European Court of Human Rights

 

 

 

FIRST SECTION

CASE OF BALOGH AND OTHERS v. SLOVAKIA

(Applications nos. 7918/19 and 43062/20)

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

16 December 2021

 

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Balogh and Others v. Slovakia,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

          Erik Wennerström, President,
          Lorraine Schembri Orland,
          Ioannis Ktistakis, judges,
and Viktoriya Maradudina, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 25 November 2021,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in applications against Slovakia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on the various dates indicated in the appended table.

2.  The applicants were represented by Ms O. Szabó, a lawyer practising in Patince.

3.  The Slovak Government (“the Government”) were given notice of the applications.

THE FACTS

4.  The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.

5.  The applicants initiated administrative proceedings on 23 December 2004 before the Komárno Land Office.  On 27 May 2010 the Land Office dismissed the claim on the ground that the claimants lacked standing. The decision was upheld by the Nitra Regional Court on 21 November 2011.

6.  The Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the Regional Court on 29 January 2014 and remitted the case for re-examination since the lower court had failed to establish the representatives’ authority to act on behalf of the claimants.

7.  The Regional Court rendered another judgment on 4 December 2014 covering several procedural issues without deciding on the merits of the case. On 25 May 2016 the Supreme Court upheld that judgment.

8.  On 21 June 2018 and 28 April 2020, the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicants’ right to a hearing within a reasonable time and awarded each of them 300 euros (EUR) in just satisfaction. Although the applicants had also complained of delays in the proceedings before the Land Office, the Constitutional Court only examined the length of the proceedings before the Regional Court (IV. US 248/2018 and II. US 392/2019).

9.  On 9 December 2019 the Regional Court quashed the decision of the Land Office of 27 May 2010 and remitted the case for new proceedings.

10.  According to the information available in the case file, the proceedings have since been pending before the Land Office.

THE LAW

I.         JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS

11.  Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.

II.     THE LOCUS STANDI OF the applicants’ heirs

12.  As concerns the applicants marked by an asterisk (see appended table), the Court notes that they died on the dates indicated in the appended table while the present applications were pending before the Court. The applicants’ heirs, whose details are set out in the appended table, have asked to pursue the applications on their relatives’ behalf. As the requests are in line with its case-law, the Court sees no reason to refuse (see, among other authorities, Horváthová v. Slovakia, no. 74456/01, §§ 25-27, 17 May 2005). However, reference will still be made to the original applicants throughout the present text.

III.   ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

13.  The applicants complained that the length of the administrative proceedings in question had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement. They relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

Article 6 § 1

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”

14.  The Government submitted that the applicants had lost their victim status because of the acknowledgment of the violation by the Constitutional Court, the acceleratory effect of its judgments and the financial compensation awarded.

15.  They further submitted that the applicants had failed to exhaust all available remedies. The proceedings were again pending before the Land Office and therefore the applicants should have challenged their length by means of an administrative action for acceleration of the administrative proceedings provided for in Articles 242-251 of the new Code of Administrative Judicial Procedure, as also required by the established practice of the Constitutional Court. The Government stressed that the current legislation had strengthened the preventive character of that remedy in that, inter alia, it allowed the administrative court to fine repeatedly an administrative organ in case of inactivity. Coupled with subsequent civil action under the State Liability Act, these remedies would offer the applicants appropriate satisfaction (preventive and compensatory).

16.  Referring to the Court’s judgment in Balogh and Others v. Slovakia (no. 35142/15, 31 August 2018), the applicants asserted that the overall length of the proceedings was unjustifiable, particularly so that they had not contributed to the delays.

17.  As regards the applicants’ victim status, the Court notes that the proceedings at hand have so far lasted for almost 17 years before the administrative authority and two levels of courts. According to the latest information available to the Court they have not yet ended, which necessarily puts in doubt the Government’s argument about the acceleratory effect of the Constitutional Court’s judgments. Moreover, the amount of EUR 300 which each of the applicants received at the domestic level cannot be considered sufficient in the light of the Court’s case-law (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 205-06 and 214-15, ECHR 2006‑V). The applicants can accordingly still claim to be “victims” of a breach of the “reasonable time” requirement.

18.  As for the Government’s plea of non-exhaustion, the Court observes that it has already found in Balogh and Others (cited above, § 57) that such a cumulation of remedies, which by extension leads to a multiplication of judicial proceedings, raises general doubts about its overall effectiveness. The Court is of the opinion that, despite certain legislative changes in respect of the administrative action for acceleration of the proceedings, the conclusions reached in Balogh and Others are still relevant in the present case for the following reasons.

19.  While taking note of the legislative changes, the Court observes that they only took effect on 1 July 2016, when the impugned proceedings had already been pending for almost 12 years. At that stage, a violation of the applicants’ right to a hearing within a reasonable time had already occurred and a mere preventive remedy could not provide adequate satisfaction (see Ištván and Ištvánová v. Slovakia, no. 30189/07, § 82, 12 June 2012). Yet, the administrative action for acceleration of the proceedings under the new Code of Administrative Judicial Procedure provides exclusively this type of satisfaction.

20.  Moreover, the action for acceleration of the proceedings together with the civil action under the State Liability Act appears scarcely to have been used in this context (Balogh and Others, cited above, § 59) and the Government have not identified any examples of the use of either remedy to show how they function and, more importantly, to demonstrate their effectiveness (see, a contrario, Pallanich v. Austria, no. 30160/96, § 30, 30 January 2001).

21.  Given the length of the restitution proceedings, the applicants should not be expected to lodge yet another action, namely an action for damages under the State Liability Act, as this would place an excessive burden on them, taking into account the subsequent duration of such proceedings and any supplementary legal costs and expenses (see, mutatis mutandis, Edward and Cynthia Zammit Maempel v. Malta, no. 3356/15, § 85, 15 January 2019).

22.  Accordingly, the Government’s objection of non-exhaustion must also be dismissed.

23.  The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicants in the dispute (see Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).

24.  Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of justifying the overall length of the proceedings at the national level. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.

25.  These complaints are therefore admissible and disclose a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

IV.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

26.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

27.  Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law (see, in particular, Balogh and Others, cited above), the Court considers it reasonable to award the sums indicated in the appended table.

28.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1.      Decides to join the applications;

2.      Decides that the applicants’ heirs (see appended table) have locus standi in the proceedings;

3.      Declares the applications admissible;

4.      Holds that these applications disclose a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the excessive length of the administrative proceedings;

5.      Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months, the amounts indicated in the appended table;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 16 December 2021, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

                       

      Viktoriya Maradudina                                           Erik Wennerström

    Acting Deputy Registrar                                                President

 

APPENDIX

List of applications raising complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention

(excessive length of administrative proceedings)