, § 51, 8 June 2004; and, more recently, Kharin v. Russia, no. 37345/03, § 35, 3 February 2011).

55. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes at the outset that rather than being stopped by the police (see reference to Section 11 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Militia” in paragraph 29 above), the applicant in the present case was picked up from the street by officers of the municipal guard. It is not clear from submissions by the parties and other available material what was the scope of the authority conveyed under the domestic legal order to the municipal guard officers and what were the procedural safeguards against abuse of this authority. It is likewise not clear what was the legal basis for the sobering-up centre’s functioning on the date of the incident giving rise to the present application (20 February 2002). As can be seen from the case-file material before the Court, on 9 August 1999 the Cabinet of Ministers decided to close down the sobering-up centres previously managed by the police authorities and to transfer them to the municipalities with a view to their being reformed as substance-abuse assistance facilities for the public (see paragraph 30 above). The by-laws and the instruction on medical assistance to persons taken to medical sobering-up centres, to which the Government refer in their observations (see paragraph 49 above), were adopted by the Lviv City Council only on 13 November 2002 (see paragraph 34 above). Further, as can be seen from the text of the Shevchenkivskiy District Court’s judgment of 6 June 2003, Y.B., the sobering-up centre’s paramedic who examined the applicant prior to his confinement, submitted in court that he had assessed the applicant’s state in accordance with an instruction provided by the medical department of the Ministry of Interior (see paragraph 22 above). However, neither this judgment nor any other document on file cites the relevant provisions or provides full reference to this legal act. Accordingly, neither the applicant, nor the Court has been able to identify the impugned document or access and consult its text. In the light of the above, the Court concludes that the applicant’s confinement was not based on accessible and foreseeable legal provisions. It was therefore not in accordance with the law.

56. In addition to the above conclusion, which, in principle, is sufficient for a finding of a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the Court observes that there is no evidence that the applicant’s confinement was “necessary”. The description of the grounds on which the municipal guard officers decided to remove the applicant from a public street appears rather formulaic and lacking case-specific details (see paragraph 20 above). It is also notable that the applicant was not charged or held liable under Article 178 of the Code of Administrative Offences, which provided for sanction for appearance in public while in a state of drunkenness (see paragraph 28 above). Moreover, nothing in the case file indicates that the municipal guard officers considered any milder options, such as escorting the applicant to his home. Overall, the case-file materials do not provide sufficient evidence that the applicant’s confinement in the sobering-up centre was necessary in the circumstances.

57. In the light of the considerations expressed in paragraphs 55-56 above, the Court considers that the applicant’s deprivation of liberty was neither lawful nor necessary for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 (e) of the Convention.

58. There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 1.

III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

59. Lastly, the applicant complained under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention that he had also been arbitrarily detained and ill-treated in a sobering-up centre on 10 April 2002. He also complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the domestic courts had incorrectly interpreted the facts and applied the law in civil proceedings brought by him.

60. Having considered these complaints in the light of all the material in its possession, the Court finds that, in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention provisions relied on by the applicants.

61. It follows that this part of the application must be declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

62. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

63. The applicant claimed 30,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

64. The Government alleged that this amount was exorbitant and unsubstantiated.

65. The Court, ruling on an equitable basis, awards the applicant EUR 500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

B. Costs and expenses

66. The applicant did not submit any claim under this head. The Court therefore finds no call to make an award.

C. Default interest

67. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the complaint concerning arbitrariness of the applicant’s confinement in the sobering-up centre admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention;

3. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 500 (five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period, plus three percentage points;

4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 October 2016, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Milan Blaško Angelika Nußberger
Deputy Registrar President

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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> GUKOVYCH v. UKRAINE - 2204/07 (Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction) : Court (Fifth Section)) [2016] ECHR 914 (20 October 2016) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2016/914.html Cite as: [2016] ECHR 914, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1020JUD000220407, CE:ECHR:2016:1020JUD000220407