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ZOCKOLL GROUP LTD v. MERCURY COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED [1997] EWCA Civ 2317 (27th August, 1997)
IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
FC2
97/6588/B
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
FC2
97/6730/B
ON
APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FC2
97/6769/B
CHANCERY
DIVISION
CHANI
97/0947/B
(SIR
RICHARD SCOTT VICE-CHANCELLOR
)
Royal
Courts of Justice
Strand
London
WC2
Wednesday,
27 August 1997
B
e f o r e:
LORD
JUSTICE SIMON BROWN
LORD
JUSTICE PHILLIPS
-
- - - - -
ZOCKOLL
GROUP LTD
Plaintiff/Appellant
-
v -
MERCURY
COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED
Defendant/Respondent
-
- - - - -
(Computer
Aided Transcript of the Palantype Notes of
Smith
Bernal Reporting Limited, 180 Fleet Street,
London
EC4A 2HD
Tel:
0171 831 3183
Official
Shorthand Writers to the Court)
-
- - - - -
MISS
HILARY HEILBRON QC & MR SIMON SALZEDO
(Instructed by Field Fisher Waterhouse, London, EC3N 2AA) appeared on behalf of
the Appellant
MR
MICHAEL DOUGLAS QC & MR DUNCAN MCCALL
(Instructed by Bird & Bird, London, EC4A 1JP) appeared on behalf of the
Respondent
-
- - - - -
J
U D G M E N T
(As
approved by the Court
)
-
- - - - -
©Crown
Copyright
LORD
JUSTICE SIMON BROWN: I will ask Phillips LJ to give the first judgment.
LORD
JUSTICE PHILLIPS: This is an appeal by the Plaintiffs, "Zockoll" against an
Order made by the Vice -Chancellor, Sir Richard Scott, on the 14th April 1997.
By that Order he dismissed an application by Zockoll for an interlocutory
injunction restraining the Defendants, "Mercury" from withdrawing from Zockoll
the use of a particular telephone number, 0500 354448. Immediately upon that
Order being made, Mercury withdrew that number from Zockoll and assigned it to
another of their customers, Manchester Flights Limited ("Manchester Flights").
This necessarily alters the form of interlocutory relief that Zockoll now seek.
They invite this Court to grant a mandatory injunction ordering Mercury to
withdraw the number from Manchester Flights and restore it to them.
Leave
to appeal was sought and granted in respect of a single ground of appeal.
Zockoll argued before the Vice-Chancellor that the withdrawal of the number
would constitute a breach of contract by Mercury by reason of the provisions of
Section 3 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. The Vice-Chancellor held that
there was no arguable case that Section 3 applied. Zockoll challenge that
finding and submit that, applying recently established principles governing
this form of interlocutory relief, the number should be restored to them
pending the determination of the issue of whether of not Mercury are
contractually entitled to withdraw the number from them.
Background
When
automatic dialling of telephone numbers first became possible, the dials of
telephones were marked with both numbers and with letters, a group of three or
four letters being attached to each number. This has remained the position in
the United States, with the result that a telephonic address can there be
described as a series of numbers, or of letters, or both. Where letters are
used to describe a telephonic address these are, it seems, now described as
alphanumerics. In a country where telephone key pads are marked with
alphanumerics a telephonic address consisting of alphanumerics that make up a
word has obvious appeal as being readily memorable and, in consequence, can
enjoy a high commercial value, particularly if the word relates to the business
of the owner of the telephonic address. In the United Kingdom the marking of
telephone key pads with alphanumerics is by no means universal, and we are not
yet accustomed to telephone addresses consisting of letters, or words, rather
than numbers. Zockoll have, however, anticipated the development of the use of
alphanumerics in this country and it is the significance of that anticipated
development that lies behind Zockoll's application.
Mercury
is licensed under the Telecommunications Act 1984 to provide telecommunications
services. In so doing Mercury allocates to its customers telephone numbers
which are made available to Mercury by Oftel. These numbers fall into
different categories. Most have a prefix 01, followed by a series of numbers
which identify the geographic location of the telephone. A minority, known as
Callink numbers, are non-geographic numbers with a distinctive prefix such as
0500 or 0645, which allow callers to make calls without incurring the normal
charge rates. Typically a business will offer potential customers the facility
to make a "Freephone" enquiry on one of these numbers, leaving the cost of the
call to be paid for by the business. Where a Callink number has a memorable
series of digits, such as 0500 123456, Mercury charge a premium for the supply
of the number. Such numbers are referred to as "coveted" numbers. Where the
number is particularly memorable ("a golden number") this premium can amount to
£5,000 a year. For a less striking coveted number the premium is
£1,000 a year. Where Callink numbers have no special numerical
characteristics Mercury make a one-off set up charge of £100 per contract
and thereafter charge no rental but look for their remuneration to the charges
made in respect of the individual calls made to those numbers.
The
contract
In
December 1993 Zockoll entered into a standard form contract with Mercury for
the provision of services on the Callink basis.
50
ordinary Callink numbers were allocated under this agreement together with 3
coveted numbers. The former included the number which is the subject matter of
this Action. The Standard Terms and Conditions to which the contract is subject
make the following provisions in relation to the subject matter of the agreement.
"4.
MERCURY'S OBLIGATIONS
Mercury
agrees to provide the Service to the Customer upon the terms and conditions
contained in this Agreement.
