Sberbank of Russia v MeSoFa and Others (Appeal - Intervention - Economic and monetary policy - Single resolution mechanism for credit institutions and certain investment firms - Order) [2024] EUECJ C-693/23P(I)

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	Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions) >> Sberbank of Russia v MeSoFa and Others (Appeal - Intervention - Economic and monetary policy - Single resolution mechanism for credit institutions and certain investment firms - Order) [2024] EUECJ C-693/23P(I)_CO (22 March 2024) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/EUECJ/2024/C69323P(I)_CO.html Cite as: [2024] EUECJ C-693/23P(I)_CO, EU:C:2024:274, ECLI:EU:C:2024:274

(Appeal – Intervention – Economic and monetary policy – Single resolution mechanism for credit institutions and certain investment firms – Decision to adopt a resolution scheme – Parent company – Interest in the result of the case)

APPEAL under the first paragraph of Article 57 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 16 November 2023,

Sberbank of Russia PAO, established in Moscow (Russia), represented by M. Campa, M. Moretto, M. Pirovano, D. Rovetta and V. Villante, avvocati,

MeSoFa Vermögensverwaltungs AG, formerly Sber Vermögensverwaltungs AG, initially Sberbank Europe AG, established in Vienna (Austria),

European Commission, represented by F. Erlbacher and D. Triantafyllou, acting as Agents,

Single Resolution Board (SRB), represented by H. Ehlers, L. Forestier and J. Rius Riu, acting as Agents,

1 By its appeal, Sberbank of Russia PAO seeks to have set aside the order of the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court of the European Union of 19 October 2023, MeSoFa v Commission and SRB (T‑524/22, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2023:713), by which she dismissed its application to intervene in support of the form of order sought by MeSoFa Vermögensverwaltungs AG, formerly Sber Vermögensverwaltungs AG, formerly Sberbank Europe AG (‘MeSoFa’), applicant at first instance in Case T‑524/22.

2 The background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 2 to 6 of the order under appeal. For the purposes of the present proceedings, it may be summarised as follows.

3 At the material time, MeSoFa was a credit institution established in Austria under the company name ‘Sberbank Europe AG’. Sberbank Europe had subsidiaries established in Member States of the European Union and in third countries and formed a group with them (‘the Sberbank Europe group’). Those subsidiaries included Sberbank d.d. (‘Sberbank Croatia’), a credit institution established in Croatia in which Sberbank Europe held 100% of the shares.

4 Following a deterioration in the liquidity situation of Sberbank Europe and Sberbank Croatia, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) adopted Decision SRB/EES/2022/21 of 1 March 2022 concerning the adoption of a resolution scheme in respect of Sberbank Croatia, in accordance with Article 18(6), of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 225, p. 1; ‘the decision at issue’).

5 On 1 March 2022, the European Commission adopted Decision (EU) 2022/948 endorsing the resolution scheme for Sberbank d.d. (OJ 2022 L 164, p. 65).

6 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 19 August 2022, MeSoFa brought an action for annulment of the decision at issue.

7 By document lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 22 December 2022, Sberbank of Russia applied to intervene in Case T‑524/22 in support of the form of order sought by MeSoFa.

8 By the order under appeal, the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court dismissed that application to intervene on the ground that Sberbank of Russia had not established that it had a direct interest in the result of the case before the General Court.

9 In paragraphs 26 and 27 of that order, the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court took the view that, in so far as Sberbank of Russia is not a shareholder of Sberbank Croatia, the former company is not justified in claiming that the decision at issue and Decision 2022/948 (‘the resolution decisions’) affected the right of Sberbank of Russia to dispose of the assets of Sberbank Croatia, to receive dividends from that credit institution and to participate in its management.

10 The President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court also found, in paragraph 28 of that order, that, given that the resolution decisions did not concern Sberbank Europe, nor were the rights of Sberbank of Russia as shareholder of Sberbank Europe affected by those decisions.

