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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Matin v Commissioner Of Police For Metropolis [2001] EWCA Civ 1903 (21 November 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/1903.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Civ 1903

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(Mr Justice Forbes)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL Wednesday, 21st November 2001

Wednesday, 21st November 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE LATHAM: In this application Mr Matin, who appears on his own behalf, seeks permission to appeal a decision of Forbes J given on 19th July 2001 this year. On that occasion Forbes J dismissed an appeal from Master Tenant which had originally been made on 15th March 2001 allocating the action to the multi-track and ordering it to be transferred to the Central London County Court. In between those two hearings there had been an application by Mr Matin to Master Tenant to set aside that order. The Master had declined to do so on that occasion, but he had said that it was a decision which was one of discretion and certainly it was not necessarily the decision to which every master or judge would have come.
2. The background facts to the case are important to understand why it is that Mr Matin is pursuing the application before us today. His claim is for damages arising out of an incident which occurred in the early hours of 13th November 2000 when he was at his home together with his children, whom he had with him as a result of an order for him to have contact with them. But it was said by his wife that he was in breach of that order in that he had kept the children beyond the time which the court order allowed: hence a police inspector and three police constables arrived on his door step. They did not have any warrant, according to Mr Matin. Indeed, that has been admitted in the defence which has been filed on behalf of the police. Nonetheless, they effected entrance to the house and removed the children. Mr Matin says that that was an act of trespass, there was damage to the property and the children were taken away without consent. The defence of the police officers is to the effect that they were exercising their rights, as they assert, under section 17 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. That is clearly an issue which requires determination, and, for the purposes of today, I approach the case on the basis that Mr Matin will establish the facts which he has set out in his claim and that there is a good prospect of his succeeding as a matter of law. In those circumstances is it right for this court to consider intervening with the decisions that have so far been made?
3. This is an application for permission to make a second appeal. That requires Mr Matin to establish not only that there are reasonable grounds for success, but also that the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice or that there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. He submits that under Article 75 of the High Court and County Court Jurisdiction Order 1991, which he submits is not affected by the procedural changes which have taken place, it is said that, amongst other matters, claims against the police are suitable for trial by the High Court and, accordingly, the decisions by both Master Tenant and Forbes J were quite simply wrong. He submits also that there is an issue here of significant public importance relating to police powers, particularly in relation to police powers when they have been called upon to intervene in family disputes involving children, and, in support of that, he has submitted a number of letters which, he says, confirm the submission that he makes.
4. I fully accept that there is a significant issue here to be tried which may, indeed, affect more people than Mr Matin himself. However, it is well-known that the county court, particularly in London, deals as a matter of regularity with significant and important cases involving the police; and it seems to me that there is nothing inherently inappropriate with the county court trying this case. There is nothing, it seems to me, in the circumstances of the case which suggest that it is so special - and this is what Mr Matin must essentially establish - that it is a case which can only sensibly be dealt with in the High Court: because it is only if he can put it in that category that he can realistically expect to be able to persuade this court that the exercise of the judge's discretion and the discretion of the Master could properly be challenged.
5. It seems to me that it does not fall into that category. It may well be that other masters or judges might have taken the view in the first instance that this matter should remain in the High Court; but the decision having been taken, as one of case management, that the matter should be transferred to the County Court, I do not consider that this court would be prepared in any way to interfere.
6. For those reasons I would refuse permission to appeal.
7. LORD JUSTICE KAY: I agree, and in deference to the careful arguments advanced by Mr Matin and the body of evidence that he has produced, I would only wish to deal with one particular aspect of his submissions, and that is that this is a case of general public importance.
8. Section 17 of the Police Criminal Evidence Act 1984 undoubtedly gives a right to enter premises where there is a genuine and reasonable belief that children are at risk of serious harm. The issue in this case will be whether the police could reasonably have had any such belief. That is an issue which will turn on the facts of this particular case and not the facts of any other case. Accordingly, the resolution of this case is most unlikely to produce any sort of general guidance which would help resolve other cases and, hence, I do not consider that the public interest can be such a powerful reason that this court would be bound to conclude that the exercise of discretion in this case was wrong.
9. For that reason, and for the reasons given by my Lord, I too would refuse this application.
Order: Application dismissed. No jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal.