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Case Nos: FC3 1995/6936/A3
FC3 1999/6977/A3
PTA 1999/6980/A3
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM MR JUSTICE ROBERT WALKER
CHANCERY DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Thursday 16th March, 2000
B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE SIMON BROWN
LORD JUSTICE OTTON
and
LORD JUSTICE MUMMERY
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WOOLWICH
PLC
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Claimants/Respondents
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-And-
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DAISYSTAR
LTD
RAJA
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1stDefendants/Appellants
2ndDefendants/Appellants
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(Transcript of the Handed Down Judgment of
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 180 Fleet Street
London EC4A 2HD
Tel No: 0171 421 4040, Fax No: 0171 831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
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Mr A. Hossain QC & Mr R. Duddridge (instructed by Ormerod Heap
& Marshall of Green Dragon House, 64-70 High Street, Croydon, Surrey, CR)
9XN) for Mr Raja
Mr K. Lewison QC & Mr M. Blackett-Ord (instructed by Slaughter &
May of 35 Basinghall Street London EC2V 5DB, solicitors) for the Respondents
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Judgment
As Approved by the Court
Crown Copyright ©
This is the judgment of the court.
The Applications
There are three applications by Mr Ibrahim Raja before the court:-
(1) An application (No 1995/6936) dated 19 September 1995 for an extension of
time in which to appeal against the judgment of Robert Walker J given on 14
June 1995. Mr Raja was ordered to pay to the Woolwich Building Society (the
Woolwich) damages for fraud in the sum of £1,052,749. The time for
appealing expired on 12 July 1995.
(2) An application (No 1999/6980) dated 6 August 1999 for permission (if
permission is required) to appeal against the judgment of 14 June 1995.
(3) An application (No 1999/6977) dated 6 August 1999 for an extension of time
in which to renew orally an application rejected by Nourse LJ on paper on 19
December 1995. That application was for permission to appeal against the order
of Robert Walker J on 6 June 1995 refusing to adjourn the trial of the action
which culminated in the judgment referred to in (1) above.
The Factual Background
During the late 1970's and early 1980's Mr Raja was a property developer. He
used a company owned by him, Daisystar Limited, as a vehicle for that business.
Between the beginning of 1983 and February 1986 there were about 85 separate
mortgage transactions in which purchasers of properties in Brighton, Hove and
South London from Daisystar or Mr Raja obtained advances from the Town and
Country Building Society (T&C). (The Woolwich took over T&C on 18
February 1992.)
From April 1987 there was prolonged and extensive litigation between Mr Raja
and T&C. After the takeover in 1992 the Woolwich pursued the claims of
T&C and defended the claims against them.
The Woolwich's case was that Mr Raja and Daisystar were parties to fraudulent
representations made for the purpose of procuring advances from T&C
totalling £2.55m. In all but one case the T&C branch involved was at
Shoreham and the Branch Manager, Mr Peter Jackson, was a co-conspirator. In all
cases it is alleged that the vendor of the property in question was Mr Raja or
Daisystar or a member of Mr Raja's family ; that the applicants for advances
were introduced to T&C by a mortgage broker in Brighton, Mr Maurice Brice,
also alleged to be a co-conspirator ; that the particulars given on the
mortgage application forms were false to a greater or lesser extent, as to such
matters as the intentions of the applicants to occupy the property, the true
identity and personal details of the applicants, the applicants' references,
the identity of the seller and the price to be paid ; and that, had T&C
been aware of the fraudulent nature of the details on the application forms,
they would not have lent the money that they did . In the vast majority of
cases a small firm of solicitors in Wimbledon, Davies Brown & Co, acted for
Mr Raja, Daisystar and the purported applicants. That firm was also instructed
to act as solicitors for T&C.