11 In addition, in paragraph 29 of that order, the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court rejected the argument put forward by Sberbank of Russia concerning its status as the ultimate parent company of Sberbank Europe, on the ground that the fact that Sberbank of Russia is not a shareholder of Sberbank Croatia precluded a finding that the resolution decisions could in any way affect its legal position.

12 Furthermore, in paragraph 31 of the order under appeal, the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court observed that Sberbank of Russia merely relied on its status as the ultimate parent company of the Sberbank Europe group and held that the interests of Sberbank of Russia, in that capacity, merged with those of Sberbank Europe, which is the shareholder of Sberbank Croatia, so that they were only indirectly affected by the decision at issue and, more generally, by the outcome of the dispute in Case T‑524/22.

– grant its application to intervene in Case T‑524/22 in support of the form of order sought by MeSoFa, and

– reject the plea of illegality raised by Sberbank of Russia as inadmissible or, in any event, as unfounded;

16 In support of its appeal, Sberbank of Russia puts forward two grounds of appeal alleging, first, errors of law in the application of the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and, secondly, errors of law and distortion of the facts as regards the assessment of the direct nature of the effects of the decision at issue on the legal position of Sberbank of Russia.

17 By the first part of its first ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia submits that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court misinterpreted the concept of ‘interest in the result of the case’ within the meaning of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

18 First, according to Sberbank of Russia, she wrongly equated that concept with the first of the two conditions relating to standing laid down in Article 263 TFEU, by making the admission of the intervention conditional on the existence of a direct interest in the result of the case. Secondly, she added a condition to those set out in Article 40, by requiring that the outcome of the case be such as to alter the legal position of the applicant for leave to intervene.

19 Sberbank of Russia asserts that although that interpretation of Article 40 corresponds to that adopted by the Court of Justice in its settled case-law, it entails an excessive restriction of the right to effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and is not faithful to the intention of the authors of the Treaties.

20 By the second part of its first ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia submits that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court erred in law, in paragraph 26 of the order under appeal, by not recognising the capacity of Sberbank of Russia, as the ultimate parent company of the Sberbank Europe group, to dispose of the assets of Sberbank Croatia and to participate in the management of the latter, through Sberbank Europe. Furthermore, the interpretation of the property right set out in paragraph 27 of the order is incorrect, since Sberbank of Russia’s property rights extend to the entire Sberbank Europe group, including Sberbank Croatia. The decision at issue therefore affected the legal position of Sberbank of Russia, by depriving it of its ownership of its Croatian subsidiary and depreciating the assets at its disposal.

21 By the third part of its first ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia submits that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court wrongly failed to take account of the arguments put forward in the application for leave to intervene as regards the a resolution plan adopted by the SRB in 2021 (‘the 2021 plan’) and the active involvement of Sberbank of Russia in the preparation of that plan.

22 By the fourth part of its first ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia asserts, in the alternative, that, should the Court of Justice uphold the interpretation of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union adopted in the order under appeal, that provision should be set aside as unlawful, in so far as it affords insufficient protection to persons with an interest in the outcome of a case and deprives the intervention mechanism provided for by that provision of its effectiveness. Most of the legal systems of the Member States provide, moreover, for an intervention mechanism available to all persons having a substantial interest in the outcome of a case.

23 The Commission asserts that the first ground of appeal should be rejected as being in part inadmissible and in part unfounded. The SRB contends that the first ground of appeal should be rejected as unfounded.

24 As regards, in the first place, the first part of the first ground of appeal, it should be noted that, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, any person may intervene before the Courts of the European Union if such a person can establish an interest in the result of the case submitted to one of those courts.

25 As the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court observed in paragraph 18 of the order under appeal, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, the concept of ‘interest in the result of the case’, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, must be defined with regard to the subject matter of the case and be understood as being a direct and existing interest in the ruling on the forms of order sought, and not as an interest in relation to the pleas in law or the arguments raised. The words ‘result of the case’ refer to the final decision sought, as set out in the operative part of the future judgment (order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 22 February 2022, Fastweb v Commission, C‑649/21 P(I), EU:C:2022:171, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

26 As is apparent from paragraphs 19 to 21 of the order under appeal, it is necessary in particular to verify that the applicant for leave to intervene is directly affected by the contested act and that its interest in the result of the case is certain. In principle, an interest in the result of the case can be considered to be sufficiently direct only in so far as that result is capable of altering the legal position of the applicant to intervene. Furthermore, it is necessary to distinguish between applicants for leave to intervene who can establish a direct interest in the ruling on the forms of order sought by the parties to the dispute in which they wish to intervene and those who can establish only an indirect interest in the result of the case by reason of similarities between their situation and that of one of the parties (see, to that effect, order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 22 February 2022, Fastweb v Commission, C‑649/21 P(I), EU:C:2022:171, paragraphs 36 and 37 and the case-law cited).

27 While it is not disputed that the interpretation of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union adopted by the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court in the order under appeal is consistent with the settled case-law referred to in paragraphs 25 and 26 of this order, Sberbank of Russia nevertheless invites the Court of Justice to depart from that interpretation.

28 In this regard, first, it should be noted that the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union is intended to ensure that a decision of a Court of the European Union affecting the interests of a third party cannot be given without that party having been given the opportunity to state its position on that decision.

29 However, in the interests of the proper administration of justice, that provision must be interpreted in such a way as to avoid multiple individual interventions which would compromise the effectiveness and proper course of the procedure (see, to that effect, orders of the President of the Court of Justice of 17 June 1997, National Power and PowerGen, C‑151/97 P(I) and C‑157/97 P(I), EU:C:1997:307, paragraph 66, and of 6 April 2006, An Post v Deutsche Post and Others, C‑130/06 P(I), EU:C:2006:248, paragraph 11).

30 The distinction between applicants to intervene who have a direct interest in the outcome of a case and those who have only an indirect interest in that outcome ensures that the objective pursued by that provision is achieved, while preventing the admission to intervene of third parties who have, at most, a tenuous connection with the proceedings in question from prejudicing the proper course of that procedure (see, to that effect, order of 15 November 1993, Scaramuzza v Commission, C‑76/93 P, EU:C:1993:881, paragraphs 10 and 11).

31 Accordingly, the fact, relied on by Sberbank of Russia, that the admissibility of an action for annulment is subject to the existence of a direct interest in the annulment of the contested decision is not such as to call into question the interpretation of the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union set out in paragraphs 25 and 26 of this order.

32 Second, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 26 of this order, the requirement that the admission of an application to intervene presupposes that the result of the case at issue is such as to alter the legal position of the applicant for leave to intervene is not an additional condition to that laid down in the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, but merely an aspect of the definition of the concept of ‘interest in the result of a case’ within the meaning of that provision.

33 Moreover, in so far as Sberbank of Russia relies on Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in support of its proposed interpretation of the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, it is important to bear in mind that recognition of the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 in a given case presupposes that the person invoking that right is relying on rights or freedoms guaranteed by EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court), C‑430/21, EU:C:2022:99, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

34 Consequently, Article 47 cannot mean that a person who is not a party to a dispute which is the subject of proceedings before a Court of the European Union is necessarily entitled to intervene in those proceedings where the outcome of that case is not, as such, capable of having consequences for that person’s rights and obligations.

35 It follows that Sberbank of Russia has not established that paragraphs 18 to 21 of the order under appeal are vitiated by an error of law and that the first part of the first ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

36 In the second place, as regards the second part of the first ground of appeal, it is not disputed that Sberbank of Russia was the sole shareholder of Sberbank Europe, of which Sberbank Croatia was a subsidiary. Sberbank of Russia is admittedly therefore correct to maintain that it was in a position to exercise a certain influence over Sberbank Croatia, through Sberbank Europe.

37 However, that influence did not derive from Sberbank of Russia’s own right over Sberbank Croatia, but rather, indirectly, from Sberbank of Russia’s right to participate, as shareholder, in the management of Sberbank Europe.

