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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Gibbons v South West Services Ltd [1994] EWCA Civ 24 (25 October 1994) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1994/24.html Cite as: [1994] EWCA Civ 24

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT
(MR. JUSTICE WRIGHT)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		25 October 1994

LORD JUSTICE MANN: There is before the Court an application for leave to appeal a decision of Wright J given in the High Court yesterday. The Applicant, Mr. Richard Charles Gibbons, is the Plaintiff in an action in which the Defendant is South West Water Services Limited. The decision of the judge was a decision refusing an adjournment of the action - an adjournment which had been requested by Mr. Gibbons.

The action arises out of an incident on 6 July 1988 when water passing through the Lowermoor Treatment Works at Camelford was polluted with an aluminium compound. Arising out of that pollution a number of personal injury actions were commenced in the High Court, and those actions were joined together as a group action which was subject to the control of Pannone Napier as lead solicitors. Wright J was assigned as the judge in charge of the action and has dealt with all subsequent hearings.

The group action proceeded by way of ten test cases which became due for trial on 10 May this year at Truro. On that day the majority of the claims in the action were compromised, the Defendant having previously accepted liability. Judgment was accordingly entered by consent for various sums of money. Mr. Gibbons was one of the few plaintiffs who did not accept the compromise. He tells us that there is one other plaintiff who still has not accepted.

Mr. Gibbons had legal aid for the purposes of the action, but that legal aid certificate was discharged on 2 June 1994 after the settlement had been achieved in the group action. Mr. Gibbons then acted in person for a while, and appeared on 7 June 1994 before Wright J in regard to matters for direction. At that hearing the trial date was fixed for 4 October of this year. Shortly after that directions hearing Mr. Gibbons sought and obtained legal aid for a full review of his claim. He instructed a firm of solicitors called Leigh Day. On 19 July there was another hearing before Wright J, on which occasion Mr. Gibbons was represented by leading counsel, and the trial date was varied from 4 October until 24 October (that is to say yesterday).

Mr. Gibbons, through his solicitors no doubt, sought the advice of a Canadian expert in aluminium toxicology, Professor McLachlan, who submitted a report . After the submission of that report Mr. Gibbons' second legal aid certificate was discharged on 11 October. He had seven days in which to show cause why it should not be, but did not do so. A few days later his solicitors, Leigh Day, came off the record. The matter then came on for hearing yesterday. Mr. Gibbons appeared in person. He had no witnesses and he applied for an adjournment on the basis that he wished to apply for a third legal aid certificate, or alternatively seek funding elsewhere. We have been told this morning of the willingness of certain people, including Professor McLachlan, to give evidence on his behalf, but there is no indication that any of them would do so gratuitously.

Mr. Gibbons made his application for an adjournment, and it is against the refusal of that adjournment that he seeks leave to appeal. The refusal of an adjournment is, of course, a judicial act, but prima facie it is a judicial act entirely within the discretion of the judge. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal is slow to interfere with an exercise of that discretion, the more particularly when the trial judge is an assigned judge who has been dealing with group litigation such as is here involved.

The learned judge observed that in this particular matter Mr. Gibbons has had the benefit of two complete teams of legal advisers and has consistently rejected their advice. Mr. Gibbons has not produced any sensible reason to adjourn, and I cannot see how the granting of an adjournment would help to progress the matter.

It is plain that the learned judge thought a further application for legal aid was, in the light of the history, quite unlikely to succeed, and that having regard to Mr. Gibbon's circumstances (he being unemployed on account of illness) it was quite unlikely that funds from any other source could be achieved. I cannot see that there is any arguable ground upon which the judge's exercise of discretion could be flawed. He was entirely entitled to take the view that to grant an adjournment against the possibility of further legal aid, or from funding elsewhere, would be pointless and fruitless. Accordingly, I here see no arguable ground, despite the care and courtesy with which the matter has been put before us by Mr. Gibbons and those with him whom we allowed to address us. I accordingly would dismiss this application.

Application dismissed.