The alleged frauds were discovered as a result of a routine internal audit of
the Shoreham Branch in late February 1986. It was discovered that in the
majority of cases no leases or charges were granted and so no completion of
title took place ; that, although T&C were lending on the basis that the
property would be occupied by the borrower, the properties in question were in
many cases fully let to regulated tenants in multiple occupation of the
properties ; and that in many cases the alleged vendor of the property did not
have title to it when the advance was made and that the amount of the advance
was used by Mr Raja or Daisystar either to complete the purchase of the
property in question or to purchase another addition to Mr Raja's growing
property empire.
T&C immediately set about recovering the monies which they claimed had
been obtained from them by fraud. On 7 March 1986 T&C's in-house solicitor,
Mr Cornelius, attended a meeting at the offices of Mr Raja's solicitors. Mr
Raja executed a power of attorney in favour of Mr Cornelius on behalf of
Daisystar and executed charges over various properties in favour of T&C,
which proceeded to sell the properties and recoup the bulk (£2.25m) of the
monies advanced. That left a shortfall of about £114,000 plus interest.
Mr Raja subsequently sought to challenge the validity of the documents
executed on 7 March 1986, but those claims were struck out in circumstances
which are not relevant to the applications now before the court.
The Proceedings
Three sets of proceedings are relevant to the resolution of these
applications:-
(1) The Fraud Proceedings (Ch 1987 D 2061).
The fraud claim was raised by T & C against Mr Raja and Daisystar by way
of amended defence and counterclaim in proceedings instituted by Daisystar
against T&C on 6 April 1987 challenging the sale by T&C of a property
mortgaged to it at the meeting on 7 March 1986. Daisystar's claim was struck
out on 31 March 1988 for failure to comply with an order for security for
costs. Mr Raja served a defence to counterclaim (later amended). The trial of
that counterclaim came before Robert Walker J in June 1995 in the circumstances
described in more detail below. It resulted in the judgment which Mr Raja seeks
to appeal against out of time.
(2) The Interpleader Proceedings ( in action Ch 1991 D 4193).
These proceedings were brought by T&C against Davies Brown & Co.
They related to a total sum of about £100,000 held by that firm on client
account. All the mortgage advances by T&C were paid direct into that
account. Various costs and disbursements were paid out of it. The account was
only used for the fraudulent mortgage transactions. The Woolwich contended that
the money remaining in that account was trust money held for them under a
resulting trust, so that they were entitled to recover it, together with the
interest subsequently earned on it.
That action was also tried by Robert Walker J in June 1995. He gave judgment
in that action for the Woolwich on 14 June 1995. He declared that the Woolwich
were the beneficial owners of the sums in dispute and that payment of those
sums with interest should be made to the Woolwich in part satisfaction of the
judgment of £1,052,749. The sums in question and the interest were not
quantified in the evidence, in the judgment or in the order.
Although there is no attempt to appeal against the judgment in the
Interpleader Proceedings they are relevant to the applications to appeal
against the judgment on the Fraud Proceedings. It is contended by Mr Hossain
QC, on Mr Raja's behalf , that the amount in the client account of Davies Brown
& Co should have been deducted in the calculation of the overall damages
for fraud.
(3) The Negligence Proceedings (Ch 1990 T 9034).
This was an action for damages for professional negligence brought by T&C
against Davies Brown & Co . They had been retained as T&C's solicitors
on the grant of mortgages on various leasehold properties sold by Daisystar and
Mr Raja. T&C made an application for summary judgment. On 16 January 1991
Master Dyson gave judgment for damages to be assessed. On 4 May 1992 Mr TRA
Morison QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, ordered an interim payment
of £300,000 to T&C. On 11 May 1993 Master Barratt made a Tomlin Order
recording the compromise under which the Woolwich were to retain the
£300,000 in full and final satisfaction of all claims in the action. It
was expressly agreed that the payment of that sum was without prejudice to the
Interpleader Proceedings and any other pending action in which the Woolwich
were parties. By letter dated 15 March 1995 the solicitors then acting for Mr
Raja were informed that the case against Davies Brown had been settled for
£300,000. The fact of that payment was not raised by Mr Raja's solicitors
in the pre-trial preparations or in the trial documents and it was not raised
with Robert Walker J at the trial either by the Woolwich or by Mr Raja.
The background to that action was that T&C were insured at the relevant
time with Sun Alliance against loss suffered, up to the limit of £300,000,
as a result of the negligence of a solicitor acting on their behalf in
connection with the investigation of titles and preparation of deeds relating
to mortgage advances by T&C. A claim was made under the policy and Sun
Alliance made a payment to T&C of £300,000. The action against Davies
Brown &Co was brought by Sun Alliance in the name of T&C in exercise of
their rights of subrogation to the rights of T&C. The letter of 15 March
1995 referred to the subrogated action taken by the insurers in the name of
T&C against Davies Brown & Co.
These proceedings and the payment of £300,000 in settlement of them are
relevant to the applications to appeal against the judgment of 14 June 1995. It
is contended by Mr Hossain QC that credit should have been given, in the
calculation of damages awarded by the judgment, for the sum of £300,000
recovered from Davies Brown & Co as joint tortfeasors and that the amount
of the judgment debt should be amended accordingly.
The Interlocutory Orders and Judgments
The trial of the Fraud Proceedings was fixed to start on 6 June 1995. It was
estimated to last for 8 weeks. A number of orders made between February and
June 1995 explain the course taken by Robert Walker J at the hearing on 6
June.
(1) On 14 March Master Barratt gave detailed directions for the trial of the
counterclaim, including exchange of witness statements by 25 April and of
experts' reports in May.
(2) On 1 May the Master made further orders on the restored summons for
directions as Mr Raja had not complied with his earlier directions. Mr Raja's
legal aid, which had been extended on 2 February to cover the full trial, had
been withdrawn on 1 April. The Master made an unless order for the service of
witness statements by 15 May.
(3) On 22 May Robert Walker J made another unless order at the pre-trial
review for the service of outstanding particulars on or before 2 June. If Mr
Raja did not comply, his defence to Woolwich's counterclaim for fraud would be
struck out. Mr Raja did not comply with the order. His legal aid was restored
on 1 June, but he contends that he was left with insufficient time in which to
comply with the orders and to brief counsel for the trial.
(4) On 6 June Robert Walker J dismissed an application made by the counsel
then acting for Mr Raja for the trial to be adjourned for 1 month. He pointed
out that Mr Raja had had the benefit of legal aid and competent solicitors
acting for him over a number of years ; that the case had already been pending
for too long ; that the application was made at the last moment ; that the
amount already spent on costs was probably out of all proportion to what might
eventually be recovered from Mr Raja; and that, while it was a serious matter
for Mr Raja to face charges of dishonesty, it was also a serious matter for the
Woolwich to see costs mounting and the final hearing endangered in a case
where the litigation had grown out of all sensible proportion.
The Trial
After the refusal of the adjournment Mr Raja's then counsel withdrew from the
case, but Mr Raja remained in court for most of the hearing. He confirmed to
the judge that he was not seeking to cross examine any of the witnesses for the
Woolwich or to take part in the proceedings. In view of the unless orders which
had been made, and neither appealed nor complied with, the defence to
counterclaim had been struck out. The judge said the case had become one where
there was default in defence and the Woolwich were accordingly entitled to
judgment in such terms as they appeared entitled to on their counterclaim (RSC
O19 r 7and 8).
The judge was taken by Mr Lewison QC, on behalf of the Woolwich, through the
documents in some detail. He concentrated on 22 transactions which Mr Raja
had pleaded in his defence to counterclaim were "genuine transactions" giving
rise to no liability on his part. There had been a substantial amount of
pre-reading by the judge. Mr Lewison had submitted a detailed skeleton opening
(with Schedules) running to nearly 120 pages.