38 It follows that the existence of that influence does not mean that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court erred in her legal characterisation of the facts in holding, in paragraph 26 of the order under appeal, that Sberbank of Russia did not have the right to dispose of the assets of Sberbank Croatia, to receive dividends from that credit institution and to participate in its management.

39 In those circumstances, it cannot be held either that Sberbank of Russia has shown, by relying on the influence which it could have over the management of Sberbank Croatia, that the assessment, set out in paragraph 27 of that order, that Sberbank of Russia did not have property rights in Sberbank Croatia is vitiated by an error of law.

40 Moreover, in so far as the second part of the first ground of appeal must be understood as alleging that the decision at issue is likely to entail depreciation of Sberbank Europe’s assets held by Sberbank of Russia, it is clear from the Court of Justice’s case-law that an adverse effect, even if significant, on the economic and financial interests of the shareholders of a company which is one of the main parties to proceedings pending before the General Court cannot be regarded as a direct, adverse effect on the interests of those shareholders, in so far as it does not alter their legal circumstances (see, to that effect, order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 6 October 2015, Cap Actions SNCM v Commission, C‑418/15 P(I), EU:C:2015:671, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).

41 Consequently, the second part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.

42 In the third place, since, by the third part of its first ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia complains that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court failed to reply to its arguments concerning the 2021 plan or its active participation in the preparation of that plan, it should be borne in mind that, in the context of the appeal, the purpose of the Court of Justice’s review is, in particular, to ascertain whether the General Court has replied to the requisite legal standard to all the arguments put forward by the appellant and, secondly, that the ground of appeal alleging failure to respond to arguments relied on at first instance amounts, essentially, to pleading a breach of the obligation to state reasons which derives from Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 of that statute, and from Article 117 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court (order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 17 August 2022, SJM Coordination Center v Magnetrol International and Commission, C‑4/22 P(I), EU:C:2022:626, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).

43 In the present case, as Sberbank of Russia points out, the grounds of the order under appeal do not include an assessment of the consequences of the outcome of the dispute in Case T‑524/22 for the application of the 2021 plan or for the active participation of Sberbank of Russia in the preparation of that plan.

44 However, it is apparent from Sberbank of Russia’s application to intervene that it did not explicitly rely, at first instance, on any such consequences of the decision at issue.

45 Accordingly, the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court cannot legitimately be criticised for failing to take a position on those consequences in the order under appeal.

46 It follows that the third part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.

47 As regards, in the fourth place, the plea of illegality raised in the alternative by Sberbank of Russia, it must, in any event, be borne in mind that, in accordance with Article 256(1) TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment or order which the appellant seeks to have set aside and the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 24 May 2022, Puigdemont i Casamajó and Others v Parliament and Spain, C‑629/21 P(R), EU:C:2022:413, paragraph 106).

48 However, the appeal does not specify the provisions of EU law on which the plea of illegality, which constitutes the fourth part of the first ground of appeal, is based.

49 It follows that that fourth part must be rejected as inadmissible and, consequently, that the first ground of appeal must be rejected in its entirety.

50 By the first part of its second ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia submits that the decision at issue directly affects its legal position, in particular its right, through Sberbank Europe, to participate in the management of Sberbank Croatia and to decide on the strategy to be followed at the level of the Sberbank Europe group.

51 Thus, the decision at issue deprived Sberbank of Russia of its right to dispose of all the assets of the Sberbank Europe group, since it ruled out the adoption of a resolution scheme at the level of that group, even though such adoption was envisaged in the 2021 plan. The reasons set out in that decision also refer to that plan and indicate that the adoption of a resolution plan for Sberbank Europe is not necessary in view of the possibility of implementing separate resolution measures at the level of its subsidiaries.