3.
THE CUSTOMER'S OBLIGATIONS
...
3.2
Use of Services
The
Customer undertakes to use the Services in accordance with such conditions as
may be notified in writing to the Customer by Mercury from time to time and in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act, the Mercury Licence, any
direction of the Director General of Telecommunications or other competent
authority and any licence granted thereunder which governs the running of a
telecommunications system by the Customer..."
1
DEFINITIONS
...
q)
Service(s) means the service specified by the Customer overleaf and as more
particularly described in Mercury's Service Literature and as modified or
substituted from time to time to be provided by means of the Mercury System."
Apart
from specifying the quantity of numbers to be supplied, the contract itself
gives no details of the services to be provided. Mercury's Service Literature
is not before the court. It is plain, however, that the services to be provided
include the transmission of telephone messages to the numbers in question.
Clause
2 of the contract deals with its duration and includes the following provisions:
"2.1
This Agreement shall come into force on the date of acceptance by Mercury and
shall continue subject to the terms hereof unless terminated by either party
giving to the other not less than 3 months prior written notice to expire at
the end of the Initial Period or at the end of any month thereafter.
...
2.3
Notwithstanding the provisions of Condition 2.1, the Customer shall have the
right to terminate this agreement during the Initial Period on serving not less
than three months' prior written notice on Mercury, subject to the payment by
the Customer of the applicable Cancellation Charge in respect of the relevant
Services.
...
2.5
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary express or implied elsewhere in this
Agreement Mercury (without prejudice to its other rights) may terminate this
Agreement forthwith in the event that:"
and
various specific events are thereafter set out.
The
most important clause in the context of this appeal is Clause 8, which provides:
"8.
ALLOCATION AND USE OF TELEPHONE NUMBERS
8.1
It is hereby acknowledged that the telephone number(s) allocated by Mercury to
the Customer as part of the Agreement do not belong to the Customer and Mercury
shall be entitled at its sole discretion at any time to withdraw or change any
telephone number used by the Customer on giving the Customer reasonable notice
in writing. The Customer accepts that it shall acquire no rights whatsoever in
any telephone number allocated by Mercury and the Customer shall make no
attempt to apply for registration of the same as a trade or service mark,
whether on its own or in conjunction with some other words or trading style."
Zockoll's
business.
The
Zockoll group of companies specialises in franchising. In his affidavit of the
3rd April 1997, Zockoll's Chairman, Mr James Zockoll, described franchising as
follows:
"Franchising
involves the licensing of a successful and established business format. It
combines the local market knowledge, entrepreneurial skills, and investment of
franchisees with the proven product or service, brand, operating system and
network support provided by franchisors."
Mr
Zockoll appreciated that, if the concept of alphanumerics were to become
established in the United Kingdom, anyone with the contractual right to use a
telephone address that suggested a particular trade or business - e.g. "0500
PLUMBER" - would be in a position to franchise the use of this "generic
phonename" to selected participants in that trade or business. Pursuing the
example, any request for plumbing services telephoned to "0500 PLUMBER" could
be routed to the nearest franchisee to the source of the call. Variations on
this theme would be possible to the owner of an attractive alphanumerical number.
Mr
Zockoll's appreciation of the potential for exploiting alphanumerics was not,
it seems, shared by the companies licensed to provide telecommunications
services. Mr Zockoll formed a company as a subsidiary to Zockoll called
Phonenames Ltd to exploit this potential. Zockoll proceeded to acquire from
both British Telecom and Mercury a very large number of "choice genetic
phonenames for services, products and companies". Those acquired from Mercury
number, in total, approximately 3,000. The contract to which this Action
relates was but one of a number by which Zockoll acquired the right to use the
numbers that could be converted to these phonenames. The particular number
that is the bone of contention, 0500 354448, converts into the phonename "0500
FLIGHTS" (the addition of the final, surplus, "S" will not affect the efficacy
of the dialling) and has obvious potential appeal to any undertaking involved
in the travel business.
Zockoll
claim to have devoted considerable energy and no little expenditure in seeking
to arouse awareness and interest in the potential of alphanumerics in this
country, but as yet to little avail. Nonetheless, advertisements are beginning
to appear in which customers are invited to telephone a phonename rather than a
number, and Zockoll purport to be confident that their investment will, in due
course, prove profitable. So far as "0500 FLIGHTS" is concerned, Mr Zockoll
deposed on the 15th August 1977 that this "is a golden number which I would
wish to licence to many travel agents all over the UK in a licensing or
franchising network". To date, however, nearly 4 years after Zockoll acquired
the use of that phonename, they have succeeded in making little use of it. In
the 6 months commencing with August 1996 the maximum monthly earnings of
Mercury from calls made to that phonename were £45.
The
withdrawal of the number.
On
the 7th March 1997 Mercury wrote to Zockoll as follows:
"Mercury
have been requested by one of our customers to provide them with the number
above. They are guaranteeing extensive usage of this number and as Zockoll's
use of this number is very low, i.e. less than £50.00 over the last six
months, Mercury are exercising their right to withdraw the number.
...
If
you require another number as a replacement, please let me know and I will try
to accommodate your request."
Zockoll
replied on the 14th March, and their letter summarises their contention as to
the overall merits of this case as follows:
"...