Two expert witnesses were called to verify their reports, one (Mr Barford) on
the financial aspects and the other (Mr Radley), a forensic document examiner.
The witness statements were the subject of a direction that they be given in
evidence under RSC O 38 r 29.
On the basis of that oral evidence, of the witness statements and of the
documentary evidence, which the judge said had been meticulously assembled by
the Woolwich's solicitors and had been lucidly presented by Mr Lewison, the
judge held that the Woolwich's case pleaded in the counterclaim was well
founded. He concluded that he should give relief on the basis that
"....Mr Raja was the principal in a prolonged course of fraud as a result of
which he received from the Society, without consideration, the sum of about
£2.55m, and that he is liable to repay this sum to the Society, with
compound interest. He is also liable to pay damages for fraud so as to make
good other items in the Society's loss......and they are fully detailed in the
schedules produced by Mr Barford."
On the basis of the material before him the judge calculated the damages at
£1,052,749, made up of capital of £177,856.14 and interest of
£874,892.86. He did not take any account in that calculation of either (a)
the amount of the judgment in the Interpleader Proceedings which he directed
should be in partial satisfaction of the main judgment, or (b) the sum of
£300,000 recovered from Davies Brown & Co in settlement of the
Negligence Proceedings. For reasons explained later, the Woolwich regarded the
sum of £300,000 as irrelevant to the calculation of the damages which they
are entitled to receive from Mr Raja for fraud.
The Appeals
Mr Raja did not appeal against the judgment within the time limited for
appealing . By application dated 19 September 1995 he applied for an
extension of time for appealing. This was supported by an affidavit explaining
his difficulties: problems in obtaining legal aid for an appeal; a change of
solicitors and counsel; and health concerns. There then followed serious delay
in the preparation of the application for hearing. At Mr Raja's request
extensions of time were granted for lodging bundles. The last extension expired
on 10 July 1996 when his application was dismissed for failing to comply with
the court's directions.
On 25 July the Master of the Rolls directed that the application would be
restored if certain conditions were satisfied as to the lodging of an opinion
of counsel before 14 August 1996 on the merits of the appeal and the lodging of
bundles by 14 September 1996. Mr Raja obtained further extensions of time for
complying with the condition as to lodging of bundles. The position was
complicated by the institution of vexatious litigant proceedings against him
and Daisystar on 1 July 1997. That led to a further delay of 5 months.
On 4 March 1998 the matter was listed for dismissal, but then adjourned for 28
days to enable proper bundles to be lodged. By 23 March 1998 the defects in the
bundles were rectified to the satisfaction of the Civil Appeals Office, but the
solicitors for the Woolwich took the view that the bundles were still
inadequate. Mr Raja indicated in August 1998 that the Notice of Appeal would
require to be amended and in September he applied for a direction that his
application not be heard before an appeal in an action between him and his
former solicitors.
On 5 January 1999 the Woolwich tried to bring the matter to a conclusion by
issuing a summons for an order confirming that Mr Raja's application for an
extension of time for appealing had been dismissed by a striking out order on
10 July 1996 and had remained struck out as the conditions set for
reinstatement had not been complied with.
That application was heard by the Court of Appeal on 30 July 1999 by which
time Mr Raja had instructed new solicitors and counsel. The court discharged
the order of 10 July 1996, ordered Mr Raja to put in an application for
permission to appeal against the order of 14 June 1995 and directed an
expedited hearing of the application for permission and for an extension of
time.
Preliminary Points
Mr Lewison made the following objections to the court even considering the
grounds on which Mr Raja wishes to base his appeal from the judgment of 14 June
1995:-
(1) The effect of non compliance with the unless orders of 1 May and 22 May
1995 was that Mr Raja's defence to the Woolwich's counterclaim was struck out
and that he was debarred from defending. He was not entitled to raise at the
hearing before Robert Walker J the points of defence which he is now seeking to
raise on his proposed appeal. He should not therefore be allowed to raise them
on appeal.