52 By the second part of its second ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia asserts that the grounds set out in paragraphs 26 to 28 of the order under appeal are vitiated by an error of law and a distortion of the facts. First, by preventing Sberbank of Russia from disposing of all the assets of Sberbank Europe and its subsidiaries, the decision at issue adversely affects its right to define the strategy of the Sberbank Europe group, which is an expression of Sberbank of Russia’s property rights and freedom to conduct a business. Secondly, since that effect of the decision at issue follows directly from the wording of that decision, the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court wrongly held that it was for Sberbank of Russia to show that that decision had such an effect and that it had thus infringed its freedom to conduct a business.

53 By the third part of its second ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia submits that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court erred in law in applying by analogy, in paragraphs 26 and 27 of the order under appeal, the judgment of 5 November 2019, ECB and Others v Trasta Komercbanka and Others (C‑663/17 P, C‑665/17 P and C‑669/17 P, EU:C:2019:923). While the decision at issue changed the legal position of Sberbank of Russia, the decision in question in that judgment did not have such an effect on the legal position of the shareholders of the undertaking referred to in that judgment.

54 By the fourth part of its second ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia submits that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court erred in law and distorted the facts in stating, in paragraph 28 of that order, that the resolution decisions did not concern Sberbank Europe and did not affect any right which Sberbank of Russia had in relation to Sberbank Europe. That statement does not take account of the fact that the decision at issue deprived Sberbank Europe of the shares in Sberbank Croatia which it owned.

55 By the fifth part of its second ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia criticises the assessment, set out in paragraph 29 of that order, that the fact that it is not a shareholder in Sberbank Croatia precludes a finding that the decision at issue could affect its legal position. It therefore considers that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court should have rejected that assessment, since that decision prevents Sberbank of Russia from disposing of all the assets of the Sberbank Europe group.

56 By the sixth part of its second ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia challenges the validity of paragraph 31 of that order. It asserts that it is wrong to consider that the contested decision only affects the economic interests of Sberbank of Russia and that the interests of the latter merge with those of Sberbank Europe, whereas that decision produces negative effects of an economic nature on Sberbank of Russia and Sberbank Europe is in liquidation.

57 The Commission and the SRB maintain that the second ground of appeal should be rejected as unfounded.

58 In the first place, on the one hand, in so far as the first part of the second ground of appeal is based on an alleged infringement of the right of Sberbank of Russia to participate in the management of Sberbank Croatia, it should be borne in mind that it is apparent from paragraph 38 of this order that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court considered, without making any error in the legal classification of the facts, that Sberbank of Russia did not have such a right.

59 The first part of the second ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as unfounded in so far as it is based on an alleged infringement of that right.

60 On the other hand, the argument put forward in support of the first two parts of the second ground of appeal is based, for the rest, on the claim that the decision at issue deprives Sberbank of Russia of its right to dispose of all the assets of the Sberbank Europe group and on the assertion that there is a contradiction between that decision and the 2021 plan.

61 However, it is clear from the Court of Justice’s case-law that to allow a party to put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea in law which it has not raised before the General Court would be to allow it to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the General Court. In an appeal, the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction is thus confined to review of the findings of law on the pleas argued at first instance before the General Court (order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 22 February 2022, Fastweb v Commission, C‑649/21 P(I), EU:C:2022:171, paragraph 30).

62 In the present case, in its application to intervene before the General Court, Sberbank of Russia did not rely on its right to dispose of all the assets of the Sberbank Europe group. In addition, that application contained no reference to the 2021 plan, to the measures which should have been adopted by Sberbank of Russia pursuant to that plan or to the relationship between that plan and the decision at issue.

63 It is thus apparent that the first two parts of the second ground of appeal in part invite the Court of Justice to rule on a plea which was not raised before the General Court by Sberbank of Russia, namely that the application to intervene should have been allowed in so far as the decision at issue deprived it of its right to dispose of all the assets of the Sberbank Europe group and entailed a deterioration in its legal position compared with the position it would have been in under the 2021 plan.

64 The first two parts of the second ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as inadmissible in so far as they allege infringement of Sberbank of Russia’s right to dispose of all the assets of the Sberbank Europe group and a contradiction between the decision at issue and the 2021 plan.