Mercury, have been kept well informed of our development plans. Mercury was
well aware that our phonename concept was dependent on the time it would take
to get the letters introduced on to the keypads of new telephones. When we
started only 3% of the phones had letters on the key pads and now that figure
is now at 30% with 80% of the phones coming off the assembly lines having an
international standard key pad. Phonenames played a major part in bringing the
alphanumeric concept to the attention of the phone manufacturers and suppliers.
If Mercury had accepted our offers of a presentation they would have seen the
amount of time, effort and money that had been invested.
Mercury
was told as early as 1993 that there would be
little
or no usage on any of our 0500 numbers until such time as the alphanumeric
market had been developed. It is on record that, at one of our meetings, I
specifically asked Mercury to help contribute some finance to help generate the
alphanumeric awareness to the consumer. After all Mercury would be the greater
beneficiary as they hold the majority of numbers. This was rejected and
Mercury declined to make any financial investment with Phonenames for this
development. For Mercury now to threaten to take back one of our numbers,
after having sat on the sidelines for the past 3½ years, and to give this
particular ´jewel' phonename to a third party to benefit considerably as a
result of our investment, is outrageous."
Zockoll's
application for an interlocutory injunction followed swiftly, and Mercury
delayed the transfer of the FLIGHTS number to Manchester Flights until the
rejection of the application by the Vice-Chancellor.
Events
since the Vice-Chancellor's Order.
Each
party has, with the leave of the Court, filed evidence of events since the
transfer of the FLIGHTS number took place. Briefly summarised, Mercury have
shown that in the month beginning the 18th August 42,949 calls were made to
that number, of which 24,240 were answered. Mercury rely on this to
demonstrate that they acted reasonably in transferring the number to a customer
who would make vigorous use of it, thereby procuring for Mercury income which
they were not enjoying while the number was reserved, infructuously, for Zockoll.
Zockoll
contend that any user of the number made by Manchester Flights is not
attributable to its alphanumeric attraction, for Manchester Flights have been
advertising the number numerically rather than alphanumerically, so that they
would have been in exactly the same position had they been allocated any random
number.
Is
there an arguable claim for breach of contract?
In
withdrawing the FLIGHTS number from Zockoll Mercury purport to have exercised
the right expressly conferred by Clause 8(1) of their Standard Conditions. It
is Zockoll's case that Mercury were precluded from acting as they did by
Section 3(2) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. That Section provides,
insofar as material:
"As
against that party, the other cannot by reference to any contract term -
(a)
...
(b)
claim to be entitled -
(i)
to render a contractual performance substantially different from that which
was reasonably expected of him, or
(ii)
in respect of the whole or any part of his contractual obligation, to render
no performance at all,
except
in so far as (in any of the cases mentioned above in this subsection) the
contract term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness."
This
Section will only avail Zockoll if:
(i)
Clause 8(1) is unreasonable and
(ii)
Mercury's action in reliance upon that clause will have the effect of rendering
their contractual performance substantially different from what was reasonably
expected of them when the contract was concluded or, indeed, of rendering no
performance at all of all or part of their contractual obligation.
In
contending that Zockoll have an arguable case that these requirements are
satisfied, Miss Heilbron Q.C. has founded her argument largely on an unreported
decision of this Court in
Timeload
Limited v. British Telecommunications PLC
(Transcript 30th November 1993). The facts of that case were as follows:
Timeload
contracted with British Telecom for the use of what might be described as a
golden BT Freephone number: 0800 192192. That number was golden because 192 is
generally known and remembered to be the number for Directory Enquiries.
Timeload used this number to provide a contact service. Anyone seeking
professional or commercial services could phone Timeload who would then refer
the enquiry to one of the providers of the service in question on Timeload's
register. Timeload's remuneration was obtained by charging for entry on its
register.
BT
gave notice of withdrawal of this number from Timeload, purporting to be
exercising a right conferred by Clause 18.1 of their Standard Conditions, which
provided:
"Termination
of service by notice. At any time after service has been provided this
contract or the provision of any service or facility under it can be ended.
(1)
by one month's notice by us; or
(2)
by seven days' notice by you."
Timeload
sought and obtained an interlocutory injunction against the withdrawal of the
number, and BT appealed against the grant of that injunction. One argument
raised by Timeload and accepted by the Judge as arguable was that BT's conduct
ran foul of Section 3(2) of the 1997 Act.
On
the question of whether this proposition was indeed arguable, Sir Thomas
Bingham MR said (at page 13 of the transcript):
"The
argument accordingly turns on section 3(2)9b) and that I find more difficult.
Mr Hobbs submits that the subsection cannot apply where, as here, the clause
under consideration defines the service to be provided and does not purport to
permit substandard or partial performance. He says that the customer cannot
reasonably expect that which the contract does not purport to offer, namely
enjoyment of the telephone service under a given number for an indefinite
period. That may indeed be so, but I find the construction and ambit of this
subsection by no means clear. If a customer reasonably expects a service to
continue until BT has substantial reason to terminate it, it seems to me at
least arguable that a clause purporting to authorise BT to terminate without
reason purports to permit partial or different performance from that which the
customer expected. If, however, section 3(2) does not in its precis terms
cover this case, I do not myself regard that as the end of the matter. As I
ventured to observe in
Interfoto
Picture Library Limited v Stiletto Visual Programmes Limited
[1989] QB 433, 439, the law of England, while so far eschewing any broad
principle of good faith in the field of contract, has responded to demonstrated
problems of unfairness by developing a number of piecemeal solutions directed
to the particular problem before it. It seems to me at least arguable that the
common law could, if the letter of the statute does not apply, treat the clear
intention of the legislature expressed in the statute as a platform for
invalidating or restricting the operation of an oppressive clause in a
situation of the present, very special, kind. I say no more than that there
is, I think, a question here which has attracted much attention in Commonwealth
jurisdictions and on the continent and may well deserve to be further explored
here."
Zockoll's
attempt to rely upon this decision in the court below was unsuccessful. The
Vice-Chancellor held that there was the following significant distinction
between that case and this (page 13 of the judgment):
"...
the agreement between Timeload and BT involved only one number. The withdrawal
of the number necessarily involved termination of the contract. In the present
case, there are 53 numbers allocated under the contract in question. The power
that has been exercised by Mercury is not the termination power conferred by
para.2 but the power to withdraw any number allocated under the agreement, a
power conferred by para.8.1. There are other factual differences between the
Timeload
case and the present case."
As
to reliance on the 1977 Act, he said (at page 16):
"I
can see no reasonably arguable basis for alleging that in this case there has
been a breach of contract by Mercury in withdrawing the 0500 354448 number.
Accordingly, issues regarding the adequacy of damages and balance of
convenience do not, in my judgment, arise. Those are matters which it seems to
me, on the arguments I have heard, are fairly balanced between the two sides.
If, however, all that there is between the parties is a question of the length
of notice that ought to have been given to qualify with the reasonable notice
requirement, then in my view the balance of convenience would fall firmly
against the grant of an interlocutory injunction. I can see that something
more than a 14 days notice might reasonably be argued for. Whether the
argument would succeed would depend upon a number of issues and the examination
of all the facts of the case. I cannot contemplate, however, that the
requisite notice would be more than, at most, six months. The difference
between a 14-day notice and a six-month notice would be something that could be
dealt with by damages. I do not myself think the amount could be very great,
since the ability of Zockoll to achieve a worthwhile commercial exploitation of
these alpha-numeric numbers seems still to be some distance away."
Miss
Heilbron argued that the significant features in
Timeload
are equally to be found in the present case and that the Vice-Chancellor fell
into error in drawing a distinction between the two. In particular:
1)
In each case the customer required a specific telephone number or numbers for a
specific purpose of which the supplier was made aware when the contract was
concluded.
2)
In each case, the contract made provision for termination for specified causes.
3)
In each case the supplier claimed to be entitled to withdraw numbers under an
additional clause which purported to permit this with or without good reason.
4)
In each case the withdrawal would defeat the very object for which the customer
had entered into the contract.
For
Mercury, Mr Michael Douglas Q.C. argued that the Vice-Chancellor had been
correct to distinguish the present case from
Timeload.
He relied particularly upon two grounds of distinction:
1)
The right to withdraw a number under Clause 8(1) was subject to a requirement
to give reasonable notice. That rendered it impossible to contend that the
clause was unreasonable. The length of notice would necessarily be tailored to
the extent needed to render operation of the right of withdrawal reasonable. In
an extreme case this might require as much as ten years' notice to be given.
2)
Mercury had withdrawn only one number out of 53 covered by the contract. It was
impossible to contend that this rendered contractual performance "substantially
different" from what was reasonably expected or that it "rendered no
performance at all" in respect of part of Mercury's contractual obligation.
I
appreciate the force of both these arguments, but they do not persuade me that
they necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Sir
Thomas Bingham's observations in
Timeload
have no application to the present case. If Zockoll are correct, Mercury have
stood by and allowed Zockoll to invest millions in building up a market for
alphanumerics in the hope and expectation of being able to make very profitable
use of numbers provided by Mercury. One of the numbers with the most obvious
potential value is the FLIGHTS number. Mercury has now claimed to be entitled
to remove that number on 14 days' notice and before the stage has been reached
when Zockoll could, or could reasonably have been expected, to use the number
for the purpose for which it was acquired. It seems to me arguable that this
conduct has rendered performance of the contract substantially different from
what had been reasonably expected, or has resulted in non-performance of part
of the contractual obligation. Nor would it be right to ignore the Master of
the Rolls' observations on the potential operation of the common law.
I
turn to the submission that the requirement for reasonable notice renders
Clause 8(1) a reasonable clause. That is an unattractive submission from a
Defendant who has purported to give but 14 days' notice of withdrawal. If
correct, the submission would seem to lead to the conclusion that, in the case
of numbers acquired by Zockoll in order to benefit from the anticipated future
adoption of alphanumeric telephone addresses in this country, notice of
withdrawal of a number should be sufficiently lengthy to enable them to achieve
this benefit. Such a conclusion might defeat a claim based on the 1977 Act,
but it would open wide the door to a much simpler claim for breach of the
notice requirement in Clause 8(1).
For
these reasons I do not accept that Zockoll have no reasonably arguable case
that Mercury are in breach of contract such as can
properly
found an application for interlocutory relief. At the same time I cannot accept
Miss Heilbron's submission that the Court can "feel a high degree of assurance"
that, at the trial,
it
will be established that a mandatory interlocutory injunction was appropriate.