(2) Permission to appeal is required, as the order of 14 June 1995 was
interlocutory. No purpose would be served in either granting permission to
appeal or an extension of time in the absence of any attempt to appeal against
the prior orders of 1 and 22 May 1995 which had the effect of striking out the
defence. Those orders are still effective.
(3) Mr Raja's delay in pursuing his application was a sufficient reason in
itself for refusing the application for an extension of time. Whatever delay
may be attributed to the Civil Appeals Office in the processing of the
application, there was serious and inexcusable delay by Mr Raja in preparing
the bundles for the hearing of his application. He had had no less than six
firms of solicitors in that period.
We would not accede to these arguments without first considering the merits of
the points which Mr Raja wishes to raise.
Two of the three points are directed not so much to establishing a defence to
liability for fraud as to challenging the correctness of the calculation of the
loss for which the Woolwich were awarded very substantial damages at a hearing
at which quantum, as well as liability, was determined.
The delay is regrettable and the explanation for it is unsatisfactory, but we
do not regard the length and circumstances of the delay as so serious that Mr
Raja should be refused an extension of time without any consideration of the
merits of his proposed grounds of appeal.
In view of the conclusions we have reached on the application for an extension
of time we do not find it necessary to reach a final decision on the point
whether permission to appeal is required. It is contended that it is an appeal
against an interlocutory judgment within RSC O 59 r.1A(6) (f). In one sense the
order is interlocutory, as the defence was struck out and Mr Raja was in
default of defence. But the judge did not simply decide the matter on the
pleadings. He read the documentary evidence and the witness statements and
heard oral evidence from the experts. To that extent the hearing was more like
a trial in the absence of a party than an application for judgment in default
of defence. That feature is reflected in the wording of the order which refers
to the "trial of the counterclaim."
As we read the judgment we find it difficult to believe that the judge would
have refused to hear any submissions which Mr Raja or someone on his behalf
might wish to make on the correct way of calculating the damages for fraud.
We prefer to base our judgment on matters relevant to the application to
extend time for appealing. They include not only the length of the delay and
the reasons for it but also the merits of the proposed grounds of appeal which
would also fall to be considered on the application for permission to
appeal.
There are three main points made by Mr Hossain QC.
(1) The 22 Genuine Transactions Issue
Mr Raja wishes to appeal against the judge's finding of fraud on the ground
that, if there was any fraud, it was carried out by others and not by him. It
is submitted there was evidence available, which the judge may not have
noted and which might have led him to take a different view. The documentary
evidence relied on as indicating that the transactions found to be fraudulent
were in fact "genuine transactions" consist of leases or counterpart leases on
the majority of the files and applications to register the purchaser's interest
. The documents also showed that in the majority of cases different firms of
solicitors acted for the purchaser and the vendor. In addition, if Mr Raja had
been permitted to defend, he would have given evidence and called evidence from
a number of purchasers to show that the transactions were "genuine."
These were grounds on which the Court of Appeal would be asked to order a
new trial of the Fraud Proceedings.
We decline to grant an extension of time in respect of this proposed ground
of appeal.It does not have any realistic prospect of success. This is an
attempt to re-open the case on liability by relying on matters in defence which
Mr Raja was debarred from raising by reason of his non-compliance with the
unless orders.
The points relied on to justify these grounds are misconceived. The existence
of "genuine" leases, counterpart leases and applications to register is quite
beside the point. The fraud which was pleaded and established at the trial did
not consist of the production of forged or fictitious conveyancing documents.
It consisted of the making of applications for advances on forms containing
false particulars to induce T&C to lend money which they would not have
lent if they had known the true position. Mr Raja does not dispute that there
were false statements in the application forms. His defence is that he did not
make them (save in five cases) and that he was engaged in only "genuine
"transactions.