65 It follows that the first part of the second ground of appeal must be rejected as partly inadmissible and partly unfounded and that the second part of that ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible.

66 In the second place, it must be noted, as regards the third part of the second ground of appeal, that, in paragraph 26 of the order under appeal, the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court merely found that Sberbank of Russia was not a shareholder in Sberbank Croatia and that it therefore had no right to dispose of that credit institution’s assets, to receive dividends from it or to participate in its management.

67 Sberbank of Russia does not dispute the fact that it is not a shareholder in Sberbank Croatia. Furthermore, although Sberbank of Russia submits that it is entitled to dispose of the assets of Sberbank Croatia and to participate in the management of the latter, it is apparent from paragraph 38 of this order that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court decided, without committing any error of legal characterisation of the facts, that Sberbank of Russia did not have such a right.

68 It follows that the fact that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court wrongly referred, in paragraph 26 of the order under appeal, to paragraphs 110 and 111 of the judgment of 5 November 2019, ECB and Others v Trasta Komercbanka and Others (C‑663/17 P, C‑665/17 P and C‑669/17 P, EU:C:2019:923), assuming it were established, would not, in any event, be such as to demonstrate that the assessment in paragraph 26 of the order under appeal should be regarded as incorrect.

69 Accordingly, the third part of the second ground of appeal must be rejected as ineffective.

70 In the third place, as regards the fourth part of the second ground of appeal, it is true that it is not disputed that the resolution decisions entail the adoption of a resolution scheme in respect of Sberbank Croatia.

71 However, contrary to what Sberbank of Russia maintains, it cannot be held that, in paragraph 28 of the order under appeal, the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court found that those decisions had no effect on the rights held by Sberbank Europe as a shareholder of Sberbank Croatia.

72 In order to rule on the application to intervene brought by Sberbank of Russia, the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court was called upon to rule not on the rights of Sberbank Europe, as shareholder of Sberbank Croatia, but on those of Sberbank of Russia, as shareholder of Sberbank Europe.

73 In that context, the statement in paragraph 28 of the order under appeal that the resolution decisions ‘do not concern Sberbank Europe’ must be understood, having regard in particular to the clarification that the latter is a legal person separate from Sberbank Croatia and to the second sentence of that paragraph 28, as implying merely that those decisions do not relate directly to the resolution of Sberbank Europe or to the management of the latter.

74 It follows that the fourth part of the second ground of appeal is based on an incorrect reading of paragraph 28 of the order under appeal and must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

75 In the fourth place, since the fifth part of the second ground of appeal alleges that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court wrongly failed to take account of the fact that the decision at issue prevents Sberbank of Russia from disposing of all the assets of the Sberbank Europe group, that part must be rejected as inadmissible, in view of the fact that that argument is new, as is already apparent from paragraphs 62 to 64 of this order.

76 In the fifth place, as regards the sixth part of the second ground of appeal, the ground, set out in paragraph 31 of the order under appeal, that the interests of Sberbank of Russia merge with those of Sberbank Europe is superfluous, since, even if the interests of those two companies were in fact distinct, that circumstance would not, in itself, be such as to establish that the outcome of the dispute in Case T‑524/22 is likely directly to change the legal position of Sberbank of Russia.

77 Accordingly, the sixth part of the second ground of appeal must be rejected as ineffective.

78 In the light of the foregoing, the second ground of appeal must be rejected and, therefore, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.

79 In accordance with Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to the costs.

80 Under Article 138(1) of those rules of procedure, applicable to the procedure on appeal by reason of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

81 Since the Commission and the SRB have applied for costs and Sberbank of Russia has been unsuccessful, Sberbank of Russia must be ordered to bear its own costs relating to the present proceedings and to pay those incurred by the Commission and the SRB.

2. Sberbank of Russia PAO shall bear its own costs relating to the appeal proceedings and pay those incurred by the European Commission and the Single Resolution Board (SRB).

Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)