Mr Douglas has satisfied me that, while Zockoll have an arguable case, there
are nonetheless substantial issues both of fact and law that will have to be
resolved. If a note in the current Supreme Court Practice is correct, this is
an impediment to the relief that Zockoll seek, but Miss Heilbron has submitted
that the note in question does not reflect the current law.
The
approach to an application for a mandatory interlocutory injunction.
The
note at O.29/1/5 of the White Book ends with a paragraph that begins:
"The
Cyanamid
guidelines are not relevant to mandatory injunctions. The case has to be
unusually strong and clear before a mandatory injunction will be granted at
the interlocutory stage even if it is sought in order to enforce a contractual
obligation."
This
note is consistent with the statement of Megarry J. in
Shepherd
Homes Ltd. v. Sandham
[1971] 1 Ch 340 at 351 that:
"...
on motion, as contrasted with the trial, the court is far more reluctant to
grant a mandatory injunction than it would be to grant a comparable prohibitory
injunction. In a normal case the court must, inter alia, feel a high degree of
assurance that at the trial it will appear that the injunction was rightly
granted; and this is a higher standard than is required for a prohibitory
injunction."
The
note in the White Book is also consistent with the comment made by Mustill L.J.
in relation to that statement by Megarry J. in
Locabail
Finance Ltd. v. Agroexport
[1986] 1 WLR 657 at p. 664:
"It
was pointed out in argument that the judgment of Megarry J. antedates the
comprehensive review of the law as to injunctions given by the House of Lords in
American
Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon Ltd.
[1975] AC 396 but to my mind at least, the statement of principle by Megarry
J. in relation to the very special case of the mandatory injunction is not
affected by what the House of Lords said in the
Cyanamid
case."
The
note in the White Book continues, however:
"...
where it is necessary that some mandatory order has to be made
ad
interim
the
Court will make the order whether or not the high standard of probability of
success at trial is made out (
Leisure
Data v. Bell
[1988] F.S.R. 367)."
In
Leisure
Data
Dillon L.J. also referred, at p. 372, to the statement of Megarry J. He went on
to observe:
"The
statutory authority, however, for the grant of mandatory and prohibitory
injunctions stems alike from section 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The
court is required, as Lord Diplock pointed out in
N.W.L.
Ltd. v Woods
[1979] 3 All E.R. 614 at 625, to give full weight to the practical realities of
the situation and weigh the respective risks that injustice may result from a
decision one way or another."
Later
in the same case at p. 376 Neill L.J. referred, with approval, to the statement
of Eveleigh L.J. in
Cayne
v. Global Natural Resources
[1984] 1 All E.R. 225 at 233 that the broad principle is "...what can the court
do in its best endeavour to avoid injustice?" and to the statement of May L.J.
at p. 237 in the same case that "the ´balance of the risk of doing an
injustice' better describes the process involved".
These
observations in
Leisure
Data
were consistent with the conclusions of Hoffman J. in
Films
Rover Ltd. v. Cannon Film Sales Ltd.
[1987] 1 WLR 670 at 680. These were not cited to the Court, but were
subsequently to be approved by Lord Jauncey in
Factortame
No. 2
[1991] 1 AC 603 at p. 683 and were relied upon by Miss Heilbron as representing
the current state of the law:
"The
principal dilemma about the grant of interlocutory injunctions, whether
prohibitory or mandatory, is that there is by definition a risk that the court
may make the ´wrong' decision, in the sense of granting an injunction to a
party who fails to establish his right at the trial (or would fail if there was
a trial) or alternatively, in failing to grant an injunction to a party who
succeeds (or would succeed) at trial. A fundamental principle is therefore
that the court should take whichever course appears to carry the lower risk of
injustice if it should turn out to have been to have been ´wrong' in the
sense I have described. The guidelines for the grant of both kinds of
interlocutory injunctions are derived from this principle.
The
passage quoted is from Megarry J. in
Shepherd
Homes Ltd. v. Sandham
[1971] Ch. 340, 351, qualified as it was by the words ´in a normal case',
was plainly intended as a guideline rather than an independent principle. It
is another way of saying that the features which justify describing an
injunction as ´mandatory' will usually also have the consequence of
creating a greater risk of injustice if it is granted rather than withheld at
the interlocutory stage unless the court feels a ´high degree of
assurance' that the plaintiff will be able to establish his right at a trial.
I have taken the liberty of reformulating the proposition in this way in order
to bring out two points. The first is to show that semantic arguments over
whether the injunction as formulated can properly be classified as mandatory or
prohibitory are barren. The question of substance is whether the granting of
the injunction would carry that higher risk of injustice which is normally
associated with the grant of a mandatory injunction. The second point is that
in cases in which there can be no dispute about the use of the term
´mandatory' to describe the injunction, the same question of substance
will determine whether the case is ´normal' and therefore within the
guideline of ´exceptional' and therefore requiring special treatment. If
it appears to the court that, exceptionally, the case is one in which
withholding a mandatory interlocutory injunction would in fact carry a greater
risk of injustice than granting it even though the court does not feel a
´high degree of assurance' about the plaintiff's chances of establishing
his right, there cannot be any rational basis for withholding the injunction.
In
Shepherd
Homes Ltd. v. Sandham
,
Megarry J. spelled out some of the reasons why mandatory injunctions generally
carry a higher risk of injustice if granted at the interlocutory stage: they
usually go further than the preservation of the status quo by requiring a party
to take some new positive step or undo what he has done in the past; an order
requiring a party to take positive steps usually causes more waste of time and
money if it turns out to have been wrongly granted than an order which merely
causes delay by restraining him from doing something which it appears at the
trial he was entitled to do; a mandatory order usually gives a party the whole
of the relief which he claims in the writ and make it unlikely that there will
be a trial. One could add other reasons, such as that mandatory injunctions
(whether interlocutory or final) are often difficult to formulate with
sufficient precision to be enforceable. In addition to all these practical
considerations, there is also what might be loosely called a ´due process'
question. An order requiring someone to do something is usually perceived as a
more intrusive exercise of the coercive power of the state than an order
requiring him temporarily to refrain from action. The court is therefore more
reluctant to make such an order against a party who has not had the protection
of a full hearing at trial."
I
would concur with this passage as providing detailed guidance to the approach
of the court when considering an application to grant a mandatory interlocutory
injunction. A more concise summary, which I would commend as being all the
citation that should in future be necessary, is the following passage in the
judgment of Chadwick J. in
Nottingham
Building Society v. Eurodynamics Systems
[1993] FSR 468 at p. 474:
"In
my view the principles to be applied are these. First, this being an
interlocutory matter, the overriding consideration is which course is likely to
involve the least risk of injustice if it turns out to be ´wrong' in the
sense described by Hoffmann J.
Secondly,
in considering whether to grant a mandatory injunction, the court must keep in
mind that an order which requires a party to take some positive step at an
interlocutory stage, may well carry a greater risk of injustice if it turns out
to have been wrongly made than an order which merely prohibits action, thereby
preserving the status quo.
Thirdly,
it is legitimate, where a mandatory injunction is sought, to consider whether
the court does feel a high degree of assurance that the plaintiff will be able
to establish this right at a trial. That is because the greater the degree of
assurance the plaintiff will ultimately establish his right, the less will be
the risk of injustice if the injunction is granted.
But,
finally, even where the court is unable to feel any high degree of assurance
that the plaintiff will establish his right, there may still be circumstances
in which it is appropriate to grant a mandatory injunction at an interlocutory
stage. Those circumstances will exist where the risk of injustice if this
injunction is refused sufficiently outweigh the risk of injustice if it is
granted."
These
are the principles to be applied to the facts of the present case.
The
facts.
Manchester
Flights' involvement.
When
the Vice-Chancellor rejected Zockoll's application for an interlocutory
injunction he also rejected an application for leave to appeal and refused a
request by Zockoll to seek an undertaking from Mercury not to withdraw the
FLIGHTS number from Zockoll pending an application to this Court for leave to
appeal. The following day Mercury disconnected the number from Zockoll and
entered into an agreement with Manchester Flights on terms similar to their
agreement with Zockoll. Manchester Flights had assured Mercury that they
wished, in contrast to Zockoll, to proceed at once to make use of the number,
to the benefit of Mercury.
Mr
Velissarides, Mercury's marketing manager, has stated on affidavit that, on the
basis of recent dealings with Manchester Flights, he believed that if Mercury
did not transfer the number promptly to Manchester Flights, Mercury would lose
this business opportunity and that, accordingly, Mercury transferred the number
immediately after the rejection by the Vice-Chancellor of Zockoll's
application. Zockoll lost no time in informing Manchester Flights of their
intention to apply for leave to appeal, and Manchester Flights were further
informed of the result of that application and of the date of this hearing.
They have not, as they could have done, applied to intervene in these
proceedings.
Each
party has, with the leave of the Court, adduced evidence of the use made by
Manchester Flights of the FLIGHTS number. This evidence is not significantly in
conflict. Manchester Flights have advertised their services with reference to
the FLIGHTS number, both in yellow pages and teletext but, subject to an
insignificant exception, they have advertised the conventional numerical
version of the number rather than the alphanumerical version. In the light of
evidence provided by Mr Zockoll, Zockoll's chairman, this is not surprising. In
an affidavit sworn on the 15th August 1997 he stated:
"In
assessing the usage of an alpha numeric number, it is vital to remember that at
present, less than 10% of the telephones in the UK have a letter keypad,
according to the Henley Report 1994, which has been confirmed to me by Alan
Pridmore of OFTEL. Thus only those with such keypads could currently use an
alpha numeric number. Effective advertising would, therefore, have to be
directed to the numerical number in order to attract custom."
Manchester
Flight's advertisement of the number has resulted in the substantial user of it
that I detailed earlier in this judgment.
In
the absence of any evidence from Manchester Flights, I draw the following
inferences from these facts:
1)
Manchester Flights had no commercial need to acquire a Mercury Freephone number
for conventional numerical advertising. They already had the benefit of a BT
Freephone number and there is nothing to suggest that they had anything to gain
by using, in addition or substitution, a Mercury number.
2)
The reason that Manchester Flights wished to acquire the FLIGHTS number was
because they appreciated the potential value of the alphanumerical version of
the number at such future time as the use of alphanumerics should become
established in this country.
3)
The offer by Manchester Flights to make significant immediate use, which was
inevitably conventional numerical use, of the FLIGHTS number was made by way of
incentive to induce Mercury to transfer the number to them.