It may very well be the case that the conveyancing documents were "genuine" in
the sense that they were not forged and that they related to actual sales of
actual properties, but the judge was entitled to find that they were brought
into existence as part of the dishonest scheme involving Mr Raja. The case of
fraud was indeed overwhelming. T&C were induced by false representations
to part with their money and that money was paid direct to Davies Brown &
Co as solicitors for Mr Raja.
The £100,000 Interpleader Issue
We would also refuse an extension of time for appealing on the ground that the
judge ought to have deducted the interpleader sum in the calculation of the
damages for fraud, instead of treating it as a sum which would go in partial
satisfaction of the damages for fraud awarded by that judgment. This point has
no realistic prospect of success.
The interpleader sum was the subject of separate proceedings involving
different parties (Davies Brown &Co). They were concluded, as they had to
be, by a separate order made in those proceedings. It would not have been
correct to deal with the Interpleader Proceedings by an order in another set of
proceedings or by an adjustment in the amount of the judgment entered in the
Fraud Proceedings.
The £300,000 Recovery Issue
We would, however, extend the time for appealing and proceed immediately to
hear the appeal on the ground that the amount of the judgment sum in the
Fraud Proceedings should be reduced by £300,000 to take account of the
fact that that sum , in the circumstances already described and unknown to
Robert Walker J, had already been recovered by the Woolwich from Davies Brown
& Co as joint tortfeasors on 4 May 1992.
We conclude that, had the judge been made aware of this fact at the trial, he
would have given credit for that sum and reduced the amount of damages awarded
accordingly.
The relevant legal principle is correctly summarised in Halsbury's Laws (4th
Ed) Vol 12 (1) para.826:-
" Where, however,a claimant who has concurrent claims against two obligors in
respect of the same matter recovers the whole or part of his loss from one of
those obligors, the amount which the claimant thus recovers is applied in
diminution of the damages which are awarded to him against the other obligor. A
claimant cannot recover more than the total sum due in respect of his loss,
merely by reason of the fact that his claim may lie against more than one
person. The rule reflects a general judicial dislike of over-compensation."
Mr Hossain cited the decision of the Court of Appeal in Townsend v Stone
Toms & Partners (1984) 27 BLR 26 in which Oliver LJ said at p.38-
" ....where a plaintiff with concurrent claims against two persons has actually
recovered part or all of his loss from another, that recovery goes in
diminution of the damages which will be awarded against the defendant.
A plaintiff can never, as I understand the law, merely because his claim may
lie against more than one person, recover more than the total sum due."
The court approved the course taken by the trial judge in giving credit for
the money actually received by the plaintiff from the other tortfeasor and then
entering judgment for the balance.
In our judgment Mr Raja has discharged the initial burden on him to show that
part of the claim against him by the Woolwich has already been satisfied by the
payment of the sum of £300,000 by Davies Brown &Co to the Woolwich as
compensation for the loss suffered in the same matter: see Townsend
(supra) at pp.41 and 56.
We reject Mr Lewison's submission that the principle does not apply because
the recovery of £300,000 made by the Woolwich was recovery under an
insurance policy and should therefore be left out of account in the calculation
of the damages payable by Mr Raja to the Woolwich for fraud. He cited Parry
v Cleaver [1970] AC 1 for the proposition that money received under
a contract of insurance is not to be taken into account in assessing damages.
At p 14 Lord Reid said-
" ...the real and substantial reason for disregarding [insurance moneys
received by the plaintiff] is that the plaintiff has bought them and that it
would be unjust and unreasonable to hold that the money which he prudently
spent on premiums and the benefit from it should enure to the benefit of the
tortfeasor."
Mr Lewison also cited Napier v Hunter [1993] AC for the
proposition that an insurer, such as Sun Alliance, which has paid over the
insurance moneys, has a proprietary interest in moneys subsequently recovered
by an assured from a third party wrongdoer. So, he submitted, there is no
question of double recovery by the Woolwich .
