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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Gomez-Salinas v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2001] EWCA Civ 1323 (26 July 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/1323.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Civ 1323

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
(MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Thursday, 26th July 2001

Thursday, 26th July 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE PILL: This is an application for permission to appeal and for an extension of time. It is made by Mr Luis Fernando Veloso and it is against a decision of Sullivan J given on 25th April 2001 whereby he refused the applicant permission to apply for judicial review. He held that the Immigration Appeal Tribunal was right to refuse the applicant permission to appeal from a decision of the Special Adjudicator given on 4th May 2000.
2. There were three appellants. The name I have been given is that with which the bundle is headed and I see from the substance of the Special Adjudicator's report that a second appellant, as the Special Adjudicator described him, is a Jorge Enrique Gomez Salinas. I add so there is no confusion at this stage that the present appellant is the third appellant, as discribed by the adjudicator.
3. There were three appeals before the Special Adjudicator against a refusal of the Secretary of State to grant the three people leave to enter and asylum. The appellants were citizens of Columbia and arrived in the United Kingdom on 8th March 1997. Each lodged separate applications for asylum. The first appellant was Rosalba Gomez Salinas; the second was Jorge Enrique Gomez Salinas; and the third and present applicant, Luis Fernando Gomez Salinas.
4. An application is made for an extension of time. Had I found there was merit in the substance of the application, I would have granted an extension of time which only needed to be sought to cover a matter of days.
5. The Special Adjudicator's decision is comprehensive and concludes by dismissing the appeal of each of the appellants. Two points are taken: the first is that the Special Adjudicator may have confused the identity of the second appellant, who is not a party to the present application, with that of another brother, Juan J Gomez Salinas referred to before the judge as "JJ". That point arises from the contents of paragraph 28.3 of the adjudication. I do not propose to read it. I note that the judgment of Sullivan J is also act out in some detail.
6. It is suggested that in this area, where anxious scrutiny should be given to applications, that the possible risk of confusion, which is alleged to exist by reason of the contents of paragraph 28.3, means that the matter should be reconsidered by the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, although repercussions may follow from a dismissal of the appeal against the Secretary of State's refusal to grant asylum to the third appellant. I can see no basis for this point. It would of course be very surprising if, in what appears to be a careful and detailed adjudication, the adjudicator confused one person with another even if they are members of the same family. I see no real possibility in this case that there has been any such confusion by her.
7. In the adjudication, Jorge Enrique was referred to as the second appellant and when the other brother, Juan J, JJ, is named he is identified by his name. I accept the point that the adjudicator's approach to credibility was a comprehensive one, so that if there was confusion in relation to the second appellant this could reflect upon a finding in relation to the third appellant.
8. I see nothing illogical in the paragraph as drafted. The adjudicator begins by referring to the third appellant interview in which JJ's name was brought up and he was said to be the most actively involved with the UP. I find nothing inconsistent between that and the sentence at the end of the paragraph which states that the third appellant would have mentioned the second appellant during his interview as an active UP member. I cannot see any basis for saying that, having carefully set the matter out in that paragraph, the adjudicator was either referring to JJ when she intended to refer to the second appellant or the other way around.
9. I note that in paragraph 28.4, JJ is again mentioned by name and again in paragraph 28.1. "In all the circumstances I am not prepared to accept that the appellant's brother JJ was politically involved with the UP." It seems to me that the Special Adjudicator is clear as to the difference in identity between the appellants and each of them and their brother, JJ, who was not an appellant.
10. The second point made is in relation to the Special Adjudicator's finding as to the UP membership cards which the appellants each provided. At paragraph 28.7 the Special Adjudicator stated, having referred to the membership cards, "However in all the circumstances I am not prepared to accept that the appellants were members of the UP".
11. Miss Veloso has referred me to the case of Carlos Mario Escobar and Dependants v The Secretary of State for the Home Department, 26 March 1999, a decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal and also to the decision in R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Shen [2000] INLR 389. At page 18 of that report, Dyson J, dealing with the importance of documents, stated:

"They were plainly relied upon by her [the Special Adjudicator] as an important plank leading to her conclusion that the account given by the applicant was incredible."

12. Miss Veloso submits that the Special Adjudicator in this case was not entitled simply to hold that the appellants were not members of the UP, once the member cards had been produced. She did not investigate the provenance of the membership cards and without such investigation she should not have declined to accept that the appellants were members. Miss Veloso criticises the approach of Sullivan J who reasoned that what the Special Adjudicator was holding was that they were nominal members and that the persecution involved was for active members. I paraphrase what the learned judge said in more detail.
13. I considered this application on paper and stated that:

"I agree with the reasoning of the judge. I do not consider that there is a real possibility that the Special Adjudicator confused the two brothers."

14. I have already dealt with that point. I added:

"Having regard to the full and detailed finding of the Adjudicator on the question of credibility, I would not consider that determination can be impugned for failure to analyse specifically the status of the UP membership cards."

15. Miss Veloso has said all that she can to persuade me that it is arguable that my conclusion is wrong and that permission to apply for judicial review should, in the circumstances, be granted. I am not so persuaded. This was a case where the Special Adjudicator considered credibility of the appellants in some detail and relied upon the evidence as a whole in coming to the conclusion which she did. In coming to that conclusion she has not stated that the membership cards were forgeries.
16. In my judgment, having regard to her reasoning and decision as to credibility upon the evidence as a whole, this was not a case where she was required to investigate further, on as I put it in writing, to analyse specifically the status of the membership cards. It is certainly not a case such as Shen where the documents were treated by the Special Adjudicator or should have been treated as a central plank in the decision. The special adjudicator in the case was entitled to reach the decision on credibility, which she did, without feeling it necessary to investigate further how it came to be that the appellants were in possession of UP membership cards. I note that she did find that UP members were persecuted ( 27.2), but on the basis of her findings as to credibility she was, in my judgment, entitled upon the evidence and her assessment of it to reach the conclusion she did.
17. I see no arguable case that the Court should intervene and, accordingly, the application for permission to appeal is refused.
(Application for permission to appeal refused)