4)
Manchester Flights were at all material times aware of Zockoll's claim to
contractual entitlement to this number.
5)
There was no urgent commercial need for Manchester Flights to have the FLIGHTS
number transferred to them.
6)
There was no reasonable basis for Mr Velissarides' belief that, if the FLIGHTS
number was not immediately transferred to Manchester Flights, that company
would lose interest in it.
What
significance do these facts have? Miss Heilbron's submission was that the
transfer of the number to Manchester Flights was, or in the absence of evidence
from that Company should be treated as having been, a tactical move to improve
Mercury's prospects on this appeal, and that the transfer and its consequences
should be disregarded for the purposes of this hearing. I would not go that
far. The transfer to Manchester Flights was an action that was perfectly proper
having regard to Zockoll's failure to obtain any holding order or undertaking
pending their application for leave to appeal. But at the same time, Manchester
Flights' position cannot be given the same consideration as if they had
contracted with Mercury bona fide and without notice of Zockoll's rival claim
to the number. Had that been the case, this Court would, I believe, have
hesitated long before ordering interlocutory relief which would have required
Zockoll to break their contract with Manchester Flights. As things are it
seems to me that the Court should simply consider the practical implications to
Manchester Flights, as well as to Mercury and to Zockoll of the grant and the
refusal of the mandatory interlocutory injunction that Zockoll seek.
The
reasons advanced by Mr Zockoll for seeking interlocutory relief, as set out in
one of his affidavits, are as follows:
"...
1. The loss of 0500 FLIGHTS to another subscriber for any length of time would
be once and for all. An alphanumeric is a marketing tool. It is important the
number is reconnected to Zockoll as soon as possible before ´0500 FLIGHTS'
becomes too closely associated with one of Zockoll's competitors.
2.
The Plaintiff cannot run its business and make deals with potential
franchisees and licensees while the threat of de-connection of any number
without cause hangs over them. Zockoll's entire business must be put on hold
if it seems that Mercury can take back numbers at its whim. The Plaintiff can
operate in an environment of losing a number if it breaches the Agreement, but
it is impossible to run the business not knowing when or whether the number
will be taken away from it.
3.
If Mercury can reclaim numbers from Zockoll pending a hearing of our appeal,
then the Plaintiff fears it is likely that other numbers, especially its most
valued ones, will quickly follow 0500 FLIGHTS as other potential competitors
and customers of Zockoll realise the fast increasing potential for the use of
alphanumerics and that the numbers can be obtained cheaply by simply asking
Mercury to withdraw the numbers from Zockoll.
4.
In short, Zockoll's business, which it has built up over three and a half
years of heavy investment, management commitment and hard work, will quickly
crumble if its core assets, the most valuable alphanumerics, are stripped away.
I would emphasise that the Plaintiff for 35 years has been in the business of
franchising and it is only the jewels like 0500 FLIGHTS that can be franchised.
5.
By contrast, the only loss which Mercury may suffer if they are prevented from
connecting the number to another customer is the short-term cashflow from line
usage generated by the other customer. This sum is easy to calculate and is
eminently compensatable in damages."
As
to the first of these points, Miss Heilbron sought to persuade us that there
was a significant danger that the FLIGHTS number would become tarnished by
association with Manchester Flights so that its potential value to Zockoll
would be lost once and for all. In the four months that have elapsed between
the Vice-Chancellor's order and this hearing it is Zockoll's evidence that this
has not occurred. In his affidavit of the 15th August Mr Zockoll says this:
"...
there is no evidence before the Court that Manchester Flights have achieved a
brand awareness with the alpha numeric number or have incurred any significant
expenditure in advertising. Mercury's evidence as to usage of the number and
revenue generated does not support any direct relationship between revenue
earned and use of the alpha numeric number. It appears likely, given all the
above factors, that the alpha numeric number as a source of revenue has been
minimal."
Miss
Heilbron has valiantly attempted to persuade us that if we refuse interlocutory
relief, this may prove to be the signal that Manchester Flights have been
waiting for to seek to promote a general association of the phonename FLIGHTS
with their Company. I can see no reason to anticipate any such scenario. If the
Vice-Chancellor's decision that Zockoll had no arguable case was not enough to
encourage such activity, I cannot see why this court's decision should
encourage a change of attitude by Manchester Flights, pending the substantive
trial. The reality seems to me that until substantially more telephones are
equipped with alphanumerical keypads, neither Manchester Flights nor Zockoll
are likely to seek or to be able to promote public recognition of the phonename
FLIGHTS. Provided that the substantive trial takes place before that point is
reached, it will be of little moment whether the right to use that phonename is
meanwhile vested in Manchester Flights or Zockoll.
Allied
to this point has been a fear expressed by Miss Heilbron that, in the interval
between this hearing and the trial, events may take place which will strengthen
Mercury's case for opposing a mandatory injunction. As to that, Mr Douglas has
conceded that his clients could not fairly seek to take advantage on the
substantive hearing of any change in the situation attributable to their having
successfully resisted interlocutory relief.