In our judgment that argument fails to answer the point that the £300,000
recovered from Davies Brown & Co in settlement of the Negligence
Proceedings was not a payment to the Woolwich under the insurance policy
purchased by them, in which case it would be disregarded in the calculation of
damages : on the contrary, it was a payment by the joint tortfeasor which falls
within the principle in Townsend (supra). The sum was paid to the Sun
Alliance by reason of their subrogated rights placing them in the position of
the Woolwich. The payment was made by the insurers of Davies Brown & Co
under a policy purchased by that firm and not by the Woolwich, so that the case
falls outside the principle in Parry v Cleaver (supra).
The Adjournment of Trial Issue
We would not extend time on the proposed grounds that the judge ought to
have granted the application to adjourn the trial , that Mr Raja was denied a
fair trial and that Nourse LJ ought to have granted leave to appeal against the
order of 6 June 1995.
Mr Hossain submitted that the complaints against the judgment of 14 June 1995
arose from the refusal of the adjournment on 6 June and the orders striking out
the defence to counterclaim and debarring Mr Raja from defending. He needed,
but was not given, time to comply with the unless orders and to prepare for
trial. He was without legal aid when the orders were made. It was restored
only 5 days before the trial.
Mr Hossain also submitted that, if permission to appeal is granted, the appeal
would probably be heard after the coming into force of the Human Rights Act
1998 and Mr Raja would be entitled to rely on Article 6.1 of the Convention and
the decisions of the ECHR on the requirements of "equality of arms", of a
reasonable opportunity to present his case and an opportunity to comment on the
evidence adduced by the opposing party. The trial was unfair and in breach of
Article 6.1 because the refusal to adjourn prevented Mr Raja from defending the
allegations of fraud against him in a complex case. He was unable to deal with
the lists of documents and the substantial trial bundles served at a time when
he was without legal aid. He was placed at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the
Woolwich who were represented by Leading and Junior Counsel. He was prevented
by the debarring orders from giving evidence or challenging the evidence
against him. The unless orders were made with a legitimate aim of imposing a
discipline on the preparations for the trial and ensuring that the Woolwich
had full knowledge of his case, but they were wholly disproportionate in
preventing him from defending the case.
In our judgment the refusal of the judge to adjourn the hearing and of Nourse
LJ to grant leave to appeal against that order were proper exercises of
discretion with which this court would not interfere. The ensuing trial was
not unfair and did not involve any breach of Article 6.1. The complaints about
an unfair trial must be viewed in the context of the long history of the
litigation. For most of the time Mr Raja had legal representation and had a
full opportunity to present his case and to challenge the case against him.
His position at the trial was the result of his own failure to comply with
orders of the court which were made with the object of ensuring that a fair
trial would take place without yet further delay.
Conclusion
In the result we propose to make the following orders:-
1. We refuse to extend the time for appealing the order of 14 June 1995 save
in respect of the payment of £300,000 to the Woolwich by Davies Brown
& Co, on which point we extend the time for appealing, allow the appeal and
vary the judgment by substituting the sum of £ 664,242 for the sum of
£1,052,749
2. We refuse the application for an extension of time for an oral hearing of
the application for leave to appeal against the order of 6 June 1995.
3. We make no order on the application for permission to appeal against the
order of 14 June 1995.
Order: Appeal Allowed to the extent indicated below:
Conclusion
In the result we propose to make the following orders:-
1. We refuse to extend the time for appealing the order of 14 June 1995 save
in respect of the payment of £300,000 to the Woolwich by Davies Brown
& Co, on which point we extend the time for appealing, allow the appeal and
vary the judgment by substituting the sum of £ 664,242 for the sum of
£1,052,749
2. We refuse the application for an extension of time for an oral hearing of
the application for leave to appeal against the order of 6 June 1995.
3. We make no order on the application for permission to appeal against the
order of 14 June 1995.
No order for costs in respect of either side on the appeal.
(Order does not form part of the approved judgment)
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