The
5th point made by Mr Zockoll is something of an oversimplification. If
Manchester Flights are, at this point, deprived of the FLIGHTS number, not only
are Mercury likely to lose the revenue that they are currently enjoying as a
consequence of Manchester Flights' use of that number, but they will be at risk
of facing a claim for damages by Manchester Flights. The precise nature of such
a claim is not clear. When the consequences of granting the mandatory
injunction sought were explored in evidence, Miss Heilbron accepted that some
form of transitional arrangements would need to be introduced to accommodate
the fact that Manchester Flights have now built up a substantial user of the
numerical form of the FLIGHTS number. These complications weigh, and in my
judgment weigh quite significantly, against the grant of the interlocutory
relief that is sought.
It
is my belief that points 2, 3 and 4 advanced by Mr Zockoll provide the
principal motivation for this interlocutory battle. They are points with which
I have considerable sympathy. They are not, however, points which would be
resolved were this Court to grant the interlocutory order sought. There is no
basis for believing that the grant or refusal of interlocutory relief is likely
to have a significant effect on the credibility of Mr Zockoll's alphanumerical
enterprise. Certainly there is nothing to suggest that Mercury's resounding
interlocutory success before the Vice-Chancellor resulted in any general
prejudice to Zockoll. What it seems to me that Zockoll needs, and needs
cogently, is a speedy substantive determination of whether or not clause 8.1 of
the contract entitles Mercury to withdraw numbers from them at will. For the
reasons that I have given, I do not consider that Zockoll have made out a case
for an interlocutory mandatory injunction. I would, however, if so requested,
grant them an order that the trial be expedited.
LORD
JUSTICE SIMON BROWN: I agree and wish to add only the briefest comments of my
own on each of the two aspects of this appeal. 1. "Is there a reasonably
arguable basis here for alleging that Mercury breached their contact with
Zockoll by withdrawing the 0500 FLIGHTS number?" In common with my Lord, and
in respectful disagreement with the Vice-Chancellor below, I think there is.
Miss Heilbron's preferred way of putting Zockoll's case is on the
Timeload
analogy. There are, of course, differences between the two cases but none, she
submits, which serve to distinguish them in principle when it comes to the
application of section 3(2)(b) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.
Mr
Douglas' most persuasive argument for such a distinction is to my mind that
which fixes upon the requirement under Clause 8(1) for any notice of withdrawal
to be reasonable. How, he asks rhetorically, can it be inherently unreasonable
to give a power to withdraw a number which by definition can only be withdrawn
on reasonable notice? With the best will in the world however, that seems to
me to leave intact Zockoll's central case. This is that it was unfair and
unreasonable for Mercury to withdraw this particular number at two weeks'
notice, a period eventually extended to five weeks, or indeed to withdraw it at
all within a period to be measured in years rather than merely weeks.
This
is a number whose alphanumeric potential Mercury knew Zockoll were intent upon
exploiting and in which they had made a considerable commercial investment.
Mercury withdrew it expressly so as to transfer it to another operator,
Manchester Flights, whose only possible interest in acquiring it can have been
so as themselves to exploit its alphanumeric use. Whether that involves "a
contractual performance substantially different from that which was reasonably
expected" of Mercury or the giving of an unreasonably short period of notice
appears to me little to the point; or rather it is essentially a pleading
point.
2.
"Were does the balance of convenience lie?" or, to my mind the preferable
formulation of this issue: "Which course carries the lower risk of injustice?"
On this issue I confess to having had somewhat more hesitation than my Lord in
reaching ultimately the same conclusion. For this reason. Had Mercury not,
immediately following their success before the Vice-Chancellor, transferred
this number to Manchester Flights I think that given our view on issue 1 the
justice of the case would have required that Mercury be enjoined against doing
so. Although Mercury were undoubtedly entitled to have acted as they did in
this matter, their conduct to my mind reflects little credit upon them. No
doubt discovery in the action hereafter will illuminate the precise
circumstances in which they came to effect this speedy transfer, but for the
present I find less than convincing Mr Velissarides' explanation for the
urgency with which Mercury acted: to ensure, so he suggests, that it did not
lose its commercial opportunity with Manchester Flights. For my part I can see
no possible reason why Manchester Flights required this number as a matter of
urgency. As my Lord has explained, save only perhaps to get their foot in the
alphanumerical door, they could not hope to exploit its commercial potential
for some time to come.
In
short, Mercury's conduct seems to me to fall readily into the character of
stealing a march on Zockoll with regard to the outcome of this appeal (see in
this regard
Shepherd
Homes Ltd. v. Sandham
[1971] 1 Ch 340 at 349 C-D and the citation from Halsbury's Laws to be found
approved in
Locabail
International Finance Ltd. v. Agroexport
[1986] 1 WLR 657 at 663H). To that extent, the changes in the situation that
Mercury's conduct brought about should, in my judgment, be substantially
discounted. Nevertheless, for the reasons given by my Lord, discount them
though one may, these changes cannot be wholly disregarded and in the end they
seem to me to tip the balance given these two central further considerations:
first, that this action plainly now cries out for early trial and, second, that
in the meantime Zockoll can demonstrate no persuasive case for asserting any
real damage at all.
In
the result, I too would dismiss the appeal and refuse to grant the
interlocutory mandatory injunction sought. I have no doubt, however, that this
is a case in which an expedited trial must be afforded.
Order: Applications
allowed; appeal dismissed; trial be expedited; time estimate 5 days; to be
heard if possible in first six weeks of fresh term; costs of the appeal be
defendant's costs in the cause; directions to be agreed.
© 1997 Crown Copyright
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